








4 Ph.sp. 41-2

<36628708750011

S

<36628708750011

E
Bayer. Staatsbibliothek

40 Ph. Sp. 41.

Philos. Theol. Nat. 1000.

R.

AN
ABRIDGMENT
OF
Dr. *CUDWORTH's*
TRUE

Intellectual System of the Universe.

In which all the Arguments for and against
ATHEISM are clearly stated and examined.


To which is prefix'd,

An Examination of what that learned Person
advanc'd touching the Doctrine of a *Trinity in Unity*,
and the *Resurrection of the Body*.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN OSWALD at the *Rose and Crown* in
the *Poultry* near *Stocks-Market*. M.DCC.XXXII.



Vol. 4.

LONDON:

The Reason and Philosophy of Atheism confuted.

CHAP. VI.

A further Examination of all the other most colourable Pretences against the Idea of God; with which are intermingl'd some ordinary, and to it are subjoin'd some Phænomena extraordinary, together with many other Metaphysical Reasonings, invincibly proving the Existence of God against Atheists and Scepticks.

BEyond what has been hitherto objected, it may be the Atheists will urge these Pretences against the Idea of God: First, that we have no Idea nor Thought of any thing not subject to corporeal Sense; nor the least Evidence of the Existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, that Theists themselves acknowledging God to be *incomprehensible*, he may from thence be infer'd to be a Non-entity. Thirdly, that the Theists Idea of God including Infinity in it, is therefore absolutely unconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, that Theology is an arbitrary Complement of inconsistent and contradictory Notions. And lastly, that the Idea and Existence of God is wholly owing either to the confounded Nonsense of astonish'd Minds, that is, to Fear or Ignorance of Causes; or else to the Fiction and Imposture of Politicians.

I begin with the first, *That we can have no Idea, Conception or Thought of any thing not subject to corporeal Sense; nor the least evidence of the Existence of any thing, but from the same.* Whence it is infer'd, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us *Nothing*; and in particular, that there being no corporeal Sense of a Deity, there can be no Evidence at all of its Existence. As to which I say, that this is to confound *Idea* with *Image*, and plainly to betray the Dulness of a Soul, which is not advanc'd above the Power of *Fancy*. To which purpose, * says a very learned Person, "I conceive that case in this
 " to be alike, as if whilst two Men are looking at
 " *Jupiter*, one with his naked Eyes, the other with a
 " Telescope, the former should avow that *Jupiter* had
 " no Attendants, and that it were impossible he should
 " have any. The reason why Mr. *Hobbes* denies immaterial Beings, whilst other Men apprehend them,
 " is, for that he looks at them with his *Fancy*, they
 " with their *Mind*. And I believe it is nothing else but want of Meditation, together with a fond and sottish Dotage upon corporeal Sense, that has so far impos'd upon some, as to make 'em assert that they have not the least Cogitation of any thing not subject to it. For did they but attend to the Principles even of their own Atomical Philosophy, the most favourable of all to Atheism, they could not but ingenuously own with † *Democritus*, that besides that Knowledge which is by the Senses, there is also another which is by the Mind; and that the Soul of Man has

* Bishop Ward in Ep. to the Reader before Philos. Essay.

† Sextus Empiricus gives this Testimony of Democritus, that δύο φανερὸν εἶναι γνώσκειν, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας.

in it such Ideas as are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive Impressions upon it from without, but domestick or actively exerted from it self, without any Phantasms or bodily Appearances. Whosoever doubts of this, may easily be convinc'd and satisfy'd by reading but a Sentence or two that he understands, in any Book almost that shall come next to his hand, and reflectively examining himself, whether he have a Phantasm or sensible Image besides the Sound or Letters belonging to every Word or no, as for instance, to the word *Quanquam* at the beginning of *Tully's Offices*. And I affirm of the Words expressing this Idea or Description of God: *A Substance absolutely perfect, infinitely wise, good and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the Cause of all other things*; that neither of them is unintelligible to him that has any Understanding in him; and yet I confess that no considerate, ingenuous Person can pretend, that he has a sensible Phantasm, answering to any one of them. But again, whosoever will have it, that what does not fall under external Sense, is therefore unconceivable and nothing, must needs affirm Life and Cogitation it self, Knowledg and Understanding, Reason and Memory, Volition and Appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere Words, without any signification. Nay Fancy and Sense it self, upon this Hypothesis, would hardly scape from becoming Non-entitys too; forasmuch as neither *Fancy* nor *Sense* falls under *Sense*, but only the Objects of them; we neither seeing *Vision*, nor feeling *Taction*, nor hearing *Audition*, much less hearing *Sight*, or seeing *Tast*, or the like. Wherefore tho God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceiv'd him to be; yet since the chief of his Essence, and as it were his *Inside*, must

by them be acknowledg'd to consist in *Mind, Wisdom,* and *Understanding*, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal *Sense* (Sight or Touch) any more than *Thought* can.

I grant indeed that the Evidence of particular Bodys existing *hic & nunc* without us, does necessarily depend upon the Information of *Sense*: yet nevertheless the Certainty of this very Evidence is not from *Sense* alone, but from a Complication of *Reason* and *Understanding* together with it. Were *Sense* the only Evidence of things, there could be no absolute Truth and Falshood, nor Certainty at all of any thing; *Sense* as such being only relative to particular Persons, only *seeming* and *phantastical*, and obnoxious to much Delusion. For if our Nerves and Brain be inwardly so mov'd and affected, as they would be by such an Object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other Motion or Sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it, then must that Object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those Imaginations, which spring and bubble from the Soul it self, are commonly taken for *Sensations* by us when asleep, and sometimes in fanciful and melancholick Persons also, when awake. Again, that Atheistick Principle, that there is no Evidence at all of any thing as existing but only from corporeal *Sense*, is plainly contradicted by the Atomick Atheists themselves, when they assert *Atoms* and *Vacuum* to be the Principles of all things, and the *exuvius Images* of Bodys to be the Cause both of *Sense* and *Cogitation*: for single *Atoms* and those *exuvius Images* were never seen nor felt; and *Vacuum* or empty Space is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the only *Incorporeal*. Wherefore they must here go beyond the Ken of *Sense*, and appeal to *Reason* only
for

for the Existence of these Principles, as *Protagoras* one of 'em in *Plato* professedly does: * *Have a care that none of the profane and uninitiated in the Mysterys overhear you; by the Profane I mean those, says he, who think nothing to exist, but what they can feel with their Fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of Being.* Were Existence allow'd to nothing which does not fall under corporeal Sense, then must we deny the Existence of *Soul* and *Mind* in our selves and others, because we can neither see nor feel any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the Existence of our own *Souls*, partly from an inward Consciousness of our own Cogitations, and partly from that Principle of Reason, that *Nothing cannot act*. And the Existence of other individual *Souls* is manifest to us, from their Effects upon their respective Bodys, their *Motions*, *Actions* and *Discourse*. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the Existence of *Soul* or *Mind* in Men, tho no such thing fall under external Sense, they have as little reason to deny the Existence of a perfect *Mind* presiding over the Universe, without which it cannot be conceiv'd whence our imperfect ones should be deriv'd. The Existence of that God, whom no Eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly prov'd by *Reason*, from his Effects in the visible *Phænomena* of the Universe, and from what we are conscious of within our selves.

The second Pretence of Atheists against the Idea of God, and consequently his Existence, is because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be *Incomprehensible*,

* Ἄθεοι πεισσοπῶν, μήτις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακέρ. εἰσὶ δὲ ἐπὶ οἱ ἐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ ὅτι ἂν δύναται ἀπειξ ταῖν χερσὶν λαβεῖσθαι, πάν το ἀόρατον ἐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν ἐστίαι μέρει. Thætet.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a *Non-Entity*. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πᾶς πάντα.

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πᾶς πάντα.

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πᾶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πᾶς πάντων

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the Sea, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it.* It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πᾶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a *Non-Entity*. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* Ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the Sea, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it.* It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* *Ψυχὴ πᾶσι πάντα*

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* *Ψυχὴ πᾶσι πάντα*

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάλητον τι.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* *Ψυχὴ πᾶσι πάντα*

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

40 Ph. Sp. 41.

Philos. Theol. Nat. 1000.

R.

AN
ABRIDGMENT

OF

Dr. *CUDWORTH's*

TRUE

Intellectual System of the Universe.

In which all the Arguments for and against
ATHEISM are clearly stated and examined.


To which is prefix'd,

An Examination of what that learned Person
advanc'd touching the Doctrine of a *Trinity in Unity*,
and the *Resurrection of the Body*.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

Printed for JOHN OSWALD at the *Rose and Crown* in
the *Poultry* near *Stocks-Market*. M.DCC.XXXII.



VOL. II.

LONDON

Printed for John Green at the 'A' and 'C' in
the Strand near St. Dunstons Church. MDCCLXXII.

The Reason and Philosophy of Atheism confuted.

C H A P. VI.

A further Examination of all the other most colourable Pretences against the Idea of God; with which are intermingl'd some ordinary, and to it are subjoin'd some Phænomena extraordinary, together with many other Metaphysical Reasonings, invincibly proving the Existence of God against Atheists and Scepticks.

BEYOND what has been hitherto objected, it may be the Atheists will urge these Pretences against the Idea of God: First, that we have no Idea nor Thought of any thing not subject to corporeal Sense; nor the least Evidence of the Existence of any thing, but from the same. Secondly, that Theists themselves acknowledging God to be *incomprehensible*, he may from thence be infer'd to be a Non-entity. Thirdly, that the Theists Idea of God including Infinity in it, is therefore absolutely unconceivable and impossible. Fourthly, that Theology is an arbitrary Complement of inconsistent and contradictory Notions. And lastly, that the Idea and Existence of God is wholly owing either to the confounded Nonsense of astonish'd Minds, that is, to Fear or Ignorance of Causes; or else to the Fiction and Imposture of Politicians.

I begin with the first, *That we can have no Idea, Conception or Thought of any thing not subject to corporeal Sense; nor the least evidence of the Existence of any thing, but from the same.* Whence it is infer'd, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly unconceivable, and to us *Nothing*; and in particular, that there being no corporeal Sense of a Deity, there can be no Evidence at all of its Existence. As to which I say, that this is to confound *Idea* with *Image*, and plainly to betray the Dulness of a Soul, which is not advanc'd above the Power of *Fancy*. To which purpose, * says a very learned Person, "I conceive that case in this
 " to be alike, as if whilst two Men are looking at
 " *Jupiter*, one with his naked Eyes, the other with a
 " Telescope, the former should avow that *Jupiter* had
 " no Attendants, and that it were impossible he should
 " have any. The reason why Mr. *Hobbes* denies im-
 " material Beings, whilst other Men apprehend them,
 " is, for that he looks at them with his *Fancy*, they
 " with their *Mind*. And I believe it is nothing else
 but want of Meditation, together with a fond and
 sottish Dotage upon corporeal Sense, that has so far im-
 pos'd upon some, as to make 'em assert that they
 have not the least Cogitation of any thing not sub-
 ject to it. For did they but attend to the Prin-
 ciples even of their own Atomical Philosophy, the
 most favourable of all to Atheism, they could not but
 ingenuously own with † *Democritus*, that besides that
 Knowledg which is by the Senses, there is also another
 which is by the Mind; and that the Soul of Man has

* Bishop Ward in Ep. to the Reader before Philos. Essay.

† Sextus Empiricus gives this Testimony of Democritus, that *δύο ποσὶ ἐναι γινώσκεις, τὴν ἑκὰς διὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας.*

in it such Ideas as are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive Impressions upon it from without, but domestick or actively exerted from it self, without any Phantasms or bodily Appearances. Whosoever doubts of this, may easily be convinc'd and satisfy'd by reading but a Sentence or two that he understands, in any Book almost that shall come next to his hand, and reflectively examining himself, whether he have a Phantasm or sensible Image besides the Sound or Letters belonging to every Word or no, as for instance, to the word *Quanquam* at the beginning of *Tully's Offices*. And I affirm of the Words expressing this Idea or Description of God: *A Substance absolutely perfect, infinitely wise, good and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the Cause of all other things*; that neither of them is unintelligible to him that has any Understanding in him; and yet I confess that no considerate, ingenuous Person can pretend, that he has a sensible Phantasm, answering to any one of them. But again, whosoever will have it, that what does not fall under external Sense, is therefore unconceivable and nothing, must needs affirm Life and Cogitation it self, Knowledg and Understanding, Reason and Memory, Volition and Appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing but mere Words, without any signification. Nay Fancy and Sense it self, upon this Hypothesis, would hardly scape from becoming Non-entitys too; forasmuch as neither *Fancy* nor *Sense* falls under *Sense*, but only the Objects of them; we neither seeing *Vision*, nor feeling *Taction*, nor hearing *Audition*, much less hearing *Sight*, or seeing *Tast*, or the like. Wherefore tho God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceiv'd him to be; yet since the chief of his Essence, and as it were his *Inside*, must

by them be acknowledg'd to consist in *Mind, Wisdom,* and *Understanding*, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal *Sense* (Sight or Touch) any more than *Thought* can.

I grant indeed that the Evidence of particular Bodys existing *hic & nunc* without us, does necessarily depend upon the Information of *Sense*: yet nevertheless the Certainty of this very Evidence is not from *Sense* alone, but from a Complication of *Reason* and *Understanding* together with it. Were *Sense* the only Evidence of things, there could be no absolute Truth and Falshood, nor Certainty at all of any thing; *Sense* as such being only relative to particular Persons, only *seeming* and *phantastical*, and obnoxious to much Delusion. For if our Nerves and Brain be inwardly so mov'd and affected, as they would be by such an Object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other Motion or Sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it, then must that Object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those Imaginations, which spring and bubble from the Soul it self, are commonly taken for *Sensations* by us when asleep, and sometimes in fanciful and melancholick Persons also, when awake. Again, that Atheistick Principle, that there is no Evidence at all of any thing as existing but only from corporeal *Sense*, is plainly contradicted by the Atomick Atheists themselves, when they assert *Atoms* and *Vacuum* to be the Principles of all things, and the *exuvius Images* of Bodys to be the Cause both of *Sense* and *Cogitation*: for single *Atoms* and those *exuvius Images* were never seen nor felt; and *Vacuum* or empty Space is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the only *Incorporeal*. Wherefore they must here go beyond the Ken of *Sense*, and appeal to *Reason* only
for

for the Existence of these Principles, as *Protagoras* one of 'em in *Plato* professedly does: * *Have a care that none of the profane and uninitiated in the Mysterys overhear you; by the Profane I mean those, says he, who think nothing to exist, but what they can feel with their Fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of Being.* Were Existence allow'd to nothing which does not fall under corporeal Sense, then must we deny the Existence of *Soul* and *Mind* in our selves and others, because we can neither see nor feel any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the Existence of our own *Souls*, partly from an inward Consciousness of our own Cogitations, and partly from that Principle of Reason, that *Nothing cannot act*. And the Existence of other individual *Souls* is manifest to us, from their Effects upon their respective Bodys, their Motions, Actions and Discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the Existence of *Soul* or *Mind* in Men, tho no such thing fall under external Sense, they have as little reason to deny the Existence of a perfect *Mind* presiding over the Universe, without which it cannot be conceiv'd whence our imperfect ones should be deriv'd. The Existence of that God, whom no Eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly prov'd by Reason, from his Effects in the visible *Phænomena* of the Universe, and from what we are conscious of within our selves.

The second Pretence of Atheists against the Idea of God, and consequently his Existence, is because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be *Incomprehensible*,

* "Αθεοὶ πεισκόπων, μήτις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακύν. εἰσὶ δὲ ἔτι οἱ ἐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ ἢ ἂν δύνασθαι ἀπειξ ταῖν χερσὶν λαβεῖναι, πάν το ἀόρατον ἐκ ὑποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν ἑστίαι μέρει. Thætes.

it may be from thence infer'd that he is a *Non-Entity*. Which Argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: First, that what is *incomprehensible* is altogether *unconceivable*; and then, that what is *unconceivable* is nothing. The latter of which two may perhaps be granted 'em, that what is so utterly unconceivable, as that no Man can frame any manner of Idea or Conception of it, is therefore either *in it self*, or at least *to us*, nothing; agreeably to this of *Aristotle*, that * *the rational Soul or Mind is in a manner all things*, it being able to frame some Idea and Conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath any actual or possible Existence from the very highest to the lowest. *Mind* or *Understanding* is as it were a Diaphanous and Chrystalline Globe, or a kind of notional World, which has some reflex Image, and correspondent Ray or Representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real World of *Being*; and upon this account may it be said that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely *unconceivable* is indeed a Non-Entity. But the former thing suppos'd in this Atheistick Argument is flatly deny'd by us, that *whatsoever is incomprehensible is unconceivable*; and therefore when we affirm that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect Minds cannot have such a Conception of his Nature, as does perfectly master, conquer and subdue that vast Object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it does every way match and equalize it. Now it does not at all follow from hence, that because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow Understandings,

* *Ψυχὴ πῶς πάντα*

that he is utterly unconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any Idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a Non-Entity. To say that we know nothing at all of God, because we do not entirely know, and have not an adequate Conception of him, is to the full as absurd, as if a *Navigator* should affirm that he knows nothing at all of the *Sea*, because he does not fathom the utmost Depths of it. It is certain that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and compleat Knowledg of the Essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a Truth, tho abus'd by the Scepticks*, that *there is something incomprehensible* in the Essence even of the lowest Substances. For *Body* it self, which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their Fingers, and which is the only Substance that they acknowledg either in themselves or the Universe, has such puzzling Difficultys and Entanglements in the Speculation of it, as they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might also instance in some accidental things, as *Time* and *Motion*. Truth is bigger than our Minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower Participation only of the *intellectual Nature*, and are rather *Apprehenders* than *Comprehenders* of it. This is indeed one Badg of our creaturely State, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive Knowledg, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the Essences of things: from whence we ought to be led to this Acknowledgment, that there is another perfect *Mind* or *understanding Being* above us in the Universe, from which

* Ἀκατάληπτον τι.

our imperfect Minds were deriv'd, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore if we can have no Idea or Conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect Comprehension, then can we not have an Idea or Conception of the Nature of any Substance. But certainly tho we do not comprehend all Truth, as if our Mind were above it or Master of it; and we cannot penetrate into and look quite thro the *Nature* of every thing; yet may rational Souls frame certain Ideas and Conceptions of whatsoever is in the Orb of *Being*, proportionate to their own nature and sufficient for their purpose. And tho we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the Infinity of its Perfections, yet may we have an Idea or Conception of a *Being absolutely perfect*, such a one as is *nostro modulo conformis*, agreeable and proportionate to our Measure and Scantling; as we may approach near to a Mountain, and touch it with our hands, tho we cannot encompass it all round nor enclasp it within our Arms:

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us, than any thing else whatsoever; which proceeds from the *Fulness* of its Being and Perfection, and from the Transcendency of its *Brightness*: but for the very same reason may it also be said in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the Sun, tho by reason of its excessive Brightness it dazzles our weak Sight, yet is notwithstanding far more visible also than any of the *Stella Nebulosa*, the small misty Stars. Where there is more of Light, there is there more of Visibilty; and so where there is more of Entity, Reality and Perfection, there is there more of Conceptibility and Cognoscibility, such an Object filling up the Mind more, and acting

acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect Minds are lost in the vast Immensity and Redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent Light and dazzling Brightness, therefore has it to us an appearance of Darkness, in that it is incomprehensible; as the unbounded Expansion of Light in the clear transparent Æther has to us the appearance of an Azure Obscurity; which yet is not any absolute thing in it self, but only relative to our Sense, and a mere Fancy in us.

In short, Nature it self plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, (which tho not *inconceivable*, yet is *incomprehensible* to our finite Understandings) by certain Passions, which it has implanted in us, and which otherwise would want a fit Object to display themselves upon: namely, those of devout Veneration, Adoration, and Admiration, together with a kind of Extasy and pleasing Horror; which in the silent Language of Nature seems to speak thus much to us, that there is some Object in the world so much bigger and vaster than our Mind and Thought, that it is the very same to *them*, that the Ocean is to narrow Vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much thereof as they can by Contemplation, and fill'd up all their Capacity, there is still an Immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, namely, by their being as it were plung'd into it and swallow'd up or lost in it.

I come now to the third Atheistick Argument, that because *Infinity*, which according to Theology is included in the Idea of God, and pervadeth all his Attributes,

tributes, is utterly *unconceivable*, (there being no Phantasm of it) the Deity it self, as a modern Writer argues, is therefore an Impossibility and Non-entity. For, say they, the word *Infinite* signifies nothing in that which is so call'd, there being no such thing really existing, but only the Inability of mens Minds, together with their rustick Astonishment and Admiration. To which purpose another Well-wisher to Atheism declares, that he who calls any thing *infinite*, does but *attribute an unintelligible Name to a thing unconceivable; because all Conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing that hath no Bounds or Limits.* But that which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confus'd Chaos of the Mind, or an unshapen Embryo of Thought; when Men going on further and further, and making a continual Progress, without seeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tir'd out with this their endless Journey, do sit down and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible Name, Infinite. Whence he also infers, that because we can have no Idea of *Infinite*, to signify any thing in that which is so call'd, we therefore cannot possibly have *germanam Dei Ideam*, any true and genuine Notion of God; of which they, who understand the Language of Atheists, do very well know the meaning to be this, that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a *Non-entity*. Now seeing this Exception against the Idea of God, and consequently his Existence, is made not only by the antient, but also the modern Atheists, I think it not amiss to make it appear in the first place, how the latter do herein differ from the former, and consequently how inconsistent Atheists in several Ages have been with one another, which at once shews how far they have been from having a firm bottom of Truth to go upon.

Whereas

Whereas the modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient Confutation of a Deity, *that there can be nothing infinite*, it is certain that the antient Philosophick Atheists were so far from being of this persuasion, that some of 'em, particularly *Anaximander*, expressly made $\alpha\pi\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ or *Infinite*, that is, *infinitely extended and eternal Matter*, devoid of all Life and Understanding, to be the Principle of all things. Also after him, *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and many others of that Atheistick Gang, heretofore asserted likewise a *numerical Infinity* of Worlds, and therefore much more an *Infinity* of Atoms or Particles of Matter. And tho this numerical Infinity of theirs was also *unconceivable* and impossible, yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these antient Philosophick Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from *Infinity*, as a thing impossible and a *Non-entity*, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, *because there can be nothing infinite*. But now in the next place I shall make it manifest, that the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain Reason and their very selves also, than they do their Predecessors in that Impiety, when they go thus about to disprove the Existence of a God, because *there can be nothing infinite* either in Duration or in Power, or any other regard. For first, tho it should be doubted, whether there be a God or no, yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable as any thing in all Geometry, that there was something or other *infinite* in Duration, or eternal and without beginning: because if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common Notion or Principle of Reason having here an irresistible Force, that

no Thing could ever come from nothing. Now if there were never *Nothing*, but always *Something*, then must there of necessity be something *infinite* in Duration, or eternal. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme Sottishness and Stupidity of Mind in these Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the Impossibility of *infinite* Duration and without beginning; for this they must needs grant to be possible, or else, which I can hardly conceive 'em so stupid as to do, they must hold that once there was *nothing* at all, and that afterwards *senseless Matter* happen'd, no body knows how, to come into being, from whence all other things were deriv'd. According to which Hypothesis it would likewise follow, that *Matter* might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things might vanish into *nothing*. Wherefore in short, either the Atheists are extremely sottish and stupid, in acknowledging neither *God* nor *Matter*, nor any other thing to have existed for an infinite Duration or *eternally*: or else they are most impudent, in making that an Argument against the Existence of a God, which themselves do ascribe to *Matter*, that is, a Pre-eternity, or infinite Past-duration.

However I shall readily comply with the modern Atheists so far, as to grant 'em these two following things: First, that we can have no proper and genuine *Phantasm* of any *Infinite* whatsoever, because we never had a corporeal Sense of any, whether of *infinite Number* or *infinite Magnitude*, and much less of *infinite Time* or *Duration*, or of *infinite Power*; these two latter things, *Time* and *Power*, themselves not falling under corporeal Sense. Secondly, that as we have no *Phantasm* of any *Infinite*, so neither is *Infinity* fully comprehensible by our human Understandings, which are
but

but *finite*. But since it is certain even to Mathematical Evidence, that there was something infinite in Duration or without Beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist upon mature Consideration will ever venture to contradict it, I shall here again extort from these Atheists an Acknowledgment of the Falseness of these two Theorems of theirs before-mention'd, that whatsoever we have no Phantasm or sensible Idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure Non-entity or Nothing. Nay I will go further in compliance with 'em, and indeed own, that as for those Infinitys ascrib'd to Number, corporeal Magnitude, and Time or successive Duration, we have not only no Phantasm nor full intellectual Comprehension of 'em, but also no manner of intelligible Idea, Notion, or Conception there being actually no such thing. That no Number is actually infinite is plain, because none is so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. Again, there can be no Infinity of corporeal Magnitude, not only because if there were, the Parts thereof must needs be infinite in Number; but also because as no Number can be so great, but that still more may be added to it, so neither can any *Body* or *Magnitude* be ever so vast, but that more *Body* or *Magnitude* may be suppos'd still further and further, this Addition of *Finities* never making up *Infinite*. In deed *infinite Space* beyond the finite World, is a thing which has been much talk'd of; but this implies no more than a *potential* Infinity or indefinite Increasableness of the Matter of the World, which, tho it were never so much vaster, than according to the Supposition of vulgar Astronomers, who make the *starry Sphere* the utmost Wall thereof, yet is not absolutely infinite, or such as has really no Bounds or Limits at all, or to which there could be added no-
thing.

thing more even by Divine Power ; it being impossible that God himself should make a World so great, as that his own Omnipotence could not make it yet greater. And lastly, I affirm concerning *Time* or successive Duration, that there can be no Infinity or Eternity of that neither : and that not only because there would then be an *actual Infinity*, and more than an Infinity of Number ; but also because upon this supposition, there would always have been an Infinity of Time past, and consequently an Infinity of Time past, which was never present. Whereas all the Moments of past Time must needs have been once present ; and if so, then all of them, at least save one, must needs be future too : from whence it will follow, that there was a first Moment or Beginning of Time. And thus does Reason conclude neither the World nor Time it self to have been infinite in their past Duration, or eternal and without beginning.

But here it may be the Atheist will presently think, that he has got a mighty Advantage to disprove the Existence of God : *Do not they, he'll say, who thus destroy the Eternity of the World, at the same time destroy also the Eternity of the Creator ? For if Time it self were not eternal, then how could the Deity or any Thing be so ?* The Atheists securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive Flux of infinite Time. But I say, that this on the contrary will afford us a plain Demonstration of the Existence of a Deity. For since the World and Time it self were not infinite in their past Duration, but had a Beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other Being, which is in order of Nature senior to *Time*, and so without

without *Time* and before *Time*, it being above that successive Flux, and comprehending in the Stability and immutable Perfection of its own Being, its *yesterday and to day and for ever*. Or thus, something was of necessity infinite in Duration and without beginning: but neither the World, nor Motion, nor Time, that is, no successive Being was such; therefore is there something else, whose Being and Duration is not successive and flowing but permanent, to which this *Infinity* belongs. Here the Atheist can only grin or make faces, and shew his little Wit in quibbling upon *Nunc stans* are a standing *now* of Eternity, as if that standing Eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason has been contended for by the antient genuine Theists) were nothing else, but a pitiful small Moment of Time standing still, and as if the Duration of all Beings whatsoever must needs be like our own. Whereas the Duration of every thing must of necessity be agreeable to its Nature; and therefore as that, whose imperfect Nature is ever flowing like a River, and consists in continual *Motion* and *Changes* one after another, must needs accordingly have a successive and flowing Duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards a future, expecting something of it self, which is not yet in being, but to come: so must that, whose perfect Nature is essentially immutable and always the same and necessarily existent, have a permanent Duration, never losing any thing of it self once present, as sliding away from it; nor yet running forwards to meet something of it self *before*, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictory for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be. Wherefore in short having shewn with Mathematical Evidence and

Certainty,

Certainty, that there is really something infinite in Duration or eternal (tho we have no Phantasm of it) by which therefore cannot be meant mens own *Ignorance* or the *confounded Nonsense of their Devotion*, nor yet the idle *Progress* of their Minds further and further *indefinitely*, which never reaches *infinite*; but a reality in the thing it self, namely this, that it *never was not*, nor had any *Beginning*: Moreover, having prov'd concerning this Infinity and Eternity, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive Being; I conclude against these Atheists also, that it is not *Matter* and *Motion* or this mundane System, but a perfect immutable Nature of a permanent Duration, that is, a God, to whom it belongs; in a word, that therefore *infinite* and *eternal* are not Words that signify *nothing* in the thing it self, nor *mere Attributes of Honour, Complement, and Flattery*, that is, of *devout and religious Nonsense, Error, and Falshood*, but Attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most Philosophick Truth and Reality; and that tho we being *finite* have no full Comprehension or adequate Understanding of this *Infinity* and *Eternity*, as neither indeed of the Deity, yet can we not be without some Notion and Apprehension of it, so long as we are able to demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither but a *perfect, immutable Nature*. But the Notion of this infinite Eternity will be yet further clear'd in the following Explanation and Vindication of infinite Power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with *infinite Power* or *Omnipotence*, and pretend in like manner, that this is utterly unconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. And here indeed have our
modern

modern Atheists the Suffrage and Agreement of the antient Philosophick Atheists, who, as I have formerly observ'd, concern'd themselves in nothing more than in asserting all Power to be *finite*, and that *Omnipotence* or infinite Power belongs to nothing. First then it is here observable that this Omnipotence or infinite Power asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous: as namely, that it can do what implies a Contradiction, or as one has ironically said, that *it can turn a Tree into a Syllogism*; and as *Des Cartes*, tho otherwise an acute and smart Philosopher, has childishly affirm'd, that all things whatsoever, even the Natures of Good and Evil, Truth and Falshood, do so depend upon the arbitrary Will and Power of God, as that, if he had pleas'd, *twice two should not have been four, nor the three Angles of a plain Triangle equal to two right ones, and the like*: he only adding that all these things notwithstanding, when they were once settl'd by the Divine Decree, became *immutable*, that is, I suppose, not in themselves or to God, but to us; than which no Paradox of any old Philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And certainly if any one desir'd to persuade the World, that *Des Cartes*, notwithstanding all his Pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was yet indeed but an hypocritical Theist or a personated and disguiz'd Atheist, he could not have a fairer Pretence for it out of all his Writings than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one Attribute thereof to devour another, *infinite Will and Power* to swallow up *infinite Understanding and Wisdom*. For to suppose God to under-

A a a

stand

stand and be wise only by his Will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no *Understanding* at all. Wherefore I do not say that God is so *omnipotent* or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible Natures of things at pleasure, this being all one as to affirm, that God is so *omnipotent* and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy or to baffle and befool his own *Wisdom* and *Understanding*, which is the very Rule and Measure of his *Power*. Wherefore I say but thus much: that Omnipotence or infinite Power is that, which can produce and do all, whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable and implies no manner of Contradiction, the very Essence of *Possibility* being no other than *Conceptibility*; and thus has the Point been stated all along not only by Christian Theists, but even the antient Pagan Theologers themselves. Now *infinite Power* being nothing else, but a Power of doing whatsoever is *conceivable*, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable, is unconceivable.

But because the Atheists look upon Infinity as such a terrible and frightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy and agreeable, and take off that frightful Vizard from it, which makes it seem such a Mormo or Bugbear to them; and that by declaring in the next place, that *Infinity* is really nothing else but *Perfection*. For *infinite Understanding* or *Knowledg* is nothing else but *perfect Knowledg*, that which has no defect or mixture of Ignorance with it, or the *Knowledg* of whatsoever is *knowable*. And thus in like manner *infinite Power* is nothing else but *perfect Power*, that which has no Defect or mixture of Impotency in it, a power of producing and doing all whatsoever
is

is possible, that is, whatsoever is *conceivable* even by *infinite Understanding*, Conception being the measure of all Power and its Extent, and what is in it self *unconceivable* being therefore *impossible*.

Lastly, also Infinity of Duration or Eternity is really nothing else but *Perfection*, as including necessary Existence and Immutability in it : so that it is not only contradictory to such a Being as is endu'd with this Attribute to cease to be or exist, but also to have had a *Newness* or *Beginning* of Existence, or to have any Flux or Change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to it self, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this Being comprehends the differences of *Past*, *Present*, and *Future*, or the successive *Priority* and *Posteriority* of all temporary things. And because *Infinity* is *Perfection*, therefore can nothing, which includes any thing of Imperfection in the very Idea and Essence of it, be ever truly and properly *infinite* ; as namely, *Number*, *corporeal Magnitude* or *successive Duration* ; all which can only *mentiri Infinitatem*, *counterfeit* and *imitate Infinity*, in their having more and more added to them *infinitely*, whereby notwithstanding they never reach or overtake it. There is nothing truly infinite either in *Knowledg* or in *Power* or *Duration*, but only one *absolutely perfect Being*, or the *Holy Trinity*.

But now that we have an Idea or Conception of *perfect Being*, is evident from the Notion we have of *Imperfection*, so very familiar to us ; *Perfection* being the Rule and Measure of *Imperfection*, and not *Imperfection* of *Perfection* ; as a streight Line is the Rule and Measure of a crooked, and not a crooked Line of a streight. So that *Perfection* is first *conceivable* in

Order of Nature before *Imperfection*, as Light before Darknes, and what is positive before a Privation or Defect. For *Perfection* is not properly the want of *Imperfection*, but *Imperfection* of *Perfection*. Moreover we perceive divers Degrees of *Perfection* in the Essences of things, and consequently a Scale or Ladder of *Perfections* in Nature, one above another; as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive, &c. and this by reason of that Notion or Idea which we first have of that which is *absolutely perfect* as the Standard, with which by comparing and measuring things, we take notice of their approaching more or less thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual Ascents be *infinite* or without end, but they must come at last to that which is *absolutely perfect* as the Top of them all. In short, we could not conceive *Imperfection* in the most perfect of all those things, which we ever had sense or experience of in our Lives, had we not a Notion or Idea of that which is *absolutely perfect*, with which we secretly comparing the same do perceive it to come short thereof: And indeed it is not conceivable, as * *Boethius* well observes, how there should be any *lesser Perfection* existent in any kind, were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was deriv'd. Wherefore since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a Notion or Idea of the latter, must have so likewise of the former. From whence we also learn, that tho the word *infinite* be in the Form thereof *negative*, yet

* Omne quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur; quò fit ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit, &c.

is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, *positive*, it being all one with *absolutely perfect*; as likewise the sense of the word *finite* is *negative*, it being the same with *imperfect*: so that *finite* is properly the *Negation* of *infinite*, as that which in order of Nature is before it; and not *infinite* the *Negation* of *finite*. However in those things, which are capable of no true *Infinity*, because they are essentially *finite*, as *Number*, *corporeal Magnitude*, and *Time*; *Infinity* being there a mere imaginary thing and a *Non-entity*, can only be conceiv'd by the *Negation* of *finite*; as we also conceive *Nothing* by the *Negation* of *Something*, that is, we can have no positive Conception at all of it. Wherefore upon the whole I sum up this Conclusion, that to assert an *infinite Being* is nothing else but to assert a *Being absolutely perfect*, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which can produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And this is to assert a God, one absolutely perfect Being, the Original of all things; *God* and *infinite* and *absolutely perfect*, being but different Names for one and the same thing.

I come now to the fourth Atheistick Pretension, that Theology, or all the Discourse and seeming Knowledge of God, is nothing but an arbitrary Compilement of inconsistent and contradictory Notions: as for instance, when we are told by it, that God is a *Substance incorporeal*, which, say the Atheists, is an absolute Impossibility, and as contradictory in Terms as to say an *incorporeal Body* (all Substance to them being *corporeal*) or that *Nothing* is *Something*. Notwithstanding which, this Contradiction is only in the Weakness and Childishness of these mens Understandings, and not in the thing it self; it being demonstrable;

monstrable, as shall be shewn hereafter, that there is some other Substance besides *Body*, according to the true and genuine Notion of it. But because some Theists are of this opinion, the Atheist, to distinguish himself from *them*, culls out a Sample of a peculiar sort of Contradictions, which he imputes to all Theology, namely, as we have it in the words of a modern Writer, in that “ it supposes God to perceive things “ sensible without any Organs of Sense ; to see all “ things in the World, and yet to have no Eyes ; to “ hear all things, and yet to have no Ears ; and to “ understand and be wise without any Brains. As to which I need only say with astonishment, *O ye brutish among the People, when will ye understand ? And ye Fools, when will ye be wise ? He that planted the Ear, and gave man’s Soul a power of hearing thereby, shall not he, tho himself have no Ears, hear ? He that form’d the Eye, and gave man’s Soul a power of seeing thereby, shall not he, tho himself have no Eyes, see ? And he that teacheth man Knowledge, or gave him an understanding Mind besides Brains, shall not he, tho himself be without Brains, know and understand ?* But thus however the sottish Atheist goes on to tell us, that “ in like manner, whenever Religion or “ Theology, which is indeed nothing else but Civil “ Law or an arbitrary Constitution, in that it consists “ purely in obedience to Christ’s Lieutenants, and “ in giving God such Honour both in Attributes and “ Actions, as they in their several Lieutenancys shall “ ordain ; whenever this, I say, is made Philosophy, “ and Men pretend to reason and dispute about the “ matter, then is it all mere Jargon and insignificant “ Nonsense. Wherefore they tell us it is not good to “ dispute about the Nature, the Attributes and Actions “ of

“ of God, but to acquiesce in what is determin’d concerning him by the Law of the Land. And indeed, I think, the Atheists do very nicely observe this Rule, in that they never attentively consider this Object, and so no wonder if they continue in their Error. Whereas if they would but awake out of their sottish Lethargy, and give their Minds free Scope to meditate on the Nature and Perfections of God, they’d presently find the Idea of God, describ’d by Theology, to be very far from contradictory. For it is certain that no simple Idea, as that of a Triangle or a Square, of a Cube or a Sphere, can possibly be contradictory to it self; and therefore much less can the Idea of a *perfect Being*, which is the compendious Idea of God; it being more simple than any of that kind. Indeed this simple Idea of a perfect Being is pregnant of many Attributes, and therefore the Idea of God more fully declar’d by them all may seem to be in this respect a compound’d Idea, or one Idea and Conception made up of many; which, if they were really contradictory, wou’d render the whole a Non-entity: as for example, an Idea of a plain Triangle, whose three Angles are greater than two right ones, being contradictory and unconceivable, is therefore no true Idea, but a Non-entity. But all the genuine Attributes of the Deity, of which its entire Idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a *perfect Being*, as the Propertys of a Triangle or a Square are of those Ideas respectively, and therefore can they not possibly be contradictory either to it or to each other; because those things which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves. Nay moreover, the genuine Attributes of the Deity, namely such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only
not

not contradictory, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from each other. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in Wisdom only, another thing infinite in Power only, and another thing infinite in Duration only: but the very same thing, which is infinite in Wisdom, must needs be also infinite in Power and Duration, and so *vice versa*. That which is infinite in any one Perfection, must of necessity have all Perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine Attributes of the Deity not only not contradictory, but also inseparably concatenate; and the Idea of God no Congeries either of disagreeing things, or else of such as are unnecessarily connected with one another. In truth, all the several Attributes of the Deity are nothing else, but so many partial and inadequate Conceptions of one and the same simple perfect Being, taken in as it were by piece-meal, by reason of the Imperfection of our human Understandings, which cannot fully conceive it all at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, tho they have the Appearance of Multiplicity to us: as the one simple Light of the Sun diversly refracted and reflected from a rorid Cloud, has to us the Appearance of the variegated Colours of the Rainbow. Moreover, I grant that by reason of the Imperfection of human Minds there may be and are different Apprehensions concerning the Idea of God. For as one that has a Conception of a plain Triangle in general, does not therefore know that it includes this Property in it, to have three Angles equal to two right ones; and one that has an Idea of a rectangular Triangle, does not therefore presently understand that the Square of the Subtense is equal to the Squares of both the sides; so neither does every one that has a Conception of a
perfect

perfect Being, therefore presently know all that is included in that Idea. To which it may be added, that Men may easily mistake such things for absolute Perfections as are not really such: but this is no Argument against the reality of these Perfections, nor any way proves 'em to be contradictory, any more than that whatever Men do not comprehend in other matters is absolutely false, or that, because Philosophers have contradictory Opinions about 'em, therefore they are altogether impossible and contradictory in themselves. Wherefore notwithstanding this, I may assuredly conclude from what has been said, that as there is nothing in the genuine Idea of God and his Attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and there cannot be the least either added to or detracted from that Idea, any more than there can from the Idea of a Triangle or a Square; so cannot there possibly be any thing, either contradictory or arbitrary in the Divine Idea; but both it and the genuine Attributes of it, are of necessary and Philosophick Truth; and such as do not only speak the Piety, Devotion, and Reverence of mens own Minds, but declare the real nature of the thing it self.

But having said this by way of prevention, let us hear what the Atheist can plead for himself. If, as according to him, the Idea of God, describ'd by Theologers, be a factitious bundle of Contradictions and Unconceivables, pray what reasonable account does he pretend to give how Men first come to entertain this Idea, and to have so general a persuasion of God's Existence, and consequent to that, an Inclination to Religion in all Ages and Places of the World? Why as well the antient as modern Atheists do both of

'em * here agree in ascribing the Original of this, first to mens own Fear and Solicitude concerning future Events, or their good and evil Fortune: secondly, to their Ignorance of the Causes both of those Events and the Phænomena of Nature, together with their Curiosity: and lastly to the Fiction of civil Sovereigns, Law-makers, and Politicians, who have thereby endeavour'd to keep Men in order and subjection. The Invalidity and Foolery of which Pretences for solving this Phænomenon, I now proceed to manifest. First then I say, that such an Excess of Fear as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the Existence of that, for which there is no manner of ground either from Sense or Reason, which also tends to the great disquiet of mens own Lives; such an excess of Fear, I say, can't be reckon'd any other than a kind of Crazedness or Distraction. Wherefore the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of Mankind to be possess'd with the Belief of a Deity, and withal resolving this into such an excess of *Fear*, do in effect assert the greatest Number of men to be frighted out of their wits, or craz'd and distemper'd in their Brains; and that none but a few Atheists, as being undaunted and undismay'd, have remain'd sober and in their right senses. Whereas I affirm on the contrary, that all the suppos'd Courage, Stayedness and Sobriety of these Atheists is really nothing else but the dull and sottish Stupidity of their Minds; nothing but a dead and heavy Incredulity, an earthly Diffidence and Distrust, inclining 'em to disbelieve all but what they can feel or see. And as to the Theists I add, that they have indeed a religious *Fear* of God, which is consequent from him, or

* See Cudworth's True Intel. Syst. p. 654, 655, 656, &c.

the Belief of him: but the Deity it self or the Belief of its Existence was not created by an antecedent Fear, that is, by *Fear concerning mens good and evil Fortune*, as the Atheists interpret it, it being most certain that none are less solicitous about such Events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chiefest Good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, *aliene* or *in another's power*, and expos'd to the strokes of Fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely the right use of their own Will. While the Atheists on the other hand, must needs for this very reason be liable to Solicitudes and Fears concerning outward Events, because they place their *Good and Evil* in the * *Passion of Pleasure and Pain*; or at least they denying *natural Honesty*, do acknowledg no other Good, but what belongs to the *Animal Life* only, and so is under the Empire of Fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and distrustful things, seems plainly to appear from their building all their Politicks, their Civil Societys and Justice, improperly so call'd, upon that only Foundation of *Fear and Suspicion*. But here the grand Error of the Atheists is this, that they supposing the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of Mankind, to be nothing but a Mormo or Bug-bear, an affrightful, hurtful, and most undesirable thing: whereas Men every where, † both wise and unwise, do invoke the Deity in their Straits and Difficultys for Aid and Assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their Trust and Confidence in it do acknowledg its Benignity and Goodness.

* Παῖδες ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης.

† Ἀγαθὸν τὸν θεὸν ὑμνεῖται ἀπ᾽ ὅλους ἀπ᾽ ὅλα καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι. Synes.
de Regno.

If amongst the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial Speech *φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον* in the worst sense, as if *God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature*, these were certainly but a few *ill-natur'd Men*, who drew a picture of the Deity, according to their own Likeness. For the Proverb in that sense was disclaim'd and cry'd down by all the wiser Pagans, who universally held the *Deity to be good, and that there is no manner of Envy in that which is good*. But the true meaning of it and of its being so ill-languag'd, seems at first to have been no other, than what besides *Hesiod*, the Scripture it self also attributes to God Almighty, that he affects to abase and humble the Pride of Men, and to pull down all towering and lofty things, whether noxious and hurtful to the Men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to *him*, and derogatory from his Honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no *Flesh to glory before him*. And there has been so much Experience of such a thing as this in the world, that even the * *Epicurean* Poet could not but confess, that there was some hidden Force or Power, which seem'd to have a spite at all overswelling Greatness, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the Pride of Men. In which Acknowledgment he either reel'd or stagger'd as to Atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain that there can be no such *Force* as this, *in regno Atomorum, in the Reign or Empire of senseless Atoms*.

Again I say, as to those Christians who make such a horrid Representation of God Almighty, as one who

* Usque adeo res humanas Vis abdita quadam
Obterit & pulchras fasces saxasque secures,
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

created far the greatest part of Mankind for no other end or design but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal Torments: they also do but transcribe or copy out their own *ill Nature*, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary *that God is Love*. I grant indeed that *Religion* is often express'd in Holy Writ by the *Fear of God*, and *Fear* has been said to be *the first Measure of the Divinity in us*, or the first Impression that Religion makes upon us in this obnoxious and guilty State, before we have arriv'd at the true Love of God, and a consequent Habit of Righteousness. But then I say, that this *religious Fear* is not a Fear of God as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as a mischievous and hurtful one (which could not be disjoin'd from *Hatred*) but an *awful Regard* of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a Punisher of Vice and Wickedness, as a Rewarder of Vertue and Goodness.

And this *Fear* of God is not only beneficial to Mankind in general, by repressing the growth of Wickedness; but likewise salutary and wholesom to those very Persons themselves, who are thus *religiously* affected, it being preservative of them both from moral Evils, and also from the Evils of Punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine *Religious Fear*, which when it degenerates into a dark kind of jealous and suspicious *Fear* of God Almighty, either as a hurtful or a mere arbitrary and tyrannical Being, then is it look'd upon as the opposite Vice or Extreme of Religion, and distinguish'd from it by that emphatical Greek word *δεισιμασμονία*, which we commonly render *Superstition*, and which whosoever falls into *must needs*, as *Plutarch* well observes,
hate

If amongst the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial Speech $\phi\thetaο\upsilon\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \delta\alpha\iota\mu\acute{o}\nu\iota\omicron\nu$ in the worst sense, as if *God Almighty were of an envious and spiteful nature*, these were certainly but a few ill-natur'd Men, who drew a picture of the Deity, according to their own Likeness. For the Proverb in that sense was disclaim'd and cry'd down by all the wiser Pagans, who universally held the *Deity to be good, and that there is no manner of Envy in that which is good*. But the true meaning of it and of its being so ill-languag'd, seems at first to have been no other, than what besides *Hesiod*, the Scripture it self also attributes to God Almighty, that he affects to abase and humble the Pride of Men, and to pull down all towering and lofty things, whether noxious and hurtful to the Men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to *him*, and derogatory from his Honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no *Flesh to glory before him*. And there has been so much Experience of such a thing as this in the world, that even the * *Epicurean* Poet could not but confess, that there was some hidden Force or Power, which seem'd to have a spite at all overswelling Greatness, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the Pride of Men. In which Acknowledgment he either reel'd or stagger'd as to Atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain that there can be no such Force as this, *in regno Atomorum, in the Reign or Empire of senseless Atoms*.

Again I say, as to those Christians who make such a horrid Representation of God Almighty, as one who

* Usque adeo res humanas Vis abdita quardam
Obterit & pulchras fasces sœvasque secures,
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

created far the greatest part of Mankind for no other end or design but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal Torments: they also do but transcribe or copy out their own *ill Nature*, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring on the contrary *that God is Love*. I grant indeed that *Religion* is often express'd in Holy Writ by the *Fear of God*, and *Fear* has been said to be *the first Measure of the Divinity in us*, or the first Impression that Religion makes upon us in this obnoxious and guilty State, before we have arriv'd at the true Love of God, and a consequent Habit of Righteousness. But then I say, that this *religious Fear* is not a Fear of God as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as a mischievous and hurtful one (which could not be disjoin'd from *Hatred*) but an *awful Regard* of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a Punisher of Vice and Wickedness, as a Rewarder of Vertue and Goodness.

And this *Fear* of God is not only beneficial to Mankind in general, by repressing the growth of Wickedness; but likewise salutary and wholesom to those very Persons themselves, who are thus *religiously* affected, it being preservative of them both from moral Evils, and also from the Evils of Punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine *Religious Fear*, which when it degenerates into a dark kind of jealous and suspicious *Fear* of God Almighty, either as a hurtful or a mere arbitrary and tyrannical Being, then is it look'd upon as the opposite Vice or Extreme of Religion, and distinguish'd from it by that emphatical Greek word *δεισιμασία*, which we commonly render *Superstition*, and which whosoever falls into *must needs*, as *Plutarch* well observes,

hate

hate God as well as fear him *. Whereas † *the true Fear of God*, as the Son of *Syrach* speaks, *is the Beginning of his Love, and Faith is the Beginning of cleaving to him*. As if he should have said, the first entrance into Religion is an awful Regard to God, as the Punisher of Vice; the second step forwards therein is Faith or Confidence in God, whereby Men rely upon him for Good, and cleave unto him: and the Top and Perfection of all Religion is the Love of God above all, as the most amiable Being. Christianity, the best of Religions, recommends Faith to us, as the Introduction or Inlet into all true and ingenuous Piety; for || *he that cometh to God must not only believe that he is, but also that he is a Rewarder of those that seek him*: which Faith is better defin'd in the Scripture, than by any Scholastick, to be *the Substance of things hoped for, and the Evidence of things not seen*; that is, a confident Persuasion of things that fall not under Sight, because they are either invisible or future, and which also are to be *hop'd for*. So that religious *Fear* consists well with Faith, and Faith is near of kin to Hope, and the Result of both Faith and Hope is Love; which Faith, Hope and Love do all suppose an essential Goodness in the Deity. God is such a Being, as if he were not, would be of all things whatsoever most to be wish'd for; it being indeed no way desirable, as the noble *Antoninus* concluded, for a Man to live in the World, void of a God and Providence. He that believes a God, believes all that Good and Perfection in the Universe, which his Heart can possibly wish or

* Ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν θεοδιδόντα καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸς θεός. Plut. *de*
deistia.

† Ecclus. 25. 12.

|| Heb. 11. 6.

desire. And it is the Interest of none, that there should be no God, but only of such wretched Persons, as have abandon'd their first and only true Interest, of being good and Friends to God, and are desperately resolv'd upon the ways of Wickedness. One great reason, I say, why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the Notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of Mankind, as a Being which is only to be *fear'd* and consequently *hated*, is nothing else but their own *Vice* and *Ill-nature*. For first, their Vice so far blinding 'em, as to make 'em think that the moral Differences of *Good* and *Evil* have no foundation in *Nature*, but only in Law or arbitrary Constitution, which Law is contrary to *Nature*, Nature implying Liberty, but Law Restraint; as they cannot but hate that which hinders 'em from their true Liberty and chiefest Good, so must they needs interpret the Severity of the Deity, so much spoken of, against Wickedness and Vice, to be nothing else but arbitrary Tyranny and Cruelty. Again, it is a wretched ill-natur'd Maxim of the Atheists, that there ** is no natural Charity, but that all Benevolence and Kindness arises only from Imbecillity and Fear*; that is, from being obnoxious to another's Power, or standing in need of his Help. So that all that is now call'd Love and Friendship amongst Men, is, according to them, really nothing else but either a crouching under another's Power, whom they cannot resist, or else *Mercatura quedam Utilitatum, a sort of trading for Advantage*. Accordingly also they conclude of God Almighty, that upon the supposition of his Existence, there could not be so

* Nulla naturalis Charitas, sed omnis Benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate & metu, &c. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

much as this spurious Love or Benevolence in him towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irresistible Power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, nor be subject to any the least *Fear*. Nay a late Pretender to Politicks, who thus discards all natural *Justice* and *Charity*, goes so far as to determine concerning God, that *he has no other Right of reigning over Men, and of punishing those who transgress his Laws, but only his irresistible Power*. Which indeed is all one as to say, that God has no Right at all of ruling over Mankind, or of imposing Obligations upon 'em; seeing what he does in this kind, is only by Force and Power: whereas Right and Force are two quite different things, there being no *ius* or Right without natural *Justice*; so that the word *Right* is here only abus'd. Agreeably to this the same Writer further adds, that *if God's right of commanding be deriv'd only from his Omnipotence, then is it manifest, that mens Obligation to obey him lies upon 'em only from their Imbecillity*. Or as it is further explain'd by him, that *Men are therefore only subject to God, because they are not omnipotent, or have not a sufficient power to resist him*. But all this, I say, is no other than the Atheist's false *Imagination*; true Religion representing a most comfortable Prospect of things from the Deity. But on the contrary, the Atheistick Scene of things is dismal, hopeless and forlorn; that there should be no other Good, but what depends upon such things as are wholly out of our own power, but the momentary Gratification of our insatiate Appetites, and the perpetual pouring as it were into a *perforated, leaking Vessel*; that our selves should be but a Congeries of Atoms, upon the Dissolution of whose Compages, our Life should vanish into nothing, and

all

all our Hope perish; that there should be no Providence over us, nor any kind and good-natur'd Being above to take care of us; there being nothing without us, but dead and senseless *Matter*. True indeed, there could be no spiteful Designs in *senseless Atoms*, or a dead inconscius *Nature*: upon which account, *Plutarch* would grant, that even this Atheistick Hypothesis, as bad as it is, were notwithstanding to be prefer'd before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious Being (if there can be such an Hypothesis as this) or a Monarchy of the *Manichean* evil Principle, reigning all over the whole World, without any Cor-rival, and having an undisturb'd Empire. However it is no less true, that there could be no positive *Faith* or *Hope* in these senseless *Atoms*, both necessarily and fortuitously mov'd, any more than there could be either *Faith* or *Hope* in a Whirlwind or tempestuous Sea, whose merciless Waves are inexorable and deaf to all Crys and Supplications. For which reason *Epi-curus* himself confess'd, that it were better, to give credit to the *Fable of the Gods*, as he calls it, than to serve the Atheistick Fate or the *material Necessity* of all things, introduc'd by those Atheistick Physiologers, *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; * because, says he, there are hopes that the Gods may be prevail'd with by *Worship* and *Prayer*; but the other, that is, *Necessity*, is altogether deaf and inexorable. And tho he thought to mend the matter, and make the Atheistick Hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it, contrary to the Ténour of those Principles, *Liberty of Will* in Man; yet this being not a power over things that are with-

* Κρείττον ἢν τῷ ἀθεῖ μύθῳ καὶ ἀπολαθεῖν, &c. In *Epist. ad Men.* apud Gall. p. 49.

out us, but only our selves, could alter the Case very little. Accordingly he himself was in a panick fear, * left the Frame of Heaven should sometime on a sudden crack and tumble about his Ears, and this fortuitous Compilement of Atoms should be dissolv'd into a *Chaos*. And what Comfort could this *Liberty of Will* then afford him, who plac'd all his Happiness in Security from external Evils? The *Atheistick Design of shaking off the Belief of a God*, says † *Plutarch*, was to be without fear; but by means hereof they fram'd such a System of things to themselves, as under which they could not have the least *Hope, Faith, or Confidence*. Thus running from *Fear*, did they plunge themselves into it; forasmuch as they who are without *Hope*, can never be free from *Fear*. Endless of necessity must the Fears and Anxietys of those Men be, who shake off that one *Fear* of God, which alone would preserve 'em from *Evil*, and have no *Faith* or *Hope* in him. Wherefore, methinks, we might conclude upon better grounds, than the Atheists do of *Theism*; that *Atheism*, which has no Foundation at all in Nature or Reason, springs first from the Imposture of Fear. For the *Faith* of Religion being the Substance of things to be hop'd for, beyond the reach of Sense, Atheistick Infidelity must needs on the contrary be a certain heavy Diffidence, Despondence, and Misgiving of Mind, or a timorous Distrust and *Disbelief of Good to be hop'd for*, beyond the reach of Sense; namely, of an invincible omnipotent Being, which exerciseth a just, kind,

* ————— Tria talia texta

Una dies dabit exitio, multosque per Annos

Sustentata ruet moles & machina mundi. *Lucret.*

† Τέλος τῆ μὴ νομίζεν θεός, μὴ φοβέσθαι. *De Superstitione.*

and gracious Providence over all those, who commit their ways to him, with an Endeavour to please him, both here in this Life and after Death. And Vice or the Love of lawless Liberty prevailing over such disbelieving Persons, and tolling em on yet further, makes 'em by degrees more and more desirous that there should be no God, that is, no such Hinderer of their *Liberty*; and to count it a Happiness to be free from the *fear* of Him, whose Justice, if he were, they must needs be obnoxious to. But how vainly do they endeavour to be so, and how very groundless is this Boast of *Lucretius* — *Nos exaquat Victoria Cælo?* We now are Masters of our selves, we are under no Control, no slavish Fears affright us, no terrible Apprehensions sour our Pleasures; we may now enjoy our selves without regard, and exult in that entire and perfect Liberty, which we have attain'd. “ But this, as * one has “ well observ'd, is all a Shadow, a mere Imagination. “ For alas! they beg the question of themselves; they “ rejoice in the Inferences, which they draw from a “ Proposition, of the Truth whereof they are not, “ they cannot be assur'd. Neither the *Epicureans* “ themselves, nor any other sort of Men did ever “ pretend to demonstrate or affirm directly, that there “ is no God; that there is no conscious, self-existent “ Being, which made the World in Wisdom, and “ preserves it by his Power. Such a Notion is incumber'd with so many Difficultys, that we may venture to say, it is impossible for a Man in his wits “ to bring his Mind to a perfect Acquiescence in it. “ That the most wonderful Effects should be produc'd “ without a sufficient Cause; that the most curious

* Dean of Ely in *Serm. upon Isa. 57. 21. P. 15, &c.*

“ Building, for Beauty, Proportion, and Consent of
“ Parts, should jumble by chance into the most ex-
“ cellent Order; that the Dust in the street by a
“ certain Position, Site, and Motion of Parts, may
“ come to be sensible of *Pleasure* and *Pain*, and capable
“ of *Thinking*, *Arts*, and *Policy*. These things, and
“ many other grosser Consequences of that Opinion
“ that there is no God, are so absurd, that we re-
“ luct against them, that we reject them as it were
“ by an Anticipation of Mind; those seminal Prin-
“ ciples that are inseparable from our Nature, resist
“ the Notion. And therefore I say, that Atheistical
“ Persons do rather wish there was no God, than
“ go about to prove it. They content themselves
“ with cavilling at the accounts that are given of
“ the Nature and Providence of God and the Creation
“ of the World, but are very tender of asserting the
“ Negative in Terms, or of owning the necessary
“ Consequences of that Opinion. And it has always
“ been observ’d, that those who have pretended to be
“ Atheists have discover’d the Distrust of their Opi-
“ nion, whether they would or no; and that not only
“ by *Suetonius*, of *Caligula*, but also by *Tully*, and
“ all that have writ upon the Question, of all
“ the Atheists they have ever known or heard of.
“ This therefore is no Principle of Peace, no Refuge
“ against the Fear of invisible Powers, or the Danger
“ of a future Account. For after a wicked Man has
“ brought himself as near to an Atheist as he can, he
“ shall be as much tormented with the Distrust of
“ his Principle, as he was before with his Fears of
“ God, and of a future Judgment. The Evidence
on one hand is so very clear, and the Objections on
the other so inconsiderable, that methinks it is impossi-
ble

ble for any man, whatever he may wish, to bring his Mind fairly over even to a State of Scepticism or Doubt; or if he could do so, yet would this never free him from the Uneasiness of Fear. For Doubting is anxious in its Nature, because it is the leaning of the Judgment to both the sides of the Proposition. In a matter of lesser Concernment it is very troublesome; the Mind is distracted and upon the fret, according to the Value of the matter in debate, till it comes to a Resolution. But what shall we say, when the Question is of no less importance, than an eternal Life of Happiness or Misery? Surely nothing less than a *Security*, which cannot possibly deceive us, will remove our Fears of so great a Danger.

Having thus confuted and turn'd upon the Atheists themselves their first Pretence to solve the Phænomenon of Religion and the Belief of a God, so generally entertain'd, from the Imposture of *Fear*, I now proceed to the second: namely, that it arose from the *Ignorance of Causes* also, or mens want of Philosophy, they being prone by reason of their innate Curiosity, where they find no Causes, to make or feign 'em, and from their *Fear* in the Absence of natural and necessary Causes, to imagine supernatural and divine; this also affording 'em a handsom Pretext and Cover for their *Ignorance*. Accordingly Democritus gave this account of the Original of *Theism* or Religion: * *that when in old times Men observ'd strange and affrightful things in the Meteors and the Heavens, as Thunder, Lightning, Thunderbolts, and Eclipses, they not knowing*

* Ὅρῳντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ ὅς τ' ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ πῦρ βροντᾶς καὶ ἀστραπᾶς καὶ κεραυνὸς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, αἰεμαίνοντο θεὸς οἰομένοι τούτων αἰτίαι. Steph. Poes. Phil. 158. ex Sexto.

the Causes thereof, and being terrify'd thereby, presently imputed them to the Gods. And *Epicurus* declares this to have been the reason why he took such great pains in the Study of *Physiology*, that by finding out the natural and necessary Causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the Terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault 'em: the Importunity of mens Minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural Causes, urging 'em so much with the Fear, Suspicion, and Jealousy of a Deity. Thus the Atheists dabling in *Physiology*, and finding out, as they conceive, *material* and *mechanical Causes*, for some of the *Phænomena* of *Nature*, and especially for such of them, as the unskilful Vulgar do sometimes impute to God himself; when they can prove *Eclipses*, for example, to be no *Miracles*, and render it probable, that *Thunder* is not the Voice of *God Almighty* himself, as it were roaring above the Heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor Mortals, and make 'em quake and tremble; and that *Thunderbolts* are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful Messengers of his Wrath and Displeasure, they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning *Nature* or *Matter*, that * *it does all things alone of it self without a God.* But I shall make it appear in a few Instances, that it is not *Ignorance*, but the *true Knowledge* of Causes, that leads to God, and that Atheism is nothing but the Ignorance of Causes and want of Philosophy. For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless *Atoms* or *Matter*, is able to assign any Cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the Original of his own *Soul* or *Mind*; it being utterly unconceivable and impossible,

* *Ipsa sua per se sponte omnia Diis agere expers.*

that *Soul* and *Mind*, that *Sense*, *Reason*, and *Understanding*, should ever arise from irrational and senseless *Matter*, however modify'd ; or result from Atoms, devoid of all manner of *Qualitys*, that is, from mere Magnitude, Figure, Site and Motion of Parts. And the Case will be the very same, both in the *Anaximandrian* or *Hylopathian*, and in the *Stratonick* or *Hylozoick* Atheism ; because Sense and conscious Understanding could no more result either from those *Qualitys* of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Moist* and *Dry* contemper'd together, or from the mere Organization of inanimate and senseless *Matter*, than it could from the * *Concourse*, *Motions*, *Order*, *Posture*, and *Figures* of Atoms devoid of all manner of *Qualitys*. Had there been once nothing else but senseless *Matter* fortuitously mov'd, there could never have emerg'd into Being any *Soul* or *Mind*, *Sense* or *Understanding* : because no *Effect* can possibly transcend the Perfection of its *Cause*. Wherefore Atheists supposing *themselves* and all *Souls* and *Minds* to have sprung from stupid and senseless *Matter*, and all that Wisdom, which is any where in the world, both Political and Philosophical, to be the Result of mere Fortune and Chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of those *Causes*, which had they not been, even they themselves could not have been Atheists. So that *Ignorance of Causes* is the Seed, not of *Theism* but *Atheism* ; true Philosophy, and in particular the Knowledg of the Cause of our selves, leading us necessarily to the Apprehension of a Deity.

Again I add, that Atheists are also ignorant of the Cause of Motion in Bodys, by which notwithstanding they suppose all things to be done ; that is, they are

* Concurfus, Motus, Ordo, Positura, Figura.

never able to solve this Phænomenon, so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledg no other Substance besides *Matter* or *Body*. For first it is undeniably certain, that Motion is not essential to all *Body* as such, because then no Particles of *Matter* could ever rest, and consequently there could have been no Generation, and no such mundane System produc'd as this is, which requires a certain proportionate Commixture of Motion and Rest : no Sun, no Moon, no Earth, or Bodys of Animals ; since there could be no coherent Consistency of any thing, when all things flutter'd and were in continual Separation and Divulsion from one another. For in short, as a most excellent * Philosopher has observ'd, “ this Motion being suppos'd to be natural and essential to the *Matter*, is alike every where in it, and “ therefore has loosen'd every Atom of it to the utmost Capacity : so that every Particle is alike, and “ mov'd alike. And therefore there being no Prevalency at all in one Atom above another in *Bigness* “ or *Motion*, it is manifest that this *universal Matter*, “ to which Motion is so essential and intrinsecal, will “ be ineffectual for the producing of any Variety of Appearances in Nature ; and so no Suns, nor Stars, nor “ Earths, nor Vortices can ever arise out of this infinitely thin Matter ; which must thus eternally remain “ unperceptible to any of our Senses, were our Senses ten thousand millions of times more subtile “ than they are : nay, indeed there could not be any “ such thing as Man or Sense in the world. But if Motion be not essential to *Matter* as such, and the

* Dr. More in his Antidote against Atheism, p. 38.

Atheists, at least the * Atomical ones will not say that it can move it self spontaneously or freely, but that all its Motion is unguided and fortuitous; what have they to assign for the Original of this? Why the *Democriticks*, as *Aristotle* observes, do not pretend to trace the Beginning or first Cause of it, but however think to solve the matter thus: *that one Body mov'd another from Eternity infinitely*; so that there was no *πρῶτον κινῆν*, no first unmov'd Mover ever to be found, because there is no Beginning nor First in Eternity. From whence probably that Doctrine of some Atheistick Stoicks in *Alexander Aphrodisius* was deriv'd, † that *there is no First in the Rank and Order of Causes*; in whose footsteps a modern Writer seems to have trodden, declaring himself in this manner: *If any one will from whatsoever Effect, ascend upward to its immediate Cause, and from thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually in his Ratiocination; yet shall he never be able to hold on thro all Eternity, but at length being quite tir'd out with his Journy, be forc'd to desist or give over.* As if he should have said, one thing mov'd or caus'd another infinitely from Eternity, in which there being no Beginning, there is consequently no first Mover or Cause to be reach'd unto. But this *infinite Progress* of these *Democriticks* in the Order of Causes, and their shifting off the Cause of Motion from one thing to another, without End or Beginning, was rightly understood by *Aristotle* to be indeed the assigning of no Cause of Motion at all; they acknowledg-

* Nam certè neque consilio Primordia rerum
Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt;
Nec quos quæque darent Motus pepigère profectò.

† Alex. Aph. L. de Fato.

ing, * says he, *no first Mover according to Nature, must needs make an idle Progress infinitely*; that is, in the Language of this Philosopher, they assign no Cause at all of *Motion*. Wherefore *Epicurus*, to mend the matter, tho according to the Principles of the Atomick Physiology he discarded all other *Qualitys*, yet did notwithstanding admit this one *Quality* of *Gravity* or *Ponderosity* in *Atoms*, pressing them continually downwards in infinite Space: than which, that is, to make upwards and downwards in infinite Space, or a *Gravity* tending to no Center or place of Rest, as nothing could be more absurd or unphilosophical, so did he not assign any Cause of *Motion* neither; but only in effect affirm, that the *Atoms* therefore tended downward, because they did so; a *Quality* of *Gravity* signifying only an Endeavour to tend downward, but why or wherefore no body knows. And it is all one as if *Epicurus* should have said, that *Atoms* mov'd downwards by an occult *Quality*, he either betaking himself to this, as a Sanctuary or Refuge for his Ignorance, or else indeed more absurdly making his very Ignorance it self, disguis'd under that name of a *Quality*, to be the Cause of *Motion*. " This, as a
 " very † Learned Person has remark'd, is so shameful
 " a piece of Beggery, that *P. Gassendus* doth more
 " than once disclaim it; and in his Discourse of Motion
 " doth prove an Impossibility of Motion in an infinite empty Space. Might not *Epicurus* then, says he,
 " have sav'd his Credit better, by sitting down with

* 'Εἰς ἀπειρον ἔστιν, εἰ μὴν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν κινῆν πρῶτον.

† By Stillingsfleet's Orig. Sacrae, Book 3. ch. 2. where more may be seen to this purpose; as also in Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu, &c. Par Mr. Jaquelot. A la Haye 1697. Dissert. 2. c. 2. p. 319.

“ the Opinions of his Fore-fathers, than thus to go a
“ begging for such Hypotheses, which none, who are
“ not resolv’d to be *ignorant*, will be ready to grant
“ him? Thus we find that the *Anaximandrian* and
Democritick Atheists universally assign’d no Cause at
all of *Motion*: and as to the *Stratonick* or *Hylozoick*
Atheists, who to avoid *incorporeal Substance*, have
ventur’d to attribute perfect *Understanding*, *Appetite*
or *Will*, and *self-moving Power* to all senseless *Matter*
whatsoever, them I shall hereafter shew to have
herein assign’d a wrong one, what they assert being
absolutely false. Wherefore if *Matter* or *Body* cannot
move it self, either the Motion of all Bodys must
have no manner of Cause, or else must there of ne-
cessity be some other Substance besides *Body*, such as
is self-active, and has a natural power of ruling over
Matter. Upon which latter account *Plato* rightly
determin’d, that Cogitation, which is Self-activity,
was in order of Nature before the local Motion of
Body, which proceeds from something else. Tho Mo-
tion consider’d *passively* in Bodys, or taken for their
Translation or Change of Distance and Place, be indeed
a corporeal thing, or a Mode of those Bodys them-
selves moving; yet as it is consider’d *actively* in refe-
rence to the *Vis movens*, or that active Force which
causes this Translation or Change of Place, it is an
incorporeal thing, that is, the Energy of a *self-active*
Substance upon the sluggish *Matter* or *Body*, which
cannot at all move it self. Wherefore in the Bodys of
Animals, the true and proper Cause of Motion, or
the Determination thereof at least, is not the Matter
it self organiz’d, but the Soul either as cogitative or
plastickly self-active, vitally united thereunto, and
naturally ruling over it. But in the whole World it

is either God himself, originally impressing a certain Quantity of Motion upon the *Matter* of the Universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the *Scripture*, * *in him we live and move*; which also seems to have been the sense of that noble *Agrigentine* Poet before cited, when he tells us, that *God is a pure and holy Mind, that with swift Thoughts moves the whole World*: or else it is instrumentally an inferior created *Spirit, Soul, or Life* of Nature, that is, a subordinate *Hylarchical* Principle, which has a power of moving *Matter* regularly, according to the Direction of a superior perfect *Mind*. And thus do we see again that *Ignorance of Causes* is the Seed of Atheism and not of Theism; no Atheists as such being able to assign a true Cause of *Motion*, the Knowledg whereof plainly leads to a God.

Furthermore, those Atheists who acknowledg no other Principle of things, but senseless *Matter* fortuitously mov'd, must needs be ignorant also of the Cause of that grand *Phænomenon*, call'd by *Aristotle* the τὸ εὖ καλῶς, *the Well and Fit in Nature*, that is, of the most artificial Frame of the whole mundane System in general, and of the Bodys of Animals in particular, together with the *conspiring Harmony* of all. For they, who boasted themselves able to shew the natural Causes of all things whatsoever without a God, can shew no other Cause at all of this *Phænomenon*, but only that the World happen'd by *Chance* to be made thus as it is. Now they who make *Fortune* and *Chance* to be the only Cause of this so admirable *Phænomenon*, the most regular and artificial Frame and Harmony of the Universe, do either make the

* Acts 17. 28.

mere absence and want of a *Cause* to be a *Cause*, *Fortune* and *Chance* being nothing else but the absence or want of an *intending Cause*; or else they make their own *Ignorance* of a *Cause* and *they know not how*, to be a *Cause*; or they affirm against all reason one *Contrary* to be the *Cause* of another, as *Confusion* to be the *Cause* of *Order*, *Beauty* and *Harmony*; *Chance* and *Fortune* to be the *Cause* of *Art* and *Skill*; *Folly* and *Nonsense* the *Cause* of the most *regular* and *wise Contrivance*: or lastly they deny it to have any *Cause* at all, since they deny an *intending Cause*; whereas there cannot possibly be any other *Cause* of *Artificialness* and *conspiring Harmony*, than *Mind* and *Wisdom*, *Counsel* and *Contrivance*. But because the *Atheists*, it may be, will deny my *Supposition*, that the *World* is thus *wisely* and *artificially* fram'd, and so would bring themselves off from the *Imputation* of *Ignorance*; I shall not conceal their *Pretences* to this purpose, but bring 'em all to light; that so we may do 'em the justice they'll be apt to demand, and at once discover their *Folly* and *Weakness*.

First then they pretend, that the *World* is not so *artificially* and *well* made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many *Faults* and *Flaws* to be found therein: whence they would infer, that it was not made by a *God*, he being suppos'd by *Theists* to be no *Bungler*, but a perfect *Mind*, or a Being infinitely *good* and *wise*, who therefore should have made all things for the *best*. As to which I now say, that having set down this by it self as a twelfth *Atheistick* *Objection* against a *Deity*, I must reserve the *Confutation* of it for its proper place. Only thus much I shall here observe by the way; that those *Theists* of later times, who either because they fancy a mere *arbi-*
trary

rary Deity, or because their Faith in the Divine Goodness is but weak, or because they judg of things according to their own private Appetites and selfish Passions, and not with a free and uncaptivated *Universality* of Mind, and an impartial regard to the Good of the *Whole*, or because they look only upon the present Scene of things, and take not the future into Consideration, nor have a comprehensive View of the whole Plot of Divine Providence together; or lastly, because we Mortals do all of us stand upon too low ground, to take a commanding Prospect upon the whole Frame of things, and our shallow Understandings are not able to fathom the Depths of the Divine Wisdom, nor trace all the Methods and Designs of Providence: because of this, I say, grant that the World might have been made much better than now it is, which indeed is all one as to say that it is not *well made*, yet do these Neoterick Christians seem hereby to give a much greater Advantage to the Atheists, than even the Pagan Theists have heretofore done; who stood their ground, and generously maintain'd against 'em, that *Mind* being the Maker of all things, and not *Fortune* or *Chance*, not *arbitrary Self-will* nor *irrational Humour omnipotent*, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and it might be consistent with the Good of the *Whole*, was the Rule and Measure both of *Nature* and *Providence*.

But again, the Atomick Atheists alledg, that tho there be indeed many things in the World which serve very well for *Uses*, yet does it not thence follow, that they were made *intentionally* and *designedly* for those *Uses*. Because tho things happen by *Chance* to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other after-

afterward, and have their several Uses consequent. Accordingly say they, all the several things of *Nature* happen'd by *Chance* to be so made as they are, and the several Uses of 'em follow'd thereupon. This account do they give of the several Parts of * *human Body*, and all the most seemingly elaborate Artifice in the whole World. To which I reply, that tho a thing which happens *accidentally* to be so or so made, may afterwards notwithstanding often prove serviceable for some Use or other; yet when any thing consists of many *Parts*, which are all artificially proportioned together, and with much Curiosity accommodated one to another; any one of which *Parts* having been wanting, or in the least plac'd and dispos'd of any otherwise than it is, would have render'd the *Whole* altogether inept or unfit for such an Use: then may we well conclude it not to have been made by *Chance*, but by *Counsel* and *Design*, *intentionally* for Uses. As for example, the *Eye*, whose Structure and Fabrick consisting of many *Parts*, *Humours*, and *Membranes*, is so artificially compos'd, that no reasonable Person, who considers the whole *Anatomy* thereof, and the Curiosity of its *Make*, can think otherwise of it, than that it was made out of design for the Use of *Seeing*, can't therefore be said to have happen'd *accidentally* to be so made; and then, as † *Lucretius* would have it, the Use of *Seeing* follow'd. To which I add, that for a Man to think that not only *Eyes* happen'd to be so made, and the Use of *Seeing*, tho *unintended*, follow'd; but also that *Ears* happen'd to

* — Nil ideo natum est in Corpore, ut uti Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat Usus. *Lucret.*

† Lumina ne facias Oculorum clara creata Prospicere ut possimus. — *Ibid.*

be so made too, and the Use of *Hearing* follow'd 'em: and a *Mouth* and *Tongue* in Animals happen'd to be so made likewise, and the Use of *Eating*, and in Men of *Speaking*, was also *accidentally* consequent thereupon: and that *Feet* and *Hands* were made by Chance; and *Walking*, with the many other Uses depending upon 'em, follow'd afterwards; besides innumerable other Parts of the Body both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting, without rendring the Whole inept or foolish: I say, to think that all these things should happen by *Chance* to be thus made in every one and the same Animal, and not design'd by Mind or Counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the Good of the Whole, argues the greatest Insensibility of Mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous Conceit has been long since so industriously confuted, and the Folly thereof so fully manifested by that Learned Heathen Philosopher and Physician *Galen*, in his Book of the Use of Parts, and since him by many others in Treatises of Anatomy, Physiology, or expressly against Atheism, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it. Moreover, as the former was one, so also, as * *Aristotle* tells us, this was another of the *Democritick* Dotages; that nothing in the Clouds and Meteors was intended for the good of this habitable Earth, within whose Atmosphere they are contain'd, but all proceeded from *material* and *mechanical* Necessity. In favour of which Conceit, tho *Des Cartes* seems to have writ his whole Book of *Meteors*, he beginning it with a Derision of those, " who seat God in the Clouds, and imagine his

* Τὸ καλῶς τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἐνεκα τῆς ποιεῖν μὴδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, &c. *Phys.* l. 2. c. 8.

“ Hands to be employ’d in opening and shutting
“ the Cloysters of the Winds, in sprinkling the Flow-
“ ers with Dews, and Thunder-striking the Tops of
“ Mountains : and closing his Discourse with this
Boast, “ that he had now made it manifest that there
“ was no need to fly to Miracles, that is, to bring in a
God upon the stage to solve those *Phænomena* : Yet were
it easy enough to demonstrate the Defectiveness of those
his mechanical Undertakings in sundry particulars,
and to evince that all those things could not be carry’d
on, with such constant Regularity, by mere *fortuitous*
Mechanism, and without a superior Principle to guide
and steer them. However I acknowledg that God and
Nature do things every where in the most frugal and
compendious way, and with the least *Operoseness*, and
therefore that the mechanick Powers are not rejected,
but taken in, so far as they can serviceably comply with
the intellectual Model and Platform ; yet still so, as
that all is supervis’d by one *understanding* and *intend-*
ing Cause, and nothing passes without its Approbation ;
which, when either those *mechanick Powers* fall short,
or the stubborn Necessity of Matter proves incom-
pliant, does over-rule the same, and supply the Defects
thereof by that which is *vital*, and that without set-
ting his own Hands to every Work too, there being a
subservient Minister under him, an *artificial Nature*,
which as an *Archeus* of the whole World, governs
the fluctuating *Mechanism* thereof, and does all things
faithfully for ends and purposes intended by its Di-
rector.

But our Atomick Atheists do further alledg, that
tho it might well seem strange that *Matter fortuitously*
mov’d should at the very first jump fall into such a regu-
lar Frame as this, having so many Aptitudes for Uses,

E e e

so

so many Correspondencies between several things, and such an agreeing Harmony in the *Whole*: yet ought it not to seem a jot strange, if *Atoms*, by Motion making all possible Combinations and Contextures, and trying all manner of Conclusions and Experiments, should after innumerable other Freaks and discongruous Forms produc'd, in length of time fall into such a *System* as this. Wherefore they affirm, that this Earth of ours at first brought forth divers monstrous and irregular Shapes of Animals, * *some without Feet, some without Hands, some without a Mouth and Face, some wanting fit Muscles and Nerves for the Motion of their Members.* And the old Philosophick Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, that amongst those monstrous Shapes of Animals there were once produc'd *Centaur's, Scylla's, and Chimera's.* But of this *Epicurus* indeed being a little ashamed, gravely declares his Mind against it, tho the reason he gives, plainly overthrows his own Principles: namely, † *because things by a certain Covenant of Nature, do always keep up their specifick Differences, without being confounded together.* For what Covenant of Nature can there be in infinite Chance? or what Law can there be set to the absolutely fortuitous Motions of Atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be acknowledg'd, that according to the genuine Hypothesis of the Atomick Atheism, all imaginable Forms of *inanimate Bodys, Plants, and Animals*, are producible by the fortuitous Motions of *Matter*,

* Orba Pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim;

Multa sine Ore etiam, sine Voltu cæca reperta. *Lucret. l. 5.*

† Res sic quæque suo ritu procedit, & omnes

Fœdere Naturæ certo discrimina servant. *Lucret. ibid.*

and there is nothing to hinder 'em from being *actually* produc'd. But they pretend, as * *Aristotle* from *Empedocles*, and † *Lucretius* from *Epicurus* tell us, that these monstrous irregular Shapes of Animals are not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their *inept Fabrick*, they could not propagate their Kind by Generation, as neither indeed preserve their own *Individuals*.

Moreover, the antient Atheists both *Anaximandrian* and *Democritick* concluded, that besides this one *World* of ours, there were other *infinite Worlds*; they conceiving it as absurd to think, that there should be but only one *World* in *infinite Space*, as that in a vast plow'd and sow'd Field, there should grow up only one Ear of Corn and no more; and they would have us believe, that amongst those *infinite Worlds*, all of 'em *fortuitously* made, there is not one of a thousand, or perhaps of ten thousand, that has such a Regularity, Concinnity, and Harmony in it, as this *World*, in which we *chanc'd* to emerge. Now it can't be thought strange, as they suppose, if amongst *infinite Worlds*, one or two should chance to fall into some *Regularity*. They would also confidently assure us, that the present *System* of things in this *World* of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, || *but gradually decay, and after a while fall into Confusion and Disorder again*. But because Men may be puzzl'd with

* Ὅπερ μὲν ἔν ἀπαντὰ συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνίσταται
 συστάτης ἐπιηδείας. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔτιος ἀπώλετο, &c. *Arist. Nat. Auscult.*
 l. 2. c. 8.

† ——— Quoniam Natura absterruit auctum,
 Nec potuere cupitum Ætatis tangere Florem,
 Nec reperire Cibus, nec jungi per Veneris res. *Lucret. l. 5.*

|| ——— Mundi natura totius Ætas
 Mutat, & ex alio Terram status excipit alter,
 Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit antè. *Lucret.*

the *Universality* and *Constancy* of this *Regularity*, and its long Continuance thro so many Ages, and that there are no Records at all of the contrary any where to be found, the Atomick Atheist further adds, that the senseless *Atoms* playing and toying up and down, without any Care or Thought, and from Eternity trying all manner of Tricks, Conclusions, and Experiments, were at length, they know not how, taught, and by the Necessity of things themselves as it were driven to a certain kind of Trade of *Artificialness* or *Methodicalness*: So that tho their Motions were at first all *casual* and *fortuitous*, yet in length of time they became artificial, and orderly, and govern'd by a *certain Law*, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long Practice and Experience, a kind of Habit, as * *Epicurus* tells us, of moving *regularly*, or else being by the mere *Necessity* of things, at length forc'd so to move, as they should have done, had *Art* and *Wisdom* directed 'em.

To all which Atheistick Pretences I now reply: and first that it is but an idle Dream, or rather impudent Forgery of the Atheists, that heretofore there were in this World of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular Shapes of Animals produc'd, and indeed at first none else but such, there not appearing the least Foot-step of any such thing in all the Monuments of *Antiquity*; and Traditions of former times: and these Atheists being not able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produc'd as well as at this present time, however the Individuals themselves

* Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτῶν τῆς πραγμάτων διδασκῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι. Epicur. in Epistle to Herodotus apud Gassend. p. 28.

could not continue long, nor propagate by *Generation*; or at least why it should not happen, that in some Ages or Countrys there were either all *Androgyna* of both Sexes, or else no Animal but of one Sex, Male or Female only; or lastly, none of any Sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when, tho otherwise Enemys to Divination, they would prophesy concerning future times, that in this World of ours things gradually decay, and will all sometime fall into Confusion and Nonsense again. Indeed I won't deny but that the Opinion of the World's *Senescence* and drawing towards a Dissolution has been often entertain'd by many well-meaning Persons, who did not consider the Illness of it in it self, nor the dangerous Consequence of it; namely, in that it very much reflects upon the conserving Providence of God, who as he first made, so still supports all things with the same even hand; and would make way for the *Epicurean* Supposition, that all things subsist and go on at random without the Preservation and Steerage of a Deity; which notwithstanding displays its Omnipotence as well in maintaining, as it did in first making the Frame of the Universe, and to shew that it is the only Master, as well as the Author of Nature, will not suffer any considerable Change to be made in the Laws it first settled among natural things, till at length its infinite Wisdom shall think fit to pass the Almighty *Fiat*, for a sudden Conflagration of the World. This being well consider'd by the very learned and ingenious Dr. *Hakewill*, gave occasion to this noble Undertaking of his, namely to oppose the common Prejudice of the World's growing old; of which how well he has acquitted himself, is abundantly manifest in his unanswerable *Apology or Declaration*

ration of the Power and Providence of God, in the Government of the World.

Again I say, touching the Infinity of Worlds asserted by the Atheists: as this is an absolute Impossibility; so to their bold and confident Assertion concerning those suppos'd other Worlds, as if they had travel'd over them all, that amongst ten thousand of 'em there is hardly one, that has so much Regularity in it, as this World of ours; it might be reply'd with equal Confidence, and much more probability of *Reason*, that were every Planet about this Sun of ours a *habitable Earth*, and every *fix'd Star* a *Sun*, having likewise its several Planets or habitable Earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopl'd with Animals; I say, were this so extravagant Supposition true, that notwithstanding there would not be found any one ridiculous or *inept System* amongst them all: but that the Divine *Art* and *Wisdom*, which being infinite, can never be defective nor any where idle, would exercise its Dominion upon all, and every where impress the Sculptures and Signatures of it self. In the next place I affirm, that the *fortuitous Motions* of senseless Atoms, trying never so many Experiments and Conclusions, and making never so many *Combinations* and *aggregate Forms* of things, could never be able to produce so much as the *Form* or *System* of one compleat Animal, with all the organick Parts thereof so artificially order'd, each of these being as it were a little World, much less the System of this great World, with that Variety of Animals in it; and least of all by this means could that *Regularity* and *Artificialness*, which are every where visible, constantly continue. For that the fortuitous Motions of *irrational, senseless, and*
stupid

stupid Matter, should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a Habit of acting as regularly and methodically, as if *Art* or *Wisdom* had directed 'em, this is the most prodigious Nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than *Atheistick Fanaticism*. It is no more possible, that the fortuitous Motion of dead and senseless *Matter*, should ever from it self be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular System, as the Frame of this whole World is, together with the Bodys of Animals, and constantly to continue the same; than that a Man perfectly illiterate, and able neither to write nor read, taking up a Pen into his hand, and making all manner of Scrawls with Ink upon Paper, should at length be taught and necessitated by the thing it self, to write a whole Quire of Paper together, in such Characters, as being decypher'd by a certain Key, would all prove coherent Philosophick Sense. Wherefore I conclude with *Aristotle*, that * *it is absolutely impossible, that things should have come to pass, after this manner*; that is, by mere *Fortune* and *Chance*, and without the Direction of any *Mind* or *God*. The Divine Wisdom has so printed its Seal or Signature upon the *Matter* of the whole corporeal World, as that *Fortune* and *Chance* could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

But notwithstanding this the antient Atheists would, by their wonderful Skill in Logick, undertake to demonstrate, that the Frame of Nature could not possibly be made by any *intending Cause*, and for the sake of *Ends* and *Uses*: as for example, that *Eyes* could not be first of all made *intentionally* for the Use of *Seeing*, nor *Ears* *intentionally* for the Use of *Hearing*, and so for

* Ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα ἄστυν ἔχει τὸ τεύχος. N at. Aufc. l. 2. c. 8.

the rest : because, forsooth, these things were all of 'em in order of Time and Nature before their several Uses. For this * *Lucretius* seriously argues, and † attempts to clear it by sundry Instances, telling us, “ that Darts were made for the sake of Fighting, but “ that Fighting was before Darts, or else they had “ never been invented ; that Bucklers were devis'd “ for the keeping off of Blows and Strokes, but the “ declining of Strokes was before Bucklers ; that Beds “ were contriv'd for the sake of resting and sleeping, “ but resting and sleeping were older than Beds, and “ gave occasion for the Invention of 'em ; that Cups “ were design'd for the sake of drinking, which they “ would not have been, had there not been drinking “ before.

According to the Force of which Instances, the Poet would infer, that whosoever affirms *Eyes* to have been made for the sake of *Seeing*, must suppose in like manner, that there was some kind of *Seeing* or other before *Eyes*. But since there was no *Seeing* at all before *Eyes*, therefore could not *Eyes* be made for the sake of *Seeing* ; and this is the Atheists pretended Demonstration, that the Parts of mens Bodys and other things of Nature, could not be made by any *intending Cause*, for the sake of *Ends* and *Uses*. But it is evident that this Logick of theirs is different from that of any other Mortals ; according to which the *End*, or that for which any thing is made, is only in *Intention* before

* Nec fuit ante, videre, oculorum Lumina nata, &c.

— & omnia denique membra
Ante fuere, ut opinor, eorum quàm fuit usus.
Haud igitur potuere utendi crescere causâ.

† At contra conferre manu Certamina pugnae
Ante fuit multò quàm lucida Tela volarent, &c.

the *Means*, or that which is made for it ; but in *Time* and *Execution*, after it. And thus was the *more effectual way* of Fighting and doing Execution, for whose sake Darts were invented, in *Time* after Darts, and only in *Intention* before them. It is true indeed, that *Fighting* in general was before *Darts* and other warlike Weapons, *Sleeping* before *Beds*, and *Drinking* before *Cups* ; and thence did men take occasion to think of Means for the *more effectual Fighting*, and the *more commodious Sleeping* and *Drinking* ; they being excited in these, as well as other cases, from the Experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to invent and provide fit Means and Remedys. But does it hence follow, that the Maker of the World could not at once have before-hand a *preventive Knowledg*, of whatsoever would be *useful* and for the Good of Animals, and so make them *intentionally* for those *Uses* ? No, this is what the Theists do with good reason assert ; and therefore if the Atheists would herein oppose our Supposition, they should have fram'd their Argument thus : Whatsoever any thing is made for, as the *End*, that must needs be in the *Knowledg* and *Intention* of the Maker, before the Existence of that, which is made for it ; and therefore if Eyes were made for the end or sake of *Seeing*, *Seeing* must of necessity be in the *Knowledg* and *Intention* of the Maker of *Eyes*, before there were any *Eyes* actually existing ; but there could be no *Knowledg* of *Seeing* before there were any *Eyes*, any more than Spectacles could be known or made for the sake of *Eyes*, before there were any *Eyes* ; wherefore *Eyes* could not be made for the sake of *Seeing*. So that the Controversy is at last wholly resolv'd into this : whether or no all *Knowledg* and *Understanding* as such, universally, arises from things antecedently existing

existing without the *Knower*. Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence, that the things of the World could not be made by the *previous Counsel, Contrivance, and Intention* of any understanding Deity, but that they all blunder'd out themselves, one after another, according to the Train or Sequel of the *fortuitous Motions of Matter*: And that from thence, *Knowledg and Understanding, Counsel and Intention* sprung up afterward, as junior to *Things and the World*. But this amounting to what I propos'd, as the eleventh Atheistick Argument against a Deity; namely, *that all Knowledg and mental Conception is the Information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the Knower, and a Passion from them; and therefore that the World must needs be before any Knowledg or Conception, and no Knowledg or Conception before the World as its Cause*: I shall refer my Answer to its proper place; where I shall plainly demonstrate, that *Knowledg or Understanding* is not in its own nature *Ectypal* but *Archetypal*, and that it is older than the World, and is *the Maker of all things*. Only before I dismiss this Head, I cannot but take notice of what a very curious Interpreter of Nature has said of that noble Part of the Body, the *Eye*, which the Atheists have dar'd to single out as a Subject of Cavil.

“ * That this is so little fitted for almost any other
 “ Use in the Body, and is so exquisitely adapted for
 “ the Use of Seeing, and that Use is so necessary for
 “ the Welfare of the Animal, that it may well be
 “ doubted, whether any considering Man can *really*
 “ think, that it was not destinated to that Use. The
 “ six or seven Muscles, that move the whole Bulbe of

* Mr. Boyle in his *Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things*, p. 146, 147, &c.

“ the Eye upwards, downwards, to the right hand,
“ to the left, and to various oblique Positions; and
“ the several Coats and Humours, that make up the
“ Sensory, have not only their Bigness, Shape, Con-
“ sistence, Situation, and Connexion admirably adap-
“ ted to that end; but the Transparency of the *Cor-*
“ *nea*, and the Humours, the Opacity of the *Uvea*,
“ and the Semi-opacity of the *Retina*, and the several
“ Motions of the Parts of the Eye, being requisite
“ to receive, transmit, refract and dispose the visive
“ Beams that come from the Object, after the manner
“ requisite to make the liveliest Picture of it in the
“ bottom of the Eye, do no less concur to compleat
“ this matchless Organ of Vision: which is so rarely
“ contriv’d in order to that Use, and comparatively so
“ little to any other, that it is no more rashness to
“ say, that an Eye, than that a Telescope, was made
“ for an Instrument to see with; that is, to discover
“ the Colours, Magnitudes, Shapes, and Motions of
“ distant Objects. And in that admirable Perforation
“ of the *Uvea*, which we call the Pupil, Nature has
“ much outdone Art. For whereas we are fain to
“ apply to the Object-Glasses of Telescopes, opacous
“ Bodys with several circular Apertures, that some
“ may let in less Light and others more, according as
“ the Objects are more or less bright or enlighten’d;
“ that part of the *Uvea* that hangs in the aqueous
“ Humour is an Aperture, as the Artists call it, that
“ narrows and opens it self in a trice, according to the
“ Exigency of the Objects we look on; which if they
“ be so constituted or plac’d, that they reflect but a
“ dim Light, the Curtain is presently drawn open,
“ and the *Pupil* circularly widen’d, to let in the more
“ Beams of Light: and the contrary happens, as often

“ as the Object being too luminous or illustrated,
 “ would offend the Organ or disturb the Sight, if the
 “ Contraction of the Pupil did not shut out some of
 “ its Beams. But as for the Uses of the several Parts
 “ of the Eye, I shall refer you to the industrious Jesuit
 “ *Scheiner's Oculus*, and *Des Cartes's* excellent Diop-
 “ tricks; where you will easily perceive, that in
 “ framing the Eye, Nature did not only act with
 “ design, but with so much Skill in *Opticks*, that a
 “ more than ordinary Insight into that Science is ne-
 “ cessary to understand the Wisdom of the Contrivances;
 “ and perhaps no degree of Skill in it could enable a man to alter 'em for the better. 'Twere tedious, says he, to mention the other Parts of the Body, that manifestly appear to have been preordain'd to certain Uses. The Books of Anatomists are full of Passages applicable to this purpose, &c.

But the Atheists urge yet further, against the proving of a God, from the regular Frame of the whole World in general, and the artificial Structure of the Bodys of Animals, that it is altogether unreasonable to suppose, that there should be no Cause in Nature for the Phænomena thereof, especially for those things which are daily generated, as the Bodys of Animals: but, as was done by the Tragick Poets, a God must be introduc'd as it were *from a Machine*, forcibly to solve 'em. Whereas on the contrary, why, say they, may we not suppose, that *undesigning, unconscious Nature* is the Cause of all Productions, and that, as a modern Author writes, *the Universe, as one Aggregate of things natural, hath no Intention belonging to it?* To which I reply, that there are indeed two Extremes here to be avoided: the one, of those who derive all things from the *fortuitous Motions* of senseless Matter,

Matter, which is the Extreme of the *Atomick* Atheists; the other of bigottical *Religionists*, who will needs have God $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\kappa\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu \ \alpha\pi\alpha\lambda\acute{\omicron}\alpha$, to do all things himself immediately, as if all in *Nature* were *Miracle*. But there is a Middle betwixt both these Extremes; namely, to suppose that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a *Nature*, not *fortuitous*, but *artificial* and *methodical*, which governing the Motion of *Matter*, and bringing it into Regularity, is a secondary or inferior Cause of Generations. Now this *artificial Nature*, tho it self indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly *intend* the *Ends* thereof, yet may well be conceiv'd to act regularly for the sake of *Ends*, understood and intended by that perfect *Mind*, upon which it depends: as the manuary *Opificers* understand not the Designs of the *Architect*, but only drudgingly perform their several Tasks impos'd by him; and as *Types* or *Forms* of Letters compos'd together do print coherent and philosophick Sense, which themselves understand nothing of. And thus neither are all things perform'd immediately and miraculously by God himself, nor are they all done *temerariouſly* and *fortuitouſly*, but *regularly* and *methodically* for the sake of *Ends*, tho not understood by *Nature* it self, but by that higher *Mind*, which is the Cause of it, and does as it were continually inspire it. But the Atheist here tells us, that the Opinion of *intending* or *Final Causality* in *Nature*, can be accounted no other than an *Idolum Specus*, as they affect to phrase it, an *Idol of the Cave or Den*, that is, a Prejudice of mens Minds, when they apply their own Propertys to things without 'em, and think that because they themselves intend and act for *Ends*, therefore *Nature* does the like. Touching which indeed I own, that some have unskilfully attributed their

own *Propertys* or *Animal Idiopathys* to *inanimate Bodys*; as when they lay, that *Matter* desires *Forms*, as the *Male* does the *Female*, and that heavy *Bodys* descend down by *Appetite* towards the *Center*, that so they may rest there; and that they sometimes again ascend in point of *Discretion*, to avoid a *Vacuum*: and thus I grant with the *Advancer of Learning*, that it is incredible how many *Errors* have been transfus'd into *Philosophy* from this one *Delusion*, of reducing natural *Actions* to the mode of *human*, or of thinking that *Nature* acts as a *Man* doth. But after all I say in the present case, that it is no *Idolum Specus*, no *Prejudice* or *Fallacy* impos'd upon our selves, from the attributing our own *Animalish Propertys* to things without us, to think that the *Frame* and *System* of the whole *World* was contriv'd by a perfect understanding *Being* or *Mind*, now also presiding over the same, which has every where printed the *Signatures* of its own *Wisdom* upon the *Matter*: As also that tho *Nature* it self do not properly intend, yet it acts according to an *Intellectual Platform*, prescrib'd to it, as being the *manuary Opificer* of the *Divine Architectonick Art*, or this *Art* it self transfus'd as it were into the *Matter*, and embody'd in it: which, as *Balbus* in *Cicero* tells us, is not a *Force* unguided by *Reason* exciting necessary *Motions* in *Bodys* temerarily; but such a *Force* as partakes of *Order*, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose *Cunning* or *Ingenuity* no *Art* or *human Opificer* can possibly reach to by *Imitation*. For it is altogether unconceivable how we our selves should have *Mind* and *Intention* in us, were there none in the *Universe*, or in that highest *Principle*, from which all proceeds.

Moreover, it was truly affirm'd by *Aristotle*, that there is much more of *Art* in some of the things of *Nature*, than there is in any thing artificially made by

by Men ; and therefore *Intention* or *final* and *mental Causality* can no more be secluded from the Consideration of *natural*, than it can from that of *artificial* things. Now it is plain, that things *artificial*, as a Clock or House, can neither be understood, nor any true Cause of 'em assign'd, without *Design* or *Intention* for *Ends* and *Good*. For to say that a House is Stones, Timber, Mortar, Iron, Glass, Lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a Definition of it, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt Disposition of all those Materials, as may make the Whole fit for the Habitation and *Uses* of Men. Wherefore neither is this sufficiently to assign the Cause of a House, to declare out of what Quarry the Stones were dug, or in what Woods or Forests the Timber was fell'd, and the like ; nor, as *Aristotle* adds, * *if any one should go about thus to give an account of a House from material Necessity*, as the Atheistick Philosophers then did of the World and the Bodys of Animals, *that the heavier things being carried downward of their own accord, and the lighter upward, therefore the Stones and Foundation lay at the bottom, and the Earth for the Walls being lighter, was higher ; and the Timber being yet lighter, higher than that ; but the Straw or Thatch above all, it being the lightest of all.* Nor lastly, if, as the same *Aristotle* elsewhere also suggests, one should further pretend that the House was therefore made such, merely because the Hands of the Labourers, and the Axes, and Hammers, and Trowels, and other Instruments chanc'd all to be mov'd so and so. I say, that none of all these would be to assign the

* *Εἰς τὸν τοῖχον γαγνηῖται ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα κατὰ πέφυκε φέρεται, τὰ δὲ κῆφα ὀπιπολλῆς, &c.* Nat. Aufc. l. 2. c. 9.

true Cause of a House, without declaring that the *Architect* first fram'd in his Mind a Model or Platform of such a thing, to be made out of those Materials so aptly dispos'd, into a *Foundation, Walls, Roof, Doors, Rooms, Stairs, Chimneys, Windows, &c.* as might render the whole fit for Habitation, and other human *Uses*. And no more certainly can the things of *Nature*, in whose very Essence *final Causality* is as much included, be either rightly understood, or the Causes of 'em assign'd, merely from *Matter* and *Mechanism*, or the *necessary* and *unguided* Motion thereof, without *Design* or *Intention* for *Ends* and *Good*. Wherefore to say, that the Bodys of Animals became such, merely because the *Fluid Seed*, by Motion happen'd to make such *Traces* and beget such *Stamina* or *Lineaments*, as out of which the *Compages* of the whole resulted, is not to assign a Cause of 'em; but to dissemble, smother, and conceal their true *efficient Cause*, which is the Wisdom and Contrivance of that Divine *Architect* and *Geometer*, making 'em every way fit for the Inhabitation and *Uses* of their respective Souls. Neither indeed can we banish all *final* or *mental Causality* from Philosophy or the Consideration of *Nature*, without banishing at the same time *Reason* and *Understanding* from our selves, and looking upon the things of *Nature* with no other Eyes, than Brutes do. However none of the *Antients* would ever undertake to assign *necessary Causes*, for all the Parts of the Bodys of Animals, and their Efformation from mere *Matter, Motion, and Mechanism*. Those small and pitiful Attempts in order thereunto, which have been made by some of 'em in a few Instances, as namely that the *Spina Dorsi* came from the Flexure of the Bodys of Animals, when they first sprung out of the Earth; the *Intestines* from the
Flux

Flux of Humours, excavating a crooked and winding Channel for it self; and that the Nostrils were broken open by the Eruption of Breath; these Attempts, I say, only betraying the Unseifableness and Impossibility thereof. And therefore *Democritus* indeed was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account, in this way, of the Formation of the *Fœtus*; he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate: nor would he venture to say any more concerning it, as *Aristotle* informs us, * *than that it always so cometh to pass of necessity*; but stop'd all further Inquiry concerning it, after this manner, † *that to demand about any of these things, for what reason it was thus, was to demand a beginning of Infinite*. As if all the Motions from Eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produc'd. And *Lucretius*, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that *Epicurus* and he were able to assign *natural* and *necessary Causes* for every thing, without a God, yet has no where so much as one word concerning it. Wherefore I conclude that *Aristotle's* Judgment concerning *Final Causes* in Philosophy is much to be prefer'd before that of *Democritus*: || *that both kind of Causes, material and final, ought to be declar'd by a Physiologer, but especially the final; the End being the Cause of the Matter, but the Matter not the Cause of the End*. And thus do we plainly see, that the *Atomick Atheists* are utterly ignorant of the Cause of the *regular* and *artificial Frame* of the things in Nature, and consequently of the whole *mundane System*,

* Ὅτι ἔσται αἰεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι.

† Τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, αἰεὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινός, τὸ ζητᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἀπείρου ἀρχῆν.

|| Nat. Aufc. l. 2. c. 9.

the true Knowledg whereof necessarily leads to a God.

But having herein seen the Ignorance and Sottishness of some *profess'd*, especially *antient* Atheists, I am surpriz'd to find 'em justify'd by some of the Moderns, who yet have not generally come under that Character. Whose Sentiments notwithstanding, because they so plainly favour Atheism (whether *designedly* or no I will not say) must here come under an Examination. Now these men also *atomizing* in their *Physiology*, would fain persuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane System, together with Plants and Animals, was deriv'd merely from the necessary and unguided Motion of the *small Particles of Matter*, at first either jumbl'd all together in a *Chaos*, or else turn'd round in a *Vortex*, without any *Intention* for *Ends* and *Good*, that is, without the Direction of any *Mind*; God in the mean time standing by, only as an idle Spectator of this *Lusus Atomorum*, this sportful Dance of Atoms, and of the various Results thereof. Nay, these mechanick Physiologers have here quite out-strip'd and out-done the *Atomick* Atheists themselves, they being much more immodest and extravagant, than ever those were. For the profess'd Atheists durst never venture to affirm, that this regular System of things resulted from the *fortuitous Motions* of *Atoms* at the very first, before they had, for a long time together, produc'd many other *inept Combinations* or *aggregate Forms* of particular things, and nonsensical Systems of the *Whole*. And they also suppos'd, that the Regularity of things here in this World, would not always continue such neither, but that sometime or other *Confusion* and *Disorder* would break in again. Moreover, that besides this World of ours, there are at this Instant innumerable

rable other *irregular* Worlds, and that there is but one of a thousand or ten thousand, amongst the *infinite Worlds*, that has such *Regularity* in it. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and look'd upon as a common Notion, that, as *Aristotle* expresses it, * *none of those things, which are from Fortune or Chance, do come to pass constantly and always alike.* But our new mechanick Philosophers will have it, that their *Atoms* have never so much as once fuml'd in these their *fortuitous* Motions, nor produc'd any *inept System* or *incongruous Forms* at all: but from the very first all along have taken up their places, and rang'd themselves so *orderly, methodically, and discreetly*, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect *Wisdom*. By which Supposition they utterly evacuate that grand Argument for a God, taken from the *Phænomenon* of the *artificial Frame* of things, which has been so much insisted on in all Ages, and which commonly makes the strongest Impression of any other upon the Minds of men; they leaving only certain *metaphysical* Arguments for a Deity, which tho never so good, yet by reason of their *Subtilty*, can do but little execution upon the minds of the *Generality*, and even amongst the Learned do often beget more of *doubtful Disputation* and *Scepticism*, than of clear Conviction and Satisfaction.

But before I dismiss these presumptuous World-makers, of whom I have made some Distinction; either those who suppose all the *Matter* of the Universe to have been first jumbl'd together in a fluid *Chaos*; or those who suppos'd it to have been turn'd round

* Τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τῶ ἀντομαίτε ὁδὲν αἰεὶ ὅτω γίνεσθαι.

in a Vortex or Vortices; and in either case to have moved without the immediate Direction of *Mind* or *Wisdom*: to each of these I say I shall speak a few words apart by themselves. To the former, as falling in almost with the old *Democritick* System, I only urge what has been of late substantially * prov'd: 1st. That by common Motion, without Attraction, the dissever'd Particles of the *Chaos* could never make the World, could never convene into such great compact Masses, as the Planets now are, nor either acquire or continue such Motions, as the Planets now have. 2^{ly}. That such a mutual Gravitation or spontaneous Attraction, can neither be inherent and essential to Matter, nor ever supervene to it, unless impress'd and infus'd into it by a Divine Power. 3^{ly}. That tho we should allow such Attraction to be natural and essential to all Matter; yet the Atoms of the *Chaos* could never so convene by it, as to form the present System: or if they could form it, it could neither acquire such Motions, nor continue permanent in this State, without the Power and Providence of a Divine Being.

But next I come to speak of those other *Neoterick Atomists*, who go a little further than the *Epicureans*, and suppose indeed the Matter of the Universe to have been first turn'd round in a Vortex or Vortices, by the hand of God: but then that without any further Direction of a superintending *Wisdom*, the orderly Course and Productions of *Nature* have been continu'd. Now in the first place this Hypothesis may be easily overturn'd by shewing that this *Theory of Vortices* is absolutely false. To which purpose it is ob-

* By Dr. Bentley in his Seventh Lecture.

serv'd by Mr. *Keill* *, that the great Philosopher of this Age, the most ingenious and incomparable Mr. *Newton*, by his great and deep Skill in Geometry, has shew'd that the periodical times of all Bodys, which swim in a Vortex, must be directly as the Squares of their Distances from the Center of the *Vortex*. But it is evident from Observations, that the Planets in turning round the Sun, observe quite another sort of a Law than this; for the Squares of their periodical times, are always as the Cubes of their Distances; and therefore since they do not observe that Law, which of necessity they must, if they swim in a Vortex, it is a Demonstration that there are no Vortices, in which the Planets are carry'd round the Sun. Besides, if the Earth were carry'd in a *Vortex*, it must necessarily move faster, when it is in the beginning of *Virgo*, where the Fluid is in a narrow Space (and by consequence moves so much the swifter) than it would do, when it is in the beginning of *Pisces*, and that in the Proportion of three to two; which notwithstanding is directly against Experience and Observation. Wherefore that the Earth and other Planets should move in a Vortex, it is impossible upon this and many other accounts, as Mr. *Newton* has shewn in his *Principles*: wherein, “ tho
“ indeed there are few, as † Mr. *Lock* well observes,
“ that have *Mathematicks* enough to understand his
“ Demonstrations; yet the most accurate Mathema-
“ ticians, who have examin'd them, allowing them
“ to be such, his Book will deserve to be read, and give
“ no small light and pleasure to those, who willing to
“ understand the Motions, Propertys, and Operations

* P. 16, &c. of his *Examination of Dr. Burnet's Theory of the Earth, &c.*

† *Thoughts concerning Education*, p. 233. Ed. first.

“ of the great Masses of Matter, in this our Solar,
 “ System, will but carefully mind his Conclusions
 “ which may be depended on, as Propositions well
 “ prov’d.

To this I add, with the * Learned Dr. More, “ that
 “ it is shrewdly to be suspected, if there were no
 “ *Superintendent* over the Motions of those *Æthereal*
 “ Whirl-pools, which the *French* Philosophy supposes,
 “ that the Form of the Sun and the rest of the Stars
 “ would be *oblong*, not *round*, because the Matter re-
 “ cedes all along the Axis of a Vortex, as well as from
 “ the Center ; and therefore naturally the Space, that
 “ is left, for the finest and subtilest Element of all, of
 “ which the Sun and Stars are to consist, will be *long*,
 “ not *round*. Wherefore this round Figure we see
 “ them in, must proceed from some higher Principle,
 “ than the mere *Agitation* of the *Matter*.

But further we may argue with Mr. *Des Cartes ad hominem*, and overturn his Vortices upon his own Principles after this manner: 1st, Let us suppose this grand Principle of his, that whatsoever Body moves in a Round, continually strives to remove it self from the Center of its Motion, and of the Circle which it describes. From which universal Principle there immediately followsthis particular Consequence: that in a *Vortex*, where the *Matters* of the first, the second, and the third Element are mov’d round, they all three of ’em endeavour to get at what distance they can from the Center of the Vortex. Also 3^{ly}, from the same Principle will follow this other Conclusion, that in the common Effort and Struggle, made by several Bodys so mov’d and confounded together, to remove them-

* Dr. Henry More *his* Antidote against Atheism, p. 39. in Folio. Lond. selves

selves from the Center of their Motion, those which are most of all agitated and most fit for Motion, must needs get ground of the others, and seat themselves in the Circumference of the Circle, describ'd by the Vortex; and by consequence force those, which are not so much agitated, and are less fit for Motion, to descend towards the Center. Were there not a necessary and plain Connection between this Conclusion and the Principle I draw it from, as indeed there is, yet might I notwithstanding apply it in this case to the purpose I drive at, because it is Mr. *Des Cartes's* own, as appears from many places of his Writings, and especially the fourth Part of his *Principles*, Numb. 23. where by this very Proposition he endeavours to account for the Gravitation of Bodys towards the Center of the Earth: that it is purely because in the Vortex of the Earth, the terrestrial Bodys are below the Air, and the Air below the celestial Matter. To which I add 4^{ly}, what Mr. *Des Cartes* often repeats, especially in the third and fourth Part of his *Principles*, and in the eighth Chapter of his *Treatise of Light*; namely, that the first and second Elements are much more agitated and more proper and fit for Motion, than the third Element, whose Parts are ramous and branchy, and of a very irregular Figure. All this being suppos'd, let us grant Mr. *Des Cartes*, that Matter having been created such as he describes it, God might divide it, and impress Motion upon it, nay that in effect he has done so. Let us fix our Imagination and Thought upon this great Portion of Matter, or this Vortex, in the Center of which the *Polar Star* is plac'd. Let us conceive that this Portion of Matter, made up of innumerable small, insensible Parts, is turn'd round, and at once that these little Parts do also move round their own proper Center.

Center. From this Motion must arise the three Elements: namely, the most subtile Matter, or as it were Dust of the first Element; the Globules of the second; and the ramous Parts of the third, which are all of 'em Parts of the universal Matter, no otherwise differing from each other, than by their Figure and Bulk. Whether the third Element be form'd at the same time with the two others, as Mr. *Des Cartes* seems, methinks, to suppose in his Treatise of *Light*; or it be form'd by the Conjunction of several Parts of the first Elements sticking close together, as he seems to teach in his Book of *Principles*: this Philosopher pretends, that in this Agitation of the Matter, after that it has lasted so long, as to break off the Angles of most of those Parts, that are in motion, the Matter of the first Element must needs have two principal places: the first in the whole Space of the Vortex, wherein it must be spread, that it may exactly fill all the Intervals and Gaps, that are between the Globules of the second Element, of which the whole Body of the Vortex or Heaven is made up; and the second, in the Center, whereinto it must be forc'd to descend by the Globules of the second Element, that there it may make a spherical and fluid Body, that is indeed a Star; which by the circular Motion of its Matter, and its Endeavour to get off from the Center of its Vortex, pushes the Globules of the second Element, which it has above it, in all imaginable Points, and communicating by their means this Impression to our Eyes, does there produce the Sensation of Light. This is the Doctrine of *Des Cartes* on this Subject. And now I undertake to demonstrate from his own Principles, that it is not the Matter of the first Element, but of the third, that must necessarily make the Center of

of the Vortex : and that so neither the Stars nor Sun could be luminous, but must needs all of 'em be opacous Bodys, like the Planets, and Earth, and hard Masses, consisting of Parts of the third Element, entangl'd together, and hanging close to each other, with hardly any Motion at all.

When several Bodys or Parts of Matter do move circularly together, those which are least agitated, and least fit for Motion, have least Force to get off at a distance from the Center. And on the contrary, those which are most agitated and most proper for Motion, have most Force to remove themselves from the Center, and do constrain the others to descend towards the Center. This is the third Principle, which I have laid down agreeably to the mind of *Des Cartes* himself. But the Matter of the first and the second, are much more agitated and fit for Motion, than that of the third ; which is my fourth Principle, and every where suppos'd by *Des Cartes*. Therefore the Matter of the third Element, and not that of the first, must needs occupy the Center of the Vortex ; which was the Proposition to be prov'd against that of *Des Cartes*, upon which he builds his whole System of *Light*. Whence it will follow, that the Sun and Stars are not luminous, but opacous Bodys. But here again I would ask *Des Cartes*, by what Principle of his, when he knows not what to do with the Fragments of the *Solar Spots*, nor what Use to apply 'em to either in or near the Center of the Vortex, where they are form'd and broken, he supposes 'em as branchy and unfit for Motion as they are, to be driven notwithstanding and push'd a great way towards the Circumference, and there to make a kind of Air, which, according to him, is extended as far and farther than the Sphere of

Mercury? How is it that the first or second Element, which are either in or near the Center, or immediately below these broken Parts, do thus as it were give up their Right, which they have by virtue of their great Agitation, to the place, which they take up towards the Circumference? And if once this Disorder, as opposite as it is to those Laws, which Mr. *Des Cartes* hath establish'd in his System, be tolerated towards the Sun, why then should a Stone thrown up into the Air near our Earth, be forc'd to fall down with violence towards the Center, by the Matter of the second Element which is below it, under pretence that this Stone has seiz'd upon a place which does not belong to it, but to the Matter, which it has displac'd, by reason of its great Motion? It would be easy upon many other accounts to strike at the main Foundation of the *Cartesian* Vortices; and particularly, I think, these two ways: first by shewing that his manner of explaining Light is no way consistent with that, according to which he disposes, I need not say, his Elements in his Vortices, but the Vortices themselves amongst each other. And secondly by shewing that according to the Principles of *Des Cartes*, neither the Earth nor the other Planets can have a proper Vortex in the Vortex of the Sun. Which being once prov'd, all the *Cartesian* Astronomy is straitway overturn'd, and the whole Oeconomy of his terrestrial World is absolutely ruin'd. But this also being substantially done by the ingenious Author of *Voyage du Monde de Descartes* from p. 273, to avoid Tedioufness, I refer the Reader thither.

However before I take leave of this mechanical Hypothesis, besides what I have oppos'd against it in general, I shall single out a few particular Phænomena, of

of which it cannot give any tolerable account, without the Presidency and Concernment of a God; they being partly above the Force of all mechanick Powers, and partly contrary to the same, and therefore not to be solv'd without *Final Causes* and some vital Principle. As first for example, the *Systole* and *Diastole*, or Pulse of the Heart, so absolutely needful to the *Animal Life*. Now this *Des Cartes* ascribes to an Ebullition and sudden Expansion of the Blood in the Ventricles, after the manner of Milk; which being heated to such a degree, does suddenly, and as it were all at once, flush up and run over the Vessel. Whether this Ebullition be caus'd by a nitro-sulphureous Ferment, lodg'd especially in the left Ventricle of the Heart, which mingling with the Blood, excites such an Ebullition, as we see made by the mixture of some chymical Liquors, namely, Oil of Vitriol and deliquated Salt of Tartar; or by the vital Flame warming and boiling the Blood. But this Conceit of his, as Mr. *Ray* well observes, is contrary both to Reason and Experience: for first, it is altogether unreasonable to imagin and affirm, that the cool venal Blood should be heated to so high a degree, in so short a time, as the Interval of two Pulses, which is less than the sixth part of a minute. Secondly, in cold Animals, as for example Eels, the Heart will beat for many hours, after it is taken out of the Body, even tho the Ventricle be open'd, and all the Blood squeez'd out. Thirdly, the contrary appears from this Experiment of the Learned Dr. * *Lower*: " He drew out of the
" jugular Vein of a Dog about half of his Blood away,
" injecting by turns into the crural Vein, a like Quan-

* *Lower de Corde*, cap. 2.

" tity of Beer mix'd with a little Wine; and this he
 " repeated alternatively so often, till instead of Blood
 " there flow'd out of the Vein only a paler Tincture like
 " Water; and yet the Heart in the mean time remi-
 " ted but a little of its former Pulsation. And the
 " like appears from this Observation, which he had
 " from a Physician worthy of Credit: A Youth about
 " sixteen Years old continuing bleeding for two days
 " together, his Friends and those that waited on him
 " gave him good store of Broth, to keep up and recruit
 " his Spirits; which he swallowing down greedily,
 " his bleeding was now and then increas'd thereby;
 " so that at length having pour'd forth almost the
 " whole Mass of his Blood, that which now run out,
 " was dilute and pale, neither of the nature nor co-
 " lour of Blood, but liker the Broth he had drunk so
 " much of: and this kind of Flux continu'd a day or
 " two (the Heart the mean while retaining its Pul-
 " sation) till at length being stopt, the Youth was re-
 " stor'd by degrees to entire Health, and grew to a
 " robust and lusty Fellow. This Experiment and
 " Observation, I say, do make it apparent that the
 " Motion of the Heart depends not on the Ebullition
 " or Accension of the Blood; for then, when in the
 " first the Beer and Wine, in the second the Broth
 " flow'd into its Ventricles instead of Blood, its Mo-
 " tion must either have been more notably alter'd,
 " or rather have quite ceas'd; these Liquors being
 " so far remote from the nature of Blood, especially
 " the Broth. Thus the ingenious * *Dr. Gibson*. But
 others mechanically inclin'd will perhaps tell us, that
 this comes to pass by reason of the Animal Spirits con-

* *Anatomy of human Bodys epitomiz'd*, p. 239.

vey'd thro the Nerves: but that the Origin of this Motion cannot be thus accounted for, appears in the first place; because the Heart moves in the Embryo, before either Brain or Nerves are so perfectly form'd, that the Animal Spirits can be elaborated out of the Blood by the former, or transmitted to the Heart by the latter: nay, seeing they are made of arterial Blood, that must be sent to the Brain by the Pulsation of the Heart, before they can be generated. And secondly, because those muscular Motions, which depend on the Influx of the Animal Spirits, are voluntary, which this of the Heart is not; for we can neither stop it, nor hasten it at our pleasure, but it is continu'd and carry'd on even without our knowledg or notice. And thirdly, because the Heart of living *Fetus's*, as of young Puppies and of Eels, being cut out of the Body and from all the Nerves, by which any Animal Spirits should flow into it, will continue beating as long as 'tis warm: nay, when it has ceas'd beating, if one throw warm Blood, or but warm Water upon it, it will recover some kind of Pulsation again. Which may serve again to convict the former Opinion of Error; for if its Motion depended only on the Dilatation of the Blood, it would cease so long as the Blood flows no longer into its Ventricles. Lastly, it may be ask'd, if the Animal Spirits are the prime Cause of this reciprocal Motion of the Heart, then how comes it to be so regular? " If, " says * Mr. Ray, that Site, which the Heart and its " Fibres have in the *Diastole*, be most natural to them, " as it seems to be, why doth it again contract it self, " and not rest in that posture? If it be once contracted " in a *Systole* by the Influx of the Spirits, why, the

* *Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation*, p. 31. Ed. first.

" Spirit

“ Spirits continually flowing in without let or hin-
 “ drance, doth it not always remain so? Forasmuch
 “ as the *Systole* seems to resemble the forcible bending
 “ of a Spring, and the *Diastole* its flying out again to
 “ its natural Site. What directs and moderates the
 “ Motions of the Spirits? They being but stupid and
 “ senseless Matter, cannot of themselves continue any
 “ regular and constant Motion, without the guidance
 “ and regulation of some intelligent Being. If any
 natural or mechanical Reason could be given, of the
 Spring and principal Efficient of this Reciprocation;
 this, in * Dr. Gibson’s judgment, would seem the most
 probable: namely, “ that the Blood distilling into the
 “ Ventricles of the Heart, is in them accended and
 “ rarify’d, and wanting more room, expands or bears
 “ against their sides: and then the *Parenchyma* of
 “ the Heart being molested by that Expansion,
 “ calls in the Animal Spirits for help, which coming
 “ in in convenient plenty, contract the muscular Fibres,
 “ that make up the *Parenchyma* of the Heart, and so
 “ by straitning its Ventricles, drive forth the Blood
 “ contain’d in them into the Arterys. But we had
 “ rather, says he, ingenuously confess our Ignorance
 “ of the reason of so admirable an Action, and profess
 “ with Dr. Lower, that it is too hard for man to con-
 “ ceive of, and that it is the Prerogative of God only,
 “ who searches the Secrets of the Heart, to know the
 “ reason of its Motion also. A notable Confession of
 two eminent Physicians, making for our purpose, in
 that it implies the aforesaid Phænomenon not to be re-
 ducible by us to mere mechanical Causes; and there-
 fore it is reasonable for us to refer the first Spring of

* Gibs. Anatom. p. 240.

that Motion to the great first Mover of all things; that so he who gave man's Heart a Pulse and Action, and kindl'd in it a vital Flame, may be acknowledg'd in this Work of his hands, and the Glory of it may be ascrib'd not wholly to the *Creatures* and *the things of Nature*, but originally and principally to the *Creator*.

The next Phenomenon I shall mention, as exceeding all the Powers of Mechanism, is this of a grand *inanimate Body*; namely, the *Intersection* of the *Plains* of the *Equator* and the *Ecliptick*, or the Earth's diurnal Motion, upon an *Axis* not parallel with that of the *Ecliptick*, nor perpendicular to the *Plain* thereof. For tho *Des Cartes* would needs imagin this *Earth* of ours to have been once a *Sun*, and so it self the Center of a lesser Vortex, whose *Axis* was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same *Site* or *Posture*, by reason of the *striate Particles*, finding no fit Pores or Traces for their Passages thro it, but only in this *Direction*; yet does he himself confess, that because these two Motions of the Earth, the *Annual* and *Diurnal*, would be much more conveniently made upon *Parallel Axes*, therefore according to the Laws of *Mechanism*, they should be perpetually brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the *Equator* and the *Ecliptick* come to have their *Axes* parallel to one another. Which as it has not yet come to pass, so neither has there been for these last two thousand Years, according to the best Observations and Judgments of Astronomers, any nearer Approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the Continuation of these two Motions of the Earth, the *Annual* and *Diurnal*, upon *Axes* different or not *parallel*, is resolvable into nothing, but a *final and mental Cause*, or the τὸ βέλτιστον; because it was *best* it should be so, the Variery
of

of the Seasons of the Year depending hereupon. To these Instances might be added many others, as namely *Gravity*, or the Tendency of Bodys downward, the Motion of the *Diaphragma* in Respiration, with innumerable other Phænomena, not explicable according to the Laws of *Mechanism*; but especially that of the Organization and Formation of the Bodys of Animals, consisting of such Variety and Curiosity; which these *Mechanick Physiologers* being no way able to give an account of, from the necessary Motion of *Matter*, unguided by *Mind* for *Ends*, do therefore cunningly break off their System there, when they should come to Animals, and so leave it altogether untouch'd. I acknowledg indeed, that there is a posthumous Piece extant, imputed to *Des Cartes*, and entitl'd *de la Formation du Fœtus*, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by *fortuitous Mechanism*. But as the Theory thereof is wholly built upon a false Supposition, sufficiently confuted by the Learned *Harvey* in his Book of *Generation*, that *the Seed materially enters into the Composition of the Egg*; so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences that are in several Animals, or offer the least reason, why an Animal of one *Species* or *Kind* might not be form'd out of the Seed of another. To which may be added what a very * ingenious and learned Prelate has said to this purpose, that *Galen* in his Book *de Formatione Fœtûs*, takes notice that there are in a human Body above 600 several Muscles, and that there are at least ten several Intentions or due Qualifications to be observ'd in each of these; proper Figure, just Magnitude, right Disposition of its several Ends, upper

* Bp Wilkins of *the Principles and Dutys of Natural Religion*, p. 81, &c.
and

and lower Position of the *Whole*, the Insertion of its proper Nerves, Veins, and Arterys, which are each of 'em to be duly plac'd; so that about the Muscles alone no less than 6000 several Ends or Aims are to be attended to. The Bones are reckon'd to be 284; the distinct Scopes or Intentions in each of these are above forty; in all about 100000. And thus is it in some proportion with all the other Parts, the Skin, Ligaments, Vessels, Glandules, Humors; but more especially with the several Members of the Body, which do in regard of the great variety and multitude of those several Intentions requir'd to them, very much exceed the homogeneous Parts. And the failing in any one of these would cause an Irregularity in the Body, and in many of them such as would be very notorious. And thus likewise is it in proportion with all other kinds of Beings: *Minerals, Vegetables*, and especially such as are *sensitive, Insects, Fishes, Birds, Beasts*; and in these particularly as to those Organs and Facultys, which concern *Sensation*; but most of all as to that kind of Frame, which relates to our *understanding Power*, whereby we are able to correct the Errors of our Senses and Imaginations, to call before us things past and future, and to behold things that are invisible to Sense. Now, says he, to imagin that all these things, according to their several kinds, could be brought into this regular Frame and Order, to which such an infinite Number of Intentions are requir'd, without the Contrivance of some wise Agent, must needs be irrational in the highest degree. Much more may be seen to this purpose in Mr. Boyle's *Disquisition about the Final Causes of natural things*, oppos'd as well against the *Cartesian*, as the *Epicurean Hypothesis*; in Bishop Parker's *Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo*, particularly in Chapters

ters the 2d, 3d, and 4th; in Bishop *Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae*, where from p. 437. 4to Edition, the *Cartesian* System is briefly examin'd, to the end of Book the 3d, Chapter the 2d; in *Voyage du Monde de Des Cartes*, and *Suite du Voyage du Monde Des Cartes*, &c. by the same Author; both which Tracts do, I think, notably ruin the *Cartesian* System in general, and particularly the latter does very well explode the mere Mechanism of Brutes; in Dr. *More's Enchiridion Metaphysicum*, the chief Scope whereof from p. 42. is to prove the Being and Concernment of incorporeal Substance, or God in the Oeconomy of the World, and that the Phænomena of Nature cannot be solv'd without it, by the bare Laws of Mechanism, oppos'd against *Hobbs*, &c. and particularly *Des Cartes*, upon which latter account the Learned * *Huetius* says of the Doctor, that *Malleum Cartesianorum meritò appelles*; also in his *Antidote against Atheism*, particularly Book 2. the main drift whereof is to demonstrate the Being and Providence of God, from the Order and Beauty of the Parts of the Universe; in *Dissertations sur l'Existence de Dieu*, par Mr. *Faquelot*, Dissert. 2. Chap. 4, 5, 6. In Dr. *Scot's Christian Life*, Part 1. Vol. 2. Chap. 4. §. 2. In Mr. *Ray's Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of Creation*, &c.

But still, it may be, the *Cartesian* Mechanist will shelter himself under a Veil of Humility, and tell us after all, † that Final Causes ought not to be of any regard

* In *Censur. Philosoph. Cartes.* p. 156.

* Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud Causarum genus, quod a fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto investigare posse fines Dei. *Cartes. in Meditat. Metaphys.* Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales, a fine, quem Deus aut Natura in iis faciendis sibi proposuit, admittimus; quia non tantum nobis debemus

regard to a Philosopher, because we should not arrogate to our selves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his Secrets ; nay in short, that none of God's ends in his corporeal Works are more manifest than others, but that all of 'em lie equally hid in the Abyss of the Divine Wisdom.

As to which I answer first with the Honourable* Mr. Boyle, “ that there are two very differing ways, where-
 “ in a man may pretend to know the Ends of God in
 “ his visible Works: for he may either pretend to
 “ know only some of God's Ends in some of his
 “ Works, or he may pretend to know all his Ends.
 “ He that arrogates to himself to discover God's Ends
 “ in this latter sense, will scarce be excus'd from a
 “ high Presumption and no less Folly: but to pretend
 “ to know God's Ends in the former sense, is not a
 “ Presumption, but rather to take notice of them is a
 “ Duty. For there are some things in Nature so curi-
 “ ously contriv'd, and so exquisitely fitted for certain
 “ Operations and Uses, that it seems little less than
 “ blindness in *him*, that acknowledges with the *Car-*
 “ *tesians* a most wise Author of things, not to conclude,
 “ that tho they may have been design'd for others,
 “ yet they may have been design'd for *this* Use. The
 Question, says Dr. *Cudworth*, is not whether we can
 always reach to the Ends of God Almighty, and know
 what is absolutely *best* in every case, and according-

debemus arrogare, ut ejus Consiliorum participes esse possimus. *Cartes. in Princip. Philos.* Nec fingi potest aliquos Dei fines, magis quam alios in propatulo esse; omnes enim in imperscrutabili ejus Sapientiae abyssio sunt eodem modo reconditi. *Resp. Quart. ad Object. Gassendi.*

* Mr. Boyle *Disquis. about Final Causes*, p. 15, 16.

ly make Conclusions, that therefore the thing is or ought to be so; but whether any thing at all were made by God for *Ends* and *Good*, otherwise than would of it self have resulted from the *fortuitous Motion* of Matter. And here again I would demand of those, that will not allow us to think that any natural things are directed to Ends knowable by Men; whether, if the Divine Author of them had really design'd them for such Ends, the things themselves are not so fram'd and directed, as in that case they should have been? And whether the Fabrick and Management of natural things do really countenance or contradict our Supposition? " For my part I see no reason at all, why it " should be thought Presumption or Intrusion into the " Secrets of God Almighty, to affirm that *Eyes*, for " instance, were made by him for the end of Seeing; " since, upon the Anatomical Dissection and the " optical Consideration of this Part, we see 'tis as exquisitely fitted to be an Organ of Sight, as the best " Artificer in the world could have fram'd a little Engine, purposely and mainly design'd for the Use of " Seeing; and 'tis very harsh and incongruous to say, " that an Artificer, who is too intelligent either to do " things by *Chance*, or to make a curious piece of Workmanship, without knowing what Uses 'tis fit for, " should not design it for an Use, to which it is most " fit. To this purpose *Aristotle* justly reprehended *Anaxagoras* for that absurd Aphorism of his: that *Man was therefore the wisest or most solert of all Animals, because he chanc'd to have Hands*; he not doubting to affirm on the contrary, that * *it was far more reasonable to think, that because Man was the wisest or*

* "Ευλογον δια τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τὸ ζῶον χεῖρας ἔχειν, &c.

most solert and active of all Animals, therefore he had Hands given him. For Nature, says he, distributes, as a wise Man does, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give Pipes to one that hath Musical Skill, than to him that hath Pipes to give Musical Skill.

But these mechanick Physiologers will tell us further, that it is below the Dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and trivial Offices, and to do the things of *Nature* himself immediately; as also that it would be but a botch in *Nature*, if the Defects thereof were every where to be supply'd by *Miracle*. To which the Reply is easy; that tho the Divine Wisdom it self contriv'd the System of the whole World for *Ends* and *Good*, yet *Nature*, as an inferior Minister, immediately executes the same; I mean not a *dead fortuitous* and merely *mechanical*, but a *vital, orderly, and artificial* Nature, of which I have largely treated towards the end of the third Chapter, and shall here only add concerning it this Description of * *Proclus*: *that it is the last of all those Causes, which frame this corporeal and sensible World, and the utmost Bound of incorporeal Substances; which being full of Reasons and Powers, orders and presides over all mundane Affairs; it proceeding, according to the Magick Oracles, from the Divine Wisdom which is the Fountain of all Life, as well intellectual as that which is concrete with Matter. Which Wisdom this Nature always essentially depending upon, passes thro all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of Life; and things corruptible remain eternal in their Species, they being contain'd by its standing Forms or Ideas, as their Causes.*

* Ἡ φύσις ἐχάτη μὲν ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ σωματωδὲς τῆτο καὶ ἀιδιότητος ἀναιρέτης αἰτίας, &c. Steph. Poet. Phil.

To which I add, that these mechanical Philosophers are again counterbalanc'd by the *Hylozoists*, who are unquestionably convinc'd that *Opera Natura sunt Opera Intelligentia*, the Works of Nature are Works of Understanding; and that the Original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid Matter fortuitously mov'd; upon which account *Strato* derided *Democritus's* rough and smooth, crooked and hooky Atoms, as mere Dreams and Dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other Substance besides Matter, suppose Life and Perception essentially to belong to all Matter as such; whereby it has a perfect Knowledg of whatsoever it self could do or suffer, tho without Animal Consciousness, and can form it self to the best Advantage; sometimes improving it self by Organization, to Sense in Brutes, and to Reason and reflexive Understanding in Men. Wherefore, according to the Principles of these *Hylozoists*, there is no need of a God at all, that is, of one perfect Mind or understanding Being, presiding over the whole World, they accordingly concluding the Opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate Conception of Matter in general, its Life and energetick Nature taken alone abstractly, for a compleat Substance by it self. Nevertheless these *Hylozoists* are no way able by this Hypothesis of theirs neither to solve that Phænomenon of the Regularity and Harmony of the whole Universe; because every Part of Matter, being according to them a distinct *Percipient* by it self, whose Knowledg extends only to its own Concernment, and there being no one thing presiding over all the things of the whole World, * in which all things are co-or-

* 'Εν ᾧ πάντα συντίτταται.

der'd, could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring Harmony. And as for those other Cosmo-plastick Atheists, who suppose the whole World to be as it were but one huge *Plant, Tree, or Vegetable*, or to have one *spermatick, plastick, and artificial Nature*, orderly and methodically disposing the Whole, but without Sense and Understanding; these can no way do the business neither, nor solve the aforesaid Phenomenon; it being utterly impossible, that there should be any such *artificial and regular Nature*, otherwise than as deriv'd from and depending upon a *perfect Mind or Wisdom*.

But besides the Phenomena of *Cogitation, or Soul and Mind* in Animals, *Local Motion* in Bodys, and the *artificial Frame* of things for *Ends and Uses*, together with the conspiring Harmony of the Whole, which can no way be solv'd without a Deity; I might here further add, that the *fortuitous*, that is, the *Anaximandrian* and *Democritick* Atheists, who universally asserted the *Novity* of the mundane System, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first Beginning of *Man* and those greater Animals, which are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of Generation, by the Commixture of Males and Females. *Aristotle* tells us, that they who pretend to account for this, without the Supposal of their being eternal, or made in time by the hand of God, must, as he conceives, do it one or t'other of these ways: either saying that they were generated out of * *Putrefaction*, or from Eggs; and this by the *fortuitous Motion* of Matter, without the Providence or Direction of a Deity. And it was the Sentiment of *Epicurus*, that

* Ἡ ὡς σκώληκος συνιστάμενα τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν. De Gen. An. l. 3. c. ult.
the

the first Men and other Animals were form'd in certain
 * *Wombs* or *Bags* growing out of the Earth. But as
 to this I say, that if Men had been at first form'd in
 this manner, either in *Wombs* or *Eggs*, growing out of
 the Earth, or generated out of *Putrefaction* by *Chance*,
 then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should
 not sometimes so happen now, the Motions of Atoms
 being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were. Nor
 is there any the least ground for that precarious Fan-
 cy and Pretence of *Epicurus*, that the Earth, as a Child-
 bearing Woman, growing old, became at length effete
 and barren. To expose which Absurdity, it may also
 be added, that Men thus at first excluded out of *Bags*,
Wombs, or *Egg-shells*, or generated out of *Putrefaction*,
 were suppos'd by these Atheists themselves to have
 been produc'd, not in a *mature* and *adult*, but an infant-
 like, weak, and tender state, just such as they are
 now born in the world; in which Condition they
 could neither be able to feed and nourish, nor to de-
 fend themselves from Harms and Injurys. Whereas
 surely 'tis not possible, "† that an Infant, which cannot
 " be kept alive one moment *sine Calore Uterino*,
 " should be preserv'd in Bladders adhering to the cold
 " Earth; nor that a Babe, which by the very Course
 " of Nature, cannot be supported without the Care
 " and Oversight of others for many Months, nay Years
 " after its Birth, should be able to preserve it self in
 " the cold and open Air. And who ever heard of
 " those milky Veins arising in the Earth, and yielding
 " a sutable Nutriment to the new-born *Fœtus*? As
 well might *Epicurus* feign the Earth to have Breasts

* Crescebant Uteri terræ radicibus apti. *Lucret.*

† The Words of *Judg Hale*, in his *Origination of Mankind*, §. 3. c. 3.

and Nipples too, as Wombs and Milk (and then what should hinder, but that she might have Arms and Hands also, and swadling Clothes to boot?) as pretend that the Earth, which had been so fruitful a Mother, became afterward by *Chance* too, as tender and indulgent a Nurse of this her own Progeny, and sent forth Streams or Rivers of Milk after them, out of those Gaps of her wounded Surface, from which they had a little before burst out. Moreover, how precariously does the same Atheistick Philosopher add, that in this imaginary state of the new born World, there was for a long time neither any immoderate Heat nor Cold, nor any rude and churlish Blasts of Wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender *earth-born* Infants and Nurslings? All which being consider'd, *Anaximander* seems of the two to have concluded more wisely: that Men, because they require a longer time than other Animals to be hatch'd up, were at first generated in the Bellies of Fishes, and there nourish'd for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorg'd, and cast up upon dry Land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the World so monstrous or prodigiously absurd, which Men atheistically inclin'd, will not rather imagine and swallow down, than entertain the Notion of a God.

But supposing after all, we should grant the Atheists that the Earth at first brought forth all manner of Animals as well as Plants, and among the rest, *Men* and *Women*; yet then I would know of 'em, how there came to be such a seemingly prudent Distinction of Sexes, as was at first needful to propagate the Species; and constantly such a due numerical Proportion of *Males* and *Females*, as was ever since needful to con-

tinue it? What is there imaginable in the Parts of *Matter*, that should make it necessarily fall into the Structure of so much as an Animal, and much less that should make so discreet a Provision for perpetuating the Kind by a difference of *Sexes*? * What can be more plain, than that the Contrivance of *Male* and *Female* in living Creatures is a genuine effect of Wisdom and Counsel? Forasmuch as it is notoriously obvious, that these are made one for the other, and both for the Continuation of the *Species*. Surely did all this depend upon *fortuitous Mechanism*, it cannot well be conceiv'd, but that in some Ages or other there should happen to be either all Males or all Females, and so the *Species* fail: whereas to continue this, I say, there is not only a due *numerical Proportion*, but to make a yet further Discovery of a Providence herein, there is also a manifest regard had in this case to some particular Exigencies of civil Life; for to this purpose it is remark'd by the very learned and pious Judg^t *Hale*, that such as have curiously observ'd the Registers and Calculations of Births and Burials, have found some Excess indeed of *Males* above *Females*, namely as fourteen to thirteen, or thereabouts in most places; which doubtless, says he, is a signal Act of God's Providence, in bringing the Number of each Sex to so near a Parity, yet allowing a Redundance to the Males, to supply those many Casualties, to which they are subject above Females, by reason of Wars, Navigations, and many other Occurrences. All which Circumstances being put together, it plainly appears, that this whole Phænomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but

* See Dr. More's *Antidote against Atheism*, Book 2. ch. 9.

† In Orig. of Mankind.

also the plastick Powers, there being much of Discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting *fatally* and *necessarily*. Wherefore to account for all this, we must have recourse to the *Mosaick* History, and admit of θεὸν ἔκδο μηχανῆς, a *God out of a Machine*; that is, an extraordinary Manifestation of the Deity in contriving and working these Effects.

But besides these Physiological, I might add to the former many other Phænomena no less real, which the Atheists can no way solve: as for instance, that of natural Justice and Honesty, Duty and Obligation, the true Foundation both of Ethicks and Politicks; and the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, *Liberty of Will*, properly so call'd, and not that of *fortuitous* Determination, when there is a perfect *Equality* or *Indifferency* of *Eligibility* in Objects: but that whereby Men deserve Commendation and Blame, Rewards and Punishments, and so become fit Objects for *Remunerative Justice* to display it self upon; a main Hinge on which *Religion* turns*. But let it suffice to have nam'd this only; it plainly appearing from what has been hitherto more largely insisted on, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the Phænomena of Nature, and particularly this of the regular Frame and Harmony of the Universe; and that the true Philosophy or Knowledg of Causes necessarily leads to a God. And if God be thus discoverable by the Usage of Reason, and the Consideration of the things of *Nature*, with what face can the Atheist pretend yet further that this Conceit of ours is owing to the Fiction and Im-

* See either Bp Cumberland, Bp Parker, or Mr. Tyrrel concerning the *Law of Nature*, per totum. Abbadie's *Verité de la Relig. Chrec.* p. 177. and Dr. Scot in his *Christian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 1. ch. 1. §. 1, 2.

posture of Politicians? In that he tells us 3ly, that tho the Infirmitys of human Nature, mens Fear and ignorant Credulity, do much dispose and incline 'em to the Belief of a God, or else of a Rank of Beings superior to Men, whether *visible* or *invisible*, commonly call'd by the Pagans, *Gods*; yet would not this be generally entertain'd as it is, especially that of *one supreme Deity*, the first Original of all things, and *Monarch* of the Universe, * had it not been for the *Fraud* and *Fiction* of Law-makers and Civil Sovereigns, who the better to keep Men in Peace and Subjection under 'em, and in a kind of religious and superstitious Observance of their Laws, devis'd this Notion of a God, and then possess'd the Minds of men with a Belief of his Existence, and a Dread of his Power and Justice.

But as to this in the first place, what will the Atheist say to it, if I overturn his Supposition, by making it appear to him, that the Belief of a God has been establish'd even in those Countrys, where yet there has been no sense of him as a *Rewarder* or *Punisher*, and consequently where that bare Belief of him could not serve the Ends of Policy, nor therefore be pretended to have been the Product of it? Now we are credibly inform'd, that, not to mention the Sect of the *Saduces*, there have been and

* *Thus Cotta in Cicero insinuates that there were not a few, qui dixerunt totam de Diis Immortalibus Opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus Reipublicæ causâ, ut quos Ratio non posset, eos ad officium Religio duceret. L. 1. de Nat. Deor. And Seneca to the same purpose: Ad coercendos Animos imperitorum, sapientissimi Viri indicaverunt inevitabilem metum, ut supra nos aliquid timeremus. Utile erat in tantâ Audaciâ scelerum aliquid esse, adversus quod nemo sibi satis potens videretur; ad conterendos igitur eos, quibus Innocentia, nisi metu, non placet, posuere super Caput vindicem & quidem armatum. Sen. l. 2. Nat. Quæst. c. 42. And too much to this purpose may be seen in some Moderns.*

still are some whole Nations, as particularly the * *Mexicans*, and the *Tapuia* or *Tapuiones* of *America*, that have indeed held the Existence of a God, but yet without any Thought or Notion of him as a Dispenser of future *Rewards* and *Punishments*. Secondly I say, that whosoever affirms the Belief of a God to have been the Invention of Statesmen, and that for the better ordering of human Society, for the instilling into the People a Principle of Fear, and thence of Obedience to Laws; whosoever, I say, affirms this, either does not in earnest think what he says, or if he does, yet will he further appear to think without Reason or Ground. For did he really think, that Religion, tho it be a mere Cheat, yet is thus beneficial and useful to the State he is in; surely then, at least, for his *own*, if not the common Safety, he would not discover it nor prevent the good Effect, which it might have upon the People: or supposing that he really does think so, and at once is so weak as to discover his Thought; yet I say again that he thinks without Reason and Ground. Alas! he looks only at the Surface, and does not dive into the Bottom of the Matter; and so no wonder, if pretending to account for it, he fall into Error and Mistake. He sees indeed that Religion does tend to the support of the Community, and that Politicians employ it for that End: but how will he account for the Origin and Rise, the Universality and Perpetuity of it in the World? Let him tell me, if he can, how it was first planted, and so come to be of this mighty

* *Mexicanis nulla quidem sollicitudo alterius est vitæ, &c. Possum idem de aliis quibusdam ejusce Indiæ Gentibus dicere, sed omnium instar fuerint, quæ de Religione Tapuiarum perscripsit nobis Christophorus Arcissewski Polonus. J. G. Voss. in Addend. lib. 1. de Orig. & Prog. Idololat. p. 2. in 4to Ed.*

Use? Did ever any Statesmen pretend to lay the first Ground of it, and did they not find that already laid to their Hand? A general Bent to that Duty, with respect to God and each other, which keeps up human Society, has in all Times and Places appear'd in all Men that have us'd their Reason; this, Politicians whether Good or Evil have observ'd, and touching the particular Exercise of it, have indeed afterwards cunningly turn'd it to their own Purposes, and made it inservient to their secular Designs: But as to the Original of this first, this general Inclination, whence can it be deriv'd, but from that infinite Wisdom, which first contriv'd our Nature, and so plac'd us in the World, as that without it we cannot subsist? To which purpose a late * Writer has not unfitly made this comparison: " That as he who first of all invented Mills, did
 " not produce that Force which sets these great Ma-
 " chines a work, but only suppos'd it in Wind and Wa-
 " ter, the Motion whereof he ingeniously directed: So
 " may it be said, that Policy supposes and does not
 " make that Knowledge of God, which is a Bridle to
 " retain the People in their Duty. And indeed to ar-
 " gue, that Men have no natural sense of God or Religi-
 " on, because Statesmen, it is granted, do make the Ac-
 " knowledgment of these to serve their Political Ends, is,
 " as another Learned Man well observes, to the full as ir-
 " rational, as to contend, " † That there is not naturally
 " any Self-Love, Love of Wife and Children, Desire
 " of Liberty, Riches or Honour, but what Politici-
 " ans and Statesmen have convey'd into the Hearts of
 " Men: because by applying themselves skilfully to

* Dr. Abbadie de la Ver. Rel. Chrét. prem. Part. p. 15.

† Dr. More in *Appendix to Antidote against Atheism*, c. 8. §. 3.

“ these Affections, they carry and wind about the
 “ People as they please ; and by the inflaming of their
 “ Spirits by their plausible Orations, hurry them many
 “ times into a hazard of losing the very Capacity
 “ of the Enjoyment of those Hopes, that they so fair-
 “ ly and fully spread out before them. It is in vain to
 object against the Universality of this Principle, that
 some particular Persons, nay and whole Nations have
 been without the Knowledg of a God : for touching
 the former, I can return these Answers.

First, That many more have been branded with the
 Character of *Atheists*, especially under Paganism, than *re-*
ally were so, and that merely because they oppos’d and
 ridicul’d the *Gentile Polytheism*, and National Superstiti-
 on : * Such were *Anaxagoras*, *Clazomenius*, *Theodorus*
Cyrenaicus, *Bion Boristhenites*, *Diagoras Melius*, *Euhe-*
merus, *Protagoras*, *Lucian*, &c. nay and *Socrates* himself
 was set down in that Catalogue.

Secondly, Others there have been, whose Tenets in-
 deed in other respects have made for Atheism, albeit in
 Words they expressly disavow’d it ; as *Epicurus* and o-
 thers, who deny’d the Providence, while notwith-
 standing they pretended to assert the Existence of God ;
 and indeed deny’d the former out of a seemingly pious
 Principle, because they thought it beneath so great a
 Majesty, possess’d of so great Happiness, to concern it-
 self with the Affairs here below.

Thirdly, Others there have been, who led by Inte-
 rest or Affectation, have been so hardy as in Words to
 deny and to argue against the Being of a God : but

* See with others both Antients and Moderns, Vigand. de Deo, Mersen. in
 Genes. Col. 669, &c. Spizel. in Scrutin. Atheismi. Bishop Fotherby’s Athe-
 omastix, p. 69, &c. and Bishop Parker’s Tentam. Physico-Theolog. cap. 1.

none of this Number (as the impartial Reader may conclude from this Treatise) have been any more than only Scepticks in Religion; while they have not deliberately and knowingly deny'd the Being and Providence of God; or at least, whatever they rashly and hardily said, could not produce such Grounds of their Denial, as were sufficient for their Minds to acquiesce in, and to weigh down the Scale against the opposite Persuasion. Accordingly sooner or later, most of these Pretenders, unless they have been perfectly stupify'd or had no Interval for Thought, have especially in the view of Death or Danger betray'd the Distrust of their Opinion, and that because they never had a full and binding Conviction upon their Mind; and therefore, * as *Seneca* tells us, *They lie, who say that they believe there is no God; for tho they may profess this somewhat confidently in the Day-time, when they are in Company, yet in the Night and alone, they have doubtful Thoughts about it*: insomuch that they can't be concluded plainly to disbelieve, but only to wish the Non-existence of a Deity. And I dare say, that in the sense before-mention'd, there never was a downright Atheist upon Principles; nor, I may add, ever can be: So that here this Term, as *Tully* speaks, is *Nomen otiosum*; because, not to mention that whatsoever he can urge for his Purpose is much out-balanc'd by the contrary Evidences, moreover he has this Bar in his Way, which he can never pass, the proof of a pure Negative. Now, says an eminent Divine †, all Men are agreed, that 'tis a very hard thing to prove a *Negative*; but to prove

* *Mentiuntur, qui dicunt se non sentire esse Deum, nam etsi tibi affirmant interdum, noctu tamen & sibi dubitant.*

† *Dr. Scot Christian Life, Par. 2. Vol. 1. c. 3. Sect. 2.*

a *pure Negative* is *impossible*, unless the Existence of the Thing, which it denys, implys an exprefs Contradiction. 'Tis true, where a Thing visibly exists, so that we can perceive as well how it doth not exist, as how it doth, we may with as good Evidence deny as affirm; but as for *pure Negatives*, which deny the very *Existence* of such things as may *possibly* exist, it is impossible to be certain of them without an infinite Understanding. For before we can be sure that what is not in our *Understanding*, is not in *Nature*, we must be sure that whatsoever is in *Nature*, is in our *Understanding*; otherwise a thousand things may be, tho we do not understand them. So that after all that can be said against a Thing, this will still be true, that many Things possibly are, which we know not of, and that many Things more *may* be, than *are*. For unless our Understanding were extended to the whole Compass of *Nature*, there may be, for all we know, ten thousand Things in *Nature*, which are not in our *Understanding*. So that concerning pure Negatives we can never be certain, unless the Things, which they deny, be absolutely impossible, and imply in the very Notion of their *Existence*, a plain Contradiction, which cannot be said of the *Existence* of God. For by God we mean nothing but a *Being endow'd with all possible Perfections*; and to say that it is impossible there should be any such *Being*, as is endow'd with all the Perfection, that 'tis possible for a Being to be endow'd with, is to assert Possibilitys impossible, which is a Contradiction in Terms.

Fourthly, I say, that granting some particular Persons to have been deliberate and resolute Atheists in the sense before-mention'd, yet the * Number and

* See Bishop Fotherby's *Atheomastix*, p. 66, &c.

Character of such as have been *reputedly* so, are very inconsiderable. And it may be said, "That as there
 " have been always some Monsters amongst Men, in
 " respect of their Bodys, so may there be likewise in
 " respect of their Minds; and this no Prejudice to
 " the standing Laws of Nature. If the Generality of
 " the most wise and rational Persons so unanimously
 " assent to the Being of a God, shall it be argu'd that
 " this Assent is not Universal, nor consequently Natu-
 " ral; because some few dissolute Persons, who have
 " besotted their Judgments, do question this Truth?
 As well might it be argu'd that Honey is not naturally sweet to our Taste, because a sick Palate does not judge it to be so. Surely, says *Lactantius* *, *There is no Man that dares prefer the foolish Opinion of Diagoras and Theodorus before the Authority of those Seven, that are call'd the wise Men: no nor yet of Pythagoras, or Socrates, or Plato, or the rest of the Philosophers, who have all of them confess'd and acknowledg'd a Divine Providence.*

But again, whereas it is pretended yet further, that some whole Nations have been Atheists, as particularly the antient † *Callaici*, a rude and savage People of *Spain*, and the ‖ *Æthiopians* mention'd by *Strabo* as Atheists; as also the Cannibals of *America*, the Inhabitants of *Soldania* and others, noted as such by some late Travellers: touching the former of these, the

* Non est enim quisquam, qui Diagoræ Theodorique sententiam præferre audeat, vel Authoritati illorum septem priorum, qui sunt appellati Sapientes; vel Pythagoræ, vel Socratis, vel Platonis, cæterorumque summorum Philosophorum, qui esse Providentiam judicaverunt. *Lact. de Irâ Dei, c. 10.*

† *Ενιοι ὁ Καλλιαικὺς ἀθεῖς φασι.* Strab. l.

‖ Id. l. 17.

Learned J. G. Vossius thinks, that Strabo may be suspected to have given this account of one and t'other, * because they had no Images in their Temples; and to this purpose it is observ'd by † Bishop Fotherby, in relation to the Callaici, that Strabo does not affirm this of them himself, nor yet tells us who they were that did so, nor so much as subscribes to their Affirmation, but leaves all in the Uncertainty of *Ενιοι φασί*, some say; and indeed if any did affirm, or Strabo himself suspected 'em to be *Atheists*; it is probable that one or t'other did so, merely upon this account, because the Callaici did not use such a Way of Worship, as he or they approv'd of; in like manner, as Christians themselves have been stigmatiz'd by Heathens with the Brand of *Atheists*, because they would not conform to their *Polytheism* and *Idolatry*. Again, I add as touching the latter, who have been of late represented as *Atheists*, that it may be the Reports are not true, those Travellers who gave them out, having not tarry'd long enough to know the Language, or observe the Customs of the Savages; and this one may the rather guess, because they have been contradicted by others, who have pretended to be curious in understanding their Ways: Or secondly, I say, that if these People were void of all Religion, it was merely because they did not use their Reason, which neither were they observ'd to do any more in matters relating to Civil Life; and so might be reckon'd Anomalys or Monsters of Mankind, and as being no otherwise distinguish'd from Brutes than by their Shape; and thus can they not properly be brought in

* Suspiciari liceat hoc inde fuisse, quia nulla haberent simulachra in Templis. Voss. de Or. & Prog. Idol. in Addend. l. 1. p. 1. in 4to Ed.

† Atheomastix, p. 20.

as Instances either of Atheists or Theists, they not coming under either Denomination; because they never thought directly on one side or t'other, nor therefore can be said *explicitly*, either to believe or disbelieve a God. Wherefore, notwithstanding these seeming Exceptions, it must needs be own'd, that the Idea and Acknowledgment of God is Universal, and that, I add not only as to *Place* but *Time*. Now certainly, says the Theist in *Sextus* *, *it is altogether irrational to think that all Men should by chance light upon the same Propertys in the Idea of God, without being naturally moved thereunto*. And surely, says *Seneca* †, *were Religion a pure Fiction, all the World would never have conspir'd to call upon deaf and idle Gods, that is to say, mere Nothings*. Since Religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable how *Civil Sovereigns* throughout the World, some of whom are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should notwithstanding all of 'em so well agree, in this one cheating Mystery of Government, or piece of *State-Cozenage*; nor if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the Generality of Mankind, as || well the Wise as Unwise, with such a constant *Fear, Awe and Dread*, of a mere counterfeit Thing and an *invisible Nothing*: and which has not only no manner of Foundation neither in sense or reason, but

* Τελέως ὃ ἐστὶ ἄλογον τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιωμαίων, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς ὅτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι. *Adv. Math.* p. 314.

† Non in hunc Furorem omnes mortales consensissent alloquendi surda numina & inefficaces Deos. *De Benefic.* l. 4. c. 4.

|| Quæ tanta Felicitas mentiendi, ut non tantummodo indoctos, sed Platonem quoque & Socratem fallerent? & Pythagoram, Zenonem, Aristotelem, maximarum sectarum Principes, tam facile deluderent? *Lactant. de Ira Dei*, c. 10.

also, as the Atheists suppose, tends to their own great Terror and Disquietude, and so brings them under a miserable Vassalage at once of Mind and Body: especially since Men are not generally so apt to think, that to how much greater Power and Dignity any are advanc'd, so much the more Wisdom must they have above others; and therefore do they commonly pry into the management, and often arraign the Conduct of such, and do seldom implicitly obey their Commands. Is it not then strange, that the World should not all this while have suspected or discover'd this Cheat and Juggle of Politicians, nor smelt out a Plot upon themselves in the *Fiction* of Religion, to take away their *Liberty*, and enthrall them under Bondage: nay and that so many even of these *Politicians* and *Sovereigns* themselves should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply aw'd with the Fear of this invisible Nothing, as any others that are subject to 'em? *All other Cheats and Juggles*, as Cicero * observes, *come quickly to an end, as Flowers shatter'd by the Wind*; and when once they are never so little detected, they are presently thereupon quite dash'd out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the World. But tho the Atheists have been, for above these two thousand Years past, continually buzzing it into Mens Ears, that *Religion* is nothing but a mere *State-Juggle* and *Political Imposture*; yet has not the Credit thereof been the least impair'd thereby, nor its Power and Dominion over the Minds of Men abated. From whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit or fictitious things but what is deeply rooted in the *intellectual Nature* of Man, a Thing

* *Ficta omnia celeriter, tanquam Flosculi, decidunt.* Cic. l. 2. Off.

solid at the Bottom, and supported by its own Strength. Which does very fully and particularly appear in the *Christian Religion*, a Religion plainly, not founded in human Policy, nor tending to promote any worldly Interest or Design; which yet by its own Force has prevail'd over the Power and Policy, the Rage and Madness of all Civil States, Jewish and Pagan, and has conquer'd under it so great a part of the persecuting World, and that not by *resisting* or *opposing Force*, but by suffering Deaths and Martyrdoms, in way of Adherence to this Principle, that *it is better to obey God than Man*; which thing was thus prefignify'd in the Prophetick Scripture: "Why do the
 "Heathen rage, and the People imagine a vain thing?
 "The Kings of the Earth set themselves, and the
 "Rulers take Counsel together against the Lord and
 "against his Christ, &c. He that sitteth in the
 "Heavens shall laugh, the Lord shall have them in
 "derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his
 "Wrath, &c. Yet have I set my King upon my Ho-
 "ly Hill of Sion. I will give thee the Heathen
 "for thine Inheritance, and the uttermost Parts of the
 "Earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O
 "ye Kings, &c.

But to prove that Religion is no Figment of Politicians, I further add: that as the Religion of an Oath is a necessary Bond of *Civil Society*; so Obligation in Conscience, respecting the Deity as its Original, and as the Punisher of the Violation thereof, is the very Foundation of all *Civil Sovereignty*. For *Pacts and Covenants*, into which some would resolve all Civil Power, without this *Obligation in Conscience*, are nothing but mere *Words and Breath*; and the *Laws and Commands* of Civil Sovereigns do not make
 Obli-

Obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of Nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. This is a Truth so evident, that the * Writer *de Cive* could not dissemble it, tho indeed he did not rightly understand this *natural Obligation*; because he supposes that *previous Obligation* to *Civil Obedience*, must needs be deriv'd from mens *private Utility* only; and if so, every man being Judg of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any Subject to rebel against his *Sovereign Prince*, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself that it would tend to his own Advantage, or that he should thereby procure the *Sovereignty*. In short, were the *Obligation* to *Civil Obedience* only by mens *private Utility*, it would then be as easily dissolv'd by the same. Wherefore it remains, that *Conscience* and religious *Obligation* to *Duty* is the only *Basis* and essential Foundation of a Commonwealth or *Polity*, without which there could be no *Right* or *Authority* of *Commanding* in any *Sovereign*, nor *Validity* in any *Laws*. And accordingly I say that religious *Obligation* cannot be thought to be the *Fiction* or *Imposture* of *Civil Sovereigns*, unless *Civil Sovereignty* it self be accounted such; nor a thing, which has no Foundation in *Nature*, but is either wholly *artificial* or *violent*.

Moreover, had a religious *Regard* to the *Deity* been a mere *Figment* or *Invention* of *Politicians*, to promote their own *Ends* and keep *Men* in *Obedience* and *Subjection* under 'em, then would they doubtless have so fram'd and contriv'd it, as that it would have been every way *flexible* and *compliant*: namely by persuading the

* Nisi prius obligentur Cives ad obediendum, hoc est ad non rebellandum, omnis Lex invalida est. Imper. c. 14. §. 21.

World, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the *Divine Will*, and whatsoever was forbidden by their Laws, was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punish'd by him; God ruling over the World no otherwise, than by and in these *Civil Sovereigns*, as his Vicegerents, and as the only *Prophets* and *Interpreters* of his Will to Men. So that the Civil Law of every Country, and the *Arbitrary Will* of Sovereigns, should be acknowledg'd to be the only measure of *Just* and *Unjust*, (there being nothing naturally such) and the only Rule of *Conscience* and *Religion*. For from Religion thus model'd, Civil Sovereigns might think to have an *absolute Power* or an *infinite Right* of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleas'd without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their Subjects being always oblig'd in *Conscience*, without the least Scruple to obey: and this is the only Religion that can be call'd a *Political Figment*. But the generality of Mankind could never yet be persuaded, that the *arbitrary Will* of Civil Sovereigns was the only Rule of *Justice* and *Conscience*; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor any otherwise reveal his Will concerning *Religion* to Mankind, than by these, as his *Prophets* and *Interpreters*. True *Religion* and *Conscience* are no such *waxen things*, servilely addicted to the arbitrary Wills of Men: but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible, they respecting the Deity only, his *eternal* or *everlasting Laws*, and his *reveal'd Will*; with which whensoever human Laws clash (a thing not impossible) they conclude that then *God ought to be obey'd and not Men*. For which reason the * profane

* Much to this purpose in Mr. Hobbs's *Leviathan*, p. 8, 168, 238, and 373 and in *De Cive*, c. 12. §. 2.

Politicians declare open War against this Religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with Civil Sovereignty; because it introduces a *Fear*, greater than the *Fear* of the *Leviathan*, namely that of Him, who can inflict *eternal Punishments* after Death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited Power of theirs, which is such a thing, as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself, a power of making their mere *arbitrary Will* the Rule of *Justice*, and not *Justice* the Rule of their *Will*. Wherefore since Theism and true Religion are thus plainly disown'd and disclaim'd by these Politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their Designs, they cannot be suppos'd to have been the Figments of Civil Sovereigns, nor the mere Creatures of *Political Art*.

Again, if the Idea and Notion of a God were the Invention of Politicians; tho they did invent, yet how could they instil it into the Minds of the People? Why, say the Atheists, the first Invention of it cloth'd it with suitable Words, and so sounding it into Mens *Ears*, convey'd it to their *Understandings*, and thus has it been propagated and transmitted to Posterity by *Oral Tradition*. But how incredible is it, that this primæval Juggler, who liv'd before all Accounts and Records of Time, should cast a mist upon the Eyes of all Mankind, and tell his Tale in such a fortunate Hour, as by it to beguile the *whole World*, and that for *ever after*! But to give a little more Colour to this Shift, perhaps they'll tell me, that I mistake their Supposition, they not understanding this to have been done by the Head of one single Statesman, but by the united Compact and Agreement of several. Which Evasion I still think as groundless as the former; and indeed

M m m

deed it shews the deplorable Obstinacy of the Atheist, who will believe any thing rather than the Truth. For how incredible is it, that Men of all the most distant Parts of the World, (which must be here suppos'd, seeing Religion is universal) of the most different Tempers and Inclinations as to all other things, should meet together and form, and unanimously jump and agree in the Sentiment of a Deity, and effectually convey down the same to all future Generations? When, or where, or by whose Order was this general Assembly conven'd? And how came those Nations, which have no Commerce with any others, nor have heard what passes in 'em, yet should agree with 'em in this Acknowledgment of a Deity? These and many other Difficultys I might urge to the Atheist on this Head, touching which I can expect no Solution from him, but only a perverse and obstinate Silence; which plainly shews, that however the clearest Light of Reason shines brightly upon him, yet he being led by his inordinate Will, resolves to abide in the Darkness of Atheism. But notwithstanding, when beat out of this, he takes up Arms in another Quarter, and makes this further Declaration against *Theism*: saying, that there is a feigning Power in the Soul of Man, which by *compounding*, or else by *ampliating*, and *increasing* the Ideas of things beyond what they really are, can frame Conceptions of such Objects as never were nor will be, as of a Centaur or a Golden Mountain, and so likewise of a God or a Being infinitely perfect, tho indeed there is no such thing; That Politicians exerting this Power in themselves, and observing the same in others, do apply and turn it to their purpose, while they themselves are so discerning, as to know it to be but a mere Deception and Fallacy,

Fallacy, and yet can impose it on the People as a Truth. But touching the former of these, indeed I will not deny, but that the human Soul has a Power of *compounding* Ideas and Things together, which exist severally and apart in Nature, but never were nor will be in that *Conjunction*; and this indeed is all the *feigning* Power which it has. For the Mind cannot make any new *Cogitation*, which was not before, but only compound that which is: As the Painter cannot feign *Colours*, but must use such as exist in *Nature*; only he can variously *compound* 'em together, and by his Pencil draw the Figures and Lineaments of such Things, as no where really are; thus can he add to the Head and Face of a Man, the Neck, Shoulders, and Body of a Horse. And in like manner that more *subtle Painter* or *Limner*, the *Mind* and *Imagination* of Man, can frame *compounded Ideas* of Things, which no where exist, but yet his simple *Colours* notwithstanding must be real; he cannot feign any *Cogitation*, which was not in *Nature*, nor make a positive *Conception* of that, which is absolutely *Nothing*; seeing this would be no less, than to make *Nothing* to be *Something*, or create *Something* out of *Nothing*. And tho the Whole of these *fictional Ideas*, as of a *golden Mountain*, or the like, does not any where actually exist; yet forasmuch as it does not imply a *Contradiction* for it so to do, therefore has it also a *possible Entity* too, and otherwise indeed it could not be conceivable at all. As a *Triangular Square*, for example, being a *contradiction* Thing, has not so much as a *possible Entity*, and therefore is not conceivable as such (tho both a Triangle and a Square severally be conceivable) it being mere *Nonsense*, *Nothing*, and no *Idea* at all. But the Idea of God is not a *Complement* or *Aggregation* of Things,

M m m 2

which

which exist scatteredly and apart in the World ; for then would it be a mere *arbitrarious Thing*, and it might be what every one pleas'd, one adding more Things together, another fewer ; but each of them writing the Name or Title of God, like bungling Painters, under these their several *Figments* : Whereas I have already prov'd, that the Idea of God is one most simple Idea of an *absolutely perfect Being*, tho having several partial and inadequate Conceptions : so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein, but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all *arbitrarious*. Moreover, many of those partial Conceptions contain'd in the entire Idea of God, are no where else to be found in the whole World, existing singly and apart ; and therefore if there be no God, they must needs be absolute *Non-entitys* : as *Immutability, necessary Existence, Infinity, Perfection, &c.* so that the Painter that makes this *Idea*, must here feign Colours themselves, or create *new Cogitation or Conception* out of *Nothing*, upon the *Atheistick Supposition*.

To which I add, that if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that there ever should be any, and so the whole Idea of God would be an Idea of that which has no *possible Entity* neither : whereas those other *fictitious* Ideas, made by the Mind of Man, tho they be of such things, as have no actual Existence, yet have they all a possible Entity, as was before said ; and therefore the Idea of God, were there not indeed such a Being, would exceed even this *feigning Power* of the Soul, which frames complex Ideas of Things which are not, by compounding those of such Things as are. But secondly, what shall we say as to the other exercise of this feigning Power, when by ampliating

and

and increasing Ideas, those *partial Ideas*, which are no where else to be found, arising, say the Atheists, from a *Transition and gradual Proceſſion from Men, in way of Amplification, Augmentation and Improvement*; And when for instance, * *Just as by increasing a Man of an ordinary Stature in our Imagination, we fictitiously make the Phantasm of a Cyclops*; so by beholding a happy Man that aboundeth with all good Things, we intend, and as it were swell, the same in our Minds higher and higher, and so arrive at length to the Idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God? As to which I answer, that according to the Principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such *amplifying and feigning Power* of the Soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no *active Power* at all, but all our *Conceptions* to be nothing but mere *Passions* from the Objects without; according to that of Protagoras, in Plato's *Thaetetus* †: *It is neither possible for a Man to conceive that which is not, or any more or otherwise than he suffers*. And again, as Sextus the Philosopher also intimates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that Fallacy or Error in Ratiocination, which is commonly call'd a *Circle*: for whereas they could not otherwise judge the greatest Perfection and Happiness, which ever they had experience of in Men, to be imperfect, than by an *anticipated Idea of Perfection and Happiness*, with which it was compar'd in their Minds; by virtue of which Idea likewise it comes to pass, that they are able to amplify those lesser *Perfections* of Men further and

* Ως γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἀνθρώπου αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν κύκλω-
 ᾗ, ὥτως ἀνθρώπου εὐδαιμόνα νοήσαντες, &c. Sext. adv. Math. p. 317.

† Οὐδε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάζειν, ἢ ἑτέρα, παρ' ἃ αὐτὰ πά-
 ρουσι.

further,

further, and can take occasion from *imperfect* Things, to think of that which is *absolutely perfect*: that is, in short, whereas these Atheists themselves do first make the Idea of *Imperfection* from *Perfection*; yet still they not attending to this, do again go about to make up the Notion or Idea of that, which is *absolutely perfect*, by way of *Amplification*, from that which is *imperfect*. But that Men have a Notion of *absolute Perfection* in them, by which, as the Rule or Measure, they comparing other things with it, judg them to be *imperfect*; and which is therefore in order of *Nature first*, may appear from hence, because all Theologers, as well *Pagan* as *Christian*, do give this direction for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done *per viam Remotionis*, * by way of *Remotion* or *Abstraction* of all *Imperfection* from him. Lastly, I add, that *Finite* Things put together, can never make up *infinite*; and therefore were there no *infinitely perfect* Being in Nature, the Idea thereof could never be made up by any *amplifying* Power of the Soul, or by the addition of *Finities*. Nor is that of any moment, which *Gassendus* so much objects to the contrary, that tho there were no God or *infinite Being*, yet might the Idea of him be as well feign'd by the Mind, as that of *infinite Worlds*, or of *infinite Matter*, was by some Philosophers. For *infinite Worlds* and *infinite Matter* are but Words ill put together; *Infinity* being a real Thing in Nature, and no Fiction of the Mind, as well as the *World* or *Matter*; but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who deny'd a God, yet retaining this Notion of *Infinity*, should misapply the same, as they did also other Propertys of the Deity, to *Matter*.

* Πρώτη ἢ αὐτῆς νόησις ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν. Alcinous.

In short, I then say, that our human Soul cannot feign or create any new *Cogitation* or *Conception*, which was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a *positive* Idea of an absolute *Non-entity*, that is, of such as hath neither *actual* nor *possible Existence*. Much less could our imperfect Beings create the *Entity* of so vast a Thought, as that of an infinitely perfect Being out of *Nothing*, this being indeed more, than for God Almighty or a *perfect Being*, to create a real World out of *Nothing*: because there is no Repugnancy at all in the latter, as indeed there is in the former. And therefore I affirm, that were there no God, the Idea of an *absolutely* or *infinitely perfect* Being, could never have been made or feign'd either by Politicians, Poets, Philosophers, or any Men whatever. Which may be accounted another Argument for a Deity.

But lastly, perhaps it may be said, and indeed we find the People too apt to fancy, that Religion has no real Bottom, but is only what a Libertine defines it, * *a sort of a reverential or seemingly Holy Worship, introduced by the Magistrate among the Subjects, to keep the Community in order*; and that, because it is too plain that *Politicians*, those who are Masters of Ecclesiastick or Civil Prudence, and privy to the Intrigues of Church or State; who seem to sit at the Helm of Religion, and to direct the Course of others, are commonly observ'd to have the least share in that Piety, which they take upon 'em to deal out to their Inferiours; and that they are generally found to be either *Profane*, or at least *Dissemblers*. In answer to which,

* Religio est cultus sacer in cœtum subditorum a Magistratu introductus ad servandum Rei-publicæ statum. Cited by Spizelius in Scrutinio Atheismi.

I have thought fit to make the following Remark ; and that not only for the sake of the People, but also Politicians themselves. Now does this come to pass, as the too credulous Vulgar, too servile Imitators may imagine, because as the Wisdom of Superiors and Rulers is proportion'd to their Greatness, they can form and give out those Laws to others, which yet they see no Ground for observing themselves ? No, far from it ; the main reason of it seems to me to be this ; Persons in a state of Superiority, even from a Sovereign Prince to a leading Parishoner, from a chief Prelate to a Country-Priest, perceiving indeed how mightily Religion conduces to the Good of Society ; but on one hand, being us'd in Conversation with their Equals, to talk of it irreverently, and to boast how much they awe the poor People by this means ; on t'other, having been very early push'd on into Hurry and Business, and either thro want of a Rational Catechism in their Minority, or of Leisure-Intervals in their Manhood, not able to form clear Ideas of the Grounds of Religion, nor to examine the Reasons and Doctrines, however skilful they may be, as to the outward Management of it, they seem, as appears by their Behaviour, to have fallen insensibly into an implicate Persuasion, that Religion, according to its whole Design, is only a Politick Bridle, by which such wise Directors, as they fancy themselves to be, do prettily steer and govern Fools. But alas poor Men ! let 'em not hug themselves nor laugh in their Sleeves upon this Conceit ; since it is easy to decide in this Case, which are the greater Cullys, either they or the People ; for tho herein they may indeed deceive the People, yet are they more grossly deceiv'd themselves. I grant 'em indeed that Religion in their Hands is a very useful Instrument ; yet, as I have said

said before, they never form'd, but only were so lucky as to find it, and so to take advantage of the Peoples Inclinations: but still it is obvious to determine, whether *they* by discarding all *Religion*, as thinking it entirely of their own Prescription; or they who embrace and hold it in the gross, tho built upon and cumber'd with some of *their* Inventions, are most in the wrong? Since Religion, to omit other Proofs of its Truth, is presuppos'd by their very Policy, as the prime Foundation upon which it stands, and those Maxims of *Righteousness*, on which Government depends, are plainly found to be of as early a Date, as our Nature, and therefore not to have been first invented by Men, but implanted in us by God; and if so, it then follows, that they are of an universal and necessary Obligation, and that they bind Politicians themselves, as well as those, over whom they preside; and whether they consider it or not, they are the main Basis of all their *Civil Wisdom*. In short, let it be observ'd, that the primary Maxims of *Religion*, which *are* and which alone *can* be immediately useful to Government, are *Justice* and *mutual Kindness*, grounded on a serious *Fear* of God: and what else are these, but merely the Results of *human Nature*, and the Need, we find it has, of being sociable? By consequence what are they, but the Laws of him, who made us, and designs our Happiness? So that whereas it is experienc'd, that they are *profitable* for this End, they ought on that very score to be look'd on also as *Moral Goods*, and such as *right Reason* might have prescrib'd antecedently to an Experiment of 'em: Since whatever Rules may be judg'd to promote the true Interest of us, and of the State, which by Nature we are in, must needs be regarded as the Ordinances of him, who made and plac'd us in

N n n

that

that State; and as Laws of no less Force and Obligation, than if he had expressly pen'd 'em down, or by a Voice promulg'd 'em to us. Thus have I abundantly confuted those three Atheistick Pretences, to solve the Phenomenon of Religion from Fear, and the Ignorance of Causes, and the Fiction of Politicians. And therefore I conclude with *Alexander ab Alexandro* *, *That the first Men were neither taught by any Learning, nor persuaded by any Reason, nor compell'd by any Law; but only of their proper and natural Inclination betook themselves to a Divine Worship.* No sooner did they open their Eyes and use their Reason, but the sense of a God, who is to be ador'd, started up in 'em either by mere Instinct, or the Consideration of the Things, which he has made, whether they be such *ordinary Phenomena*, as I have before-mention'd, and which we find can no way be solv'd without the supposal of a God; or some other *Phenomena extraordinary*, which I shall now mention, as either immediately proving a *God and Providence*, or else that there is a rank of *understanding Beings invisible, superiour to Men*, from whence a Deity may be afterwards infer'd; and such especially are these, namely, *Apparitions, Miracles and Prophecys*; each of which I shall distinctly treat of, and first of *Apparitions*; to which may be fitly subjoin'd the *Phenomena of Magicians or Wizzards, of Energumeni or Daemoniacks.*

Now touching *Apparitions*, or the Manifestation of *finite Spirits*, by sensible Tokens amongst Men, tho I grant there is much *Fabulosity* in relations of these Matters, and that a great number of 'em are false; yet can

* *Primi Mortales nullâ Doctrinæ Scholæ, Ratione aut Lege; sed suo quisq; ingenio numina coluerunt. Genial. Dier. l. 6. c. 26.*

it not thence be reasonably infer'd, that none of 'em are true, especially such as have been aver'd and attested in all Ages by Persons of unquestionable Prudence and unsuspected Veracity, and who could in no wise be suppos'd, either thro Ignorance or Design, to relate or give Testimony to a Falshood; and especially again if the Matters they relate, have been at once observ'd by many Eye-Witnesses, and, to shew 'em yet further to be real, there have afterwards remain'd some sensible Marks and Footsteps of 'em; * for these methinks are so clear and authentick Proofs of the Truth of 'em, that no one can believe or even suspect, but can only *wish* 'em to be false. How extravagant then is it for Men to rant and swagger, and, as if they thought themselves to be the highest rank of *Beings*, to deny in gross, that there are or have been such Things as *Apparitions* or *Spiritual Powers*; which, upon occasion, are sometimes *visible*, or otherwise perceivable to *Sense*? Especially considering, that for the Atheist to assert that there have been no *Apparitions*, is in effect to assert (and so indeed he seems to mean) that it is impossible there should be any; for if it be possible there should be any, unless he will pretend to know whatever is or has been, how can he deny that they actually have been? But for him to assert that *Apparitions* are impossible, must suppose him to pretend that he knows not only all that *is* or *has been*, but likewise all that is possible to be; or else that an *Apparition* im-

* Certè quamvis nollem omnes harum rerum narrationes, quæ ad has Leges non quadrant, Falsitatis haberi suspectas; de eis tamen, quæ quadrant, dubitare, hominis profectò mihi videtur esse Sceptici aut obstinatæ Incredulitatis, quiq; misere afflictimque cupit, ut nullæ hujusmodi Narrationes sint vera. Dr. More in Enchirid. Metaph. p. 336. Where, as also in the following Pages, are Instances given of what is here mention'd.

plys a Contradiction: neither of which Pretences can he have the least Colour of Reason for. Wherefore, as it cannot be any ground of *Reason*, it can be no other than a Motive of *Interest*, that inclines Men to deny or doubt of these things; they are not willing to believe that there are Spirits of a lower Order, but superior to Men, lest they should thus make way for the Admission of a *supreme Spirit* or God, a Spectator and Judg of their evil Deeds; whom the sense of their former Guilt, and their Desire to increase it, obliges 'em, what they can, to banish from their Thoughts. But for this end, what seeming Reason or Evasion have they in the present Case? Why they impute the Original of these Things to Mens mistaking both their *Dreams* and their *making Fancys* for real *Visions* and *Sensations*. But herein I tell 'em that they plainly contradict one fundamental Principle of their own Philosophy, that *Sense is the only Ground of Certainty*, and the *Criterion* of all Truth: for if prudent and intelligent Persons may be so frequently mistaken in confounding their own *Dreams* and *Fancys* with *Sensations*, how can there be any Certainty of *Knowledg* at all from *Sense*? For this Reason some of the Atheists, being apprehensive of this Inconvenience, of denying so many sensible Appearances, and Testimonys and Relations of Fact, have chose rather to acknowledg the reality of Apparitions, concluding 'em nevertheless to be either *Idols*, or certain finer *Concretions* of Atoms, that is a kind of *Aereal* or *Æthereal Animals*, corruptible and mortal, and so in no danger of introducing the Belief of a God (as * *Democritus* did) or else Things *caus'd* and *created* by the Power of Imagination only; as if

* Δημόκριτος εἰδὼν ὅτι τὴν ἀπορία ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, &c. θεωρούμενα καὶ φαντάσματα. Sext. adv. Math. p. 311.

the Strength of Imagination were such, that it could not only create *Fancys*, but also *real sensible Objects*; and that at a distance from the Imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, tho they quickly vanish away again. From which prodigious Paradox we may take notice that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which Men infected with *Atheistick Incredulity*, will not rather entertain into their Belief, than admit of any thing that shall in the least hazard or endanger the Existence of a God *; if, think they, we once acknowledg *invisible Ghosts* or *Spirits*, as *permanent Things*, it will not be easy to give a reason, why there may not also be one supreme *Ghost*, presiding over them and the World. But the reality of these things might be further confirm'd by the Phenomena of *Magicians* or *Wizzards*, *Energumeni* or *Demoniacks*; both of these proving also the real Existence at least of *evil Spirits*, and that they are not mere *Fancys*, or imaginary Inhabitants of Mens Brains only, but real Inhabitants of the World. By *Magicians* or *Wizzards* I mean such Persons as do associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with evil Spirits, for the gratification of their own Revenge, Lust, Ambition and other Passions; and to these, besides what the Scripture says of 'em, there have been so full Attestations given by Persons unconcern'd in all Ages, that those our so confident Exploders of them in this present Age, can hardly escape the suspicion of Atheism or some other sinister Design, it being not otherwise conceivable how they should be led by so very

* See the great Absurdity of this and of other Attempts of Atheists to solve these Things, expos'd and baff'd and the contrary prov'd in More's Antidote against Atheism, lib. 3. c. 16. in Enchirid. Met. c. 20. in Mersen. Quæst. celeberrimæ in Genesim, from Col. 477. to 538. and in Templer's Idea, Theolog. Leviath. from pag. 319. to 337.

weak and inconclusive Reasonings, as the greatest Champions among 'em cou'd produce. Again, I add, as to *Energumēni*, *Dæmoniacks*, or Persons, whose Bodys are possess'd and infested by the Devil, that these do also prove the real Existence of evil Spirits; and that there have been such, *Josephus* tells us, that the Pharisaick Jews were generally persuaded; and to shew that this was not a mere Form of Speech amongst 'em, to denote those who were any way ill-affected or barely distemper'd in their Bodys (as a late Atheistick Writer would have it) *Josephus* tells us *, *That they were the Spirits or Souls of wicked Men deceased, getting into the Bodys of the Living.* Which Opinion, whether it were altogether true or not, yet however this Account that the *Pharisees* held it, shews what makes enough for my purpose, that they believ'd Things real and extraordinary to be sometimes effected in human Constitution by the Energy and Action of *evil Spirits*. Accordingly neither the Object nor the Power to work on it in this Case was deny'd to our Saviour by the *Jews*, nor were they at all surpriz'd that as he had frequent Opportunitys, he actually cast out Devils; it being usual for *them* also, as the same † Writer tells us, to exorcise the same, the Art of doing which they pretended to have learnt from *Solomon*. Moreover, not only the *Jews* heretofore, but also the *Greeks* and other *Gentiles* were persuaded of this Agency of Demons and Spirits in or upon the Bodys of Men, as appears from *Apollonius Tyanens*'s curing a laughing *Dæmoniack* at *Athens*, he ejecting from him an evil Spirit, as the People at least thought, by Threats and Menaces, which is

* Πνεύματι ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν ἐισινοῦμενα. Ant. Jud. l. 8. c. 2.
 † Jos. ib.

said at its Departure to have tumbled down a Royal Porch in the City with great noise; as also from his freeing, as Heathen Authors report, the City of *Ephesus* from the Plague, by stoning an old ragged Beggar, said by *Apollonius* to have been the Plague, which appear'd to be a Dæmon, by his changing himself into the Form of a shagged Dog. And again, that there have been real Instances of this Nature since the times of Christianity, is plain from the Records of credible Writers: *Pfellus* avers of a certain *Maniacal* Woman, that tho she knew none but her own Mother Tongue; yet when a Stranger, who was an *Armenian*, was brought into the Room to her, she spake to him presently the *Armenian Language*; at which, says he, we all stood amaz'd. But further, he adds concerning the same Person, that she foretold certain future Events, which happen'd shortly after to himself: She looking upon me, he tells us, said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful Pains and Torments in thy Body; for the Demons are extremely angry with thee, for opposing their Service and Worship; and they will inflict great Evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a Power greater than that of Demons, exempt thee from them. All which Things, says he, happen'd shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to Death by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully deliver'd. Whereupon *Pfellus* concludes: * Who then, says he, that considers this Oracle or Prediction, will infer, as some Physicians do, all kind of Madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant Motions of the Matter or Humors, and not the Tragick Passions of the Demons? Moreover, that not

* Τίς ἂν ἐκείνου τὴν χρησμόν ἐωρακώς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελὲς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τραγικὰ δαιμόνων; Psel. περὶ Ἐνεργ. Δαιμόν.
only

only formerly, but also at this very Day, *evil Spirits* or *Demons* do sometimes really act upon human Bodys, and inflict or augment Diseases and Distempers, has been the Judgment of two very experienc'd *Physicians*, *Sennertus* and *Fernelius*: The former of whom tells us, * *That tho the Devil may, by Divine Permission, possess Men without any morbid Disposition, yet does he usually intermingle himself with bodily Diseases, and especially those of Melancholy; and perhaps, says he, this comes to pass oftner, than is commonly believed or suspected.* The latter also having attributed real Effects upon the Bodys of Men, to Witchcraft and Enchantment, adds: *Neither do these wicked Magicians only inflict Diseases upon Mens Bodys, but also send Devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of Fury and Madness, which yet differs from a simple Madness, or the Disease so call'd, in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare Things past unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.* Of which he subjoins two notable Instances, one whereof was in the Case of a young Man of a noble Family, who was strangely convuls'd in his Body, having sometimes one Member, sometimes another violently agitated, insomuch that four several Persons were scarce able to hold them; and this at first, without any Distemper at all in his Head, or Crazedness in his Brain. To whom *Fernelius* with other skilful *Physicians* being call'd, apply'd all manner of Remedys; Blisters, Purgations, Cupping-Glasses, Fomentations, Unctions, Plaisters, and strengthening Medicines, but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same *Fernelius*: *Because, says he, we were all far from the Knowledg*

* *Sennert. de Mania, l. 1. c. 15.*

of the Truth; for in the third Month it was first plainly discover'd to us, that it was a certain Demon, who was the Author of all this Mischief; he manifesting himself by Speech, and by unusual Words and Sentences, both in Greek and Latin, tho the Patient were altogether ignorant of the Greek Tongue, and by his revealing many secrets of those who stood by, especially of the Physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the Patient in that manner with their frustraneous Remedys. Now upon all this, I say, that when *Maniacal* Persons do not only discover Secrets, and declare Things past but future also; and besides this, speak in Languages, which they had never learnt, this puts it out of all Doubt and Question, that they are not mere Madmen, but *Demoniacs* or Persons possess'd by evil Spirits. Wherefore to this purpose *Fernelius* concludes his Discourse: *These Things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil Demons or Devils do sometimes enter into the very Bodys of Men, afflicting and tormenting 'em after an unheard of manner, but that at other times, tho they do not enter into, and possess their whole Body, yet partly by exagitating, and disturbing the profitable Humours thereof, partly by traducing the Noxious into the principal Parts, or else by obstructing the Veins and other Passages with them, or disordering the structure of the Members, they cause innumerable Diseases* *. There are many other unexceptionable Instances of this kind, recorded by modern Writers, of Persons either wholly *Demoniacal* and possess'd by evil Spirits (this plainly appearing from their discovering Secrets and speaking Languages, which they never learnt) or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural Symptoms, and

* Fernel. de abditis rerum causis.

only formerly, but also at this very Day, *evil Spirits* or *Demons* do sometimes really act upon human Bodys, and inflict or augment Diseases and Distempers, has been the Judgment of two very experienc'd *Physicians*, *Sennertus* and *Fernelius*: The former of whom tells us, * *That tho the Devil may, by Divine Permission, possess Men without any morbid Disposition, yet does he usually intermingle himself with bodily Diseases, and especially those of Melancholy; and perhaps, says he, this comes to pass oftner, than is commonly believed or suspected.* The latter also having attributed real Effects upon the Bodys of Men, to Witchcraft and Enchantment, adds: *Neither do these wicked Magicians only inflict Diseases upon Mens Bodys, but also send Devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of Fury and Madness, which yet differs from a simple Madness, or the Disease so call'd, in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare Things past unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by.* Of which he subjoins two notable Instances, one whereof was in the Case of a young Man of a noble Family, who was strangely convuls'd in his Body, having sometimes one Member, sometimes another violently agitated, insomuch that four several Persons were scarce able to hold them; and this at first, without any Distemper at all in his Head, or Crazedness in his Brain. To whom *Fernelius* with other skilful *Physicians* being call'd, apply'd all manner of Remedys; Blisters, Purgations, Cupping Glasses, Fomentations, Unctions, Plaisters, and strengthening Medicines, but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same *Fernelius*: *Because, says he, we were all far from the Knowledg*

* *Sennert. de Mania, l. 1. c. 15.*

of the Truth; for in the third Month it was first plainly discover'd to us, that it was a certain *Demon*, who was the Author of all this Mischief; he manifesting himself by Speech, and by unusual Words and Sentences, both in Greek and Latin, tho the Patient were altogether ignorant of the Greek Tongue, and by his revealing many secrets of those who stood by, especially of the Physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the Patient in that manner with their frustraneous Remedys. Now upon all this, I say, that when *Maniacal* Persons do not only discover Secrets, and declare Things past but future also; and besides this, speak in Languages, which they had never learnt, this puts it out of all Doubt and Question, that they are not mere Madmen, but *Demoniacks* or Persons possess'd by evil Spirits. Wherefore to this purpose *Fernelius* concludes his Discourse: *These Things do I produce, to make it manifest, that evil Demons or Devils do sometimes enter into the very Bodys of Men, afflicting and tormenting 'em after an unheard of manner, but that at other times, tho they do not enter into, and possess their whole Body, yet partly by exagitating, and disturbing the profitable Humours thereof, partly by traducing the Noxious into the principal Parts, or else by obstructing the Veins and other Passages with them, or disordering the structure of the Members, they cause innumerable Diseases* *. There are many other unexceptionable Instances of this kind, recorded by modern Writers, of Persons either wholly *Demoniacal* and possess'd by evil Spirits (this plainly appearing from their discovering Secrets and speaking Languages, which they never learnt) or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural Symptoms, and

* Fernel. de abditis rerum causis.

such as cannot be reduc'd to proper Classes in the Catalogue of human Diseases ; which for brevity's sake I omit.

But upon the whole perhaps it may be ask'd, if the Existence of Spirits and Dæmons be so plainly evinc'd by matters of *Fact*, by the undoubted *Appearances* and Operation of them in way of *Witchcraft* or *Possession*, how then comes it to pass, notwithstanding all this, that so many do disclaim and disbelieve 'em ? Why first I say in general, that one reason of it is the frequent Imposture and Illusion of the *Romanists* in their Exorcisms and pretended Miracles. A second may be the too great Credulity of some, who attribute all that to the Agency of Spirits, and make every thing to be *Witchcraft* or *Possession*, which they do not understand, and are not able to account for ; when the Whole notwithstanding might be the mere Product of ordinary Causes. A third reason, particularly in reference to *Witchcraft*, may be, that perhaps thro the Ignorance of some Judges and Jurys, it may have come to pass, that some silly melancholy People have been condemn'd, either upon their own Confession, or other slender and insufficient Proofs. And fourthly, some seem to be incredulous to all these things, because we cannot explain the manner how they come to pass, nor answer all their Querys about 'em. But the Truth of these Premises being granted, will it not be unreasonable to argue thus from 'em, that because there have been Cheats in the World, because some have been too credulous to things of this nature, and particularly some, either thro their own Weakness or the Ignorance of others, have been condemn'd and suffer'd Death for *Witchcraft*, when indeed they were not guilty of it, and because some

Parti-

Particulars relating to the *Modus* of these things are not explicable by us; therefore all Men are Deceivers or deceiv'd, and there is no reality in any of these matters? As well might they argue as to other points, that because many Historians, either out of Design or mere Credulity and Ignorance, have written fabulous Accounts of things, therefore none of 'em are to be trusted, none are authentick and true; that some have suffer'd as Criminals, who were not so, therefore there have been or are no Criminals at all; and that all the Phænomena in Nature, the reasons whereof we do not comprehend, are mere Figments and Delusions. Yet these however we may find to be the grounds Men generally go upon against the Truth of *Apparitions*, *Wizzards*, and *Demoniacks*; and thus childishly do they argue not only in Company but Books, from some particular negative Premises to an universal negative Inference; which is so weak and inconclusive a way of reasoning, that every unbiass'd impartial Judg cannot but think, that they rather wish, than are thorowly convinc'd of the Falshood of these matters. It is observable, that most of the Saducean Order are strongly prejudic'd, and resolv'd beforehand to be Scepticks or downright Unbelievers in these Points; and therefore will they not examine and search 'em with that Candor and Indifferency, which they shew in other cases: and what can be the reason of this strong Prepossession, this obstinate Doubting or Infidelity, but a secret Atheism, or rather an Inclination to it, lurking at the bottom? They dread to own such things as *finite Spirits*, lest this should induce the Belief and Thought of an infinite Spirit or God; whom tho many of the modern *Saduces* do perhaps in words confess, yet is it remarkable of 'em again, that in

O o o 2

their

their Works they deny him, and therefore make it their great Concern to banish him out of their Hearts, and not to *have him in all their Thoughts*. It must be some such Bias as this that seduces mens Judgments, and carrys 'em to the wrong side; which makes me, whenever I reflect upon the unspeakable Danger of, and the little ground they have for one and t'other, especially considering the opposite Evidences; I say, this makes me, whenever I reflect upon it, almost apt to think, that more than this, the Devil himself, tho' hid behind the Curtain, has no small hand in the Conclusion, he secretly *working* in those very *Children of Disobedience*, who deny his Existence, and thereby making 'em either *knowingly* or *unknowingly* to be servicable to himself: and that because now-a-days he may be suppos'd more effectually to compass his malicious Designs by concealing himself, as if there was no such Being, than by appearing and openly acting; for thus without question does he most successfully draw Mankind into Mischief and Perdition, even when they least think of him, or suspect his Concernment and Agency about 'em. Indeed it must be own'd, that in times of gross Ignorance, when Men had not the Knowledg of the true God, or at least not of the means of drawing near to him and obtaining his Favour, the Devil had then a fair opportunity of rivalling the Deity, of setting up himself for a God amongst the People, and frightening them into the Worship of him; and that because seeing themselves to be subject to his Power, and therefore in danger from his Displeasure, yet they knew not where to take Sanctuary from it, as having no plain Direction or Rule for addressing themselves to, and finding Refuge in the *one great God*. But now, since that Christ Jesus

was

was manifest in the *Flesh* to destroy the *Works* of the Devil, and has brought *Life and Immortality to Light*, and made the way to *Salvation* plain thro his *Gospel*: this cursed Fiend being accordingly sensible, that his former Wiles are hereby confounded, and his Hands extremely shorten'd, does now betake himself to act another part, and is glad to display his Artifice and Spite in a new and different method. He very well knows, that now, at least wheresoever the Gospel has resounded, the Rule of Life and Salvation is plain before mens Eyes; and that therefore 'tis but for 'em to attend to this Rule, and then they are in a sure way to Happiness. But whereas this Attention is an Act of the *Understanding*, which the generality do much seldomer use than their *Imagination* and *Senses*; this Rule is too often disregarded, and so becomes of no advantage to 'em; especially if when they do chance to think of it, yet they are unable, as too frequently Men are, to demonstrate the ground on which it stands, that is, to prove the Divine Authority and Truth of the Scriptures, and withal are sway'd by their Lusts and Vices, by ill Examples, Customs, and the like, to disbelieve 'em, even because they plainly declare against all *Ungodliness*, and would persuade Men to *live godly, righteously, and soberly in this present World*. The Case, I say, being so, what do men do in this unlucky Juncture, but yield to these Temptations, and imprudently reject the Rule of their Conduct? In the mean while the grand Enemy of Souls cunningly stems the Tide, and opportunely falls in with this Bent to Infidelity: but there what he mainly endeavours, is to confirm and increase mens Prepossession against that Gospel, which he knows contains the Words of eternal Life; accordingly
what

what thro their own corrupt Nature, their Habits of Ungodliness, and lastly the Reinforcement of both, with the invisible Workings and Suggestions of the Devil, they are made yet more averse to the Restraints of Christianity, and would fain have it to be an Imposture ; and under that Stupidity and Numbness of Spirit, which must needs follow their wretched Vassallage to Sin and *Satan*, as they are unable to use their Understanding to make enquirys into these matters, or to raise their Souls to any higher pitch than the Acts of Fancy and Sensation, they only want something extraordinary to be objected to these latter, they only want the visible Appearance of a *Spirit* or *Devil*, to convince 'em that there is a *God*, and that the Religion, which so often mentions, and has very frequent References to 'em, is true. Whereupon the Devil now thinks it for his purpose to act unseen, lest by openly appearing, he should straightway turn Persons thus affected to the Rule which is before 'em ; lest when they have had their desir'd Proof of his Existence, they should then begin to think of God and a future Judgment, and so to make *their Calling and Election sure*. This, I say, may be argu'd in point of mere Reason, when we consider the Danger men incur, the Weakness of the ground they go upon, the Evidence they oppose in denying Spirits, and withal the Interest the Devil may be thought to propose to himself in their doing so, that he has a hand in so absurd a Conclusion. And this being reasonable in it self to be suppos'd, makes me the rather credit this Fact related by * *Mamorius*, concerning *Gulielmus Linensis* a Popish Doctor, who con-

* Pet. Mamor. in Lib. de Lamiis.

feſs'd Witchcraft, and died a Penitent for it, he producing out of his Pocket a written Covenant made with Satan, and owning that his Share of the Devil's Service was to preach and perſuade the People, that Wizzards or Witches, and Perſons ſuppos'd to be in league with the Devil, were ſilly deluded Melancholiſts, and that therefore their Confessions were no Proof againſt 'em. And for the reaſons aforeſaid it is much to be ſuſpected, that the Devil now actuates not only the Tongues, but alſo the Pens of thoſe, who either deny his Exiſtence, or at leaſt his Concernment with Mankind. Thus to ſingle out one or two of 'em, that have lately made moſt noiſe, as having ſuch a Fund of natural Parts, Shew of Learning, Plauſibility of Speech, Stock of Assurance and Vogue in the World, &c. as were ſufficient to puzzle the Truth, at leaſt among the ignorant and unthinking ſort, and to amuſe thoſe who have never made Enquirys, but being prejudic'd by inward Inclination, *deſire* the Falſhood of theſe matters, and are well enough ſatisfy'd even with the very Title of a Book that denys and pretends to explode 'em: what elſe can be thought of a late *Dutch* Writer, but that he himſelf was infatuated by Satan, while among many other Impertinencys he tells us, that to believe a Devil, or at leaſt his Concernment with *us* here on Earth, is for us to be *Ditheists*, and with *Manes* to believe two Gods: * *It is now look'd on*, ſays he,

* In Preface to firſt Book of *De Betoverde Weereld*, or the World Bewitch'd, by Balthaſar Bekker, S. T. D. and Preacher at Amſterdam. See this Book answer'd by Mr. Binet in *Traité Historique des Dieux & des Demons du Paganisme*, avec quelques Remarques Critiques ſur le Systeme de Mr. Bekker.

as a point of Godliness, for Men truly to fear God, and at once to fear the Devil; and without this double Fear a Man passes for an Atheist, or one who believes no God at all, because forsooth he believes not two Gods, one good and another evil: but such as do this, he adds, may in my opinion be justly term'd Ditheists, or Believers of two Gods. To this I add the mention of another late plausible, but very loose Writer, of whom I should not have taken any notice, but that some Well-wishers to Atheism have said, that he urg'd the strongest Arguments they had met with against Apparitions, Witchcraft, and the like; which therefore I shall just set in view, to expose the Weakness both of his and their Judgments, and to this I need add but little other Confutation.

1. He tells us that to assert such things is *absolutely to deny the Omnipotence of God*: as if because God allow'd some derivative Power to the Creatures, therefore he himself could not still be *Almighty*.

2. That this Belief *speaks a want of Religion, Sense, and Wisdom*: for which however he gives no reason; and therefore I have the more reason to think, that he himself is wanting in these Characters: but as he is willing to have the Credit of 'em, tho really inconsistent with his other Principle, he is so *bold* as to deny that they consist with the opposite Persuasion.

3. That *none but Europeans can credit Storys of this nature*: this, I say, is a mere story of his; or were it not, yet would it be hard to account, how among these most *reasonable* People of the World, there should be so universal a *Fame* and *Fear* of that, which never was, is, nor can be.

4. That the Devil must be suppos'd to promise good things to those Miscreants, who entrust themselves to him:

him: but in fact it is seen that he does not do good to nor enrich 'em, but suffers 'em *all* to be destitute and *poor*, nay and some of 'em *to be hang'd and burnt*. He mistakes the Notion we have of the Devil; we suppose him to be a Deceiver and a Liar, and that whatever he promises, yet it is not in his nature, beyond what may serve his own malicious Purposes, to be either just or kind.

5. That it is incredible, tho he does not tell us why, that *God should invest the Devil with a power to seduce poor Mortals by false Promises, which he could not do without authorizing Lies*. As to which I say, that the Devil by Nature, and in the Rank that God made him, is superior to Men; and what Absurdity is it for God to permit him to use, or rather abuse his Power? which if he does by lying or deceiving, yet how is this any more chargeable upon God, than it can be affirm'd, that because he made *Men capable* of sinning, therefore whenever they commit Sin, he himself is the Author of it?

6. That for *God to arm the Devil against Mankind*, would be repugnant *to his Wisdom*. I do not say, that God puts any new Weapon into the Devil's hand, but may permit him in some measure to use that Strength, which he first gave him, for the Tryal or Punishment of *free Agents*; and for him to do this, does in no wise contradict, but rather speak his infinite Wisdom: but this Man, I find, would teach God a new way of governing his Creatures.

7. That *none but Fools and Bigotts do entertain the Sovereignty of the Devil as an Article of Faith*. Indeed I tell him that neither do I know of any such Fools or Bigotts, and believe they are only in his rambling Fancy.

8. That because the *Fire-Eater* at *Paris*, and other reputed Sorcerers have not been really so, therefore there never have been any ; and that because *Priests*, for the sake of Gain, have sometimes *feign'd* such things, therefore none are true. Whereas I should rather have thought on the other hand, that seeing hereby they cunningly endeavour'd to fall in with the Facultys of Men, as they knew 'em to be easy to listen to and allow of such things, their very Impositions, unless these Facultys be vain, do suppose the *Reality* of some ; just as men's coining of false Money supposes there is some which passes for true.

9. That it cannot be imagin'd that Men would give away their *Souls* for the *Pleasure* of poisoning Cattel, blasting Corn with Storms and Hail, and the being enabl'd to do other the like mischiefs. He did not reflect on what we in fact experience, the great Corruption of human Nature, nor its mighty proneness to Malice and Revenge ; and that Men do only want what they often desire, a *Power* to execute the Ruin of each other ; and this some Wretches may venture to purchase, at once upon other fair Promises, even with their own Souls : not that they or their infernal Master has so often a power over mens *Persons*, as they have to disorder the *Elements* and *Things* of *Nature*, and inconvenience their outward Estate.

10. That *the Devil* has not a power to appear visibly before our Eyes, &c. such a Supposition being inconsistent with the Goodness of God, who does not lay Snares for men, that are already apt to go astray. To which I say, that God himself does not lay them ; but in his Wisdom, as he rules Mankind according to their Nature, and in that they are endu'd with a liberty of acting, are capable of Vertue or Vice, and so rewardable for their

their good or evil Deeds, he may suffer Temptations or Snares to be laid in their way, and that by a Power superior to them; but still, what by their own Light and Ability, what by the Helps of Grace, and God who *strengthens 'em, they may be more than Conquerors*, and it is still their own fault, if they make a wrong Choice.

11. That whereas *δαίμόνιον* signify'd originally and antiently only *good Genius* or *Angel*, the *Evangelists* perverted the sense of it, by adding to it *κακο*, which has since given occasion to a Supposition of real evil Spirits, and their Concernment with Men. But this, I say, is just as if the Holy Spirit, which guided their Pens and Expression, were guilty of an Error, and wanted Instruction in Propriety of Speech from this impious Pretender.

12. That it is absurd to suppose, that *the Devil, a Sorcerer or Magician, transforms himself into a Mastiff, a Cat, or a Wolf, &c.* I know not what he means by *transforming*; I do not understand that one of the Substances aforesaid is transmuted or turn'd into another; but I think it not absurd to suppose, that either the Spirit of a Man or Woman, when separated from its Body, as 'tis possible it may be without immediate Death, may insinuate it self into and actuate various bodily Shapes; or else it may be said that their real Persons are in these Apperances cover'd with a Vehicle, which by a certain Disposal of the Rays coming from it, may deceive the Eyes by the same Impressions that come from the true Sight of such or such things.

13. He tells us, *that in all the Countrys which he had been in, he never saw or heard any thing supernatural, even tho he had sought and desir'd it, as namely, by crossing Quebec Church-yard above a hundred times at mid-*
P p p 2
night,

night, &c. In this there is no Argument; and withal it may be said, that things of this nature do seldomest appear to those, who only want this Demonstration of a God and Religion, and are not convinc'd by *Reason*, by *Moses*, the *Prophets*, nor the *Gospel*.

14. However upon these Presumptions he swaggers and bids defiance to *Apparitions* and *Spirits*, because at the most he supposing 'em to be no other than Shadow and Vapour, does not imagin they could hurt him; and accordingly hereupon he utters this notorious Falshood, that *in these cases we never hear of the wounding or killing of any body*: I say this notorious Falshood, for in many Instances there have been such Effects from a Hand *invisible*, or not otherwise *visible* indeed, than by a *Shadow* or *Vapour*.

15. He imputes mens Belief of these things to a Prejudice taken up from their *Infancy*, without giving themselves the trouble to enquire into the Possibility of their Existence. But here I would ask him, does he pretend to prove the *Impossibility* of them? This I defy him or any Man to do; and on the contrary will undertake to prove the *Possibility* of them: and truly as I cannot suppose that *Man*, or a Compound of *Body* and *Spirit*, is the highest of the Creatures; but rather, as there are many Scales of separate *Bodys* below him, so there may be also as many of separate *Spirits* above him; and further, as I cannot deny that there actually are such Beings as finite *Spirits*: so neither can I think it more absurd that they should be concern'd either mediately or immediately with Beings that are below 'em, than that *we* should be concern'd with those below *us*; nor also that in order to a Commerce with *Bodys*, they, as well as the rational Souls of Men, should assume and be united to *Bodys*; and

and so under various Forms make a visible Appearance. But enough of this * foreign Trifler, whom for the sake of others I have thus long discours'd with, and heard the Substance of what he had to say.

I come now to speak a word with another here at home; who denies the Reality of *Witches* and *Dæmoniacks*, telling us that to grant these is to ascribe to the Devil a kind of Omnipotence; as if because he is thereby suppos'd to be able to do more than Men can do, therefore he can also do whatever God himself can, that is to say, all things. And particularly in reference to the former, namely *Witches*, he tells us, and takes much pains to prove that the Bodys of Women, suppos'd to be *Witches*, cannot be turn'd into *Dogs*, *Cats*, *Hares*, &c. and because many Historys of Witchcraft are false, and the *Witches* have no Witnesses to attest their making a visible League with Satan, that therefore there is no such thing. To all which it may be answer'd: 1st. That to ascribe to the Devil a power superior to and sometimes irresistible by Men, but still subject to and governable by the Power of God, is in no wise to ascribe *Omnipotence* to him. 2^{ly}. That we, who hold the Reality of *Witches*, and that they appear in the Shapes of various Animals, do not therefore suppose, that the Substance of their Bodys is converted or transubstantiated into that of those Animals, but either, as I have before remark'd, that there is a Deception of our Sight, thro a preternatural Change of the Medium, or sudden Indisposition of the visive Organ; or else that the Spirit or Soul of the Witch leaves its own Body, and really insinuates it self into that of another living Creature, and so becomes an *assisting Form* to the Body of a Dog, a Cat,

* The Baron Lahontan in *New Voyages*, &c. Vol. 2. p. 258, 259, &c.

or the like : and this the most accurate Philosophers do suppose not impossible to be done, without immediate Death to the respective Body, which is for a while deserted by its *informing Soul* ; provided only that the vital Spirits, which make the Body a fit Receptacle for it, be well preserv'd by Ointments or the like, which serve to cover and close the Pores, till the Return of its Guest. Or lastly I confess that *I know not how*, thro the Power of the Devil, *Men and Women* may be enabl'd to do strange things in various Shapes ; and withal I tell my Opponent, that when matters of Fact do plainly prove that this or that thing *is*, it is not the least Argument against its Existence, that we do not know or cannot explain *how it is* : for if so, I make no question, but that I could bring in parallel *Querys* and *Doubts* to disprove the Reality of every thing, either above or in Nature, and of whatever is objected to our Senses. 3^{ly}. I say, that tho many Storys, as I have own'd, are false, yet does it not thence follow that none are true ; and I would urge my Antagonist here to prove the universal Negative, which no Man yet has, or I think can do. 4^{ly}. I say, that methinks the Confession of Witches themselves may be thought more valid in this case, especially seeing it is with the Loss of their own Lives, when it is probable, that their deceitful Master leaves 'em, and especially more valid than Mr. Webster's bare Doubts and Suspicions, without the least *Proof* of the contrary. In short then I say of his whole * Writing with a very Learned † Man, that it

* Webster's *Displaying of suppos'd Witchcraft*.

† Dr. More in *Postscript to a Letter prefix'd to Mr. Glanvil's Considerations about Witchcraft* ; both which may be profitably read upon this Subject.

is a weak impertinent Piece. However I do not much wonder that a * late infamous Writer complements this Man with the Title of Learned; he being at much an equal pitch of Learning, and of the like Atheistical Inclination with himself; for the displaying whereof in their several ways, they had indeed both of 'em such a smattering in Philosophy, made such an Appearance of Learning in their Pomp of Quotations, and us'd such a tolerable way of Expression, as upon the Supposition that men are here in a state of Trial, Theists may conceive to be permitted by God; this being enough to give some specious colour to Falshood, and to obscure and cast a mist upon the Light of Truth, at least in the Minds of the Ignorant and the Prejudic'd, who are either unable or unwilling to dispel or keep it off. In short, these two Persons are so near the same size of Understanding, especially in matters of *Pneumatology*, that in truth I compar'd 'em in my Mind, after having read Mr. *Webster*, before I got so far in *Second Thoughts*, as to the aforesaid Character. I hope, as their Calling requir'd, they have better Skill in *Physiology* or *the Science of natural Bodys*, than in matters relating to *Spirits*; and indeed I will not deny it to be probable, that they may both of 'em excel in the former, as well because I find that when they occasionally tend that way, they commonly seem to reason well enough, as also because I am apt to believe, that they have so much dwelt and por'd upon the Subject of Bodys, *ut non recesserint ab Arte suâ*; being chiefly employ'd about things *material*, however they might make some little Efforts upward, yet could they not raise their Thoughts so high, as to conceive

* Author of *Second Thoughts* concerning human Soul, p. 80.

and reason justly of things *immaterial*. Now having here mention'd the Author of *Second Thoughts*, I might hence take occasion in opposition to him, and at once to confirm what I have before argu'd for, namely, the *real* Existence of *finite Spirits*; and withal because to assert the Soul's *Mortality*, is not unjustly thought *by some to oppose my main Drift, and accordingly † Atheists do sometimes lay hold of this Topick to disprove the Existence of a God. I say, because of all this, I might here take an opportunity to prove that the human Soul is purely spiritual and therefore immortal: but considering what has been, and will be hereafter occasionally offer'd to that purpose in this Treatise, and also what ‖ many others have writen of it, particularly those who have lately reply'd to *Second Thoughts*, I shall, at least for the present, wave this Undertaking. Only I tell this Man, that I would not have him, as he seems to do, both in *Second Thoughts* and *Grand Essay*, assume to himself the Honor of undeceiving Mankind, and of discovering hidden Truths; because not to mention how far he is from advancing Truths, he cannot say, that much of what he offers directly to his purpose was *discover'd* by him; for excepting what is here and there glean'd

* Hæc tria ita sunt connexa & conjuncta Existimatione ac Persuasione, divelli ac dissociari ut nullo modo nec possint nec fas sit; Dei Religio, Dei Providentia, Animæ nostræ Immortalitas. *Lud. Viv. de Verit. Fid. in Operib. fol. 333.*

† In Mersennus's *Quæstiones celeberrimæ in Genesim*; where see this confuted, and the contrary prov'd from Col. 365 to 380. and at Col. 391, &c. See also the Spirituality, and consequently Immortality of the Soul prov'd conjointly with the Being of a God, in Abbadie's *De la Verit. de la Rel. Chrêt. prem. Part. p. 50, &c.* And in Bently's *Second Lecture*.

‖ Templer in *Idea Theolog. Leviath. from p. 297 to 315.* Dr. More of *the Immortality of the Soul, &c.*

from antient and modern *Epicureans*, I have seen what he drives at, namely, a Proof of the *Materiality and Mortality of human Soul*, as pertinently attempted in a * 12^o of 130 Pages, publish'd above 50 Years ago; which, I am apt to guess not only from some matters but words, that this Writer had seen, tho he is not, I think, so candid, as to name it, but proposes the Whole as his *own Second Thoughts*.

But again, I might evince the Existence of *Spirits*, or at least of *Beings superior to Men*, from such Effects, as tho they do not require an infinite Power to work them, nor are in that sense *supernatural*, yet do exceed the utmost *human Power*; and these we term *Prodigys* or *Wonders*, as being extraordinary to *us*, and proving the Existence of something above us. Now that such things may be, and have been done, by Devils and deceiving Persons actuated by them, is not only attested by the Holy Scriptures, but frequently also by Profane Historys: as what, for instance, *Apuleius* terms *Miraculum Cotis*, the *Miracle of the Whetstone*, done by *Actius Nevius*, when at his Command it was divided into two with a Razor. The crediting of which, and many the like Facts universally among the Pagans, does at once make it probable, that they were *naturally* inclin'd to believe such things; which is another Argument, that there *really* may be and have been such: for otherwise 'twould be hard to account

* Man wholly mortal, or a Treatise, wherein 'tis prov'd both Theologically and Philosophically, that as whole Man sinned, so whole Man died; contrary to that common Distinction of Soul and Body; and that the present going of the Soul into Heaven or Hell is a mere Fiction; and that at the Resurrection is the beginning of our Immortality; and then actual Condemnation and Salvation, and not before: with Doubts and Objections answer'd and resolv'd both by Scripture and Reason, &c. By R. O. Ed. 2d. Lond. 1655.

for this general Inclination to credit 'em.

And once more, the like might be prov'd from the Prediction and Foreknowledg of future Events, which tho they did not suppose an infinite Understanding, yet to *Men* were naturally unforeknowable, and do therefore demonstrate, that there is some more perfect Understanding or Knowledg in the world than that of *Men*: this Maxim, in the Judgment of the Pagan Theists, being unquestionably true, *Si Divinatio est, Dii sunt; if there be Divination or Presension of future Events, undiscoverable by Men, then are there Gods*: which in their Language was no more than to say, *Beings superior to Men*, created Spirits, whether Angels or Dæmons. Which being suppos'd not only to have clearer Understandings than *Men*, and a greater Insight into Nature, but also by reason of their Agility and Invisibilty, Opportunity of knowing things remotely distant, and of being privy to men's secret Machinations and Consultations; it is easily conceivable, that many future Events nigh at hand, which cannot be foreknown by *Men*, may be probably at least foreseen by *them*; and that without any miraculous Divine Revelation, forasmuch as the *Causes* of these things were actually *in being*. And accordingly, that there have been such Predictions as these, even * *Democritus*, tho otherwise an Atheist, ingenuously own'd. The reason whereof was, says † *Dr. Cudworth*, because he suppos'd certain Understanding Beings superior to *Men*, call'd by him *Idols*, which having a larger Comprehension of things, and other Advan-

* Plurimis locis, gravis Auctor Democritus, Præsentionem rerum futurarum comprobat. *Cic. de Div. l. 1.*

† True Intel. Syst. p. 710.

tages of Knowledg, could therefore foretel many future Events, which Men were ignorant of. But because this Acknowledgment does not come quite up to what I drive at, that is, to prove the Existence of created *Spirits*, according to the true Notion of 'em, we may further observe what *Cicero* says of this in the name of all the Heathen World. First, he tells us, “ that this is an old Opinion, deriv'd down all
 “ along from the Heroick Times or the Mythical Age ;
 “ and not only entertain'd among the *Romans*, but also
 “ confirm'd by the Consent of all Nations, * that
 “ there is such a thing as Divination, and Presension
 “ or Foreknowledg of future Events. Secondly, from this he rightly concludes elsewhere in the Person of *Balbus*, “ † that tho *Epicurus* deride nothing more
 “ than the Prediction of future things, yet does this
 “ seem to me to be a great Confirmation of the Provi-
 “ dence of the Gods, that is, as I have said, of under-
 “ standing Beings superior to Men, over human Af-
 “ fairs. And that the *Augurs* themselves were some-
 times not unassisted by certain officious *Genii* or *Spirits*, is plain from that of *Actius Nevius*, as the Circumstances thereof are related by Historians. When *Tarquinius Priscus*, having a mind to try what there was in the Skill of *Augury*, told *Nevius*, “ that he thought of
 “ something, and would know of him whether it
 “ could be done or no : *Nevius* having perform'd his
 “ augurating Ceremonys, reply'd, that the thing
 “ might be done. Whereupon *Priscus* declar'd what

* Versari quendam inter homines Divinationem, quam Græci *μαντικήν* appellant, id est, Præsentionem & Scientiam rerum futurarum. *Cic. de Div. l. 1.*

† De Nat. Deor. l. 2.

“ his Thought was, namely that a Whetstone might
“ be cut in two with a Razor. *Nevius* will’d them to
“ make trial: wherefore a Whetstone being brought
“ immediately into the Court, it was in the sight
“ of the King and all the People divided with a Razor.
Likewise there are some Instances of Events remotely
distant, and not knowable by men, that have been
foretold under *Paganism*: such was that intimated
by *Cicero* in his Book of *Divination*, where he declares
the Doctrine of *Diodorus* concerning *Necessity* and *Con-*
tingency, that it was not necessary *Cypselus the Tyrant*
should reign at Corinth, tho that were a thing foretold
by Apollo’s Oracle a thousand Years before. And again,
this recorded by *Varro*, of *Vectius Valens* an Augur in
the time of *Romulus*, who when *Rome* was a building,
from the flying of twelve Vulturs, presag’d that the
Continuance of that City would be for twelve hun-
dred Years: which seems to have been accordingly
fulfill’d in the Year of our Lord four hundred fifty
and five, immediately after the Death of the third
Valentinian (whom some make to be the last real
Emperor of the West or *Rome*) when *Genfericus the*
Vandal took the City the second time, and fir’d it.
But to omit these latter kinds of Argumentation for
the real Existence of finite Spirits, and thence of a
God, this being already sufficiently prov’d, I pass on
from the Phænomenon of *Apparitions*, &c. to that
other extraordinary one of real Miracles, which also
demonstrates the Being of a God, these being in effect
the Productions of Something out of Nothing (and
therefore supposing an infinite Power) either as to the
thing it self, or the manner of doing it: as to the
thing it self, when it cannot be effected by any ordi-
nary or second Cause; as the Resurrection of the
Dead,

Dead, the Reunion of the Soul and Body, the restoring of the Springs and Mechanism of Motion after a total Separation ; or as to the manner of doing it, when the thing indeed lies within the power of second Causes, yet is brought about without the assistance of any of them, as the curing of Diseases by a *word's speaking* and *touching the Hem of a Garment*, &c *. Now that Facts of this nature have come to pass in the Persons or upon the account of *Apollonius Tyaneus*, and the Roman Emperors *Vespasian* and *Adrian*, &c. is witness'd by Heathen † Writers ; and the like appears from a *Greek Table* hung up in the Temple of *Æsculapius* at *Rome*, where among other things this is recorded : “ that a blind
 “ Man being commanded by the Oracle to kneel before the Altar, and then passing from the right side
 “ thereof to the left, to lay five Fingers upon the
 “ Altar, and afterwards lifting up his Hand, to touch
 “ his Eyes therewith ; all this being done accordingly,
 “ he recover'd his Sight, the People all applauding,
 “ that great Miracles were done under the Emperor
 “ *Antoninus*, &c. But because there is good reason to suspect the Truth of such Facts, as are pretended to come up to the Notion of true and real Miracles under Paganism, and especially such as are said to have been done by *Apollonius*, in opposition to that very Faith, which was usher'd in and recommended by unquestionable Miracles ; albeit indeed in the beginnings of Christianity, the Devil to counterplot the Design of it, and so to keep up his usurped Tyranny in the Pagan World, did work great *Signs and Wonders* (not

* See Still. Orig. Sac. p. 239.

† Philostrat. in Vit. Apol. Suet. in Vespas. c. 7. Tacit. Hist. l. 4. c. 81. Spartian. p. 12. Salmas.

true Miracles) by the Instrumentality of the aforesaid *Archimago* : because of this, I say, I shall not rely upon the Pagan Miracles for proving the Existence and Agency of a God, nor shall in this Argument make any other advantage of 'em, than that where *true Miracles* are done, it is agreeable to the common sense of Mankind to conclude, that the Person who does 'em is attended by a Divine Power. This therefore we may take to be sufficiently evidenc'd by the unquestionable Accounts we have of such Miracles as these, both more in number, and of a far higher nature than those which are reported to have been done under Paganism ; as namely those of *Moses*, and especially of our Saviour Christ and his Apostles : I say, the unquestionable Account we have of these, that they were really done ; “ which is most evident from the Sincerity of the primitive Believers, who were Eye-witnesses of these Miracles, and the Records of 'em ; and who laid down their Lives, not only to give Sanction to the Doctrine of Jesus, but to attest the Truth of his Miracles, by which it was confirm'd. The Relations of these Persons must be assuredly true, since they could propose no other Interest to themselves, but the Propagation of the Truth. All other sinister Aims were disappointed by their Deaths, and their Reward was only to be hop'd for in that glorious future State, of which they discours'd so much. Add to this, that the first Professors of Christianity always appeal'd to Miracles, and challeng'd the Heathens to bring their fancy'd Deitys, assuring 'em, that they should be all miraculously struck dumb by the God of the Christians ; otherwise they offer'd themselves to death, as Enemies of the establish'd Religion of the Country.

†

“ The

“ The greatest Opposers of Christianity could not deny
 “ so evident a matter, as the Miracles wrought by
 “ Christ and his Apostles. Even *Lucian*, that great
 “ Ridiculer of Religion, freely owns it: for he, as
 “ * one observes, whom he blasphemously stiles in his
 “ † *Ariston*, τὸν ἐκ τῆς παλαιστίνης σοφιστὴν, is undoubted-
 “ ly our Saviour; this *Jewish* Sophister, he tells us,
 “ cast out Devils, heal’d the Sick, rais’d the Dead.

But here perhaps it may be ask’d, why are there no Miracles done now-adays, to demonstrate the Being and Power of God? As to which I say, that these are so plainly to be seen by the things which he has made, that God has never thought fit *directly* to prove ’em by Miracles, albeit in the Consequence they have been so prov’d: as when he was pleas’d to stamp a newly reveal’d Doctrine with his Seal of Approbation, and so to make it pass current in the world; which he abundantly did heretofore, in order to propagate the Gospel. But when it was hereby sufficiently evidenc’d, that Christ and his Apostles were sent from God, and acted by a Divine Commission, as there was no further occasion for this *extraordinary* way of working, so may we suppose it after that to have ceas’d. And those who say it has not, but to make way for their own Innovations and Heresys, pretend a Succession of new Miracles, have, methinks, among such as are not willing or able to examine the reasons of these things, not a little discredited the old ones. Because when finding these pretended modern Miracles to be but mere Cheats, they are apt to suspect that all the former were such. But in answer to this, and at

* J. B. in *Discourses and Essays*, &c. p. 70.

† Φιλοψευδὴς ἢ Αἰστῶν. p. 363. Ed. Ribic.

once to reinforce my main Argument, I say in short, that to deny and disbelieve all *Miracles*, is either to deny all Certainty of *Sense*, which would be indeed to make *Sensation* it self *miraculous*; or else monstrously and unreasonably to derogate from human Testimonys and Historys. Certainly the *Jews* would never have so stiffly and obstinately adher'd to the Ceremonial Law of *Moses*, had they not all along believ'd it to have been unquestionably confirm'd by *Miracles*; and indeed that the *Gentiles* should at first have entertain'd the Faith of Christ without *Miracles*, would it self have been the greatest of *Miracles* *.

But moreover, as the Being of God is evinc'd from the *Doing* of things *extraordinary* and *supernatural*, that is, not only exceeding the Power of Men, but of all other finite Agents: so likewise is the same to be infer'd from *Predictions* and *Prophecys*, or the foretelling of such future Events, as were not only un-foreknowable by Men, but likewise all other Beings whatever less than infinite. To this purpose we might perhaps instance in the *Sybilline Prophecys*, which, if real, must needs have had some higher Original, than the natural presaging Faculty of *Dæmons*; and for ought we know, says † *Dr. Cudworth*, the *Sybils* might be as well assisted *supernaturally* to predict our Saviour Christ amongst the Pagans in the *West*, as *Balaam* was in the *East*. But not to depend on the Certainty of this, here the Holy Scripture triumpheth

* See more of this Argument, that is, the Being of a God, prov'd from Miracles, as namely the Raising of the Dead, Healing of Diseases, &c. and the Objections of Atheistick Persons answer'd, in Mersennus's *Quæstiones celeberrimæ in Genesim*, &c. from Col. 542 to Col. 654.

† Int. Syst. p. 713.

over Paganism, over all its Oracles and Divinations, there being contain'd in it so many unquestionable *Predictions* of Events to follow after, and such as can be imputed to nothing but the supernatural Knowledg and Omniscience of God Almighty, as being also future contingent things, and not depending on necessary but free Agents. As for example, those concerning the *Messiah* or our Saviour Christ, deliver'd by *Jacob, Moses, David, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Daniel*, and most of the Prophets; foretelling sundry particular Circumstances of his Coming, and that grand Event which follow'd after, of the Gentiles or Pagans so general Reception and Entertainment of Christianity, that is, the Belief of the *Messiah* promis'd to the *Jews*, together with the shaking off of their Gods and Idols. Amongst which Scripture-Prophecys concerning our Saviour Christ, we must reckon for one, and that none of the least considerable neither, that of *Daniel's* Weeks, or of 490 Years, to commence from the going forth of the Word or the Decree made by *Artaxerxes* the Son of *Xerxes*, in the seventh Year of his Reign, for the Return of the People of *Israel*, of the Priests and Levites to *Jerusalem*; and to terminate in the Death of the *Messiah*, and the Preaching of the Gospel to the *Jews* only. Now that these Prophecys concerning our Saviour Christ, could have no other Original, than the immediate supernatural Revelation of God Almighty, is evident from the thing it self, it being such as depended on no natural Causes, much less upon those Constellations of the Astrological Atheists, but only upon his own secret Will and Counsel *. But

* See Dan. 9. and an excellent Illustration of his Prophecy of the Messiah, in Derodon's *Traité de l'Existence de Dieu*, p. 54, &c.

besides these Prophecys concerning our Saviour Christ, there are others also contain'd in the Scripture, concerning the Fates and Successions of the chief Kingdoms, Empires, and Politys of the World; as of the Rise of the *Persian* Monarchy, of its Fall and Conquest by the *Macedonian Alexander*; of the quadripartite Division of this *Greekish* Empire after *Alexander's* Death; of the Succession of the *Seleucidae* and *Lagidae*; a Prophetick History so agreeable with the Events, that it was pretended by *Porphyrus* to have been written after them; and lastly of the Rise and Continuance of the *Roman* Empire. For notwithstanding the Endeavours of some to pervert all those Scripture-Prophecys, which extend to the present times, it is clearly demonstrable that this was *Daniel's* fourth ten-horn'd Beast, or the Legs and Toes of *Nebuchadnezzar's* Statue, that fourth Empire, as strong as Iron, which came at length to be broken or divided into ten, or many Principalities, call'd in the Prophetick Language, and according to the *Eichon, Horns*. Among which was to start up another *Horn with Eyes, speaking great Words against the Most High, and making War with the Saints, and prevailing against 'em for a Time, Times, and half a Time*. Which Prophecy of *Daniel's* is the Ground-work of *St. John's Apocalypse*, it being there further insisted on, fill'd up, and enlarg'd with the Addition of several Particulars; so that both *Daniel* and *John* have each of 'em, from their respective Ages, set down a Prophetick *Calendar* of Times in a continu'd Series, the former more compendiously and generally, the latter more copiously and particularly, to the very End of the World *.

Thus

* See Dan. 2. and again this particular Prophecy excellently illustrated in *Derodon de Existentiâ Lei*. In which Treatise the whole Argument for God's Existence

Thus we plainly see that the Scripture-Prophecys evince a Deity ; neither can these possibly be imputed by Atheists, as other things have been, to mens *Fear* and *Fancy* only, nor yet to the *Fiction of Politicians*. Nor do they only evince a Deity, but confirm Christianity also, partly as predicted by them in its several Circumstances, a grand one whereof was the Gentiles Reception of it; and partly as it self predicting future Events: this Spirit of Prophecy being the Testimony of *Jesus*. Both which Scripture-Prophecys, of Christ in the Old Testament, and from him in the New, are of equal, if not greater Force to us in this present Age, for the Confirmation of our Faith, than even the *Miracles* recorded in the Scripture, we having now *certain* Knowledg our selves of many of those Events, and being no way able to suspect, but that the Prophecys were written long before. Upon the whole I then say, that all theafore said *Phænomena extraordinary*, of *Apparitions*, *Witchcraft*, *Possessions*, *Miracles*, and *Prophecys*, do evince that Spirits, Angels, or Dæmons, tho invisible to us, yet are no *Fancys*, but real and substantial Inhabitants of the World : which does in the consequence make way for the Belief of a God ; and indeed some of 'em, as the higher kind of *Miracles* and *Predictions*, do *immediately* enforce this Belief : I mean, of a Being superior to *Nature*, which therefore can check and control it, and which comprehending the *Whole*, foreknows the most remotely distant and contingent Events.

Existence from Prophecy is admirably urg'd, he introducing it thus : Datur verbum Dei, ergo datur Deus ; which Antecedent he proves from the Instance of Prophecy, or the Foretelling of such future contingent things, as could not have fallen under any created Understanding. Also upon the Whole see Still. Orig. Sacra, B. 2. c. 5, 6.

But after all that has been said touching the Idea of God, and other reasons for his Existence, I grant, some ancient Theists themselves, as * *Alexander Aphrodisius*, † *Clemens Alexandrinus*, &c. have affirm'd, that there could be no *Demonstration of a God*. But let not the Atheist think to take an advantage from these words of theirs; forasmuch as they only meant by it, that the Existence of a God could not be demonstrated *a priori*, himself being the *first Cause* of all things; which, I grant, is true. Nevertheless it does not thence follow, that there can be no Certainty at all had of the Existence of a God, but only a conjectural Probability; no *Knowledg*, but *Faith* and *Opinion* only. For we may have a certain Knowledg of things, the *διότι* whereof cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, or from antecedent *necessary Causes*: as for example, that there was something *eternal* of it self and without beginning, is not at all demonstrable by any *antecedent Cause*, it being contradictory to such a thing to have a Cause. However upon supposition only that *Something* does exist, which no man can possibly make any doubt of, we may not only have an *Opinion*, but also certain Knowledg, from the necessity of irrefragable *Reason*, that *there was never Nothing*, but something or other did always exist from Eternity and without beginning. In like manner, tho the Existence of a *God* or *perfect Being* cannot be demonstrated *a priori*, yet may we notwithstanding from our very selves, whose Existence we

* Δεῖ ἀπο' τῆς ὑσέως τε καὶ φανερών ἀρχαμένους, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα συμφωνίαν ἀναλύσει χρωμένους συστήσαι τὴν ἐκείνη φύσιν. Alex. Aphr. l. i. c. i.
 And † Clemens Alexandrinus speaking of God says, Ἀλλὰ ὅδε ὁπισθὴν λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ. αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ πρεσβύτων καὶ γνωσιωτάτων συνίσταται. τὸ δ' ἀγνήτης ὅθεν προὔπασχει. Strom. l. 5.

cannot doubt of, and from what is contain'd in our own *Minds*, or otherwise consequent from him, by undeniable Principles of *Reason*, necessarily infer his Existence. And whensoever any thing is thus necessarily infer'd from what is undeniable and indubitable, this is a *Demonstration*, tho not of the $\delta\iota\omega\tau\iota$, yet of the $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ of it: that the thing *is*, tho not *why* it *is*; and many of the *Geometrical* Demonstrations are no other.

Again, a late eminent Philosopher hath asserted, that there is no possible Certainty to be had of any thing, before we be certain of the Existence of a *God* essentially *Good*; because we can never otherwise free our Minds from the Importunity of that Suspicion, which with irresistible Force may assault them, that our selves might possibly be so made, either by *Chance* or *Fate*, or by the Pleasure of some evil *Demon*, or at least of an *arbitrary Deity*, as that we should be deceiv'd in all our most clear and evident *Perceptions*; and therefore in *Geometrical Theorems* themselves, and even in our common Notions. As to which I say, that tho there be indeed a plausibility of Piety in this Doctrine, as making the Knowledg of a *God* essentially good, so necessary a *Præcognitum* to all other *Science*, that there can be no Certainty of Truth at all without it; yet does this very Supposition, that our understanding Faculty might possibly be so made, as to deceive us in all our *clearest Perceptions*, wheresoever it is admitted, render it utterly impossible ever to arrive to any Certainty concerning the Existence of a *God* essentially good, and who therefore cannot deceive: whilst this Existence of a *God* is in the mean time it self no otherwise prov'd, than by our understanding Faculty. Which is at once to prove the Truth of *God's* Existence from our Faculty of *Reason* and *Understanding*,
and

and again to prove the Truth of those Facultys from the Existence of a God *essentially good*; and this, I say, is plainly to move round in a Circle, and to prove nothing at all; a gross Oversight, of which the foremention'd Philosopher seems plainly guilty. Wherefore according to this Hypothesis we are of necessity condemn'd to eternal *Scepticism*, both concerning the Existence of a God, when after all our Arguments for it, we must at length gratify the Atheists with this Confession in the conclusion, that it is *possible* notwithstanding, there may be none; and at once concerning all other things, the *Certainty* whereof is suppos'd to depend upon the *Certainty* of the Existence of such a God as cannot deceive. So that if we will pretend to any *Certainty* at all concerning the *Existence of a God*, we must of necessity explode this new *Sceptical Hypothesis*, of the *Possibility* of our Understanding's being so made, as to deceive us in all our *clearest Perceptions*, by means whereof we can be *certain* of the Truth of nothing; and use our utmost Endeavours to remove the same.

In the first place then we affirm, that no Power how great soever, and therefore not *Omnipotence* it self, can make any thing to be indifferently either *true* or *false*; this being plainly to take away the nature of *Truth* and *Falshood*, or to make them nothing but *Words* without any signification. Truth is not *Factitious*, not a thing which can be arbitrarily *made*, but which is. The Divine *Will* and *Omnipotence* it self, now suppos'd by us, has no *Imperium* upon the *Divine Understanding*; for if God understood only by *Will*, he would not understand at all.

In the next place we add, that tho the Truth of *singular contingent Propositions* depends upon the things
existing

existing without, as the Measure and Archetype thereof; yet as to the universal and abstract Theorems of *Science*, the Terms whereof are those reasons of things which exist no where, but only in the Mind it self, whose *Noemata* and Ideas they are, the Measure and Rule of Truth concerning them can be no foreign or extraneous thing without the *Mind*, but must be native and domestick to it, or contain'd within the Mind it self, and therefore no other but its distinct and clear *Perception*. In these *intelligible Ideas* of the Mind, whatsoever is *clearly perceiv'd to be, is*; or which is all one, *is true*. Every *distinct and clear Perception* is an *Entity* or *Truth*; as that which is repugnant to *Conception* is a *Non-entity* or *Falshood*. Nay the very *Essence* of Truth here, is this *clear Perceptibility* and *Intelligibility*, and therefore can there not be any clear or distinct *Perception* of *Falshood*; as must be acknowledged by all those, who tho granting false *Opinions*, yet agree in this, that there can be no false *Knowledg*. For the *Knowledg* of these *universal abstract Truths* is nothing but the clear and distinct *Perception* of the several Ideas of the Mind, and their necessary Relations to one another. Wherefore to say that there can be no *false Knowledg*, is all one as to say, that there can be no *clear and distinct Perceptions* of the Ideas of the Mind, *false*. In false *Opinions* the *Perception* of the understanding Power it self is not *false*, but only *obscure*. It is not the *understanding Power* or *Nature* in us that erreth; but it is we our selves who err, when we rashly and unwarily assent to things not *clearly perceiv'd* by it. The Upshot of all is this, that since no Power how great soever can make any thing indifferently to be *true*, and since the *Essence* of *Truth* in *universal abstract things* is nothing but *clear Perceptibility*;
it

it follows that *Omnipotence* cannot make any thing which is *false* to be clearly perceiv'd to *be*, or create such *Minds* and *understanding Facultys*, as shall have such clear Conceptions of *Falshoods*, that is, of *Non-entitys*, as they have of *Truths* or *Entitys*. For example, no rational understanding *Being*, that knows what a *Part* is, what a *Whole*, what a *Cause*, and what an *Effect*, could possibly be so made, as clearly to conceive the *Part* to be greater than the *Whole*, or the *Effect* to be before the *Cause*, or the like. Wherefore I presume with Reverence to say, that there could not possibly be a World of rational Creatures made by God, either in the Moon, or some other Planet, or elsewhere, that should clearly and distinctly conceive all things, quite contrary to what they are *clearly conceiv'd* to be by *us*; nor could our human Facultys have been so made, as that we should have as clear Conceptions of *Falshoods* as of *Truths*. *Mind* or understanding Facultys may be made more or less weak, imperfect and obscure; but they could not be made *false*, or such as should have clear and distinct Conceptions of that *which is not*; because every clear Conception is an *Entity*: and tho *Omnipotence* can make *Something out of Nothing*, yet can it not make *Something* to be *Nothing*, nor *Nothing Something*. All which is no more than is generally acknowledg'd by *Theologers*, when they affirm that God Almighty himself cannot do things contradictory; there being no other reason for this Assertion but only this, that *Contradiction* is repugnant to *Conception*. So that *Conception* and *Knowledg* are hereby made to be the Measure of all *Power*, even *Omnipotence* or *infinite Power* it self being determin'd thereby; from whence it follows, that *Power* has no dominion over *Understanding*, *Truth*, and

and *Knowledg*, nor can infinite *Power* make every thing whatsoever to be clearly conceivable: for could it make contradictory things *clearly conceivable*, then would it self be able to *do* them, because whatsoever can be clearly *conceiv'd* by any, may unquestionably be *done* by *infinite Power*.

It is true indeed that *Sense* alone, consider'd by it self, does not reach to the *Absoluteness*, either of the Natures or of the Existence of things without us, it being as such nothing but *Seemingness*, *Appearance* and *Fancy*: but as for *Knowledg*, this reaches beyond *Appearance* to the *Absoluteness* of Truth. For, as it has been already declar'd, whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceiv'd in things *abstract* and *universal*, by any one rational Being in the whole World, is not a private thing, and true to himself only that perceives it, but it is, as some *Stoicks* have call'd it, a * *publick, catholick, or universal Truth*; which obtains every where, and, as *Empedocles* sang of *natural Justice*, is † *extended throughout the vast Æther, and thro infinite Light or Space*: and were there indeed infinite Worlds, all thickly peopl'd with rational Animals, it would be alike *true* to every one of them. But in all probability, because *Sense* is indeed but *seeming, phantastical, and relative*, this is the reason that some have been so prone and inclinable to suspect the like of *Understanding* and all *mental Perception* too, that this also is but *seeming and relative*; and that therefore mens *Minds* or *Understandings* might have been so made by an *arbitrary omnipotent Deity*, as clearly and distinctly to perceive

* Ἀληθὲς καθολικόν.

† ——— διὰ τ' εὐερμέδοντος

Ἀιδεῖος ἡκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

every thing that is *false*. But if notwithstanding all that has been said, any will still sing over the old Song again, that all this, which has been hitherto declar'd, is indeed true, if *our human Facultys be true*, but we can go no further than our *Facultys*; and whether these be true or not, no Man can ever be certain: as to which I only add at present, that tho we were not certain of the Truth of our Facultys, yet being as little certain of the Falshood of 'em, in going against what Reason dictates, and turning to the contrary side, we do at once incur a very great hazard, without any Probability, if indeed Possibility of *Safety* in so doing; which betrays in men an over-stiff and heavy Adherence to a Prejudice of their own *Minds*, that not only *Sense*, but also *Reason* and *Understanding*, and all human Perception is merely seeming or phantastical, and relative to the Facultys only, but not reaching to the Absoluteness of any Truth; and that the human Mind hath no *Criterion* at all of Truth within it self.

But here perhaps it will be further objected, that it is too great an Arrogance for created Beings to pretend to an absolute *Certainty* of any thing, it being the sole Privilege and Prerogative of God Almighty to be infallible, who is therefore stil'd in * Scripture *the only Wise*. To which I answer, that the Deity is the first original Fountain of *Truth* and *Wisdom*, which is said to be the Brightness of the everlasting Light, the unspotted Mirror of the *Power* of God, and the Image of his *Goodness*. The Divine *Word* is the Archetypal Pattern of all Truth; it is ignorant of nothing, and knoweth all things infallibly. Created Beings have

* ὁ μόνος σοφός.

but a derivative Participation hereof, their Understandings being obscure, erring in many things, and ignorant of more. And it seems to be no Derogation from Almighty God to suppose, that created *Minds* by a participation of the Divine Mind should be able to know *certainly*, that two and two make four; that Equals added to Equals will make Equals; that the Whole is greater than the Part, and the *Cause* before the *Effect*; and that nothing can be made without a Cause; and such like other *common Notions*, which are the Principles from whence all their Knowledg is deriv'd. And indeed were rational Creatures never able to be *certain* of any such thing as this at all, what would their Life be but a mere Dream or Shadow, and themselves but a ridiculous and pompous piece of Vanity? Besides, it is no way congruous to think, that God Almighty should make rational Creatures so, as to be in an utter Impossibility of ever attaining to any *Certainty* of his Existence, or of having more than an Hypothetical Assurance thereof; as that if *our Facultys be true* (which possibly may be otherwise) then there is a God. I shall conclude this Discourse against the *Cartesian* Scepticism with this of *Orogen*: * *Knowledg is the only thing in the world which Creatures have, that is in its own nature firm*: they having here something of *Certainty*, but no where else. Wherefore we now having what *Archimedes* requir'd, that is, some firm ground and footing to stand upon, such a *Certainty* of Truth in our *common Notions*, as that they cannot possibly be *false*, without which nothing at all could be prov'd by *Reason*; we having this, I say, shall in the next place endeavour not to shake or disettle any thing thereby, which

* Μόνον τὸ ὄντως βέβαιον ἀνίστηται.

was the Undertaking of that *Geometrician*, but to confirm and establish the *Truth* of God's *Existence*; and that from the very Idea of him, hitherto made good and defended against all the Assaults of Atheists.

It is well known that *Des Cartes* has lately pretended to do this with Mathematical *Evidence* and *Certainty*; and he dispatches the business briefly after this manner: *God* or a *perfect Being* includeth necessary *Existence* in his very Idea; and therefore he *is*. But tho the Inventor of this Argument, or rather the Reviver of that which had been before us'd by some *Scholasticks*, affirms it to be as good a Demonstration for the Existence of a God from his Idea, as that in *Geometry*, for a Triangle's having three Angles equal to two right, is from the Idea of a Triangle; yet nevertheless it is certain, that by one means or other this Argument has not hitherto prov'd so fortunate and successful, there being many who can't be made sensible of any Efficacy therein, and not a few who condemn it for a mere *Sophism*; saying, that it is no Probation at all of a Deity, but only an Affirmation of the thing in dispute, and a mere *begging of the Question*: that therefore God *is*, because he *is* and *cannot but be* *. Wherefore we shall endeavour to make out an Argument or Demonstration of God's Existence from his Idea, as including *necessary Existence*, some other ways.

1. Tho it will not follow from hence, because we can frame an Idea of any thing in our Minds, that therefore such a thing really exists; yet nevertheless what-

* See at large what may be said for, and what against the Cartesian Argument for God's Existence from his Idea, in Cudworth's True Intel. Syst. p. 721, 722, 723, &c.

soever we can frame an Idea of, implying no manner of Contradiction in its Conception, we may certainly conclude thus much of it, that such a thing was not *impossible to be*; there being nothing to us impossible, but what is contradictory and repugnant to *Conception*. Now the Idea of a God, or a *perfect Being*, can imply no manner of Contradiction in it, because it is only the Idea of such a thing as hath all *possible* and *conceivable Perfections* in it, that is, all *Perfections* which are neither contradictory in themselves, nor to one another. And they who will not allow of this Consequence, from the Idea of a *perfect Being*, including *Necessity* of *Existence* in it, that it does therefore *actually* exist, yet cannot deny, but that this at least will follow from its implying no manner of Contradiction in it, that it is therefore a thing *possible*, or not *impossible to be*. For thus much being true of all other *contingent* things, whose Idea implies no *Contradiction*, that they are therefore *possible*; it must needs be granted of that, whose very Idea and Essence contains a *Necessity* of Existence in it, which the Essence of nothing else but a *perfect Being* doth. And in the next place, as this particular Idea of that which is *possible* includes *Necessity* of Existence: from these two things put together, at least the *Possibility* of such a Being and its *necessary Existence* (if not from the latter alone) will it according to *Reason* follow, that he *actually is*. If God or a *perfect Being*, in whose *Essence* is contain'd necessary Existence, be *possible*, or no way *impossible* to have been, then he *is*; because upon supposition of his *Non-existence*, it would be absolutely *impossible*, that he should ever have been. It does not thus follow concerning *imperfect Beings*, which are *contingently possible*, that if they *be not*, it was therefore *impossible* for them

ever to have *been*; for that which is *contingent*, tho it *be* not, yet might for all that *possibly* have *been*. But a *perfect necessarily* existent Being, upon the bare supposition of its *Non-existence*, could no more *possibly* have *been*, than it could possibly hereafter *be*; because if it might have been, tho it *be* not, then would it not be a *necessary existent Being*. The Sum of all is this, A *necessary existent Being*, if it *be possible*, *is*; because upon supposition of its *Non-existence*, it would be *impossible* for it ever to have *been*. Wherefore God is either impossible to have been, or else he *is*; for if God were possible and yet *be* not, then he is not a *necessary*, but *contingent Being*, which is contrary to the Hypothesis.

2. To this I add what is yet more plain: Whatsoever we can frame an Idea of in our Minds, implying no manner of Contradiction, either actually *is*, or else if it *be* not, it is *possible* for it to *be*. But if God *be* not, he is not possible hereafter to *be*, therefore he *is*. The Reason and Necessity of the Minor is evident; because if God *be* not, and yet possible hereafter to *be*, then would he not be an *eternal* and *necessary existent Being*, which is contradictory to his Idea. And the ground of the *Major*, upon which all the weight lies, has been already declar'd; where we prov'd before, that if there were no God or *perfect Being*, we could never have had any *Conception* or *Idea* of him in our Minds; because there can be no positive *Conception* of an absolute Nothing, of that which has neither *actual* nor *possible* Existence. Here the posture of the Argument is only inverted; because we have an Idea of God or a *perfect Being*, implying no manner of *Contradiction* in it, therefore must it needs have some kind of *Entity* or other, either an *actual* or *possible* one: but God, if he *be* not, is not *possible* to *be*, therefore he doth *actually* exist.

But

3. But thirdly, I argue yet more plainly still for the Being of a God, from the Idea of him, as including *necessary Existence* in it. First let it be premis'd, that unquestionably something or other did exist from all Eternity without beginning. For it is certain that every thing could not be *made*, because *Nothing* could come from *Nothing*, or be made by it self; and therefore if once there had been *Nothing*, there could never have been *any Thing*. Whence it is undeniable, that there was always *Something unmade*, which existed *of it self* from all Eternity. Now all the Question is, and indeed this is the only Question between *Theists* and *Atheists*; since Something did certainly exist of it self from all Eternity, what that thing is, whether it be a *perfect* or an *imperfect* Being? The former of these is asserted by the *Theists*, the latter by the *Atheists*. As to which I say first in behalf of the *Theists*, that whatsoever existed of it self from Eternity and without beginning, contains *necessary* and *eternal Self-existence* in its own nature. Now there is nothing which contains necessary and eternal Self-existence in its own Nature or Essence, but only an *absolutely perfect Being*; all other imperfect things being in their nature *contingently possible*, either to *be* or *not be*. Wherefore since something or other must and doth exist of it self *naturally* and *necessarily*, from *Eternity unmade*; and nothing could do this, but what included necessary Self-existence in its own *Nature* or *Essence*; it is certain that it was a *perfect Being* or God, who existed of himself from Eternity, and nothing else: all other *imperfect* things, which have no necessary Self-existence in their nature, deriving their Being from him; and all lesser Perfections gradually descending from the one most *perfect Being*, till at last they
end

end in *senseless Matter* or *inanimate Body*. Accordingly I might add, as a further Confirmation of this Argument, what has been already prov'd, that no *temporary successive Being*, whose Duration is in a continual Flux, as if it were every moment generated a-new, and therefore neither our own *Souls*, nor the *World*, nor *Matter moving*, could possibly have existed from Eternity, and independently upon any other thing ; but must have had a Beginning, and been caus'd by something else, namely by an *absolutely perfect Being*, whose Duration therefore is permanent, and without any successive Generation or Flux.

But here on t'other hand I say, that the Atheists are infinitely absurd and unreasonable, when they will not acknowledg that which containeth *independent Self-existence* or *Necessity of Existence* (which indeed is the same with an Impossibility of Non-existence) in its Nature and Essence, that is a *perfect Being*, so much as to exist at all ; and yet in the mean time assert that, which has no *Necessity* of Existence in its nature, the most *imperfect* of all Beings, *inanimate Body* and *Matter*, to have existed of it self *necessarily* from all *Eternity*, and to have been the Cause of all other things ; and consequently that all higher Degrees of Perfections which are in the World, climb'd up or emerg'd by way of Ascent from thence, as namely that *Life*, *Sense*, *Understanding*, and *Reason* arose from that which is altogether *dead*, *senseless*, and *irrational*. Whereas tho on one hand it be undeniably evident, that lesser *Perfections* may naturally descend from greater, or at least from that which is *absolutely perfect*, and which virtually contains all : yet on the other, is it utterly impossible, that greater *Perfections* and higher Degrees of *Being* should ascend and arise out of lesser and lower,
so

so as that what is the most *imperfect* of all things, should be the first Fountain and Original of all; since no Effect can possibly transcend the Power of its Cause. Wherefore it is certain, that in the Universe things did not thus ascend and mount, or climb up from *lower* Perfection to *higher*; but on the contrary, descended and slid down from *higher* to *lower*: so that the first Original of all things was not the most *imperfect*, but the most *perfect* Being. To which I add more particularly, that notwithstanding all the Pretences of *Lucretius* and other Atheists or Semi-Atheists to the contrary, *Life* and *Sense* could never possibly spring out of *dead* and *senseless Matter*, as its only Original, either in the way of Atoms (no Composition of *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions* being ever able to produce Cogitation) or in the way of *Qualitys*; since *Life* and *Perception* can no more result from any mixture of *Elements* or Combination of *Qualitys*, of Heat and Cold, Moist and Dry, &c. than from *unqualify'd Atoms*: this being clearly demonstrable from that very Principle of *Reason*, which the Atheists are so fond of, but, thro a misunderstanding of it, abuse, (as shall be shewn hereafter) that *Nothing can come from Nothing*. And much less could *Understanding* and *Reason* in men have ever emerg'd out of *stupid Matter*, devoid of all manner of *Life*. Wherefore I must needs here freely declare against the *Darkness* of that Philosophy, which has been sometimes unwarily entertain'd, even by such as were no Atheists: that *Sense* may rise from a certain *Modification*, *Mixture*, or *Organization* of *dead* and *senseless Matter*, and also that *Understanding* and *Reason* may result from *Sense*; the plain Consequence of both which is, that *senseless Matter* may prove the Original of all things, and

the only *Numen* or God.

But this Controversy betwixt *Theists* and *Atheists* may be yet more particularly stated from the Idea of God, as essentially including in it *Mind* or *Understanding*: namely thus, whether *Mind* be *eternal* and *unmade*, as being the Maker of all; or else whether all *Mind* were made or generated, and that out of *senseless Matter*? And the Controversy, as thus stated, may be also satisfactorily and clearly decided. For first, as it was before said, *if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing*; so is it true likewise, that if once there had been no Life in the whole Universe, but all had been *dead*, then could there never have been any *Life* or *Motion* in it; and if once there had been no *Mind*, *Understanding*, or *Knowledge*, then could there never have been any *Mind* or *Understanding* produc'd. Because to suppose *Life* and *Understanding* to rise and spring up out of that which is altogether *dead* and *senseless*, as its only Original, is plainly to suppose *Something* to come out of *Nothing*. It cannot be said so of other things, as of the *corporeal World* and *Matter*, that if once they had not been, they could never possibly have been; because tho there had been no *World* or *Matter*, yet might these have been produc'd from a *perfect, omnipotent, incorporeal* Being, which in it self *eminently* containeth all things. *Dead* and *senseless Matter* could never have created or generated *Mind* and *Understanding*; but a *perfect omnipotent Mind* could create *Matter*. Wherefore because there is *Mind*, we are certain that there was some *Mind* or other from Eternity and without beginning; tho not, because there is *Body*, that therefore *Body* or *Matter* was from Eternity *unmade*. These *imperfect Minds* of ours were by no means eternal or without beginning, but
from

from an antecedent *Non-existence* brought forth into Being; and since no *Mind* could spring out of *dead* and *senseless Matter*, and all *Minds* could not possibly be *made*, nor one produc'd from another *infinitely*; there must of necessity be an *eternal unmade Mind*, from whence those *imperfect Minds* of ours were deriv'd, which *perfect omnipotent Mind* was as well the Cause of all other things, as of human *Souls*.

But here the Atheists daringly object, that the World could not be made by *Knowledge* and *Understanding*, because there could be no *Knowledge* or *Understanding* of the World, or of any thing in it before it was made; for according to them, *Things* made *Knowledge*, and not *Knowledge* Things; they meaning by *Things* here, such only as are sensible and corporeal. So that *Mind* and *Understanding* could not be the *Creator* of the World and of these sensible things, it self being the mere *Creature* of them, a secondary derivative Result from them, or a phantastick Image of them, the youngest and most *creaturely* thing in the whole World. Whence it follows, that to suppose *Mind* and *Understanding* to be the Maker of all things, would be no better sense, than if one should suppose the Images in Ponds and Rivers to be the Makers of the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Stars*, and other things represented in them. And upon such a ground as this, does a modern * *Writer* presume to determine, that *Knowledge* and *Understanding* are not to be attributed to God Almighty, because they imply *Imperfection* and Dependence upon

* Quoniam Scientia & Intellectus in nobis nihil aliud sunt, quam suscitatus a rebus externis Organa prementibus Animi tumultus, non est putandum aliquid tale accidere Deo. Signum enim est Potentiæ ab alio dependentis. Hobbs de Cive, c. 15. §. 14. & Lev. ch. 31.

corporeal things without; it being nothing but a Tumult rais'd by the Motions and Pressures of them. According to which Doctrine he must also needs deny the first Principle of all things to be any *knowing understanding* Nature; unless he had asserted some other kind of *Knowledge* distinct from that of Men, and clearly attributed the same to God Almighty. As to which Atheistick Doctrine, I shall at the present only so far forth concern my self in confuting it, as to lay a Foundation for demonstrating the contrary, (I having reserv'd another place for a fuller Confutation of it) namely the Existence of a God, or a *Mind* before the World, from the Nature of *Knowledge* and *Understanding*. First then I say, it is a sottish Conceit of these Atheists, proceeding from their not attending to their own Cogitations, that not only *Sense*, but also *Knowledge* and *Understanding* in Men, is but a *Tumult* rais'd from corporeal things without, pressing upon the Organs of their Bodys; or else, as they declare themselves more distinctly, nothing but the *Activity* of sensible Objects upon them, and their *Passion* from them. For if this were true, then would every thing that *suffer'd* and *reacted* Motion, especially polite Bodys, as Looking-Glasses and the like, have something both of *Sense* and of *Understanding* in them. It is plain that there comes nothing to us from Bodys without us, but only *local Motion* and *Pressure*. Neither is *Sense* it self the mere *Passion* of those Motions; but the *Perception* of the *Passions* in way of *Fancy*. But sensible things themselves, as for example Light and Colours, are not *known* or *understood* either by the *Passion* or *Fancy* of *Sense*, nor by any thing merely foreign and adventitious; but by *intelligible Ideas*, exerted from the *Mind* it self, that is, by something native and domestick to it;

it; nothing being truer than this of Boetius: * *That whatsoever is known, is known, not by its own Force and Power, but by the Force and Power, the Vigour and Activity of that thing it self, which knows or comprehends it.* Wherefore besides the Phantasms of singular Bodys, or of sensible things existing without us, which are not mere Passions neither, it is plain that our human Mind has other Cogitations or Conceptions in it: namely, the Ideas of the intelligible Natures and Essences of things, which are universal, and by and under which it understandeth singulars. It is a ridiculous Conceit of a modern Atheistick Writer, that Universals are nothing else but Names attributed to many singular Bodys, because *whatsoever is, is singular.* For tho whatsoever exists without the Mind be indeed singular, yet is it plain that there are Conceptions in our Minds objectively universal. Which universal Objects of our Mind, tho they exist not as such any where without it, yet are they not therefore nothing, but have an intelligible Entity for this very reason, because they are conceivable; for since Non-entity is not conceivable, whatsoever is conceivable and an Object of the Mind, is therefore Something. And as for Axiomatical Truths, in which something is affirm'd or deny'd, as these are not all Passions from Bodys without us (for what local Motion could impress this common Notion upon our Minds, that things which agree in one third, agree amongst themselves, and the like?) so neither are these things only gather'd by Induction, from repeated and reiterated Sensations; we clearly apprehending at once, that it is impossible they should be otherwise. To this purpose Aristotle

* Omne quod scitur, non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium Natura, Vi & Facultate cognoscitur.

thus ingeniously argues: * *It is evident*, says he, *that there is no Knowledg of the universal Theorems of Geometry by Sense*; for if we could perceive by Sense that the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right, yet should we not rest satisfy'd in this, as having therefore a sufficient Knowledg; but should seek further after a Demonstration of it: Sense reaching only to Singulars, but Knowledg to Universals. When from the universal Idea of a Triangle, which is neither here, nor there, nor any where without our Mind, but yet has an intelligible Entity, we see a plain Necessity, that its three Angles must be equal to two right ones; then do we know the Truth of this universal Theorem, and not before: also we understand, that every singular Triangle, so far as it is true, has this Property in it. Wherefore the Knowledg of this and the like Truths is not deriv'd from Singulars, nor do we arrive to them in way of Ascent, from Singulars to Universals; but on the contrary having first found them in the Universals, we afterwards descending, apply them to Singulars: so that our Knowledg here is not after singular Bodys, and secondarily or derivatively from them; but in order of Nature before them, and Proleptical to them.

Now these universal Conceptions, some of which are also abstract, as of Life, Sense, Reason, Knowledg, and the like; and many of 'em are of such things, whose Singulars do not at all fall under Sense, which therefore could never possibly be imprest upon us, from singular Bodys by local Motion: and again some of 'em are of such, as tho they do belong to sensible and corporeal things; yet as their Accuracy cannot be reach'd to by Sense, so neither did they ever exist in that Mat-

* Οὐδὲ δῆλον αὖτὶς ἀποδείκναι τὴν ἀκρίβειαν, &c.

ter of this lower World, with which we are here encompass'd; and therefore could not be stamp'd upon us from *without*: as, for example, the Ideas of a *perfect straight Line* and a *plain Superficies*, or of an exact *Triangle*, *Circle*, *Sphere*, or *Cube*; no material thing here amongst us being terminated in so *straight Lines*, but that even by *Microscopes* there may be discover'd much Irregularity and Deformity in them; and very probable it is, that there are no perfectly *straight Lines*, no such *Triangles*, *Circles*, *Spheres*, or *Cubes*, as answer to the Exactness of our Conceptions in any part of the whole material Universe, nor ever will be. Notwithstanding which, they are not absolute *Non-entitys*, since we can demonstrate things concerning them, and tho they never were, nor will be; yet are they *possible* to exist, since nothing can be conceiv'd, but what either *is*, or else is *possible to be*. The human Mind therefore has a power of framing Ideas and Conceptions not only of what actually *is*, but also of things which never were, nor perhaps will be, inasmuch as they are only *possible to be*. But when from our Conceptions we conclude of some things, that tho they *are not*, yet they are *possible to be*; since nothing that *is not* can be *possible to be*, unless there be something actually in Being, which hath sufficient Power to produce it; we do thereby implicitly suppose the *Existence* of an *Omnipotent Being* or *God*, which can make whatsoever is conceivable, tho it yet *be not, to be*; and accordingly, material *Triangles*, *Circles*, *Spheres*, *Cubes*, &c. mathematically exact.

The Result of what I have been saying is this, that since singular Bodys are not the only Objects of our *Mind* and *Cogitation*, it having also *universal* and *abstract Ideas* of the *intelligible Natures* or *Essences* of things, some of which are such, whose *Singulars* do
not

not at all fall under *Sense*; others tho they belong to Bodys, yet *Sense* can never reach to 'em, nor were they ever in *Matter*. Moreover, since our Mind can conceive of things which no where *actually exist*, but are only *possible*; and can have such a *demonstrative Science* of *universal Truths*, as *Sense* can never ascend to. Therefore *human Knowledge* and *Understanding* it self is not the mere Image and Creature of *singular* Bodys only, and so derivative or ectypal from them, and in order of Nature junior to them: but as it were hovering aloft over the whole corporeal Universe, it is a thing independent upon *singular* Bodys, or *Proleptical* to them, and in order of Nature before them.

But perhaps it will be ask'd, what Account can we then give of *Knowledge* and *Understanding*, their Nature and Original? since there must be *νοῦτος*, *that which is intelligible*, in order of Nature before *νόησις* or *Intellection*. Certainly we can give no other than this, that the first original *Knowledge* is that of a *perfect Being*, infinitely *good* and *powerful*, comprehending it self, and the utmost Extent of its own Fecundity and Power; that is, the Possibilitys of all things, their Ideas with their several relations to one another, and all necessary and immutable Truths. Here therefore is there a *Knowledge* before the World and all sensible things, which was *Archetypal* and Paradigmatical to the same; of which one perfect *Mind* and *Knowledge*, all other imperfect Minds, as being deriv'd from it, have a certain Participation; whereby they are enabl'd to frame intelligible *Ideas*, not only of whatever does *actually exist*, but also of such things as never were nor will be; but are only *possible* or Objects of Divine Power. Wherefore since it is certain, that even human *Knowledge* and *Understanding* it self is not a mere

* *Passion*

Passion from *sensible* things and *singular* Bodys existing without, which is the only Foundation of this Atheistick Argument, that *Things* made *Knowledg*, and not *Knowledg Things*; it must consequently have some other Original. Moreover, since *Knowledg* and *Understanding* do include an Apprehension of things proleptical and antecedent to their Existence (*Mind* being able to frame Conceptions of all *possible Entitys* and *Modifications*) and therefore in their Nature do plainly suppose the *actual Existence* of a *perfect Being*, which is infinitely fruitful and powerful, and could produce all things *possible* or *conceivable*; the first original *Knowledg* or *Mind*, from which all other Knowables and Minds are deriv'd, being that of an absolutely *perfect* and *omnipotent Being*, comprehending it self, and the Extent of its own Power, or of its *Communicability*; that is, the *Ideas* of all Possibilitys of things, that may be produc'd by it, together with their *Relations* to one another, and their *necessary immutable Truths*, accordingly as *Wisdom* and *Understanding* are describ'd to be * *the Breath* or Vapour of *the Power* of God, and an *Efflux* or Emanation from *the Glory* of *the Almighty*, a *clear Mirror* or Looking Glas of his *active Energy* or *Virtue*, and *the Image* of his *Goodness*. I say, the Result of all is this, that the Nature of *Knowledg* and *Understanding* is so far from being a ground of disproving a Deity, as the Atheists ignorantly pretend, that on the contrary it affords us a firm Demonstration of the Existence of a God, or a *perfect omnipotent Being*, comprehending it self and the Extent of its own Power, or all *Possibilitys* of things: A *Mind* before the World, and senior to all things; no *Ectypal* but *Arche-*

* Wisd. c. 7.

typal thing, which comprehended in it, as a kind of intellectual World, the *Paradigm*, or *Platform*, according to which this *sensible* World was made.

And this may be further confirm'd from what is generally acknowledg'd, and indeed cannot reasonably be deny'd by any, namely that there are *eternal Truths*, such as were never made and had no beginning, nor can ever be destroy'd or cease to be. Which Argument being also lighted on and clearly set forth by a late ingenious * Writer, I shall partly use his Words in propounding it here. Now that there are eternal Truths, is, I say, a thing undeniable; as for example, in *Logick*, that the Cause is always before the Effect in order of Nature; in *Physicks*, that all *local Motion* is by Succession; in *Metaphysicks*, that nothing can be and not be at once; in *Mathematicks*, that the Diameter or Diagonal of a Square is incommensurable to the Sides, that those Lines which are parallel to the same right Line, are also parallel to each other, &c. to which I might add many moral Truths, there being things † *eternally just*, which were not made such at certain times by Law and arbitrary Command; but being such in their own Nature immutably, were from *Everlasting to Everlasting*, and (as it is said of that eternal Word which comprehends all Truth) *the same yesterday, to day, and for ever*. Now again, if there be *eternal Truths*, which were never made and could not but be,

* Mr. Norris in *Metaphysical Essay*, among his *Miscellanys* at p. 152. who there proposes this Argument as his own; and so, I grant, it might very well be look'd on, as being the Result of his own Inquiries, and because no one else, as he says, that he knew of, had industriously and professedly manag'd it: tho' it is certain that some others, and particularly Dr. Cudworth p. 727, &c. of *Int. Syst.* had done this before him.

† *Ἀἰώνια Δίκαια*

then must the *Rationes rerum*, the *simple Reasons* of things also, or their *intelligible Natures* and *Essences*, out of which those Truths are compounded, be of necessity *eternal* likewise; since it is certain, that there can be no *Truth* of the Object complex, without *Truth* of the Object simple. This will appear undeniably to any one that attends to the Idea of *objective Truth complex*, which is nothing else but certain *Habitudes* of *Respects* betwixt thing and thing, as to *Composition* or *Division*. For how can there be any such *Habitudes* or *Relations*, without the *simple Essences* themselves, from which they result? As for instance, how can any *Mathematical Proposition*, suppose that of *Euclid*, that if two *Circles* touch one another inwardly, they have not the same common *Center*, have this *Habitude*, unless there be two such distinct *simple Essences*, as *Circle* and *Center*? These *Habitudes* can no more subsist by themselves, than any other *Relations* can; they must have their *simple Essences*, as the other have their *Subject* and *Term*; upon the *Position* of which they immediately result. If therefore there can be no *Truth* of the *Object complex* without *Truth* of the *Object simple*, and there can be no *Habitudes* and *Relations* of *Composition* and *Division*, without the *simple Essences* themselves; it follows, that whenever the one does exist, the other must exist also; and consequently if the one be *eternal*, the other must be *eternal* also: and so to recur to the former Instance, if it be a *Proposition* of *eternal Truth*, that if two *Circles* touch one another inwardly, they have not the same common *Center*, the two distinct *simple Essences* of *Circle* and *Center*, must be from *Eternity* also; and consequently, as the

most discerning of the * Antients have acknowledg'd the simple Essences of things are eternal and immutable. If therefore there be *eternal Intelligibles* or *Ideas* and *eternal Truths*, and necessary Existence do belong to them; then must there be an eternal Mind necessarily existing: since these Truths and intelligible Essences of things cannot possibly be any where but in a *Mind*. For by the *Essences* of things, when they are said to be eternal, must not be meant their very Substances, as if every thing were in it self eternal and uncreated; or that God in *Creation* did only, as a modern Writer expresses it, *Sartoris instar vestire Essentias rerum novâ Existentiâ*, clothe the antecedent Essences of things with a new Garment of Existence: but only their *Esse cognitum*, their possible and intelligible Natures, as they were Objects of infinite Power and Understanding, before they were made. Accordingly there must be a *Mind* senior to the World and all sensible things, and such as at once comprehends in it the Ideas of all Intelligibles, their necessary *Schemes* or *Habitudes* and Relations to one another, and all their immutable Truths: A *Mind* which does not, as *Aristotle* writes of it, † *sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand*; as if it were sometimes awake and sometimes asleep, or like an Eye, sometimes open and sometimes shut: but such a Mind as is essentially *Act* and *Energy*, and in which there is no Defect. Such a *Mind*, I say, there must needs be; forasmuch as there are but two

* Ἀεὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὁσάποτε ἔχοντα; τὰ μὴ γινόμενα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ὄντα; μήτε γινόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα. Plat. And to Plato in this even Aristotle agrees: Ἀξιόσομεν αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἄλλην ἔσσαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἢ ἔτε κίνησις ὑπάρχει, ἔτε φθορὰ, ἔτε γένεσις τὸ πᾶν. Arist. Met. l. 4.
† Ὅτι μὴ νοεῖν, ὅτι δὲ νοεῖν.

conceivable ways, how any thing may exist: either out of all *Understanding* and *Mind*, or within some *Understanding* and *Mind*. If therefore the simple *Essences* of things are eternal, but not without all *Mind*, it remains that they must have an eternal Existence in some *Mind*, or rather they are the same with that *Mind* it self, consider'd as variously *exhibitive* or *representative*, according to the several Modes of Imitability or Participation; which, as I have before declar'd, can be no other than the *Mind* of an *omnipotent* and *infinitely perfect* Being, comprehending it self, and the Extent of its own Power, or how far it is communicable, that is, all the *Possibilities* of things that may be made by it, and their respective *Truths*: *Mind* and *Knowledg* in the very nature of it supposing the actual Existence of an *omnipotent* or *infinitely powerful* Being, as its *Intelligible*, it being nothing but the *Comprehension* of the Extent of Infinite or Divine Power, and the measure of the same. But perhaps it may here be objected, that those *Habitudes*, which we affirm to be eternal, are not attributed *absolutely* to the *simple Essences* as actually existing, but only *hypothetically*; implying that whensoever they shall exist, they shall also carry such Relations to one another: so that there is, you'll say, only an *Hypothetical Connexion* between the Subject and the Predicate, but not an absolute Position of either. In answer to which, I say first, that these *Habitudes* are not, as is suppos'd, only by way of *Hypothesis*, but *absolutely* attributed to the *simple Essences* as actually existing. For when I say, for instance, that every Part of a Circle is equally distant from the Center, this Proposition does not hang in suspense, then to be verify'd, when the things shall exist in Nature, but is at present *actually*

*

ally true, as true as it ever will or can be ; and consequently I may thence infer, that the things themselves *already are*. There is no necessity, I confess, that they should exist in *Nature*, which is all the Objection proves ; but exist they must, because of *Nothing there can be no Affections*. But secondly, suppose I grant what the Objector would have, that these Habitues are not *absolutely* attributed to the *simple Essences*, but only by way of *Hypothesis* ; yet do I not see what he can gain by this Concession. For thus much at least is attributed to the *simple Essences* at present, that whensoever they shall exist, such and such Habitues will attend 'em. I say thus much is attributed *actually*, and at present : but now how can any thing be said of that which *is not* ? Wherefore there is another way of existing, besides that in *rerum Naturâ* ; namely, in the *Mundus Archetypus*, or the Ideal World, where all the *Rationes rerum*, or *simple Essences* of things, whereof there are standing and immutable *Affirmations* and *Negations*, have an eternal and immutable Existence, before ever they enter upon the Stage of *Nature* *.

Thus I have now not only fully answer'd and confuted all the Atheistick Pretences against the *Idea* of God, tending to disprove his *Existence* ; but also occasionally propos'd several solid and substantial Arguments for a Deity : as, that all *successive Beings*, the *World*, *Motion*, and *Time*, are in their own nature absolutely incapable of an *Ante-*

* Of this Argument see more in Cudworth's Intel. Syst. p. 737. In Norris's Postscript to Metaphysical Essay ; and in his Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World.

Eternity, and therefore there must of necessity be something else of a *permanent Duration*, that was eternal and without beginning ; that no Atheist, according to his Principles, can possibly give an account of the Original of his own *Soul* and *Mind* ; that the *Phænomenon* of *Motion* cannot be solv'd without an incorporeal Principle presiding over the Whole ; that the *artificial, regular, and orderly Frame*, together with the Harmony of the Whole, do demonstrate an *understanding* and *intending Cause* of the World, that order'd things for *Ends* and *Good* : Besides, that there are several other *Phænomena*, both *ordinary* and *extraordinary*, which *Atheists* being no way able to solve, are forc'd to deny. And in short, from that very Idea of God, which is objected against by the Atheist, I have prov'd his Existence ; as also from the *Certainty of eternal Truths*.

C H A P. VII.

A Confutation of the Second Capital Objection of the Atheist against Omnipotence and Divine Creation ; That Nothing, by any Power whatsoever, can be made out of Nothing.

I Come now to the *Achilles*, or pretended invincible Objection of the Atheist, who tells us in the next place *ad Hominem*, that by God we understand a *Creator* of some real Entity or other out of *Nothing*: But, says he, it is an undoubted Principle of *Reason* and *Philosophy*, an undeniable *common Notion*, that *Nothing can be made out of Nothing*; and consequently, as there can be no such *Creative Power* as this, so can there be no God. In answer to which I shall endeavour to perform these three things: First, I shall shew, that in some senses, this is indeed an unquestionable *Truth* and *common Notion*, that *Nothing can come from Nothing*. But secondly, I shall make it evident, that in the sense of these Atheistick Objectors it is absolutely false, and consequently that Omnipotence and a Divine Creation can be no way impugn'd from this Principle when rightly understood. Thirdly and lastly, I shall prove, that as from this *Principle* or *common Notion*, *Nothing out of Nothing*, there can be no Execution at all done against Theism or a Divine Creation; so from the very same, rightly understood, the Impossibility of all Atheism may be demonstratively prov'd, in bringing something

something out of nothing in an impossible sense; and on t'other hand, the Existence of a God may be evinc'd.

First then I say, that this Axiom must be acknowledg'd to be undeniably true, that *Nothing can possibly be made out of Nothing, or come from Nothing, in that Nothing, which was not, could ever bring it self into Being, or efficiently produce it self, or that Nothing can possibly be made without an efficient Cause:* and thus was it frequently understood by divers of the Antients, and particularly by Cicero.

Secondly I say, that *Nothing, which was not, could be produc'd or brought into Being by any other efficient Cause, than such as hath at least equal Perfection in it, and a sufficient active or productive Power.* For if any thing were made by that which has not *equal Perfection*, then must so much of the *Effect* as transcends the *Cause*, be indeed made *without a Cause* (since nothing can give that which it has not) or be caus'd by it self, or by *Nothing*. Again, to suppose a thing to be produc'd by that which has no sufficient productive Power, is really to suppose it also to be produc'd from it self, without a Cause, or from *Nothing*: and hitherto is the Axiom verifi'd in respect of the *Efficient Cause*.

Thirdly, I say in respect of the *material Cause*, that *Nothing which is materially made out of things præ-existing, as some are, can have any other real Entity, than what was either before contain'd in, or resulteth from the things themselves so modify'd; or that there can be no new Entitys or Substances, naturally generated out of Matter:* and therefore that all natural *Generations* are really nothing else but *Mixtures*, or new *Modifications* of things præ-existing. And this was that very thing, and no other, which the antient Physiologers meant (however I am

not ignorant that the generality of * modern Writers have interpreted their meaning quite another way) when, as *Aristotle* tells us, they so much insisted upon this Principle, that † *it was impossible that any real Entity should be naturally made or generated out of nothing*; or, as it is also otherwise express'd, || *that no real Entity was either generated or corrupted*: that is, that in natural Generations, Corruptions, and Alterations, where God is not conceiv'd miraculously to interpose, there is no Creation of any new Substance or real Entity out of nothing, nor Annihilation or Destruction of any into *Nothing*. Whence on one hand, *Anaxagoras* being not able to conceive otherwise of the *Forms* and *Qualities* of Bodys, than that they are *real Entitys* distinct from the Substance of *Matter* or its *Modifications*, concluded that therefore in *Generations*, *Corruptions*, and *Alterations*, these were not created out of *Nothing*, and annihilated or reduc'd into *Nothing*; but that every thing was naturally made ** *out of pre-existent and in-existent things*, and consequently that there were in all things dissimilar Atoms and Particles of every kind, tho by reason of their *Parvitude* insensible to us, and every thing seem'd to be only that which was most predominant and conspicuous in it: as namely, that *Bone* was made out of *bony* Atoms, *Flesh* out of *fleshy*, &c. and *Nothing* out of *Nothing*, but every thing out of *pre-existent similar Atoms*. On t'other hand, the *Italicks* or *Pythagoricks*, as well before *Anaxagoras* as after him (with whom also thus

* See Cud. Int. Syst. p. 749.

† Τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον.

|| Οὐδὲν ἔστι γίνεσθαι, ἔστι φθείρεσθαι ὅπ' ὄντων.

** Ἐκ ὁμοπαρχόντων καὶ ἑτεροπαρχόντων.

far concur'd *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*, those *Atheizers* of the *Italick* Philosophy) did with much better reason conclude, from the same fundamental Principle, that since the *Forms* and *Qualitys* of Body were unquestionably generated and corrupted, they were therefore no *Entitys* really distinct from the *Substance* of *Matter* or its *Modifications*: but only different *Dispositions* or *Modifications* of the insensible Parts thereof, causing in us different *Phantasms*, and this was the first Original of the *dissimilar Atomology*. Again, those of this way that were *Theists*, made this other use of the aforesaid Principle: that since the *Souls* of Animals, especially *human*, are unquestionably *Entitys* really distinct from *Matter* and all its *Modifications* (no *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites* and *Motions* being ever able to beget *Cogitation* or *Consciousness*, much less a power of understanding *eternal Truths*) that therefore these could not be generated out of *Matter*, nor corrupted again into it: for if human *Souls* were generated out of *Matter*, then must some real Entity be *materially* produc'd out of *Nothing* (there being nothing of Life or *Cogitation* in *Matter*) which is a thing absolutely impossible. Wherefore these Philosophers did not hold that *Souls* are generated out of *Matter*, but * having been made by the immediate Hand of God and pre-existed, they were insinuated and introduc'd into *Bodys* in Generations. I say, having pre-existed, because they thought it incongruous that *Souls*, which are in order of Nature senior to *Bodys*, should in order of Time be junior to them; as also not reasonable, that Divine *Creation* being as it were prostituted, should without end perpetually attend and wait upon na-

† Πάσα ψυχή γεννᾶται ἐκ τῆς οὐρίας.

tural Generations, and be intermingl'd with 'em *.

Thus far I have represented those Senses, wherein it is impossible, that any thing should be made out of *Nothing* or come from *Nothing*; all which may be reduc'd to this general one, that *Nothing can be made out of Nothing causally*; or that *Nothing* cannot cause any thing either *efficiently* or *materially*. Which, as it is undeniably true, so is it likewise so far from making any thing against a *Divine Creation* or the *Existence* of a God, that the same may be demonstratively prov'd and evinc'd from it, as shall be shewn hereafter. But next I come to mention the Sense of the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists, and to shew in what way they propose it as an Argument against the *Existence* of a God. Now the *making of Something out of Nothing* is not taken *causally* by them, but only so as to signify the *Terminus a quo*, or *Term from which* they are made, to wit, an antecedent *Non-existence*; and then the meaning of this Proposition, that *Nothing can possibly be made out of Nothing*, will be this: That *Nothing* which once was not, could by *any Power whatsoever* be afterwards brought into *Being*. In answer whereunto, I shall perform these two things: First, I shall make it appear, that *Nothing out of Nothing*, taken in this sense, is so far from being a *common Notion*, that it is not at all true. And secondly I shall prove, that if it were true, yet would it of the two make more against *Atheism* than it does against *Theism*, and therefore ought by no means to be us'd by Atheists, as an Argument against a Deity.

First then, it is unquestionably certain, that this cannot be universally true, that *Nothing*, which once

* See more of this in Cudworth's True Int. Syst. p. 744, 745.

was not, could possibly be made, or brought out of Non-existence into Being; because if it were, then could there be no such thing as *making* or *causing* at all; no Action or Motion, and consequently no Generation or Mutation in the corporeal Universe: but the whole World would be like a stiff adamantine Rock; and this would doubtless be a better Argument against Motion, than any of *Zeno's*. But we have all of us experience within our selves of a power of producing new Cogitations in our Minds, new *intellectual* and *moral* Habits, as also new *local Motion* in our Bodys, or at least new Determinations of 'em, and of causing thereby *new Modifications* in Bodys without us. And therefore are the Atheists forc'd to restrain the sense of this Proposition to *substantial things* only; so that tho there may be new Accidents and Modifications produc'd out of *Nothing*, yet there can be no new *Substances* made; however they be not able in the mean time to give any reason why one of those should be in it self more impossible than the other, or why no *Substance* should be *makable*. But however, that some are so stagger'd with the seeming plausibility of this Argument, is chiefly upon these following accounts: first, by reason of the Confusion of their own Conceptions; for because it is certain, that *Nothing can possibly be made out of nothing* in one sense, to wit *causally*, they not distinguishing Senses, nor being aware of the Equivocation, which is in this, ἐξ οὐ αὐτῶν, *out of Nothing*, do inadvertently give their Assent to those words in a wrong sense, that no Substance, such as *Matter* is, could possibly be brought out of Non-existence into Being. Secondly, by reason of their unskilful arguing from *artificial* things, when because nothing can be artificially made, but out of *pre-existing Matter*, as namely a *House* or

a *Garment*, and the like, there being nothing done in the Production of these things, but only a new Modification of what before *substantially* was, they overhastily conclude, that no *Power* whatsoever could produce any thing otherwise, than out of *præ-existing Matter*, and that *Matter* it self therefore could not possibly be made. In which Conceit they are again further confirm'd from hence ; because the old *Physiologers* maintain'd the same thing concerning natural Generations likewise, that nothing was in them produc'd ἐξ ἑνός οὐκ ὄντος, *out of Nothing* neither ; or that there was no new *Substance* or *Entity* made in them, really distinct from the *præ-existent Matter* and its *Modifications*, they unwarily extending this beyond the Bounds of *Physicks* into *Metaphysicks*, and unduly measuring or limiting *infinite Power* accordingly. Lastly, because it is undeniably certain, concerning our selves and all *imperfect created Beings*, that none of these can create any new *Substance*, which was not before, therefore some men are apt to measure all things by their own Scantling, and to suppose it universally impossible, according to human Reason, for any *Power* whatsoever thus to create : whence it follows, that *Theology* must in this sense be acknowledg'd to be contradictory to the Principles of natural *Light* and *Understanding*. But as to this I say, that since it is certain that *imperfect created Beings* can themselves produce some things out of *Nothing* *præ-existing*, as *new Cogitations*, *new local Motions*, *new Modifications* and *Transformations* of things corporeal, it is very reasonable to think, that an *absolutely perfect Being* could do something more, that is, create new *Substances* out of nothing, or give them their *whole Being*. And it may well be conceiv'd to be as easy for God or an omnipotent Being to make a

whole World, *Matter* and all ἐξ οὐκ οὐτις, *out of Nothing*, as it is for us to create a *Thought* or to move a *Finger*, or for the *Sun* to send out *Rays*, or a *Candle Light*, or lastly for an opacous *Body* to produce the *Image* of it self in *Glasses* or *Water*, or to project a *Shadow*; all these imperfect things being but the *Energys*, *Rays*, *Images*, or *Shadows* of the *Deity*. For a *Substance*, which once was not, to be made by *God* or a *Being* infinitely perfect, is not for it to be made out of *Nothing* in the impossible sense, it coming from *Him* who is *All*; who has not only infinitely greater *Perfection*, but also a sufficient active *Power* to produce the same, it being *substantially emanative*. It is true indeed, that infinite *Power* it self cannot do things in their own nature *impossible*; and therefore this is the only thing which the *Atheists* have to prove, that it is in it self absolutely *impossible* for a *Substance*, tho not for an *Accident* or *Modification*, to be produc'd out of *Non-existence* into *Being*; in order to which, they must shew it implies a *Contradiction*: but this will they in vain endeavour to attempt, because tho it be contradictory for a *thing to be and not be* at the same time, yet is there no manner of *Contradiction* in this, for any *imperfect contingent Being*, which before *was not*, afterwards to *be*. Wherefore this being in it self no way impossible, must be acknowledg'd to be a due *Object* of *infinite Power*, or that which may be done by a *perfect, omnipotent, existent Being*. To this I add, that if *Nothing* could be made ἐξ οὐκ οὐτις, *out of Nothing*, in this latter sense, that is, *Nothing*, which before was not, afterwards brought into *Being*; then must the reason hereof be, because no *Substance* or real *Entity* can be caus'd by any other *Substance*, so as to receive and derive its whole *Being* from it; and consequently whatsoever *Substance* or real *Entity*

tity is in the whole World was not only from Eternity and without beginning, but also existed of it self *necessarily* and *independently* upon any thing else. But first, I say, it has been already declar'd, that it is repugnant to the human Facultys, that any *temporary successive* Being whatsoever, or that *Time* it self should be eternal and without beginning; because upon that Hypothesis there would have been an Infinity of *Time past*, and if so, then would there of necessity have been *Time past*, which was never *present* *. But to make every *substantial* thing not only to have existed from *Eternity* and without beginning, as even some mistaken Theists have done, but also to have existed independently upon any thing else as its *Original* or *Cause*, and therefore of it self *necessarily*; this, I say, is it self to make Something come from Nothing in the impossible sense, that is, *causally*. For, as when some Atheists affirm, that Nothing could ever move it self, and yet suppose there has been *Motion* from all Eternity, they plainly make this Motion, however suppos'd to be eternal, to come from *Nothing* in the impossible sense: so in like manner they who suppose things to have existed of themselves *necessarily*, which have no *Self-existence* or *necessary Existence* contain'd in their Nature, which nothing but a perfect Being has, do make this *necessary Existence* of such things to come from *Nothing*. Wherefore, tho it be certain that Something did exist of it self *necessarily* and from all *Eternity*, namely a *perfect Being*, whose *necessary Existence* is therefore not from *Nothing*, because essentially included in its own Nature; yet withal is it certain that there can be but *one* such thing: *necessity* of Existence being

* See Dr. More's Enchirid. Metaph. c. 10.

natural and essential to no more. But as for all other things, which are in their own nature *contingently possible* to be or not to be, Reason pronounces of 'em, that they could not exist of themselves *necessarily*, but were caus'd by something else, and deriv'd their Original from that *one absolutely perfect and necessarily existent Being*.

Lastly, I shall disprove the Truth of this Assertion, that whatsoever *substantially* and *really is*, did exist of it self from all Eternity *unmade*, after this manner: because it would follow from thence, that not only *Matter* and *unqualify'd Atoms*, as the *Democritick* Atheists suppose, but likewise *Souls*, especially human, must needs have existed of themselves too, from *Eternity unmade*. For, as no man can be so sottish, as to conceive himself, or that which thinketh in him, his own *Soul* or *Mind* and *Personality*, to be no real Entity, whilst every Clod of Earth is such; so is it certain, that Mind can never be generated out of dead and senseless *Matter* or *Body*, nor result as a *Modification* thereof, out of *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions*, and therefore must needs be a thing really distinct from it, or *Substance incorporeal*: the *Democritick* Atheists being here grossly deceiv'd in thinking, that because *Forms* and *Qualitys* of *Bodys* may be resolv'd into those foremention'd Elements of *Matter*, and consequently concluded to be no Entitys really distinct from the *Substance* thereof, but only different *Modifications* of the same, that therefore the like may be said of *Souls* too, the *rational* not excepted. Wherefore if no Substance or real Entity could ever be brought out of *Non-existence* into *Being*, or be caus'd by any thing else, then must all human *Souls* and *Personalities*, as well as *Matter* and *Atoms*, have existed not only from *Eternity*, but also

of *themselves* independently upon any other thing. But the Atheists are so abhorrent from this Eternity of human Souls, that they will by no means admit of their *Post-existence* or *Immortality*; they apprehending, that if any *living understanding* Being should prove immortal, they could not sufficiently secure themselves against the possibility and danger of a God. Indeed some Theists have asserted not only the *Præ-existence*, but also the *Eternity* of all *human Minds*, as * *Cicero* more than once does: but notwithstanding none of 'em ever maintain'd, that human Minds and their distinct Personalities were thus all of *themselves* independently upon any thing as their Cause and Original. And, as it was before prov'd, from the nature of *Knowledge* and *Understanding* (it comprehending the *Possibilities* of all things, and therefore supposing infinite Power) that there can be but one *Mind* or *understanding Being* self-existent, all other *Minds* partaking of that *one Mind*: so is it hardly possible for any one in good earnest to entertain such a Conceit as this, that his own particular *Soul*, *Mind*, and *Personality*, and for the same reason all human Souls, tho' subject to such Laws of Fate as now they are, did not only præ-exist before their respective *Bodys*, and were from all Eternity; but also existed of themselves *necessarily* and *independently* upon any thing else. Wherefore if human Souls, Minds, and Personalities being unquestionably *substantial* things, and really distinct from *Matter* (which therefore could not possibly be generated out of it) did not all exist from Eternity of *themselves*, *necessarily*, and *independently*, it is certain that they must derive their whole Being

* Animus quia vixit ab omni Æternitate, &c. And again, cum Animi Hominum semper fuerint futurique sint, &c. Cic. de Divin.

from the Deity, or be created ἐξ οὐδενός, out of *Nothing* or *Non-existence* by it. And if human Souls were unquestionably thus created, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that *Matter* or *Body* it self was created likewise out of *Nothing*, or caus'd by the Deity: forasmuch as that which created one thing out of *Nothing*, could create every thing; and there is really more of *Substance*, that is, a higher degree of *Entity*, in *Minds* and *Souls*, *conscious self-moving* and *understanding Beings*, than in senseless *Matter* or unactive Bulk. But here, it may be, the Atheist will demand; If it be so plain that there is in the Deity a creative or productive Power of *Something out of Nothing*, why then did not those Pagan Theists, who were suppos'd to have kept close to the simple Light of Nature, ever own this? To which I answer, that whatever some have said to the contrary, the most Intelligent among 'em have own'd it. For, according to *Cicero*, the ancient Physiologers, who laid so great stress upon this Proposition, *De nihilo nihil fit*, did not so understand it, as that *Nothing* could by any Power whatsoever be brought out of *Non-existence* into *Being*, but only that *Nothing could be made without a Cause*. Nor did they here mean by *Cause* the *material* only, as if *Nothing* could possibly be made but out of *pre-existing Matter*; seeing *Epicurus* is tax'd by *Cicero* for this piece of Singularity, of introducing his third Motion of *Atoms*, which he terms *Clinamen Principiorum**, out

* Nec cum hac ita sint, est causa cur Epicurus Fatum extimescat, & ab Atomis petat Præsidium, easque de viâ deducat; & uno tempore suscipiat res duas inenodabiles; unam ut sine causâ fiat aliquid, ex quo existet ut de Nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipsi nec cuiquam Physico placet. *Cic. Lib. de Fat.*

of *Nothing*, or without an *efficient Cause*, as indeed all Motion also was to the Atomick Atheists in this sense from *Nothing*; however they would not expressly own it, for fear of contradicting this Principle, which they and all Naturalists allow'd of, that *Nothing could come from Nothing*. And here it is observable, that whereas the Atheists are inconsistent with themselves, in that tho in words they absolutely and universally assert the Truth of this Maxim, yet do they in effect hold, that *Something* is from *Nothing* even without a *Cause*: the Theists, I say, on the contrary do maintain that this, tho not without a *Cause*, nor indeed by any ordinary, yet by an extraordinary *Cause* or *infinite Power*, may be done. For it is certain, that not only * *Plato*, but all those other Pagan Philosophers too, who asserted the *Incorporeity* and Immortality of human Souls, could not possibly conceive 'em to have been made out of *præ-existent Matter*; but either out of *Nothing*, they being not eternal, but having a *newness* of *Being* (as *Plato* himself seem'd to suppose) or else, if they were conceiv'd by 'em to be eternal, which was the Opinion of most of the junior *Platonists*, yet were they at once held to have deriv'd their whole *Substance* from the Deity, and always to depend upon it, as eternal *Light* would depend upon an eternal *Sun*. Only *Plutarch* and his Followers are here to be excepted, who would neither have Souls to be made out of *Nothing* by God, nor yet out of *corporeal Matter præ-existing*, they being themselves *incorporeal*; but out of a strange Commixture of the Substance of God himself with the Substance of a certain disorderly Soul *self-existent* and *un-created*, as I have before observ'd. But that the genu-

* See Cudworth's Int. Syst. p. 750, 751.

ine *Platonists* universally suppos'd, that one *Substance* might be caus'd by another, and derive its whole Being from it, is evident from hence, because their second *Divine Hypostasis* or *Substance*, tho eternal, was, according to them, deriv'd from or begotten by their first, and their third *Hypostasis* or *Substance* was produc'd both from the *first* and *second*; and other inferior Orbs of Being, as the particular Souls of Dæmons and Men, from that whole Trinity of *Divine Hypostases* jointly concurring. And as for *Matter* or *Body* it self, it is certain also that *Plotinus*, *Porphyrus*, *Jamblichus*, *Hierocles*, *Proclus*, and other *Platonists* expressely deny'd it to have been ἀγέννητον, *unmade* or *self-existent*, and conceiv'd it to have deriv'd its whole Being from the Deity, which accordingly is stil'd by *Proclus*, * *the ineffable Cause of Matter*. In like manner have we already shew'd, that according to the *Chaldaick* Oracles, *Matter* it self was also caus'd or produc'd by the Deity; to which purpose is this Sentence cited by *Proclus*: † *from whence, that is, from the Deity, abundantly springs forth the Generation of the multiform Matter*. Thus *Hierocles* in *Photius* affirms of *Plato*, || that he held the *World* to have been produc'd by *God* out of no *præ-existent Matter*. Much the same is affirm'd of him by *Proclus*, and also of *Orpheus*, he deriving this Doctrine, as is suppos'd, with other things from the old *Egyptian* Theologers, among whom *Hermes* and the rest held *Matter* not to be *self-existent, unmade, or underiv'd* from the Deity, but to have been caus'd by it.

* Ἀρχήτης αἰτία τῆς ὕλης.

† Ἐνθεν αἰτὴν θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλης ὕλης.

|| Δημιουργὸν θεὸν προϋφίστην ὁ Πλάτων πάσης ἐμφανῆς τε καὶ ἀφανῆς διακοσμήσεως ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένης γαλημένης, &c.

It is true indeed, that many of these Philosophers asserted *Matter*, *Souls*, and the whole *World* to have been eternal or without beginning, and consequently not created ἐξ οὐ οὐραν in that stricter sense, that is, out of an antecedent *Non-existence* in Time. Notwithstanding which, they suppos'd 'em to have receiv'd their whole Being from the Deity, and to have depended on it every jot as much, as if having once not been, they had afterwards been made by it. For certainly that which gives to any Substance its whole Being, tho from Eternity, so that it never *was not*, the same upon supposition that it once had *not been*, could unquestionably have produc'd it out of *Nothing*, or an antecedent *Non-existence*.

I have now sufficiently disprov'd the Truth of that Assertion, that *Nothing could be made out of Nothing*, in the Atheistick sense thereof, namely, that *Nothing*, which before was not, *could afterwards be possibly made to be*; tho this must not be extended so far as to *accidental* things and *Modifications*, but restrain'd and confin'd only to *Substantials*. I shall in the next place make it appear, that were this Assertion true, that no *Substance* or *real Entity*, which once *was not*, could be caus'd or produc'd, yet would it notwithstanding of the two more impugn Atheism than Theism; forasmuch as the Atheists do really bring more out of *Nothing* or *Non existence* than the Theists do: in that, as * *Plato* and *Aristotle* represent their Opinion, they generate and corrupt *real Entitys* and substantial things, and produce 'em out of *Nothing* or *Non-existence*, and reduce 'em to *Nothing* again; they making all things whatsoever, the bare *Substance* of *Matter* only ex-

* Cudworth's Int. Syst. p. 754.

cepted, (which to them is either no determinate thing, or else nothing but mere Bulk, or resisting and divisible Magnitude) to come out of *Nothing*, and to go to *Nothing*. And thus it is plain, that either there is no *real Entity* in the whole world besides the bare Substance of *Matter*, that is, besides divisible and separable *Extension* or resisting *Magnitude*; and consequently *Life* and *Cogitation*, *Sense* and *Consciousness*, *Reason* and *Understanding*, all our own *Minds* and *Personalities*, are no *real Entitys*; or else that there are, according to the Atheistick Hypothesis, *real Entitys* produc'd out of *Nothing*, and reduc'd to *Nothing* again. Indeed the Hylozoick Atheists being somewhat sensible of this Inconvenience of making all *Life* and *Understanding* out of *Nothing*, and that there must of necessity be some fundamental *Life* and *Perception*, which is not *accidental* but *substantial*, and which was never *generated* and cannot be *corrupted*, have therefore attributed a kind of *Life* and *Perception* to all *Matter* as such. Notwithstanding which, even these also, forasmuch as they deny to *Matter* animal *Sense* and *Consciousness*, do suppose all animal *Life* or *Sense* and *conscious Understanding* to be generated and corrupted, produc'd out of *Nothing*, and reduc'd to *Nothing* again. Neither can *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *Understanding* be reckon'd amongst the *Modes* of *Matter*, that is, of *Magnitude* or *divisible* and *antipypous Extension*, since they may be conceiv'd without the same: whereas *Modes* cannot be conceiv'd without their *Substance*. *Standing*, *Sitting*, and *Walking* cannot be conceiv'd without a *Body*, and that fitly organiz'd too, and therefore are they nothing but different *Modes* of such a *Body*. When that human *Body* which before stood, does afterwards sit or walk, no man can think that here is a *miraculous Production*

Production of any new *real Entity* out of *Nothing*: nor when the same Matter which was square or cubical is made spherical or cylindrical. But when there is *Life* and *Understanding*, which was not before, then is there unquestionably a new real Entity produc'd. But the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists themselves, according to the Tenour of the *Atomick Physiology*, do acknowledg no other Modes of *Matter* or *Body*, but only more or less Magnitude of Parts, Figure, Site, Motion or Rest. And upon this very account do they explode *Qualitys*, consider'd as *Entities* really distinct from these *Modes*; because in the Generation and Alteration of 'em, there would be real *Entities* made out of *Nothing* or without a *Cause*: whereupon they resolve these *Qualitys* into *Mechanism* and *Fancy*. But *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *Understanding* are things, which have more real Entity in them, and can no way be solv'd by *Mechanism* and *Fancy*; wherefore undoubtedly they are no Modes of *Matter* or *Body*, but Attributes of another kind, of *Substance incorporeal*. All cogitative Beings, especially human *Souls* and *Personalities*, are unquestionably *substantial things*, and yet do the Atheists bring these, and consequently themselves, out of *Nothing* or *Non existence*, and reduce 'em to *Nothing* again. In short then we find, that these very *Atheists*, who contend against *Theists*, that *Nothing can be made out of Nothing*, do themselves bring all things out of *Nothing* or *Non-existence*, and perpetually reduce 'em to *Nothing* again; according to whose Principles, as there was once no *Life*, no *Understanding* at all in the Universe, so may there be none again. They who deny a God, because there can be no *creative Power* belonging to any thing, do themselves notwithstanding attribute to *Matter*, tho a mere *passive*, *luggish*, and

unactive

unactive thing, a *creative* Power of things substantial, as namely of human *Souls* and *Personalities* out of *Nothing*. And thus is that formidable Argument of the *Atheists*, that there can be no God, because *Nothing* can be made out of *Nothing*, not only prov'd to be false, but also retorted upon these *Atheists* themselves, they bringing all things besides *senseless* and *unqualify'd* *Matter* out of *Nothing*.

I shall now in the third and last place make it evident, that the *Atheists* do not only bring *real* *Entitys* and substantial things out of *Nothing* in the second sense, that is, out of an *antecedent Non-existence*, which yet is a thing only possible to God or a perfect Being, but also that they bring them out of *Nothing* in the absolutely impossible sense, that is, suppose 'em to be made without a *Cause*, or *Nothing* to be the Cause of *Something*. But in order to this I think fit to premise, that in the *Atheistick Hypothesis* are contain'd these three things: First, that no *Substance* can be made or caus'd by any thing else but only new *Modifications*. Secondly, that *Matter* or *Body* is the only *Substance*, and therefore whatsoever is made, is made out of præ-existing *Matter*. Thirdly and lastly, that whatsoever else there is in the whole World, besides the *Substance* of *Matter*, is made or generated out of *Matter*. And now I shall proceed to demonstrate the absolute Impossibility of this *Atheistick Hypothesis*, from that very Principle of the antient *Physiologers*, that *Nothing* can be made out of *Nothing* in the true sense thereof; it not only bringing *real* *Entitys* and substantial things out of an *antecedent Non-existence* (tho nothing but an infinitely perfect Being neither can thus create) but also producing 'em, as was before hinted, without a *Cause*.

First then, when they affirm *Matter* to be the only *Substance*, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of that alone, they hereby plainly suppose all things to be made without an *efficient Cause*; which is to bring 'em out of *Nothing* in an impossible sense. For tho it be not true, that nothing can be made but out of *præ-existent Matter*, and consequently that God being suppos'd to exist, could do no more than a Carpenter or Taylor does; I say, tho it be not universally true, that every thing which is made must needs have a *material Cause*, so that the *Quaternio* of Causes in *Logick* is not to be extended to all things *caus'd* whatsoever; yet is it certain, that nothing, which once was not, could possibly be made without an *efficient Cause*. Wherefore if there be any thing made, which was not before, there must of necessity, besides *Matter*, be some other Substance existing, as the *efficient Cause* thereof; forasmuch as *Matter* alone could not make any thing: as Marble cannot make a Statue, nor Timber and Stones a House, nor Cloth a Garment. To which it may be added, that whereas the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists do admit of no other *efficient Causality* in Nature than *local Motion*, and allow to *Matter* or *Body*, their only *Substance*, no *self-moving Power*; they hereby make all the Motion which is in the world to be without a Cause, and from *Nothing*; Action to be without any *Subject* or *Agent*, and the *Efficiency* of all things without an *Efficient*.

In the next place, should we be so liberal as to grant the Atomick Atheists *Motion* without a Cause, or permit *Strato* and the *Hylozoick* Atheists to attribute to *Matter* a *self-moving Power*; yet do we still affirm, that this *Matter* and *Motion* both together could not possibly produce any new real Entity, which was not before:

before : *Matter* as such efficiently causing *Nothing*, and *Motion* only changing the *Modifications* of *Matter*, as *Figure*, *Place*, *Site*, and *Disposition* of *Parts*. Wherefore if *Matter* as such have no *animal Sense* and *conscious Understanding* essentially belonging to it, which no Atheists, as yet, have had the Impudence to assert ; then can no *Motion* or *Modification* of *Matter*, no *Contexture* of *Atoms*, possibly beget *Sense* and *Understanding*, *Soul* and *Mind* ; because this would be to bring Something out of *Nothing* in the impossible sense, or to suppose Something to be made *by it self*, without a *Cause*. This was the very Doctrine, as we have before intimated, of the most antient Atomick Physiologers ; not that every thing whatsoever might be made out of *pre-existing Matter*, but on the contrary, that in all natural *Generations* there is no real *Entity* produc'd out of the *Matter*, which was not before in it, but only new *Modifications* : and consequently that *Souls* and *Minds* being not mere *Modifications* of *Matter* (in respect of *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site* and *Motion*) could never be produc'd out of it ; because they must then of necessity come from *Nothing*, that is, be made either by themselves, *without a Cause*, or without a *sufficient Cause*. And we have before noted out of *Aristotle*, how the old Atheistick *Materialists* or *Hylopathians*, being assaulted by those *Italick Philosophers* after this manner, that *Nothing* which was not before in *Matter*, besides its *Modifications*, could possibly be produc'd out of it, because *Nothing can come out of Nothing*, and consequently, that in all natural *Generations* and *Corruptions*, there is no real *Entity* made or destroy'd, endeavour'd, without denying the sense of that Proposition, thus to evade the sense of it : that all things whatsoever, be-

sides *Matter*, being but *Accidents* thereof, are generated out of it and corruptible into it, * without the Production of any real Entity out of *Nothing*, or the Reduction of any into *Nothing*, so long as the Substance of *Matter*, which is the only real Entity, remains always the same. Wherefore tho *Life*, *Sense*, and *Understanding*, all *Souls* and *Minds* be generated out of *Matter*, yet does it not thence follow, that therefore there is no real Entity made or produc'd, because these are nothing but *Accidents* or Modifications of *Matter*. As to which I say, it is true indeed that whatsoever is in the Universe is either *Substance* or *Accidents*, and that the *Accidents* of any *Substance* may be generated and corrupted, without the producing of any real Entity out of *Nothing*, and reducing of any into *Nothing*; forasmuch as the Substance still remains entirely the same. But the Atheists taking it for granted, that there is no other Substance besides *Body* or *Matter*, do therefore falsely suppose what is really *incorporeal Substance*; or else the Attributes, Propertys, and Modes thereof to be mere *Accidents* of *Matter*, and therefore conclude, that these are generable out of it, without the Production of any real Entity out of *Nothing*. Wherefore I say, that it does not at all follow, because the same *numerical Matter*, as for example a piece of Wax, may be successively made *spherical*, *subical*, *cylindrical*, *pyramidal*, or of any other figure, and the same man may successively *stand*, *sit*, *kneel*, and *walk*, both without the Production of *any thing out of Nothing*; that therefore the same may be affirm'd likewise of every thing else besides the bare Substance

* Δια τῆς οὐσίας ἔτεχνεσθαι καὶ εἶναι ὁιονταί, ὅτε ἀπολλύσθαι, ὥς τῆς πιαύτης πύσεως αἰεὶ σωζομένης, &c. Arist.

of *Matter*, as namely *Life* and *Understanding*, *Soul* and *Mind*, that tho there be no such thing in *Matter* it self, yet the Production of 'em out of *Matter* would be no Production of *Something out of Nothing*. But one ground of mens being here mistaken is this; that they have not rightly consider'd what the *Accidents* of a *Substance* are, and that they are indeed nothing else but the *Modes* thereof. Now a *Mode* is such a thing, as cannot possibly be conceiv'd without that whereof it is a *Mode*; as *Standing*, *Sitting*, *Kneeling*, and *Walking* cannot be conceiv'd without a *Body* organiz'd, and therefore are but *Modes* thereof. But *Life* and *Cogitation* may be clearly apprehended without *Body* or any thing of *Extension*; nor indeed can a *Thought* be conceiv'd to be of such a *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thicknes*s, or to be hew'd and slic'd out into pieces, all which being laid together, as so many small *Chips*, would make up again the Entireness of that whole *Thought*. From whence it ought to be concluded, that *Cogitation* is no *Accident* or *Mode* of *Matter* or bulky *Extension*, but a *Mode* or *Attribute* of another *Substance*, really distinct from *Matter*, or *Incorporeal*. There is indeed nothing else clearly conceivable by us in *Body* or bulky *Extension*, but only more or less *Magnitude* of *Parts*, *Figures*, *Site*, *Motion* or *Rest*; and all the different *Bodys* that are in the whole *World*, are but several *Combinations* or *Syllables* made up out of these few *Letters*: but no *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites* and *Motions* can possibly spell or compound *Life* and *Sense*, *Cogitation* and *Understanding*, as the *Syllables* thereof; and therefore to suppose these to be generated out of *Matter*, is plainly to suppose some real *Entity* to be brought out of *Nothing*, or something to be made without a *Cause*, which is impossible. But that which has chiefly confirm'd men
in

in this Error, is the business of sensible *Qualitys* and *Forms*, as they are vulgarly conceiv'd to be distinct Entitys from those foremention'd Modifications of *Matter*, in respect of Magnitude of Parts, Figure, Site, Motion and Rest. For since these *Qualitys* and *Forms* are unquestionably generated and corrupted, there seems to be no reason, why the same might not be as well acknowledg'd of *Life*, *Sense*, *Thought*, and *Understanding*, that these are but *Qualitys* and *Accidents* of *Matter* also, tho of another kind, and consequently may be generated out of it, without the making of any real thing out of *Nothing*. But the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists themselves have, from the Principles of the Atomick Philosophy, sufficiently confuted and rectify'd this mistake concerning *sensible Qualitys*, they exploding and banishing them all, as conceiv'd to be Entitys really distinct from the foremention'd *Modifications* of *Matter*, and that for this very reason; because the *Generation* of them would, upon this Supposition, be the Production of Something out of *Nothing*, or without a *Cause*; and therefore concluding 'em to be really nothing else but *Mechanism*, or different Modifications of *Matter*, in respect of the Magnitude of Parts, Figure, Site, and Motion or Rest, as they cause different Fancys and Apparitions in us. And in truth, this vulgar Opinion of real *Qualitys* of Bodys seems to have no other Original than mens mistaking their own *Fancys*, *Passions*, and *Affections*, for things really existing in the Objects without 'em. For as *sensible Qualitys* are conceiv'd to be things distinct from the foremention'd Modifications of *Matter*, so are they really nothing else but our own *Fancys*, *Passions*, and *Affections*, and consequently no *Accidents* or *Modifications* of *Matter*; but *Accidents* and *Modifications*

tions of our own Souls, which are *Substances incorporeal*. But now, if these *Democritick* Atheists themselves concluded that *real Qualitys*, consider'd as distinct from the Modifications of *Matter*, could not possibly be generated out of it, because this would be the Production of Something out of Nothing; certainly they ought much more to have acknowledg'd the same concerning *Life* and *Cogitation*, *Sense* and *Understanding*: that the Generation of these out of *senseless Matter* would be an impossible Production of Something out of *Nothing*, and consequently that these are therefore no corporeal things, but the Attributes, Propertys, or Modes of *Substance incorporeal*; since they can no way be resolv'd into *Mechanism* and *Fancy*, or the Modifications of *Matter*, as the vulgar *sensible Qualitys* may and ought to be. For tho' these *Democriticks* and *Epicureans* did indeed suppose all human *Cogitations* to be caus'd or produc'd by the Incurfion of corporeal *Atoms* upon the Thinker, yet did never any of 'em arrive to such a degree either of Sottishness or Impudence, as a modern Writer has done, to maintain that *Cogitation*, *Intellection*, and *Volition* are themselves really nothing else but *local Motion* or *Mechanism* in the inward Parts of the *Brain* and *Heart*, or * that *Mind it self is nothing else but Motion in some Parts of the organiz'd Body*: which is to advance beyond the Paradoxical Hypothesis of *Des Cartes*, in making this prodigious Conclusion, that not only *brute Animals*, but all cogitative Beings and Men themselves are really nothing else but *Machines* or *Automata*. As well might Heaven be affirm'd to be Earth, Colour to be Sound,

* Mens nihil aliud præterquam motus in partibus quibusdam Corporis organici.

Number to be Figure, or any thing else in the World to be any thing, as *Cogitation* and *local Motion* to be the very self-same thing. Nevertheless so strong was the Atheistick Intoxication in those old *Democriticks* and *Epicureans*, that tho denying real *Qualitys* of Bodys for this very reason, because nothing could be produc'd out of Nothing, they notwithstanding contradicting themselves, would make *Sense*, *Life*, and *Understanding* to be *Qualitys* of *Matter*, and therefore generable out of it, and so unquestionably produc'd real Entitys out of *Nothing* or *without a Cause*.

But here by the way I shall speak a word or two with *Epicurus* in private, who having a mind to assert *contingent Liberty* in men, by way of opposition to that *Necessity* of all human Actions, which had been before maintain'd by *Democritus* and his Followers, plainly acknowledges, that he could not possibly do this, according to the grounds of his own Philosophy, without supposing something of *Contingency* in the *first Principles*, that is, in the Motion of those *Atoms*, out of which Men and other Animals are made; the reason for which is afterwards thus express'd by him, because *Nothing can be made out of Nothing* *. Upon which account he therefore ridiculously feign'd, besides his two other Motions of *Atoms* from † *Plage* and *Pondera*, *Strokes* and *Weight*, a third Motion of them, which he calls || *Clinamen Principiorum*, a con-

* De Nihilo quoniam fieri Nil posse videmus. *Lucret. l. 2. p. 134. Lamb.*

†

_____ Fateare necesse est

Esse aliam præter Plagas & Pondera causam
Motibus, unde hæc est nobis innata Potestas. *Id.*

||

_____ Sed ne Mens ipsa necessum

Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis,

Et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique,

Id facit exiguum Clinamen Principiorum. *Id.*

tingent and uncertain Declination every way from the *Perpendicular*, out of design to solve this Phænomenon of *Free-will* in men without bringing *Something out of Nothing*. Now if *Epicurus* himself conceiv'd that *Liberty of Will* could not possibly be generated in Men out of *Matter* and *Atoms* (they being suppos'd to have no such thing at all in 'em, that is, no contingent Uncertainty in their Motion) without bringing of something out of *Nothing*, which was contrary to the fundamental Principles of the Atomick Philosophy; (tho this were equally absurd in him to suppose Contingency and a kind of Free Will in the Motions of senseless Atoms, this being still in effect to bring his *Liberty of Will* out of *Nothing*) certainly *Sense* and *Understanding*, *Soul* and *Mind* in Animals and Men, could not possibly be generated out of *Atoms* or *Matter*, devoid of all *Sense* and *Understanding*, for the very same reason, because *Nothing can be made out of Nothing*. For unquestionably were all *Life* and *Understanding*, all *Souls* and *Minds* generated out of dead and senseless *Matter*, and were there no substantial or essential *Life* and *Understanding* in the whole Universe, then must it of necessity be all made out of *Nothing*, which is absolutely impossible. For tho we do not say, that *Life* and *Cogitation*, *Sense* and *Understanding* abstractly consider'd are *Substances*, yet do we affirm 'em to be *Entitys* really distinct from *Matter*, and no Modifications or Accidents thereof; but either Accidents and Modifications, or rather essential Attributes of *Substance incorporeal*: as also that *Souls* and *Minds*, which are the Subjects of 'em, are indeed *substantial* things. Wherefore we cannot but here again condemn the Darknes of this Philosophy, which educes not only *Species visible* and *audible*, *Entitys* perfectly

unintelligible and *real Qualities*, distinct from all the Modes of Body, and even *substantial Forms* too, as they call 'em, but also *sensitive Souls* themselves *ex Potentiâ Materiae*, out of the Power of Matter, that is, indeed out of *Nothing*. Forasmuch as this, says * Dr. Cudworth, prepares a direct way to *Atheism*; because if *Life* and *Sense*, *Cogitation* and *Consciousness* may be generated out of *dead* and *senseless Matter*, then might this well be suppos'd the first Original of all things: nor could there reasonably be any stop made at *rational Souls*, especially by these men, who also conclude 'em to be *Tabula rasa*, mere white Sheets of Paper, that have nothing at all in 'em, but what is scribl'd upon 'em by corporeal Objects from without, there being nothing in the *Understanding* or *Mind* of Man, which was not before in *Sense*: so that *Sense* is the first *original Knowledg*, and *Understanding* but a secondary and derivative thing from it, and more umbratile and evanid than this pretended Fountain of it.

Hitherto have we prov'd, that all things whatsoever could not possibly be made out of *Matter*, and particularly that *Life* and *Sense*, *Mind* and *Understanding* being no Accidents or Modes of *Matter*, could not by *Motion* be generated out of it, without the Production of real Entitys out of *Nothing*. But because some may possibly imagine, that *Matter* might otherwise than thus by *Motion*, by a kind of *miraculous Efficiency*, produce *Souls* and *Minds*, we shall add in the next place, that *Nothing* can *efficiently* produce any *real Entity* or *substantial thing* which was not before, unless it have at least equal Perfection

* True Int. Syst. p. 763.

with it, and a substantially *emanative* or *creative Power*. But scarcely any man can be so sottish, as to imagine that every Atom of Dust has *equal Perfection* in it with that of the *rational Soul* in Man, or to attribute a *creative Power* to all *Matter*, which is but a passive thing, whilst this is in the mean time deny'd by him to a *perfect Being*; both these Assertions also, in like manner as the former, producing real Entitys out of *Nothing causally*. And thus we have shewn the Impossibility and Nonsense of all *Atheism* from this very Principle, by which the *Atheists* would assault *Theism*, in the true sense thereof, that *no thing can be made without a Cause*, or that *Nothing cannot be the Cause of any thing*. Now if there be no middle betwixt *Atheism* and *Theism*, and all things must of necessity either spring from *senseless Matter*, or else from a *perfect understanding Being*, then is this Demonstration of the Impossibility of *Atheism*, a sufficient Establishment of the Truth of *Theism*; it being such a Demonstration of a God, as the Geometricians call *Reduction ad impossibile*, which they allow of for good, and frequently make use of. Thus either there is a God, or else *Matter* must needs be acknowledg'd to be the only *self-existent* thing, and all things else whatsoever to be made out of it: but it is impossible that all things should be made out of *senseless Matter*; therefore there is a God. Nevertheless, for further Satisfaction, I shall here likewise shew, how the Existence of a God may be also directly prov'd from this very Principle, which the *Atheists* endeavour to take sanctuary in, and from thence to impugn *Theism*, that *Nothing can be made out of Nothing causally*, or that *Nothing cannot be the Cause of any thing*. In the first place then we shall fetch our beginning from what

has been often declar'd already, that it is *mathematically certain, that something or other did exist of it self from all Eternity or without beginning, and unmade by any thing else.* The Certainty of which Proposition depends upon this very Principle as its Foundation, that *Nothing can come from Nothing or be made out of Nothing, or that Nothing which once was not, can of it self come into Being, without a Cause*; it following unavoidably from thence, that *if once there had been Nothing, there could never have been any thing.* And having thus laid the Foundation, we shall in the next place make this further Superstructure, that because something did certainly exist *of it self from Eternity unmade,* therefore is there also actually a *necessarily existent Being.* For to suppose that any thing existed *of it self* from Eternity by its own *Free-Will* and *Choice,* and therefore not *necessarily* but *contingently,* since it might have will'd otherwise, is to suppose it to have existed before it was, and so positively to have been the Cause of it self, which, as we have before seen, is impossible. When a thing is said to be of it self or the Cause of it self, this is to be understood no otherwise, than either in a negative sense, as having nothing else for its Cause, or because its *necessary eternal Existence* is *essential* to the Perfection of its own Nature. Wherefore that which existed of it self from Eternity *independently* upon any thing else, did not so exist *contingently* but *necessarily*; so that there is undoubtedly something actually in being, whose Existence is and always was *necessary.* In the next place it is certain also, that nothing could exist *necessarily* of it self, but what included *Necessity* of Existence in its own Nature. For to suppose any thing to exist *of it self necessarily,* which has no *Necessity* of Existence in its

own Nature, is plainly to suppose that necessary Existence of it to come from *Nothing*, since it could neither proceed from that thing it self, nor from any thing else. Lastly, there is nothing which includes necessity of Existence in its very Nature and Essence, but only an *absolutely perfect Being*. The Result of all which is, that God or a perfect Being does certainly *exist*, and that there is nothing else which existed *of it self from Eternity, necessarily and independently*: but all other things whatsoever deriv'd their Being from him, or were *caus'd by him, Matter or Body* it self not excepted.

Moreover, the Existence of a Deity might be further demonstrated from this common Notion, that *Nothing can come from Nothing causally*; because if there were no God, as we could not have had any Idea of him or a *perfect Being*, since it must have come from *Nothing*, and have been the Idea or Conception of *Nothing*, so neither indeed could there have been any Knowledg or Understanding at all. For singular Bodys existing without us, cannot enter into us, and put *Understanding* in us, nor is there any thing but *local Motions* propagated by them to our Organs of Sense. The Mind must have its immediate *Intelligibles* within it self, for otherwise it could not possibly understand any thing; which *Intelligibles* and their *Relations* to one another or *Veritys* are, as was before said, *eternal*. Again, the *Mind* can frame *Ideas* or *Conceptions* not only of things *actually existing*, but also of all *Possibilitys*; which plainly implies and supposes the actual Existence of a Being infinitely powerful, that could produce 'em. So that the proper Object of *Mind* and *Understanding* is a *perfect Being*, and all
tha

the *Extent* of its *Power*; which perfect Being comprehending it self and the *Extent* of its own *Power*, or the *Possibilitys* of all things, is the first original *Mind*, of which all other Minds partake. Wherefore were there no perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending it self and its own *Power*, or all the *Possibilitys* of things; the *intelligible Objects* of the Mind, and *Ideas* must have come from *Nothing*. Thus have we abundantly confuted the second Atheistick Argumentation, that there can be no *Omnipotence* or *Divine Creation*, because *Nothing can be made out of Nothing*; we having plainly shew'd that this very Principle, in the true sense thereof, affords a Demonstration of the contrary.

C H A P. VIII.

A Confutation of the Third and Fourth Atheistick Arguments against an INCORPOREAL DEITY. That the Belief of Ghosts and Spirits Incorporeal, and consequently of an Incorporeal Deity, sprung neither from any ridiculous Mistake of the abstract Names and Notions of mere Accidents for Substances, nor from the Scholastick Essences said to be Eternal. Prov'd from the very Principles of the Atheistick CORPOREALISM, as represented in the Fifth and Sixth Objections against a Deity, that there is INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCE. Which being done, the two following Arguments, built upon a contrary Supposition, are found to be insignificant.

IT has been before observ'd, that tho all Corporealists be not therefore of necessity Atheists, yet Atheists universally have been Corporealists, this being always their first and grand *Postulatum*, that *there is no other Substance besides Body.* * They strongly contend,

* Διόχειζόνται τὸτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει πρῶτον καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινὰ, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ ὑπὸν δειζόμενοι, &c. Plat. in Soph. p. 172. Fic.

says Plato, that that alone really is, which is tangible or can resist their Touch, concluding Body and Substance to be one and the self-same thing. And if any one should affirm that there is any thing incorporeal, they will presently cry him down, and not hear a word more from him. And to the same purpose Aristotle tells us, that the Atheists * affirm that Matter or Body is all the Substance that is, and that all other things are but the Passions and Affections thereof. And with the antient Atheists agree those in our days, that Body, or that which is tangible and divisible, is the only substantial thing; from whence it follows, that an incorporeal Substance would be the same with an incorporeal Body, that is, an Impossibility; and that there can be no incorporeal Deity. But in the management of this Cause there has been some Disagreement among the Atheists themselves. For first the Democriticks and Epicureans, tho consenting with all the other Atheists in this, that whatsoever was unextended and devoid of Magnitude was therefore Nothing (so that there could neither be any Substance nor Accident, or Mode of any Substance unextended) did notwithstanding distinguish concerning a double Nature. First, that which is so extended, as to be impenetrable and tangible, or to resist the Touch, which is Body. And secondly, that which is extended also, but penetrably and intangibly, which is Space or Vacuum, a Nature, according to them, really distinct from Body, and the only incorporeal thing that is. Now since this Space, which is the only Incorporeal, can neither do nor suffer any thing, but only give place or room for Bodys to subsist in or pass thro; therefore can

* Τὸτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι ἁπασαν ὑσίαν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα πᾶσι
τῶτων.

there not be any *Active, Understanding, Incorporeal Deity*.

To which we reply: That if *Space* be indeed a Nature distinct from *Body* and a thing really *incorporeal*, as they pretend, then will it undeniably follow from this very Principle of theirs, that there must be *incorporeal Substance*; and, as this *Space* is also suppos'd by 'em to be *infinite*, an *infinite incorporeal Deity*. Because if *Space* be not the Extension of *Body*, nor an Affection thereof, then must it of necessity be either an Accident existing by it self without a *Substance*, which is impossible; or else the *Extension* or *Affection* of some other *incorporeal Substance*, which is *infinite*. But here will *Gassendus* step in to help out his good Friends, the *Democriticks* and *Epicureans*, at a dead lift, and undertake to maintain, that tho' *Space* be indeed an *incorporeal* thing, yet would it neither follow of necessity from thence, that it is an *incorporeal Substance*, or an Affection of it, nor yet that it is an *Accident* existing alone by it self without a *Substance*; because this *Space* is really neither *Accident* nor *Substance*, but a certain middle Nature or Essence betwixt both. To which Subterfuge of his, that we may not contend about Words, we shall make this Reply: that unquestionably whatsoever *is*, or hath any kind of Entity, does either subsist by it self, or else is an *Attribute, Affection, or Mode* of something which subsists by it self. For it is certain, that there can be no *Mode, Accident, or Affection* of *Nothing*; and consequently that *Nothing* cannot be extended nor mensurable. But if *Space* be neither the *Extension* of *Body*, nor yet of *Substance incorporeal*, then must it of necessity be the *Extension* and *Affection* of *Nothing*, and *Nothing* must be mensurable by Yards and Poles. Wherefore we conclude, that

B b b b

from

from this very Hypothesis of the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists, that *Space* is a Nature distinct from *Body* and *positively infinite*, it undeniably follows, that there must be some *incorporeal Substance*, whose *Affection* its *Extension* is; and because there can be nothing infinite, but only the Deity, that it is the *infinite Extension* of an *incorporeal Deity*; just as some learned Theists and Incorporealists have asserted. To which it might be further added, that *Epicurus*, who professedly oppos'd *Plato's incorporeal God* as an Impossibility, did notwithstanding plainly contradict himself, when he asserted such a *Democracy* of *Monogrammous* Gods, as were not compounded of *Atoms* and *Vacuum* (tho according to him the only Principles of *Body*) that so they might be *incorruptible*; nor yet, as * *Lucretius* declares, could touch or be touch'd, but were *penetrable*; (tho *Tangibility* and *Impenetrability* were elsewhere made by him the very *Essence* of *Body*) and again, when he asserted 'em to be such as had not *Corpus*, but *quasiCorpus*, and therefore must needs be really *incorporeal*. Tho there is no doubt to be made, but that *Epicurus* and his Scholar colluded in all this, themselves not believing a jot of it, nor any such Gods at all.

But other Atheists there were, who concluded likewise, that whatsoever was *unextended* was *Nothing*, were sensible of the Inconvenience of making *Space* thus to be a thing really distinct from *Body* (from whence it would follow unavoidably, that it was

* Tenuis enim natura Deum ———
 Quæ quoniam manuum Tactum suffugit & Ictum,
 Tactile nil nobis quod sit, contingere debet;
 Tangere enim non quit, quod tangi non licet ipsum.

an Affection of *incorporeal Substance*) and therefore acknowledged not *two Natures of extended things*, but, as * *Aristotle* tells us, *one only Nature, and that bodily*. *Space* being therefore to them either a mere imaginary thing, that has no reality without our *Minds*, but only a Phantasm of our own, and in their modern Language a kind of *Ghost, Apparition, or Spectre* of a Body; or else indeed the very *Extension* of *Body* it self, considered in general and abstractly from this or that *singular Body movable*. And accordingly these Men fram'd their Argument against an *Incorporeal Deity* after this manner: Whatsoever is *extended*, is *Body* or corporeal; but whatsoever *is*, is *extended*: therefore whatsoever *is*, is *Body* or corporeal; and by consequence there can be no *incorporeal Deity*. To which Argumentation the Assertors of *Incorporeal Substance* have reply'd two ways. First, the generality of the ancient *Incorporealists* taking it for granted, that whatsoever was *extended* in *Magnitude*, and *had Parts one without another*, was *divisible*, as also probably *impenetrable* by any thing else *extended*, because there can be no *Penetration* of *Dimensions*; and therefore no one *Magnitude* can be imbib'd or swallow'd up into another, but must of necessity stand without it, adding so much to the Quantity thereof: these *Incorporealists*, I say, readily gave their Assent to this Proposition, that whatsoever is *extended* into Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity, is *Body*. But being strongly persuaded of the Existence of some other Substance besides *Body*, they deny'd this other Proposition, that whatsoever *is*, is *extended*; or what is *unextended* is *Nothing*; main-

* "Εν τῷ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι τινὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν. Met. l. 1. c. 7.

taining that besides *Body* or *extended Substance*, there was another *Substance incorporeal*, which therefore was * *unextended* and devoid of *Quantity* and *Magnitude*, without *Parts* and indivisible. That *Plato* and *Aristotle* philosophiz'd in this manner might be prov'd from sundry Passages in their Writings: as when, for instance, the former of 'em discoursing of God under the Title of the † *vast Sea of Pulchritude*, gives this Account of him, that || *he is not any where either in Earth or in Heaven, but himself alone by himself, and with himself, all other beautiful things partaking of him.* And the latter having spent a whole Section at the end of his *Physicks* upon this very Subject, to prove that his first *immovable Mover*, which is *God Almighty*, must of necessity be devoid of *Parts* or *indivisible*, and have no *Magnitude* at all, concludes the whole in this manner: ** *These things, says he, being thus determin'd, it is manifestly impossible, that the first Mover should have any Magnitude. For if it has Magnitude, that must of necessity be either finite or infinite. But that there can be no infinite Magnitude was before demonstrated in the Physicks; and that nothing which has a finite Magnitude can have infinite Power, has been now prov'd. Wherefore it is plain, that the first Mover is indivisible and devoid of Parts, and has no Magnitude at all. Neither does Aristotle appropriate this to the supreme Deity, to be thus devoid of Magnitude and Parts, and consequently indivisible; he somewhere attributing the same also*

* Ἀδιάστατος ἀμεγέθης, ἀποστος, ἀμεγής, ἀδιαίρετος.

† Πολυπύλατος τὸ καλόν.

|| Οὐδέποτε ἢ ἐν γῇ, ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς, μετ' αὐτῶν, μονοειδὲς αἰετὸν, τὰ ὅσα ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνη μετέχοντα.

** Διωρισμένων ὅς τέτων, φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον τὸ πρῶτον κινεῖν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἔχειν τί μέγεθος, &c.

to all other *immaterial* or *incorporeal* things, and particularly to the *human Mind*; * *Every thing*, says he, *which is devoid of Matter, is indivisible as the human Mind*. And the like does he assert at once concerning the † *mundane* and the *human Soul*, that they are no *Magnitudes*. And again, he stiffly denies in his Book *de Animâ*, as *Simplicius* and *Philoponus* do also witness of him, that *Souls* in general are either in a *place* or *locally* mov'd, otherwise than by *Accident*, as they are said to be mov'd, together with the *Motion* of the *Body*. Besides *Plato* and *Aristotle*, we might here instance in sundry other of the antient *Incorporealists*, who clearly maintain'd the same Doctrine. *Philo* does not only assert in general a double *Essence* or *Substance*, a distant and indistant one, but somewhere writes thus concerning the Deity: " || All things are fill'd with
" God as containing them, but not as being contain'd
" by them or in them; to whom alone it belongeth to
" be both every where and no where. No where;
" because he himself created Space and Place, together
" with Bodys; and it is not lawful to include the Cre-
" ator within any of his Creatures. And every where;
" because he extendeth his Vertues and Powers
" throughout Earth and Water, Air and Heaven, and
" leaveth no part of the World destitute thereof: but
" collecting all things together under himself, has
" bound them fast with invisible Bonds. But none has
more industriously pursu'd this business than *Plotinus*, who every where asserts *Body* and *Magnitude* to be one

* Ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ὕλην ἔχον, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νῦς.

† Οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν πλὴν ψυχὴν μέγεθος εἶναι, &c. Arist. de An. l. i. c. 3.

|| Ὑπο τῷ θεῷ πεπληρωταὶ τὰ πάντα, περιέχοντες, ἢ περιεχομένοι, ὡς πανταχῶς τε καὶ ὁμοῦ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι μόνον, &c. De Confus. Ling. p. 339.

and the samething; and that besides this there is another *Substance* incorporeal, which consequently is devoid of *Quantity* and of *Magnitude*, and of *Parts locally distant* from one another, * *it having in its Nature transcended the Imperfection of Quantity*. And who has also written two whole Books upon this very Subject: † that one and the self-same numerical thing may be all of it entirely every where. Wherein his principal Design was to prove, that the *Deity is not Part of it here, and Part of it there*; and so much of it in one place, and so much in another: but the whole undivided *Deity* every where. Moreover, he often affirms of the human Soul, or rather takes it as a thing for granted, that this is, the whole or all of it, in every Part of the Body, that is, undividedly: || *As for the human Soul*, says he, *it is one and the same numerically, in the Hand and in the Foot*; from which he argues, that this being commonly suppos'd, why should we not in like manner acknowledge that of the mundane Soul or *Deity*, which is in one part of the Universe, to be the same with that in another? In like manner *Simplicius* proving that *Body* is not the first Principle, because there must of necessity be something *self-moving*, and what is so, must needs be *incorporeal*, writeth thus: ** *Because what is such, must of necessity be indivisible and indistant*; for were it divisible and distant, it could not all of it be conjoin'd with its whole self; so that the Whole should both actively move and be mov'd. Which same thing seems further evident in the Soul's being all conscious of it

* Ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὑπερέβηκεν.

† Τὸ ὅν ἐν καὶ ταυτὸν ἀειδμῶ ἅμα πανταχῶς εἶναι ὅλον.

|| Ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸ αὐτὸ ἀειδμῶ, τὸ ἐν τῷ ποδὶ καὶ τῇ χειρὶ ὑπάρχει, &c.

** Τὸ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀμερὲς ἐνθὺς ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ ἀδιάστατον, &c.

self, and reflexive upon its whole self; which could not be, were one Part of it distant from another. And again the same Philosopher expressly denies with *Aristotle*, that the Soul, tho a *self-moving Substance*, is at all *locally mov'd* otherwise than by Accident, in respect of the Body which is mov'd by it; * *for*, says he, *since the Soul is not in a place, it is not capable of any local Motion*. To this purpose we also find *Porphyrus* very full and express; who makes this the very beginning of his *Manuduction to Intelligibles*, † that *tho every Body be in a place, yet nothing, that is properly corporeal, is in a place*. This, says he, *is only present by a certain Disposition and Inclination of it to one thing more than another; nor is its Presence there any otherwise discernible, than by its Operations and Effects*. Again he says of the *supreme God*, || that he is therefore every where, because he is no where; and denies him to be *locally* in the corporeal World; and thinks it more proper to say, that the *corporeal World is in God*, than *God in it*. And the same he also affirms of the *human Soul*, that this is also a *Substance devoid of Magnitude*, and not *locally present* to this or that *Body*, but by *Disposition and Energy*; and therefore the *whole* of it in every *Part* thereof *undividedly*. To these might be added the common Suffrage of antient Christian Writers, both *Greeks* and *Latins*: particularly among the former the learned *Origen*, who also maintain'd *Incorporeal Substance* to be *unextended*, as appears from sundry Passages both of his Book against *Celsus*, and that *Ἐν ἀρχαῖς*; and among the latter *St. Austin*, who

* Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ ἐν τόπῳ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀν. κίνησις.

† Πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, ἐστὶν ὃ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ἀσωμάτων ἐν τόπῳ.

|| Ὁ θεὸς πανταχῶς, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ, &c.

clearly asserted the same, he telling us in his Book *de Quantitate Anima*, and elsewhere concerning the *human Soul*, that being incorporeal, it has no Dimensions of *Length, Breadth, and Profundity*, and is *illocabilis, no where as in a place*. But these for brevity's sake I only touch at, and conclude with the Testimony of *Boetius*, who was both a *Philosopher* and a *Christian*: * *There are, says he, certain common Conceptions or Notions of the Mind, which are known by themselves amongst wise Men only*; as this for example, *that Incorporeals are in no place*. Thus, I think, I have made it unquestionably evident, that the Opinion of *Incorporeal Substance* being *unextended, indistant, and devoid of Magnitude*, is no novel thing, nor first started in the *scholastick Age*; but that it was the general Persuasion of the most antient and learned Assertors of *Incorporeal Substance*: especially that the Deity was not part of it here, and part of it there, nor the Substance of it mensurable by Yards and Poles, as if there were so much of it contain'd in one Room, and so much and no more in another, according to their several Dimensions; but that the whole *undivided Deity* was at once in every part of the World, and consequently no where *locally*, after the manner of *Bodys*. But because this Opinion lies under great Prejudice, and appears to some very strange and paradoxical, I shall in the next place shew yet further, how these antient Incorporealists endeavour'd to acquit themselves, in repelling the several Efforts and Plausibilitys made against it.

The first whereof is this, that to suppose *incorporeal Substances, unextended and indivisible*, is to make 'em

* Quædam sunt communes Animi Conceptiones, per se notæ, apud sapientes tantum: ut, Incorporalia non esse in loco.

absolute Parvities, and by means of that to render 'em all, even the Deity it self, contemptible: since they must of necessity be either *Physical Minimums*, which cannot *actually* be divided further, by reason of their *Littleness* (if there be indeed any such thing) or else mere *mathematical Points*, which are not so much as *mentally* divisible; so that thousands of these *incorporeal* Substances or Spirits might dance together at once upon a Needle's Point. To which *Plotinus* and others have long since reply'd in this manner: that an *incorporeal unextended* Deity is neither a *Physical Point*, because this has distance in it, and is *mentally* divisible; nor yet a *mathematical* one, because this, tho having neither *Magnitude* nor *Substance*, has notwithstanding *Site* and *Position*; a *Point* being, according to *Aristotle*, a *Monad* having *Site* and *Position*. It is not to be conceiv'd as a *Parvity* or very little thing, because then it could not *congruere* or fute with all the greatest things; nor yet as a great thing in a way of *Quantity* and *Extension*, because then it could not be all of it present to every the least thing. Nor does true *Greatness* consist in a way of *Bulk* or *Magnitude*, all *Magnitude* being but *little*, since there can be no *infinite Magnitude*; and no *finite Magnitude*, as *Aristotle* before urg'd, can have infinite Power. And in short, tho some, who are far from Atheists, may make themselves merry with that Conceit, of thousands of *Spirits* dancing at once upon a Needle's point; and tho the Atheists may endeavour to rogue and ridicule all *incorporeal* Substance in that manner: yet does this run upon a clear mistake of the Hypothesis, and make nothing at all against it; forasmuch as an unextended Substance is neither any *Parvity*, as is here suppos'd (because it has no *Magnitude* at all) nor has it any *Place*, *Site*, or *local Motion*, properly

perly belonging to it ; and therefore can it neither dance upon a Needle's point, nor any where else.

But in the next place it is further objected, that what is neither *great* nor *little*, what possesses no *Space*, and has no *Place* or *Site* amongst *Bodys*, must therefore needs be an absolute *Non-entity* ; forasmuch as *Magnitude* or *Extension* are the very *Essence* of *Being* or *Entity* as such, so that there can be neither *Substance* nor *Accident* unextended. Now since whatsoever is extended is *bodily*, there can therefore be no other *Substance* but *Body*, nor any thing otherwise *incorporeal*, than as that word may be taken for a *thin* and *subtle Body* ; in which sense *Fire* was by some in *Aristotle* said to be * *the most incorporeal of all the Elements*. And *Aristotle* himself uses the word in the same manner, when he affirms, that all *Philosophers* defin'd the *Soul* by three things, *Motion*, *Sense*, and *Incorporiety* ; several of those there mention'd by him, understanding the *Soul* to be no otherwise *incorporeal*, than as a † *thin* and *subtle Body*. In answer to which *Objection*, *Plato*, we find, declareth this to be a vulgar *Error*, that || whatsoever does not take up *Space*, and is in no *Place*, is *Nothing* ; he intimating the *Original* hereof to have sprung from mens adhering too much to those lower *Facultys* of *Sense* and *Imagination*, which are able to conceive nothing, but what is corporeal ; whereas both he and *Plotinus* tell us, that *Reason* suggests quite the contrary, particularly in reference to the *Deity* ; and therefore to the same purpose *Porphyrus* also gives this *Advice* : “ that we ought in our *Disquisitions* concerning corporeal and incorporeal things to conserve

* Μάλιστα τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον καὶ ἀσώματῶτον.

† Σῶμα λεπτόμερες. || In *Timæo*.

“ the Property of each, and not to confound their
 “ Natures. * But especially to take heed that our
 “ *Fancy* and *Imagination* do not so far impose upon our
 “ *Judgments*, as to make us attribute to *Incorporeals*,
 “ what properly belongs to *Bodys* only. For we are
 “ all accusom’d to *Bodys*, but as for *Incorporeals*, scarce-
 “ ly any one reaches to the knowledg of ’em; men
 “ always fluctuating about ’em and distrusting ’em,
 “ so long as they are held under the Power of Imagi-
 “ nation. To this purpose again he instructs us how
 we should think of *Incorporeals*, so as not to confound
 their Natures with *Corporeals*, saying particularly of
 the Deity, “ that its *indistant* and *unextended* Nature is
 “ the whole of it present in infinite Parts of the dis-
 “ tant World; neither divided, as applying part to
 “ part, nor yet multiply’d into many *Wholes*, accor-
 “ ding to the multiplicity of those things which par-
 “ take thereof. † But the Whole of it, one and the
 “ same in number, is present to all the Parts of the
 “ bulky World, and to every one of those many
 “ things in it, undividedly and unmultipliedly; that
 “ in the mean time partaking thereof dividedly. It
 was therefore granted by these Antients, that this *un-
 extended* and *indivisible* Nature of *Incorporeals* is a thing
 altogether || *unimaginable*; and this was concluded by
 ’em to be the only reason why so many have pro-
 nounc’d it to be *impossible*, because they attended only
 to Sense and Imagination, and made them the only
 measure of Things and Truth; it having been accor-

* Μᾶλλον ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸν κόσμον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ τοιαῦτα, μὴ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ
 δοξάζειν περὶ τὸ ἀσώματον, &c.

† Ἀλλ’ ὅλον πᾶσι τε τοῖς μέρεσι τῶν ὀγκομένων, ἐνὶ τε ἐκείνῳ τῷ πλήθει,
 ἀμερῶς καὶ ἀπληθύνως καὶ ὡς ἐν ἀειδίῳ, &c.

|| Ἀφανήτατον.

dingly maintain'd by divers of 'em, as *Porphyrus* tells us, that *Imagination* and *Intellection* are but two different Names for one and the same thing. Whereas I say, that there are many things, of which no man can have any Phantasm or Imagination, and yet are they notwithstanding acknowledg'd by all for Entitys or Realitys; from whence it is plain, that we must have some other Facultys in us, which extend beyond *Fancy* and *Imagination*. *Reason* indeed dictates, that whatsoever can either *do* or *suffer* any thing, must therefore be undoubtedly *Something*: but that whatsoever is *unextended*, and has no *distant Parts*, one *without another*, must therefore needs be *Nothing*, is no *common Notion*, but the spurious Suggestion of Imagination only, and a vulgar Error. There needs be no fear at all, lest a Being *infinitely wise* and *powerful*, which acts upon the whole World, and all the Parts thereof, in framing and governing the same, should prove a *Non-entity*, merely for want of *Extension* and *Bulk*; or, because it swells not out into *Space* and *Distance*, as *Bodys* do, it should therefore vanish into nothing. Nor does active Force and Power, as such, depend upon *Bulk* and *Extension*; because then whatsoever has the greater Bulk, would have the greater *Activity*. There are therefore two kinds of *Substances* in the Universe, the one *corporeal*, which are nothing but * *Bulks* or Tumors; the other *incorporeal*, † *substantial Powers*, *Vigours*, and *Activitys*; which tho they act upon *Bulk* and *Extension*, yet are themselves *unbulky* and devoid of Quantity and Dimensions, however they have, as *Simplicius* observes, a certain || Depth

* ὄγκοι. † ἁλογκοὶ δυνάμεις.
|| Πολὺ δὲ βάθος ἔχοντα. In Arist. Phys. p. 3.

and Profundity in another sense. But that there is something unimaginable even in *Body* it self, is evident, whether you will suppose it to be infinitely *divisible* or not ; as you must of necessity suppose one or t'other of these. And that we ought not always to pronounce of *corporeal things* themselves according to Imagination, is manifest from hence ; because tho Astronomical Reasons assure us, that the Sun is really more than a hundred times bigger than the whole *Earth*, yet can we not possibly for all that *imagine* the Sun of such a *Bigness*, nor indeed the *Earth* it self half so big as we *know* it be. The reason whereof is, because we never had a sense or sight of any such vast Bigness at once, as that of either of them ; and partly because our sense always representing the Sun to us, but as * *of a Foot Diameter*, and we being accustom'd always to imagine the same, according to the appearance of *Sense*, are not able to frame any Imagination of it, as very much bigger. Wherefore if *Imagination* be not to be trusted, nor made the *Criterion* or Measure of Truth, even as to *sensible* things, much less ought it to be so, as to things *insensible*. Moreover, the antient Incorporealists argu'd after this manner, that it is as difficult for us to conceive a *Substance*, whose Duration is unextended or unstretch'd out in *Time*, into *past*, *present*, and *future*, and therefore without beginning ; as that which is unextended as to *Parts*, *Place*, or *Space*, in *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*. However Reason pronounces, that there must needs be not only a Duration without beginning, but also a † timeless Eternity or *permanent Duration*, differing from that successive Flux of Time ; which is

* ὡς μετρίων.

† Ἀχρονος αἰών.

one of *Plato's* * *things generated*, or that had a beginning. Which parity of Reason is by *Plotinus* thus insisted on: "For the same reason, says he, that we deny local Extension to the Deity, must we also deny temporal Distance to the same. Forasmuch as Time is always scatter'd and stretch'd out in Length and Distance, one Moment following after another; but Eternity remains the same, without any Flux, and yet nevertheless out-goeth Time and transcendeth the Flux thereof, this seeming to be stretch'd and spun out more in length. Now the reason why we cannot frame a Conception of such a *timeless Eternity*, is only because we our selves are essentially involv'd in *Time*, and accordingly are our Conceptions chain'd, fetter'd, and confin'd to the narrow and dark Dungeon wherein we are imprison'd; notwithstanding which, our freer Facultys assuring us of the Existence of a Being, which far transcends our selves, namely one that is *infinitely perfect*, we have by means hereof a *certain Vaticination* of such a standing timeless Eternity, as its *Duration* is.

And further as to that other Conceit, which makes up part of the Objection last nam'd, of *immaterial* or *incorporeal Bodys*; or that God and human Souls are no otherwise *incorporeal*, than as a *thin* and *subtle Body*, such as Wind or Vapour, Air or Æther; it is certain, that according to the Principles of the most antient Atomick Philosophy, before it was Atheiz'd, there being no such *real Quality* of *Subtlety* or *Tenuity*, because this is altogether unintelligible, but this difference arising wholly from *Motion*, dividing the *insensible Parts*, and every way agitating the same, together

* Γεννητά.

† Μαυτερίαν τινα.

with a certain *Texture* of those Parts ; it is not impossible, but that the finest and most subtle Body that is, might become as gross, hard, heavy, and opaque; as Flesh, Earth, Stones, Lead, or Iron ; and again, that the grossest of these Bodys, by Motion and a different *Texture* of Parts, might not only be chrySTALLIZ'd, but also become as thin, soft and fluid as the finest *Æther*. So that there is no *specifick Difference* betwixt a thick and thin, a gross and fine, an opacous and pellucid, a hard and soft Body, but *accidental* only ; and therefore is there no reason, why *Life* and *Understanding* should be thought to belong to the one, rather than to the other of them. Besides which, the reasons of the antient *Incorporealists*, hereafter to be mention'd, will evince, that the human *Soul* and *Mind* cannot possibly be any *Body* whatsoever, tho never so fine, thin, and subtle, whose Parts are by Motion divisible and separable from one another.

But it is further objected against this unextended Nature of *incorporeal Substances*, as they are said to be *all in the Whole*, and *all in every Part* of that Body, to which they are united, or on which they act ; that this is an absolute Contradiction and Impossibility : because if the *Whole* of the Deity be in *this one point of Matter*, then can there be nothing at all of it in the next adjoining ; but that must needs be another *Whole*, and not at all the same with the former. And in like manner, if the *whole human Soul* be in *this one part* of the organiz'd Body, then can there be none at all of it in any other Part thereof, and so not the *Whole* in the *Whole*. To which Objection the antient *Incorporealists* made this twofold Reply : first in way of Concession, that this is indeed, as *Plotinus* speaks, an absolute

*

Contra.

* *Contradiction, for an extended Substance or Body to be one and the same, all of it in every part of the Space, which it occupies, and for every part thereof to be the same with the Whole. But secondly, as for an unextended and indistant Substance, which has no Parts one without another, it is so far from being a Contradiction, that it should be All of it in every part of that Body which it acts upon, that it is impossible it should be otherwise, only a Part in a Part thereof; so then an equal Quantity of both should co-exist together; because this is to suppose an unextended Substance to be extended. " This Form of Doctrine, says Plotinus, " concerning Incorporeals is necessarily taken from " the thing it self, namely the Nature of them as un- " extended; and has nothing in it aliene from that " Essence, as confounding the corporeal Nature there- " with. Wherefore the word *Whole*, when apply'd to the *Deity* as existing in every Part of the *World*, and to the *Soul* as in every Part of the *Body*, is not to be taken in a positive sense, for a *Whole* consisting of *Parts one without another*, but in a negative only, for a *Whole undivided*; so that the meaning thereof is no more than this, that as the *Soul* is not in the *Body*, so neither is the *Deity* in the *World dividedly*, a *Part* here and a *Part* there; but † *every where all of it undividedly*; and indeed otherwise, as Plotinus observes, this would be the very same, as to make *God a Body*, and to divide an indivisible thing into Parts.*

The fourth and last Objection against incorporeal and unextended Substance, is from that *Illocality* and

* Σώματι αδύνατον ἐν πλείοσι τὸ αὐτὸ ὅλον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέρος ὅσπερ τὸ ὅλον ὑπάρχειν. Επ. 4. l. 7.

† Τὸ Θεὸν πανταχῶς ὅλον μὴ μεμερισμένον.

*

Immo-

Immobility, which will follow thereupon, of *human Souls* and other *finite particular Spirits*, such as *Dæmons* or *Angels*; that it is not only in it self very absurd to suppose these finite and particular Beings to be thus *illocal* and *immovable*, *no where* and *every where* (from whence it would seem to follow, that they might act the whole *corporeal Universe* or take cognizance of all things therein) but also that this Conceit is contradictory to the very Principles of *Religionists* themselves, and plainly confuted by the same; they acknowledging universally, that human Souls at death departing out of this Body, do locally move from thence into a certain other place, call'd *Hades*, *Inferi*, or *Hell*.

Now the latter part of this Objection will be most seasonably answer'd first. This indeed, I own, is a thing, which the antient Assertors of *incorporeal Substance* as *unextended*, were not unaware of; that the vulgarly receiv'd Tradition of human Souls after death going into *Hades* might be objected against 'em. For the satisfying whereof, *Plotinus* suggests these two things: First, " that if by *Hades* be meant nothing
 " else but *τὰ αἰδῆς* the invisible, then is there no more
 " signify'd by the Soul's going into *Hades*, than its
 " being no longer vitally united to this earthy Body,
 " and but acting apart by it self, and so has it nothing
 " of Place necessarily included in it. But if by *Hades*
 " be understood a certain worser place (as sometimes
 " it is also taken) what wonder is this? since now
 " where our Body is, there in the same place is our
 " Soul said also to be. But you will reply, says he,
 " how can this be, when there is now no longer any
 " Body left? We answer, that if the Idol of the
 " Soul be not quite separated from it, why should not
 " the

“ the Soul it self be said to be there also, where its Idol
 “ is *? Where by the Idol of the Soul *Plotinus* seems
 to mean an *airy* or *spirituous Body*, quicken’d and vita-
 liz’d by the Soul, adhering to it after Death. Foras-
 much as this was his serious Persuasion, † that *our Soul,*
tho it shall quit this Body, yet shall never be disunited
from all Body. And *Porphyry* in answering the same
 Objection tells us also, that *human Souls are always united*
to some Body or other: agreeably to this of *Plato*, that
the Soul is always in a Body, but sometimes of one kind
and sometimes of another. To this purpose *Philoponus*
 also very fully declares his own sense, and that of the
 best Philosophers: “ || The rational Soul, as to its Ener-
 “ gy, is separable from all Body; but the irrational
 “ Part or Life thereof, is separable only from this
 “ gross Body, and not from all Body whatsoever, but
 “ has after Death a spirituous and airy Body, in which
 “ it acts. For, says he, our human Soul, in those
 “ who are not purg’d and cleans’d during this Life, after
 “ its departure out of this Body, is acknowledg’d, or
 “ rather demonstrated, to go into *Hades*, there to re-
 “ ceive Punishment for its past evil Actions. For
 “ Providence does not only take care of our Being,
 “ but also of our Well-being. Therefore is the Soul,
 “ tho laps’d into a preternatural State, yet not neg-
 “ lected by Providence; but has a convenient care
 “ taken of it, in order to its Recovery. And since
 “ Sinning had its original from the desire of Pleasure,
 “ it must of necessity be cur’d by Pain. For here

* En. 6. l. 4.

† Τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν τὸ δὲ μὲν σῶμα καταλείψεν, ἡ πάλιν αὖ ἐξ
 σώματος ἐστῆται.

|| Τὴν αὖ λογικὴν χεῖρην, &c. Proam. in Ar. de Anim.

“ also

“ also Contrarys are the cures of Contrarys. There-
“ fore the Soul being to be purg’d, is punish’d and
“ pain’d in those subterraneous Judicatorys and Prisons,
“ in order to its Amendment. But if the Soul be
“ incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. And
“ how then can it be punish’d? There must of necessity
“ be some *Body* join’d with it, which being immode-
“ rately constring’d or agitated, concreted or secreted,
“ and discordantly mov’d by Heat and Cold, or the
“ like, may make the Soul sensible of Pain, by reason
“ of Sympathy, as it is here in this Life. What
“ Body therefore is that, which is then conjoin’d with
“ the Soul, after the Dissolution of that earthy Body
“ into its Elements? Certainly it can be no other than
“ this pneumatical or spirituous Body, which we now
“ speak of; for in this are seated, as their Subject, the
“ irascible and concupiscible Passions, and they are
“ inseparable from the same, nor could they be in the
“ *Soul* disunited from all *Body*. And that Soul which
“ is freed from these, would be forthwith freed from
“ Generation; nor would it be concern’d in those
“ subterraneous Judicatorys and Prisons, but be carry’d
“ up aloft to the higher celestial Regions. After which
he endeavours further to confirm this Opinion, from the
vulgar *Phænomena*: “ Moreover, says he, that there
“ is such a pneumatical, spirituous, vaporous, or airy
“ Body, which accompanies Souls unpurg’d after
“ Death, is evident also from the *Phænomena* them-
“ selves. For what account can otherwise be given
“ of those Spectres or Phantasms, which appear
“ shadow-like about Graves or Sepulchers? Since the
“ Soul it self is neither of any figure, nor yet at all visi-
“ ble. Wherefore the Antients say, that impure
D d d d 2 “ Souls,

“ Souls, after their departure out of this Body, wan-
“ der here up and down for a certain space, in their
“ spirituous, vaporous, and airy Body, appearing
“ about Sepulchers, and haunting their former Habi-
“ tations. For which cause there is great reason that
“ we should take care of living well, as also of ab-
“ staining from a fouler and grosser Diet; these An-
“ tients telling us likewise, that this spirituous Body of
“ ours being foul’d and incrassated by evil Diet, is apt to
“ render the Soul in this Life also, more obnoxious to
“ the Disturbances of Passions. Now from these Pas-
sages cited out of *Philoponus* it further appears, that
the antient Assertors of the Soul’s Immortality did not
suppose human Souls to be quite strip’d stark naked
from all Body: but that the generality of Souls had
then a *spirituous, vaporous, or airy* Body accompanying
them; tho in different degrees of Purity and Impurity
respectively to themselves. As also that they conceiv’d
this *spirituous* Body, or at least something of it, to
hang about the Soul also here in this Life, as its interior
Indument or Vestment; which also sticks to it after
death; when that other gross *earthly* part of the Body
is put off, as an outer Garment. And indeed thus much
cannot be deny’d, that our Soul acteth not immediately
only upon *Bones, Flesh, and Brains*, and other such-
like gross Parts of this Body; but first and chiefly
upon the *Animal Spirits*, as the immediate Instruments
of *Sense and Phancy*, and that by whose Vigour and
Activity the other heavy and unweildy Bulk of the
Body is so nimbly mov’d. And therefore we know
no reason why we may not assent to this of *Porphyrus*:
that the Blood is the Food and Nourishment of the Spirit,
that is, the subtle Body, call’d the *Animal Spirits*; and
that

that this Spirit is the Vehicle of the Soul, or the more immediate Seat of Life.

But beyond this the same *Philoponus* adds, that according to these Antients, besides the *terrestrial Body*, and this *spirituous* and *airy Body* too, there is yet a third kind of Body, of a higher rank than either of the former, peculiarly belonging to such Souls after Death, as are purg'd and cleans'd from corporeal Affections, Lusts, and Passions; which they term'd * *Heavenly, Luciform, and Starlike*, and held to be *always conjoin'd with the Soul, and eternal*. The same is often mention'd by *Plato* in his *Epinomis*, and is stil'd also by *Proclus* in his Comment on the *Timæus*, † *the uniform, lucid, or splendid Vehicle*: by *Hierocles*, || *the spiritual Vehicle of the rational Soul*: and according to him, by the Magick Oracles, ** *the thin and subtle Vehicle or Chariot of the Soul*. Which seems to come near that *Spiritual Body* mention'd in the Scripture, and to be the same with *Synesius's* †† *Divine Body*, as being more *sutable* and *cognate* with that highest and divinest part of the Soul, *Mind* or *Reason*, than the other *terrestrial* or *airy Body* is, which upon that account is stil'd by *Hierocles* as well as *St. Paul*, ||| *the natural or animal Body*. And to shew that this Opinion of two interior *Vehicles* or *Tunics* of the Soul, besides that outer Vestment of the *terrestrial Body*, stil'd in *Plato* the *crustaceous* or *ostraceous Body*, is not a mere

* Σῶμα ἑρμηνεῖον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αἰδῖον, ὃ φάσιν Ἀνγρείδες ἢ Ἀσπερείδες.

† Τὸ ὄχημα τὸ Ἀνγρείδες.

|| Τὸ πνευματικὸν ὄχημα τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς.

** Ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα οἱ χηρισμοὶ καλῶσι.

†† Θεσπέσιον σῶμα. ||| Σῶμα ψυχικόν.

Figment of the latter *Platonists* since *Christianity*, but a Tradition deriv'd down from Antiquity, appears plainly from *Virgil* in his sixth *Æneid*; where, tho not commonly understood, he makes a distinction of the * *spirituous* and *airy Body*, by which was probably meant the *animal Spirits*, diffus'd from the Brain by the Nerves throughout the whole terrestrial Body, from the † pure ethereal and fiery Body, which, tho it be in the mortal Life the inmost *Clothing* or *Tunicle* of the Soul, yet is now acknowledg'd to have its Force much weaken'd and abated, and its Splendor mightily obscur'd by the heavy Weight and gross Steams of the *terrestrial Body*. But at present it was look'd on by those *Antients* to be the *Vinculum* or Tye betwixt the Soul and the *aerial* and *terrestrial Body*; and as before this Copulation it præ-existed with, so will it, after that is dissolv'd and broken, eternally adhere to the rational Soul. But not to expatiate any further upon this distinction of Bodys united to the Soul, in short we find that the most antient Assertors of the *Incorporeity* and *Immortality* of this latter, suppos'd it notwithstanding to be always conjoin'd with a Body; and accordingly may we sum up their Sentiment to this

-
- * Quin & supremo cum lumine Vita reliquit,
Non tamen omne malum miseris nec funditus omnes
Corporeæ excedunt Pestes: penitusque necesse est
Multa diu concreta modis inolescere miris.
Ergo exercentur Poenis, veterumque Malorum
Supplicia expendunt; aliæ penduntur inanes
Suspensæ ad Ventos; aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur Scelus aut exurit igni.
† Donec longa Dies perfecto temporis Orbe,
Concretam exemit Labem, purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum atque Aurai simplicis ignem.

purpose

purpose in the following Words of *Hierocles*: “ * The
 “ rational Nature, says he, having always a cognate
 “ Body, so proceeded from the *Demiurgus* or Creator,
 “ as that neither it self is Body, nor yet can it be
 “ without Body: but tho it self be incorporeal, yet
 “ is its whole Form notwithstanding terminated in a
 “ Body. And accordingly he gives this Definition of
 Man, † *that he is a rational Soul, together with a cognate*
immortal Body; he afterwards concluding, that this
enliven'd terrestrial Body or mortal Man is nothing but
 || *the Image of the true Man, or an Accession* thereunto,
 which is therefore separable from the same. Nor does
 he affirm this only of *human Souls*, but also of all
 other rational Beings whatsoever, below the *supreme*
Deity and above *Men*, that they always *naturally actuate*
a Body. Accordingly also I add, that a *Dæmon* or
Angel (which words are us'd as synonymous not only
 by *Hierocles*, *Simplicius*, and other modern Pagans,
 but also the Jews, as *Philo* tells us) is also defin'd by
 him after the same manner: ** *a rational Soul, toge-*
ther with a lucid Body. And agreeably to him *Proclus*
 upon the *Timæus* affirms, that †† *every Dæmon supe-*
rior to our human Souls has both an intellectual Soul and
an ethereal Vehicle, the Entireness thereof being made up
or compounded of these two things. So that there is
 hardly any other difference left between *Demons* or

* Ἡ λογικὴ οὐσία σύμφυτος ἔχουσα σῶμα, ὅτι τὸ δὲ δὲμιουργεῖ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήλθεν, ὡς μήτε τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐτὴν μήτε ἄνευ σώματος, &c.

† Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ συμφῶς ἀθανάτου σώματος.

|| Εἰδωλον ἀνθρώπου.

** Ψυχὴ λογικὴ μετὰ φωτεινῷ σώματι.

†† Πάντα δαίμονα εἴη ἡμετέρων κρείττονα ψυχῶν, καὶ νοεράν ἔχειν ψυχὴν καὶ ὄχημα αἰθέριον.

Angels and Men, according to these Philosophers, but only this; that the former are lapsable into *aereal Bodys* only, and no further; but the latter into *terrestrial* also. Now *Hierocles* positively affirms this to have been the true *Cabala* and genuine Doctrine of the antient *Pythagoreans*, entertain'd also by *Plato*; * *He resembling*, says he, *every both divine and human Soul*, that is, in our modern Language, every created rational Being below the Deity, *to a winged Chariot and a Driver or Charioteer both together*; meaning by the *Chariot* an *enliven'd Body*, and by the *Charioteer* the *incorporeal Soul* it self *acting* it. Thus did the antient Pagan Assertors of *Incorporeal Substance*, as *unextended*, decline that Absurdity objected against 'em, of the *Illocality* of all *finite created Spirits*, that these being *incorporeal Substances*, vitally cloth'd with some Body, may by reason of the *Locality* and *Mobility* of their respective Bodys, truly be said to be *here* and *there*, and to move from place to place.

Moreover 'tis observable, that with these best and religious Philosophers Christianity also did herein agree: That the most consummate Happiness and highest Perfection that human Nature is capable of, consists not in a separate state of Souls, strip'd naked from all *Body*, and having no manner of Commerce with *Matter*, as some high-flown Persons in all Ages have been apt to conceit. But then neither did the Philosophers nor Christians mean such gross Bodys as these we now have, unchang'd and unalter'd. For

* Ἀπεικάζας συμπύκνω δύναμις ὡς πότερ' ἑνὺς τε καὶ ἀνιόχου, πᾶσαι δὲλας τε καὶ ἀνδραγαθίαν ψυχῆν. More to this purpose may be seen in Cud. True Int. Syst. p. 806, &c.

as the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* have always complain'd of these *terrestrial Bodys* as *Prisons* or *living Sepulchers* of the *Soul*: so does Christianity seem to run much upon the same strain in these Scripture Expressions; *In this we groan earnestly, desiring to be cloth'd upon with our House which is from Heaven*; and again, *We that are in this Tabernacle do groan, being burden'd, not for that we would be uncloth'd, that is, strip'd quite naked of all Body, but so cloth'd upon, that Mortality might be swallow'd up of Life*; and lastly, *Our selves also which have the first Fruits of the Spirit, groan within our selves, waiting for the Adoption, even the Redemption of our Bodys*, that is, the Freedom of 'em from all those Evils and Maladys of theirs, under which we are here oppress'd; which will be brought about, by having 'em chang'd into the *Likeness of Christ's glorious Body*, and in this *Mortal's putting on Immortality*. But this, you'll say, refers only to the future supernatural *Resurrection*, and *Re-union* of the Body to the Soul, which Christians believe will be effected by God thro Christ at the last day: and which does not answer to the afore-said Notion of the Pagans; unless they also held, that the Soul at its Separation from the terrestrial Body by death, and always, either before or after its Union with it, does notwithstanding exist in some Body. As to which I first cite the learned *Origen* to answer for himself; who tells us, that it is *impossible for any other Nature besides the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, to live quite without a Body*. Indeed if it were *natural* to the human Soul and most perfective of it to continue separate from all Body, then doubtless, as he implies, should the Souls of good men, rather *after* the day of Judgment, continue in such a state of Separation to all Eternity. But on the contrary, if it be *natural* to

Souls to enliven and inform some Body or other, tho not always a terrestrial one, as our inward Sense inclines us to think, then can it not seem so probable, that they should by a kind of *Violence* be kept so long in an unnatural or preternatural State of Nakedness and Separation from all Body, some of 'em even from *Adam* till the Day of Judgment*. To this purpose the same *Origen* again plainly tells us, “† That our Soul, “ which in its own nature is incorporeal and invisible, “ in whatsoever corporeal place it existeth, doth al- “ ways stand in need of a Body, suitable to the nature “ of that place respectively ; which Body it sometimes “ beareth, having put off that which before was ne- “ cessary, but is now superfluous for the following “ State : and sometimes again putting on something “ to what it before had, as now standing in need of “ some better Clothing, to fit it for those more pure, “ ethereal, and heavenly Places. Moreover, that the *Soul* is not altogether naked after Death, *Origen* endeavours to confirm from that of our Saviour concerning the *Rich man* and *Lazarus* : “ The Rich man punish'd, “ says he, and the Poor man refresh'd in *Abraham's* “ Bosom, before the coming of our Saviour, and be- “ fore the end of the World, and therefore before the “ Resurrection, plainly teaches, || that even now also “ after Death the Soul useth a Body. The same he thinks to be further prov'd from the visible Apparition of *Ghosts*, particularly he instanceth in that of *Samuel* : “ *Samuel*, says he, also visibly appearing after Death, “ makes it manifest, that his Soul was then cloth'd “ in a Body. To which he adds in *Photius*, “ That

* Orig. *de i. Arch.* l. 2.

† Cont. Cels. l. 7.

|| Διδάσκουσιν ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ σώματι χρῆται ἡ ψυχή.

“ the

“ the exterior Form and Figure of the Soul’s Body after
 “ Death does resemble that of a gross terrestrial Body
 “ here in this Life ; all the Historys of Apparitions
 “ making Ghosts, or the Souls of the Dead, to appear
 “ in the same Form which their Bodys had before.
 And this is that which *Origen* understands by τὸ σκῆνος in
St. Paul ; not this gross *terrestrial Body*, but a certain
 middle Body betwixt it and the heavenly, which the
 Soul after Death carries away with it. To which I
 add, that this Opinion of the learned *Origen* was never
 reckon’d up by the antient Fathers, or his greatest Ad-
 versarys, in the Catalogue of his Errors. Which gives
 us a fair Presumption that he was not singular in this
 Opinion ; and to shew more particularly that he was
 not, I shall next produce the Authority of * *Tertullian*,
 who, tho he seems to drive the business so far as to
 make the Soul it self to be *corporeal*, yet, as † *Dr. Cud-*
worth observes, will the Reasons he insists on extend no
 further than to prove, that the Soul has after Death
 some Body vitally united with it, by means whereof it
 is both capable of *Converse* and sensible of *Pain* ; for-
 asmuch as Body alone can have no sense of any thing.
 From which Opinion, for these reasons, neither do we
 find that ‖ *St. Austin* was altogether abhorrent, and
 therefore does he seem to leave every man to his own
 liberty therein. But to this I add the more express
 Sentiment of *Irenæus*, who does not say that the *Soul*
 is a *Body*, but that it has a Body conjoin’d with it after

* *Tertul. de An. p. 309. Cud. True Int. Syft. p. 801.*

† *See Cud. True Int. Syft. p. 821, 822.*

‖ *Plenissimè autem Dominus docuit non solum perseverare, non de cor-
 pore in Corpus transgredientes Animas, sed & characterem corporis, in quo
 etiam adaptantur, custodire eundem, &c. L. 2. c. 62.*

Death, and that of the same Form and Figure with that Body, which it had before in this Life: I say, he does not here declare the Soul it self to be a Body, but only that after the Death of a man his Soul still abides and acts in some Body; which * Soul he elsewhere plainly affirms to be *incorporeal*. Also *Philoponus*, a Christian Philosopher, dogmatiz'd in this manner. To whom might be added *Johannes Thessalonicensis*, who in that Dialogue of his, read in the seventh Synod, seems to have been of the same Persuasion, when he affirms of Souls, † *that they are often seen by many sensibly, in the Form of their own Bodys*. And the same is plainly suppos'd by *Pfellus*, who, when speaking of Devils insinuating their Temptations into mens Souls, by affecting immediately the Phantastick Spirit, writes in this manner: “ When one man speaks to another
 “ from afar off, he must, if he would be heard, make
 “ a loud cry or noise; whereas if he stood near to him,
 “ he might softly whisper into his Ear. But could he
 “ immediately approach to the Spirit, or subtle Body
 “ of the Soul, he would not then need so much as to
 “ make a Whisper; but might silently and without
 “ noise communicate whatsoever Thoughts of his own
 “ to him, by Motions made thereupon. And this is
 “ said to be the way that Souls going out of these Bo-
 “ dys converse together; they imparting their Thoughts
 “ to each other without any noise. In which words *Pfellus* takes it for granted that Souls after Death have a πνεῦμα, that is, a certain subtle Body adhering to 'em, by Motions upon which they silently converse with

* Flatus autem Vitæ incorporalis est.

† Ὁραθέντες ὡς πλειόνων, αἰσθητῶς πλεονάκεις, τῷ εἶδει τῆς οἰκείας αὐτῶν σωματίων.

one another. All which, as was in part before noted, seems to be grounded on the Testimony of *Scripture*, which intimates that *Souls* departed out of this Life, have a knowledg of one another, and are also capable of the Punishment of *Sense* or *Pain*: * *Fear him*, says our Saviour, *who after he hath kill'd, hath power to cast into Hell*. And the Soul of the *Rich man* is said to be immediately after death in *Torments*, before the Day of *Judgment*; as likewise to have known *Abraham* and *Lazarus*. And it seems neither agreeable to our *common Notions*, nor yet to *Piety*, to conclude that the *Souls* of wicked men departing out of this Life, from the beginning of the World in their several Ages till the Day of *Judgment*, have all of 'em no manner of *Punishment* inflicted on 'em, save only that of Remorse of *Conscience* and *future Expectation*. Now it is not conceivable, how Souls after Death should *know* and be *knowable*, and converse one with another, and have any Punishment of *Sense* or *Pain* inflicted on 'em, were they not *vitally* united to some Bodys. Moreover it may be observ'd, that when upon our Saviour's first Apparition to his Disciples it is said that they were affrighted, as supposing they *had seen a Spirit*, our Saviour does not tell 'em, that a Spirit or Ghost had no *Body* at all, wherein it could visibly appear; but (as rather taking that for granted) that a *Spirit had no Flesh and Bones*, no *σῶμα ἀντίτυπον*, or such *solid Body*, as they might find him to have; he bidding 'em therefore handle him, to remove that Scruple of theirs: as if he should have said, tho *Spirits* or *Ghosts* and *Souls* departed have *Bodys* or *Vehicles*, which may by them be so far condens'd, as sometimes to make a visible

* Luke 12.

Appearance to the Eyes of Men, yet have they not any such *solid Bodys* as those of *Flesh* and *Bone*; and therefore by *Feeling* and *Handling* may you satisfy yourselves that I am not a mere *Spirit*, *Ghost*, or *Soul*, appearing, as others have frequently done, without a *Miracle*: but that I appear in that very same *solid Body*, wherein I was crucify'd by the *Jews*, by miraculous Divine Power rais'd out of the *Sepulcher*, and now to be found no more there. To which I add, that there is also another place of Scripture so interpreted by the generality of the antient Fathers, as naturally to imply even the *Soul* of our Saviour *Christ* himself, after his *Death* and before his *Resurrection*, not to have been quite naked from all *Body*; but to have had a certain subtle or *spirituous Clothing*; and it is this of *St. Peter*, which is understood by them of *Christ's* descending into *Hades* or *Hell*, and from the * *Original* thus render'd: *Put to death in the Flesh, but quicken'd in the Spirit; in which (Spirit) also he went and preach'd to those Spirits that were in Prison, &c.* Where the word πνεύματι or *Spirit*, according to this Interpretation, is to be taken for a *spirituous Body*, the sense being this; *That when our Saviour Christ was put to death in the Flesh or the fleshly Body, he was quicken'd in the Spirit or a spirituous Body; in which spirituous Body also he went and preach'd to those Spirits that were in Prison.* And doubtless it would be said by the Assertors of this Interpretation, that the word *Spirit* could not here be taken for the *Soul* of our Saviour *Christ*; because this being *naturally immortal*, could not properly be said to be *quicken'd* and *made alive*; nor could he, that is,

* Θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ τῷ πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασι πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξε. 1 Pet. 3. 18, 19.

our Saviour Christ's Soul, be so well said to go in this *Spirit* neither, that is *in it self*, the *Soul* in the *Soul*, to preach to the *Spirits in Prison*. Also they would add, that *Spirit* here could not be taken for the Divine *Spirit* neither, which was the efficient Cause of the *Vivification* of our Saviour's Body at his Resurrection; because then there would be no direct Opposition betwixt being *put to Death in the Flesh* and *quicken'd in the Spirit*; unless they be taken both alike *materially*. Likewise the following Verse is thus to be understood: that our Saviour Christ went in that Spirit, wherein he was *quicken'd*, when he was *put to death in the Flesh*, and therein *preach'd to the Spirits in Prison*; by which *Spirits in Prison* also would be meant not *pure incorporeal Substances* or *naked Souls*, but *Souls cloth'd with subtle spirituous Bodys*, as that word may be often understood elsewhere in Scripture. But thus much we are unquestionably certain of from the *Scripture*, that not only *Elias*, whose *terrestrial Body* seems to have been in part at least *spiritualiz'd*, in his Ascent in that *fiery Chariot*, but also *Moses* appear'd visibly to our Saviour Christ and his Disciples upon the Mount; and therefore (since Piety will not permit us to think this a mere prestigious thing) in real *Bodys*, which *Bodys* also seem to have been *luciform* and clear, like to our Saviour's then *transfigur'd Body*. Again, there are sundry places in Scripture, which affirm that the Regenerate and Renew'd have here in this Life a certain *Earnest* of their future *Inheritance*, which is their *spiritual* or *heavenly Body*: as also the *quickenings of their mortal Bodys* is therein attributed to the *Efficiency* of the Spirit dwelling in them. Which is a thing that has been taken notice of by some of the *Antients*, particularly *Irenaeus* and *Novatian*; the former of whom tells us,

*

that

* *that now we have a part of that Spirit, for the Preparation and Perfection of Incorruption ; we being accus- tom'd by little and little to receive and bear God. Which also the Apostle has call'd an Earnest, that is, a part of that Honour, which is promis'd to us from God : If there- fore this Earnest dwelling in us hath made us already spiri- tual, the mortal is also swallow'd up by Immortality. The latter, † that this is what the Holy Spirit does in us, namely to bring and lead on our Bodys to Eternity and the Resurrection of Immortality ; whilst of it self it ac- customs us to be mingl'd with the heavenly Vertue. More- over there are some other Places which seem to imply that good men after death shall have a further In- choation of their heavenly Body, the full Completion whereof is not to be expected before the Resurrection, or the Day of Judgment. We know that if our earthly House of this Tabernacle were dissolv'd, we have a building of God, a House not made with hands, eternal in the Heavens. For in this we groan earnestly. And again, he that hath wrought us for the self-same thing is God, who also hath given us the Earnest of the Spirit. Now how these Preludes and Prelibations of an immortal Body can consist with the Soul's Continuance after death, in a perfect Separation from all manner of Body, is not so easily conceivable. Lastly, it is not at all to be doubted, but that *Irenæus, Origen*, and those other Anti- ents, who entertain'd that Opinion of Souls being cloth'd after death with a certain thin and subtile Body, suf-*

* Nunc autem partem aliquam Spiritûs ejus sumimus, ad perfectionem & præparationem Incorruptelæ, paulatim assuescentes capere & portare Deum, &c. L. 5. c. 8.

† Spiritus sanctus id agit in nobis, ut ad Æternitatem & ad Resurrectio- nem Immortalitatis corpora nostra perducatur, dum illa in se assuefacit, cum celesti Virtute-misceri.

pected it not in the least to be inconsistent with that of the *future Resurrection*: as it is no way inconsistent for one, who has only a Shirt or Waist-coat on, to put on a Suite of Clothes or exterior upper Garment. Which will also seem the less strange, if it be consider'd that even here in this Life our Body is as it were two-fold, *exterior* and *interior*; we having, besides the grossly tangible Bulk of our *outward Body*, another *interior spirituous Body*, the Soul's immediate Instrument both of *Sense* and *Motion*; which latter is not put into the Grave with the other, nor imprison'd under the cold Sods. To which purpose the sense of *Origen* is thus express'd in *Photius*: " This short Life of our
" earthly Body being destroy'd, our Soul shall then
" have before the Resurrection a Dwelling from God;
" till we shall at last receive it renew'd, restor'd, and
" so made an incorruptible House. Wherefore in this
" we groan; desirous not to put off all Body, but to
" put on Life or Immortality upon the Body which
" we shall then have.

What has been hitherto said of human Souls, is, as we have before observ'd, in the Sentiment of Heathens apply'd in like manner to Angels, Dæmons, and all other created Spirits; and the same, I add, has also been done by many antient Christians; in that, as I formerly took notice, they look'd upon it as a peculiar Prerogative of the Godhead, to be able to subsist without a Body, and that it was impossible that any other finite Spirit should be entirely separate from one. This again is particularly asserted by *Origen* in several places of his Book *Σὺν Ἀρχαῖς*; whom *Aquinas* affirms to have herein follow'd the Opinion of certain antient Philosophers: and undoubtedly it was the old *Pythagorick Cabala*, which this learned Person did here ad-

here to; that, as it is in *Hierocles*, * *the rational Nature made by God*, that is, all created understanding Beings are neither *Body*, nor yet *without Body*; but have always a *cognate* or *congenite* one, as their *Vehicle* or *Indument*. So that Angels or Dæmons, as well according to *Origen* as *Hierocles*, are all of 'em *incorporeal Substances*, not naked and abstract, but cloth'd with certain subtle Bodys; or *Animals* compounded of *Soul* and *Body* together. And that the generality of the most antient and learned Fathers were of this opinion, is unquestionably evident from hence; because they agreed with *Porphyrius* and other *Greek Philosophers* in this Conceit, that evil Dæmons or Devils were therefore delighted with the Blood and Nidour of Sacrifices, as having their more gross, airy, and vaporous Bodys nourish'd and refresh'd with those Vapours, in which they did as it were luxuriate and gluttonize †. And perhaps this might be the meaning of *Joannes Thessalonicensis*, in that Dialogue of his before-mention'd, read and approv'd of in the seventh Council, and therefore the meaning of that Council it self too, when it declar'd, || *That the Catholick Church acknowledges Angels to be intellectual, but not altogether incorporeal and invisible, but to have certain subtle Bodys, either airy or fiery*. For it being there only deny'd, that they were altogether *incorporeal*, one would think the meaning should not be, that they were altogether *corporeal*; nor indeed could such an Opinion be fasten'd upon the *Catholick Church*: but

* Ἡ λογικὴ ὕψια. πᾶς ὁ λογικὸς διακόσμος.

† See Cudworth's True Intel. Syst. p. 810, 811.

|| Νοεῖν μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία γινώσκει, ὡς καὶ τὴν ἀσώματον πύσιν καὶ ἀοράτους, λεπτοσώματος δὲ, καὶ ἀερώδους ἢ πυρώδους.

only that they were partly incorporeal and partly corporeal; this being also sufficient in order to that Design, which was driven at in that Council. However *Pfellus*, who was a curious Enquirer into the nature of *Spirits*, declares it not only as his own Opinion, but also as agreeable to the sense of the *antient Fathers*, * that the *Demoniack* or *Angelical* kind of Beings is not altogether incorporeal or bodiless; but that they are conjoin'd with Bodys, or have cognate Bodys belonging to 'em. To which he adds in his Dialogue, that this may be learn'd also from the *Fathers*, the *Divine Basil* contending, that there are Bodys not only in Devils, but also in the pure Angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate Spirits. Where he shews likewise afterwards, how that † Body which is connate with Angels differs from that to which Devils are united, in respect of the radiant Splendor of the one, and the dark fuliginous Obscurity of the other. Moreover, that Devils are not without Bodys, he endeavours to confirm from the words of our Saviour, where speaking of the Resurrection State, he affirms, that they who shall be accounted worthy of it, shall neither marry nor be given in Marriage, but || be equal to the Angels: which comparative Expression of Men, as to their Bodys, with Angels, would be thought not so proper, were the Angels absolutely devoid of all Body. The same is every where declar'd by ** *St. Austin*, by *Claudianus Mammertus*, *Fulgentius*, *Marcus* the Monk, &c. However it must be own'd, that this Opinion, that Angels and Demons are not altogether incorporeal, but consist

* Ὡς ἐκ ἀσώματον δαιμόνιον ἐστὶ φύλον, μετὰ σώματος δὲ γὰρ.

† Σύμφυτος ἀγγελοῖς σῶμα. || Ἰσαγγελοῖ.

** See Cudworth's True Int. Syst. p. 701, 702, 812, 813, &c.

of a *bodily Indument* or *Clothing*, has not so much prevail'd in these latter Ages. Which, * Dr. Cudworth thinks, may be imputed partly to the Injury of Time, which is rightly compar'd to a River, as quickly sinking the more weighty and solid things, and bearing up only the more light and superficial; partly to the *Aristotelick* Philosophy, which when generally introduc'd into Christianity, brought in its *abstract Intelligences* along with it; partly to some spurious *Platonists*, who talking much of their *Henades* and *Noes*, their *simple Monads* and *immovable unbodiy'd Minds*, as the chief of their *generated* and *created* Gods, have probably occasion'd some Christians to vye their Angels with 'em; partly and principally to a religious Regard which many have had to the Authority of the third *Lateran Council*, as if the seventh *Oecumenical* or second *Niceene*, wherein the contrary was before own'd and asserted, were not of equal force, at least to counterballance the other. Wherefore still we may venture to conclude, that this Opinion of Angels and Demons being not mere *abstract incorporeal Substances* and *unbodiy'd Minds*, but consisting of something incorporeal and something corporeal, that is, of *Soul* or *Spirit* and *Body* join'd together, is not only more agreeable to Reason, but has also had more Suffrages amongst the antient Fathers, and those of greater weight too, than either of those two other Extremes, namely, that Angels are mere *Bodys*, and have nothing at all incorporeal in 'em; or else, that they are altogether incorporeal, or without any *bodily Indument* or *Clothing*: which Opinion they the rather stood to, because, as was before observ'd, they thought it a Privilege, which no *finite*

* True Int. Syst. p. 814.

Being was capable of, to be separate from all *Body*; the Imperfection of all *Creatures*, tho *Spirits*, necessarily requiring the *Conjunction* of some *Body* with 'em, to make 'em up complete; without which it is unconceivable, says * *Dr. Cudworth* agreeably to their *Sentiment*, how they should either have *Sense* or *Imagination*.

And moreover this Opinion, tho it does so exactly agree with the old *Pythagorick Cabala*, yet cannot therefore be said to have been entirely borrow'd or deriv'd from thence by the *antient Fathers*, but rather it is probable that they were chiefly led into it by the *Scripture* it self. For first, the historical *Phænomena* of *Angels* in *Scripture* are such, as cannot well be otherwise solv'd, than by suposing 'em to have *Bodys*: and not to lay any stress upon those words of the *Psalmist*, *who maketh his Angels Spirits, and his Ministers a Flame of Fire*; nor to insist upon those Passages of *St. Paul*, where he speaks of the *Tongues* of *Angels* and of the *Voice* of an *Arch-angel*, and the like; to pass by this I say, there are several other places in *Holy Writ*, which seem plainly to confirm this Opinion. As first, that of our *Saviour* before mention'd to this purpose: † *They who shall be accounted worthy to obtain that World and the Resurrection from the Dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage, neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the Angels*. For were *Angels* devoid of all *Bodys*, then would the *Souls* of good men in a state of *Separation*, and without any *Resurrection*, be rather equal to the *Angels*, than after a *Resurrection* of their *Bodys*: wherefore the natural meaning of these words, as *St. Austin* has expounded 'em, seems

* *True Int. Syst.* p. 818.† *Luke* 20. 35.

to be this: that the Souls of good men after the Resurrection shall have *Angelical Bodys*, or *such Bodys as those of Angels are* *. Wherein it is suppos'd that Angels also have Bodys, but of a very different kind from those of ours here. Again, that of St. Jude, where he writes thus concerning *Devils*: *the Angels which kept not their first Estate*, or rather according to the vulgar Latin, *suum Principatum, their own Principality*, but left their own Habitation or Dwelling-house, hath he reserv'd in everlasting Chains under Darkness, unto the Judgment of the great Day. In which words it is first imply'd, that the Devils were created by God pure, as well as the other Angels, but that they kept not † *their own Principality*, that is, their lordly Power and Dominion over their worser and inferior Part; they having also a certain *Duplicity* in their Nature of a better and worser Principle, of a superior Part, which ought to rule and govern, and of an inferior, which ought to be govern'd: nor is it indeed otherwise easily conceivable how they should be capable of *Sinning*. And this inferior Part in Angels seems to have a respect to something also which is corporeal or bodily in them, as well as it has in *Men*. But in the next place St. Jude adds, as the immediate Result and natural Consequence of these Angels *sinning*, that *they thereby left or lost τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον*, that is, not only their Dwelling-place at large, those ethereal Countrys and heavenly Regions above, but also their proper Dwelling-house or immediate Mansion, to wit, their heavenly Body: forasmuch as that heavenly Body which good men expect after the Resurrection, is thus call'd by Saint Paul,

* Corpora Angelica, qualia sunt Angelorum corpora. In Gen. ad Lit. l. 3.

† Τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν.

τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἔξ ὀρανοῦ, *our Habitation or Dwelling-house that is from Heaven.* The heavenly Body is the proper House or Dwelling, Clothing or Indument both of angelical and human Souls; and this is that which makes 'em fit Inhabitants for the heavenly Regions. This, I say, was the natural Effect and Consequence of these Angels sinning, their leaving and losing their pure heavenly Body, which forthwith became thereupon obscur'd and incrassated; the Bodys of Spirits incorporate always bearing a correspondent Purity or Impurity to the different Disposition of their Mind or Soul. But then again in the last place, what was thus in part the natural Result of their Sin, was also, by the just Judgment of God, converted into their Punishment; for their ethereal Bodys being thus chang'd into gross, aereal, feculent, and vaporous ones, themselves were immediately thereupon, as St. Peter in a parallel place expresseth it, ταρταρωθέντες, cast down into Tartarus, and there imprison'd or reserv'd in Chains under Darkness, until the Judgment of the great Day. Where it is observable that the word ταρταρῶν, us'd by St. Peter, is the very same that Apollodorus and other Greek Writers frequently make use of in a like case, when they speak of the Titans being cast down from Heaven: which seems to have been really nothing else, but this Fall of Angels poetically mythologiz'd. And by Tartarus here, in all probability, is meant this lower caliginous Air or Atmosphere of the Earth, according to that of St. Austin concerning these Angels: * That after their Sin they were thrust down into the misty Darkness of this lower Air. And being by that same weight

* Post peccatum in hanc sunt detrusi caliginem; ubi tamen & Aer. De Gen. ad Lit. l. 3.

of their gross and heavy Bodys, which first sunk 'em down hither, not suffer'd to re-ascend upward, or return back to those bright ethereal Regions above, they may be said for the present to be *chain'd* or *imprison'd* in this lower *Tartarus*, or caliginous Air or Atmosphere, and reserv'd in custody unto the *Judgment* or general Assizes of the *great Day*; however they may notwithstanding in the mean time domineer and lord it here for a while. Lastly, our Saviour's *Go ye cursed into everlasting Fire, prepar'd for the Devil and his Angels*, seems to be a clear Confirmation of Devils being body'd: because on one hand, to *allegorize* this *Fire* into nothing but Remorse of Conscience, would endanger the rendering of other Points of our Religion uncertain also; and on t'other, to say that *incorporeal Substances* un-united to *Bodys* can be tormented with *Fire*, is, as much as in us lies, to expose Christianity and the Scripture to the Scorn and Contempt of all Philosophers and especially to Atheistick *Wits*. Wherefore *Pfellus*, we find, lays no small stress upon this place: "I am also convinc'd of this, says he, that Dæmons
 " have Bodys, from the words of our Saviour, affirm-
 " ing, that they shall be punish'd with Fire: which,
 " how could it be, were they altogether incorporeal?
 " it being impossible for that, which is both it self in-
 " corporeal and vitally un-united to any Body, to suffer
 " from a Body. Wherefore of necessity it must be
 " granted by us Christians, * that Devils shall receive
 " Punishment of Sense and Pain hereafter, in Bodys
 " capable of suffering. Thus do we see, how the
 antient Assertors of Incorporeal Substance repel'd this

* Ἀνάγκη γὰρ σώμασιν αὐτὰς πῦρ κόλασιν ὑποδέχεσθαι πεφυκόσι πᾶσιν.

Assault made against it by Atheists and Corporealists from the *Illocality* and *Immobility* of *finite Spirits*, they supposing these always to be vitally united to some Bodys, and consequently by the *Locality* of these their respective Bodys, determin'd to *here* and *there*; according to that of *Origen*, * *our Soul stands in need of a Body in order to local Motions*. Which middle Opinion, that Angels, Dæmons, and Souls, tho of themselves and naturally *incorporate*, yet as vested with Bodys, are in some sense partly corporeal and partly incorporeal, has, I am apt to think, occasion'd many of the Antients to be censur'd as Abettors of the opposite Extreme, that they are *entirely* corporeal; and that because of their synechdochical way of expressing the *Whole* sometimes by a *Part*; a *Spirit*, whether *Angel*, *Dæmon*, or *Soul*, by its *Vehicle* or *Body*; just as in common Language we term a Man or Woman *Somebody*, tho at the same time we hold the one and the other to be made up at once of *Soul* and *Body*. And thus perhaps may *Tertullian* himself be brought off from being a downright Corporealist, especially considering what an † eminent Person has also observ'd out of his || Book against *Hermogenes*, that he did not always mean by *Body*, *impenetrable, passive Matter*; but the *mere Substance, Being, or Essence of a thing*. Lastly, as to that other Pretence of the Atheists, inserted in the former Objection, that finite Spirits or Substances *incorporeal*, being *unextended*, and so having in them-

* Ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν δὲ σῶμα ἔχει, διὰ τὴν τομὴν καὶ μεταβάσιν. *Contr. Cels. l. 4.*

† Tho Tenison, now Ld ABp of Canterbury, in the Creed of Mr. Hobbs examin'd, p. 23.

|| Quum autem sit, habeat necesse est aliquid, per quod est: si habet aliquid per quod est, hoc erit Corpus ejus. Omne quod est, Corpus est sui generis. *Tert. adv. Herm. c. 35.*

selves no relation to any place, it would hence follow, that then they might actuate and inform the whole corporeal World at once, and take cognizance of all things therein: to this, I say, the antient Assertors of *unextended* Substance made this Reply, That these *Spirits* being essentially but Parts of the Universe, and therefore not comprehensive of the *Whole*; being finite or particular, and not universal Beings (as the three Hypostases of the *Platonick* Triad are) the Sphere of their Activity could not possibly extend any further, than to the quickening and enlivening of some certain Parts of *Matter* and the *World* allotted to them; and thereby of becoming *particular Animals*, it being peculiar to the Deity, or that *incorporeal Substance* which is *infinite*, to quicken and actuate all things.

But however after all, these antient Incorporealists did not deny, that *Substance unextended, indistant, and indivisible*, or devoid of *Magnitude* and *Parts*, is repugnant to Sense and Imagination, and therefore to vulgar Apprehension. Upon which account it will not be amiss to enquire in the next place, how this Opinion came to fall within the verge of their intellectual view, and to be espous'd by their Faculty of *Reason*. Now this seems to have come to pass, and hereby that these Antients endeavour'd to prove that the Deity is no impossible Idea, from what we experience within our selves, and may observe of our own Souls, shewing 'em to be *extended* or Bodys. And that first, as *Simplicius* argues, because whatsoever can act and reflect upon its whole self, as we find the Soul can, cannot possibly be extended, nor, like a Body, have Parts distant from one another. Secondly, as *Plotinus* also argues, if the Soul be extended, then it has Parts; but the Soul has not Parts, therefore 'tis not extended.

The

The *Major* being evident, the *Minor* he proves thus: If the Soul has Parts, then either every single Part of the Soul is *Soul*, or it is not; if the former be suppos'd, that every Part of the *Soul* is *Soul*, then would all the rest of it besides any one *Part* be superfluous, or indeed every *Part* thereof would be the same with the *Whole*; from whence it follows, that it could not be extended or have any real Parts at all, since no *Part* of an *extended* thing can possibly be the same with the *Whole*: but if the latter be suppos'd, that not every Part of the Soul is Soul, or has *Life* and *Mind* in it, then is it certain, that being put together, neither could they make it up what it is, or give *Life* and *Mind* to it; because *Nothing* can causally come from *Nothing*. It is true indeed that corporeal *Qualitys* and *Forms*, according to the *Atomick Physiology*, do result from a *Composition* and *Contexture* of Atoms or Parts, * each of which taken alone by themselves, have nothing of that *Quality* or *Form* in them. But the reason of the difference here is plain; because these *Qualitys* and *Forms* are not *Entitys* really distinct from the *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site* and *Motion* of Parts; but only such a *Composition* of them, as causes different *Fancys* in us: but *Life* and *Understanding*, *Soul* and *Mind* are *Entitys* really distinct from *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site* and *Motion* of Parts; and not mere *Fancys* nor *Syllables* of things, but simple and uncompounded *Realitys*. Thirdly, the same Philosopher reasons from the *Energys* and *Actions* of human Soul, as well those of *Sensation* as *Intellection*, the sum of what he urges being this: that if the *Soul* be an *extended* Substance, then must it of necessity be either

* ——— Nè ex Albis Alba rearis;
Aut ea, quæ nigrant, nigro de Semine nata.

a *Physical Point* or *Minimum*, the least Extension that can possibly be (supposing there is any such least, and Body or Extension be not infinitely divisible) or else it must consist of more such *Physical Points* join'd together. As to the former of these, it is utterly impossible that one single Atom, or smallest Point of Extension, should be able distinctly to perceive all the Variety of things; and again, to suppose every Soul to be but one *Physical Minimum* or smallest *Extensum*, is to imply such an essential difference in *Matter* or *Extension*, as that some of the *Points* thereof should be *naturally* devoid of all *Life*, *Sense*, and *Understanding*, and others again *naturally sensitive* and *rational*. Which Absurdity, if it should be admitted, yet would it be utterly unconceivable, how there should come to be *one* such *sensitive* and *rational Atom* in every Man, and no more; and how this should constantly remain the same, from Infancy to old Age, while other Parts of *Matter* transpire continually. And as to the latter, if Souls be *extended Substances*, consisting of more Points, one without another, all concurring in every *Sensation*, then must every one of those Points perceive either a *Point* and *Part* of the Object only, or else the *Whole*. Now if every Point of the *extended Soul* perceive only a *Point* of the Object, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the *Whole*, or which can compare one Part with another. But if every *Point* of the *extended Soul* perceive the whole Object at once consisting of many *Parts*, then would there be innumerable Perceptions of the same Object in every *Sensation*; that is, as many as there are Points in the *extended Soul*. And from both these Suppositions it would alike follow, that no man is one single *Percipient* or *Person*; but that there are innumerable distinct *Percipients*

cipients and *Persons* in every man. Neither can there be any other Supposition made, besides those three before-mention'd: as that the whole *extended Soul* should perceive both the whole sensible Object, and all its feveral Parts; no *Part* of this Soul in the mean time having any Perception at all by it self, because the *Whole* of an *extended Being* is nothing else, but all the *Parts* taken together; and if none of those Parts have any *Life*, *Sense*, or *Perception* in them, it is impossible that there should be any in the *Whole*. But in truth to say, that the *Whole* perceiveth *All*, and no *Part* of it any thing, is in effect to acknowledg it not to be *extended*, but to be *indivisible*; which is the thing that *Plotinus* contends for. Fourthly, to the same purpose he insists yet further upon *internal Sensations*, and that *Sympathy* or *Homopathy*, which is in all Animals; it being one and the same thing in them, which perceives *Pain* in the most distant Extremitys of the *Body*, as in the Sole of the Foot and the Crown of the Head, and which moves one Part to succour and relieve another, labouring under it; which could not possibly be by Traduction of *all* to *one* Physical Point, as the Centre, for divers reasons: but *what perceives in us must be every where, and in all the Parts of the Body, one and the same thing with it self; which therefore cannot be it self Body, * but must of necessity be some other Entity or Substance incorporeal.*

Lastly, the fore-mention'd Philosopher endeavours yet further to prove, that the human Soul is *unextended* and devoid of *Magnitude*, and indivisible; and that from its *rational Energys* or *Operations*, its *Intellections* of *Intelligibles*, and *Apprehensions* of things devoid of

* Τὸ ὅτι ἄλλω τινὶ ἢ τῷ ὅλῳ ἢ τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν νοεῖται.

Magnitude; for how could the Soul, says he, if it were a *Magnitude*, understand that which has no *Magnitude*? and with that which is divisible, conceive that which is indivisible? Now it is certain, that we have Notions of many things which are altogether *unimaginable*, and therefore have nothing of *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thick-ness* in 'em, as *Vertue*, *Vice*, &c. * So that the Soul must receive these by what is indivisible, and lodge 'em in what is indivisible. We have also a Notion, not only of mere *Latitude* or *Breadth*, indivisible as to *Thick-ness*, but also of a *Mathematical Point*, which is every way indivisible, as to *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thick-ness*. We have a Conception of the *Intension* of Powers and Vertues, wherein there is nothing of *Extension* or *Magnitude*. And indeed all the abstract *Essences* of things, call'd by the Greeks *οὐτέναια*, which are the first Objects of *Intellection*, are indivisible. And tho we apprehend *Forms* which are in *Matter* too, yet do we apprehend 'em as separated and abstracted from the same; there being nothing of *Flesh* in our Conception of a *Man*, &c. Nay the Soul conceives *extended* things themselves *unextendedly* and *indivisibly*; for as the Distance of a whole Hemisphere is contracted into a narrow Compass in the Pupil of the Eye, so are all Distances yet more contracted in the Soul it self, and there understood *indistinctly*: for the Thought of a *Mile distance*, or of ten thousand Miles, or Semidiameters of the Earth, takes up no more room in the Soul, nor stretches it any more, than does the Thought of a *Foot* or *Inch*, or indeed of a *Mathematical Point*. Were that which perceiveth in us a *Magnitude*, then could it not be † equal to every

* * Ωςτε καὶ πρὸς ὅλην καὶ πρὸς ἀμέρη αὐτῆς ἀποδέξασθαι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐν ἀμέρη κείνῃ.
† ἴσον παντὶ αἰσθητῷ.

sensible, and alike perceive both greater and lesser *Magnitudes*, than it self; and least of all could it perceive such things as have no Magnitude. And this was the other part of *Aristotle's* Argumentation, to prove the *Soul* and *Mind* to be *unextended* and *indivisible*; * for how, says he, could it perceive that which is *indivisible*, by that which is *divisible*? he having before demanded how it could apprehend things *divisible*, and of a great *Extension*, by a mere *Point* or *absolute Parvitude*. Where the *Soul*, or that which perceives and understands, is, according to *Aristotle*, neither *divisible*, as a *continu'd Quantity*, nor yet *indivisible*, either as a *Mathematical* or a *Physical Point* and *absolute Parvitude*: but as that, which has in it self no out-swelling Distance or Relation to any place, any otherwise than as it is vitally united to a *Body*, with which, wherever it be, it sympathizes and acts upon it.

Moreover, these antient Assertors of *unextended Incorporeals* would, in all probability, confirm that Opinion from hence; because we are able not only to conceive *Extension* without *Cogitation*, and again *Cogitation* without *Extension*; from whence it may be infer'd, that they are *Entitys* really distinct and separable from one another (we having no other Rule to judg of the real *Distinction* and *Separability* of things, than our own *Conceptions*) but also are not able to conceive *Cogitation* with *Extension*. We cannot conceive a *Thought* to be of such a certain *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thicknes*, measurable by *Inches*, and *Feet*, and solid Measures, and of this or that determinate Figure; especially the *Thought* of a thing which is *indivisible*. Whereas if whatsoever is *unextended* be nothing, *Thoughts* and conse-

* Πῶς γὰρ νοήσει τὸ ἀμερές μερὲς.

quently all Veritys, these being but complex Axiomatical *Thoughts*; nay and all Volitions, Appetites, and Passions, and all other things belonging to cogitative Beings as such, must either be Non-entitys, or else extended into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*, divisible into *Parts* and mensurable, and also where *finite*, as in Men, of a certain *Figure*. But if this be absurd, and these things belonging to *Soul* and *Mind*, tho doubtless as great Realitys at least as the things which belong to *Bodys*, be *unextended*, then must the Substances of *Souls* and *Minds* themselves be *unextended* also. Thus *Plotinus* tells us, that * *Mind is not distant from it self*: and indeed were it so, it could not be *one thing*, as it is, but *many*; every conceivable Part of *distant* and *extended* Substance being a *Substance* by it self. And the same is to be said of the human *Soul*, tho it act upon distant Parts of that Body, to which it is united, that it self notwithstanding is not scatter'd out into *Distance*, nor dispers'd into multiplicity, nor infinitely *divisible*; because then it would not be one *single* Substance or *Monad*, but a *Heap* of Substances. Lastly, if *Soul* and *Mind*, and the things belonging to 'em, as *Life* and *Cogitation*, *Understanding* and *Wisdom*, &c. be out-spread into *Distance*, having *one Part without another*, then can there be no good reason given, why they should not be as well *really* and *physically*, as *intellectually* divisible, and one *Part* of 'em separable from another, at least by a divine Power; since, as *Plotinus* speaks, † in all *Magnitude* or *Extension* this is one thing, and that another. Wherefore the sense of the antient *Incorporealists* seems to have been

* Νῦς ἔστι διατὰς αὐτῆς ἑαυτῆς.

† Παντὸς μεγέθους τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

as follows, that there are in Nature two kinds of Substances, *specifically* differing from one another: the one *Bulks* or *mere passive things*, the other *self-active Powers* or *Vertues*, or the * *energetick Nature*. The former of these is nothing else but *Magnitude* or *Extension*, not as an *abstract Notion* of the Mind, but as a thing really existing without it. For when it is call'd *Res extensa*, the meaning is not, as if the *Res* were one thing and the *Extension* thereof another, but that it is *Extension* or *Distance* really existing, or the *Thing* thereof without the *Mind*, and not the *Notion* only. Now this in the nature of it is nothing but *one thing without another*, and therefore perfect *Alterity*, *Disunity* and *Divisibility*. So that no *Extensum* of any sensible bigness is truly and really *one Substance*, but a *Multitude* or *Heap* of Substances, as many as there are Parts, into which it is divisible. Moreover, *one Part* of this Magnitude always standing *without another*, it is an essential Property thereof to be *antitypous* or *impenetrable*, that is, to juggle or shoulder out all other *extended Substance* from penetrating into and co-existing with it, so as to possess and take up the same room or space. Moreover, *Magnitude* or *Extension* as such, is mere *Outside* or *Outwardness*; it has nothing within, no self-active Power or Vertue, all its Activity being either keeping out or hindering any other *extended* thing from penetrating into it (which yet it does merely by its being *extended*, and therefore not so much by any physical Efficiency, as a logical Necessity) or else *local Motion*, to which it is also but *passive*, no *Body* or *Extension* as such being able to move or act upon it self.

* Φύσις δυνάμιος.

Wherefore were there no other Substance in the world besides this *Magnitude* or *Extension*, there could be no Motion or Action at all in it, no *Life*, *Cogitation*, or *Consciousness*, no *Intellection*, *Appetite*, or *Volition* (which things do yet make up the greatest part of the Universe) but all would be a dead Heap or Lump; nor could any one Substance penetrate another, and co-exist in the same place with it. From whence it follows of necessity, that besides this outside bulky *Extension* and *tumorous Magnitude*, there must be another kind of Entity, whose essential Attribute or Character is *Life*, *Self-activity*, or *Cogitation*. Which, that it is not a mere *Mode* or *Accident* of *Magnitude* and *Extension*, is plain from hence, because *Cogitation* may be as well conceiv'd without *Extension*, as *Extension* without *Cogitation*: whereas no *Mode* of any thing can be conceiv'd without that whereof it is a *Mode*. And since there is unquestionably much more of Entity in *Life* and *Cogitation*, than there is in mere *Extension* or *Magnitude*, which is the lowest of all Beings, and next to nothing; it must needs be imputed to a mere delusion and imposture of Imagination, that men are so prone to think this *Extension* or *Magnitude* to be the only *Substance*, and all other things, besides the mere *Accidents* thereof, *generable* out of it, and *corruptible* again into it. But tho that secondary and participated Life, as it is call'd, in the Bodys of Animals, be indeed a mere *Accident*, and such as may be present or absent, without the destruction of its Subject; yet can there be no reason given, why the primary and original Life it self should not be as well a substantial thing, as mere *Extension* and *Magnitude*. Again, that *Extension* and *Life* or *Cogitation* are not two inadequate Conceptions neither of one and the self-same Substance, consider'd
brokenly

brokenly and by piece-meal, as if either all Extension had *Life* and *Cogitation* essentially belonging to it, as the Hylozoists conclude, or at least all *Life* and *Cogitation* had *Extension*; and consequently all *Souls* and *Minds*, and even the Deity it self, were either *extended Life* and *Cogitation*, or living and *thinking Extension*; there being nothing in nature *unextended*, but *Extension* the only Entity: this, I say, will also appear from hence, because, as I have before declar'd, we cannot conceive a *Life*, or *Mind*, or *Thought*, nor any thing at all belonging to a cogitative Being as such, to be extended into *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*, and to be mensurable by Inches, Feet, and Yards. From whence it may be concluded, that Extension and Life or Cogitation are no inadequate Conceptions of one and the self-same thing, since they cannot be complicated together into one; but that they are distinct Substances from each other. *Lives* and *Minds* are such compact things in themselves, and have such a *Self-unity* in their Nature, as that they cannot be lodg'd in that, which is wholly scatter'd out from it self into *Distance*, and dispers'd into infinite *Multiplicity*, nor be spread all over upon the same as co-extended with it. Nor is it conceivable, how all the several Parts of an *extended Magnitude* should jointly concur and contribute to the Production of one and the same single and indivisible *Cogitation*; or how that whole Heap or Bundle of things should be one *Thinker*. A Thinker is a *Monad* or one *single Substance*, and not a *Heap* of Substances: whereas no *Body* or *extended thing* is one, but many Substances, every conceivable or smallest Part thereof being a real Substance by it self.

But this will yet further appear, if we consider what kind of Action *Cogitation* is. The Action of an ex-

tended thing as such is nothing but *local Motion*, change of *Distance*, or Translation from place to place, a mere outside and superficial thing: but it is certain, that *Cogitation*, *Fancy*, *Intellection*, and *Volition*, are no local Motions, nor the mere fridging up and down of the Parts of an *extended Substance*, changing their *Place* and *Distance*; but it is unquestionably an *internal Energy*, that is, such an Energy, as is within the very Substance or Essence of that which *thinketh*, or in the *Inside* of it. Now this *Inside* of *cogitative Beings*, wherein they thus act or think internally within themselves, cannot have any *Length*, *Breadth*, or *Thicknes* in it; because if it had, it would be again a mere *outside* thing. Wherefore, tho all *cogitative Beings*, *Souls* and *Minds* had *Extension* and *Magnitude* never so much belonging to 'em, as some suppose they have, yet could this for all that be nothing but the mere *Outside* of their Being, besides which they must of necessity have also an *unextended Inside*, that has no *out-swelling Tumor*, and is not scatter'd into *Distance* nor dispers'd into *Multiplicity*; which therefore could not possibly exist a *Part* in a *Part* of the suppos'd *Extension*, as if one half of a *Mind* or *Thought* were in one half of that *Extension*, and another in another; but must of necessity be *all undividedly* both in the *Whole* of it and in every *Part*. For had every twentieth or hundredth part of this *Extension*, not the *Whole* of a *Life* or *Mind*, but only the twentieth or hundredth Part thereof; then could none of them have any true *Life* or *Mind* at all, nor consequently the *Whole* have any. Nor indeed is it otherwise conceivable, how a whole Quantity of *extended Substance* should be *one thing*, and have *one Personality*, *one I my self* in it all; were there not one indivisible thing presiding over it, which held it all together, and diffus'd

diffus'd it self thro *All*. And thus do we see, how this *Whole in the Whole*, and in every *Part* (let men do what they can) will, like a Ghost, still haunt 'em and follow 'em every where. But now it is impossible, that one and the self-same Substance should be both extended and unextended. Wherefore it must be acknowledg'd that *finite Spirits* have an undiscern'd Complication of two distinct Substances, *extended* and *unextended*, or *corporeal* and *incorporeal* both together, and a Confusion of them into one; so that they being in effect created Animals, are compleated and made up of these constituent Principles, an *extended Outside* and an *unextended Inside*, both of 'em Substances indeed really distinct, but yet vitally united each to other; and thus are they capable of being determin'd *here* and *there*, and of moving locally or changing place.

But, as I have said, the Assertors of incorporeal Substance are divided in their Sentiment of the Atheistick Syllogism, and have reply'd to it two manner of ways. Many of 'em, as we have seen with the reasons for it, granting the Major, that *whatsoever is extended is Body*, have deny'd and endeavour'd to disprove the Minor, that *whatsoever is, is extended*. But other learned Incorporealists granting the Minor, have deny'd the Major; and lest God and Spirits being made wholly unextended, should quite vanish into nothing, have answer'd the Atheistick Argument in a different way; and that by distinguishing and asserting a twofold Extension, one of *Bodys*, and another specifically differing from that of *Bodys*. For whereas corporeal Extension is not only *impenetrable*, so as that no one Part thereof can enter into another, but also both *mentally* and *really* divisible, one Part being in its nature separable from another; they affirm that there is another incorporeal Extension,

Extension, which is both penetrable and also indiscer-
pible; so that no one Part thereof can possibly be se-
parated from another or the Whole; and that to such
an *incorporeal Extension* as this, belongeth *Life, Cogi-
tation, and Understanding*, the Deity having such an
infinite Extension, but all created Spirits a *finite* and
limited one, which also is in them suppos'd to be con-
tractible and dilatable. Now it is not our part here
to oppose *Theists* but *Atheists*: wherefore we shall leave
these sorts of *Incorporealists* to dispute it out friendly
amongst themselves. And whatever the Truth of the
case be, it must be acknowledg'd that this latter Hypo-
thesis may be very useful and serviceable to retain some
in *Theism*, who can by no means admit of a *Deity* or
any thing else *unextended*. Tho perhaps there will
not be wanting others, who would go in a middle way
betwixt these two, or compound them together; by
supposing the Deity to be indeed altogether *unextended*,
and *All* of it every where; but *finite Incorporeals* or
created *Spirits* to have an unextended Inside, a Life or
Mind diffusing it self into a certain Amplitude of *out-
ward Extension*, whereby they are determin'd to a
place, yet so as to be *All* in every *Part* thereof: which
outward Extension is therefore not to be accounted *Body*,
because *penetrable, contractible, and dilatable*; and be-
cause no one Part thereof is separable from the rest, by
the Rushing or Incurfion of any one *corporeal* thing
upon them. However in this point we our selves do
not assert any thing, save only what all *Incorporealists*
do agree in, to wit, that besides *Body*, which is *impe-
netrably and divisibly* extended, there is in nature ano-
ther *Substance*, which is both penetrable of *Body* and
indiscerpible, or which does not consist of Parts sepa-
rable from one another; and that there is such a *Sub-
stance*

stance as this, is unquestionably manifest from what has been already declar'd. But notwithstanding these Answers to the Atheist and Proofs of Incorporeal Substance, he will, it may be, have the Confidence to shift the Scene, and still to go on and tell us in his way, that we are all mistaken, and to assign this ground of our Mistake, saying that it sprung partly from the Abuse of *abstract Names* and *Notions*, men making *Substances* of 'em; and partly from the *scholastick Essences*, distinct from the things themselves, and said to be *eternal*. From both which Delusions and Dotages together, the Atheist conceives, that men have been first of all much confirm'd in the Belief of *Ghosts* and *Spirits*, *Demons* and *Devils*, and *invisible Beings* call'd by several Names; which Belief had also another Original, namely mens mistaking their own *Fancys* for *Realities*. The chief of all which affrightful *Ghosts* and *Spectres*, is reckon'd by the Atheists to be the Deity, the *Oberon* or Prince of *Fairys* and *Fancys*. But then whereas men by their natural Reason could not otherwise conceive of those *Ghosts* and *Spirits*, than that they were a kind of *thin aerial Bodys*, their *Understandings* having been so enchanted by these *abstract Names*, which are indeed the *Names* of *Nothing*; and by those separate *Essences* and *Quidditys* of *Scholasticks*, as that they have made *incorporeal Substances* of 'em. And thus the Atheist concludes, that they who assert an *incorporeal Deity*, do really but make a *scholastick separate Essence*, or the mere abstract Notion of an *Accident*, to be a substantial *Ghost* or *Spirit*, presiding over the whole World.

Now in answering this Objection, a part of that, I say, which is complicated with it, has been fully confuted in the sixth Chapter; and therefore now I shall only

only meddle with what is directly aim'd at here, and shew that the Belief of *Ghosts* and *Spirits incorporeal*, sprung neither from any ridiculous mistake of the *abstract Names* and *Notions* of mere *Accidents* for *Substances*, nor from the *scholastick Essences* said to be *eternal*. For as to the latter, none of those *Scholasticks* ever dreamt, that there was any *universal Man* or *universal Horse*, existing alone by it self, and separate from all *Singulars*; or that the *abstract Metaphysical Essences* of Men, after they were dead, subsisting by themselves, did walk up and down amongst *Graves* in airy Bodys; it being absolutely impossible that the real *Essence* of a thing should be separable from the thing it self, or *eternal*, when that it self is not so. And were the *Essences* of all things look'd upon by these *Scholasticks* as *Substances incorporeal*, then must they have made all things, even *Body* it self, to be *Ghosts* and *Spirits* or *incorporeal*. But in very truth these *Scholastick Essences*, said to be *eternal*, are nothing but the *intelligible Essences* of things, or their *Natures*, as conceivable and *Objects* of the *Mind*. And in this sense it is an acknowledged *Truth*, that the *Essences* of things, as for example, of a *Sphere* or *Triangle*, are *eternal* and such as were never made; because otherwise there could not be *eternal Veritys* concerning 'em. So that the true meaning of these *eternal Essences* is indeed no other than this, that *Knowledg is eternal*, or that there is an *eternal Mind*, which comprehends the *intelligible Natures* and *Ideas* of all things, whether *actually* existing or only *possible*, their necessary *Relations* to one another, and all the immutable *Veritys* belonging to 'em. Wherefore tho these *eternal Essences* themselves be no *Ghosts* or *Spirits*, or *Substances incorporeal*, they being nothing but *objective Entitys* or *Ideas* of the *Mind*; yet does it

*
plainly

plainly follow from the necessary Supposition of 'em, as was before declar'd, that there is one *eternal unmade Mind* and perfect *incorporeal* Deity, a real and substantial *Ghost* or *Spirit*, which comprehending it self, and all the Extent of its own Power, the *Possibilitys* of things and their *intelligible Natures*, together with an Exemplar or Platform of the whole World, produc'd the same accordingly.

But our Atheistick Reasoner tells us yet further, that those *Scholasticks* and *Metaphysicians*, who, because *Life* or *Cogitation* can be consider'd *abstractly* from *Body*, do therefore conclude it not to be the *Accident* or *Action* of a *Body*, but a *Substance* by it self, and that *incorporeal*; which also, after men are dead, can walk amongst the Graves; are under a gross mistake, thro an Abuse of abstract Names or Notions. To which we answer, that if, as this Argument implies, the abstract Notions of *Accidents* in general were made by those Philosophers to be *incorporeal*, then must they likewise have suppos'd all the *Qualitys* or *Affections* of *Bodys*, such as *Whiteness* and *Blackness*, *Heat* and *Cold*, and the like, to have been *Substances incorporeal* likewise; a thing never yet heard or thought of. But again the case is far otherwise, as to conscious *Life* or *Cogitation*, tho it be an *Abstract* also; because this is no *Accident* of *Body*, as the Atheist, to serve his own *Hypothesis*, securely takes it for granted, nor indeed of any thing else; but an essential Attribute of another *Substance* distinct from *Body* or *incorporeal*, as *Extension* or *Magnitude* is, of *Body*. Besides what has been said to disprove that * *all is Matter* or *Body*, and in particular,

* Norris in Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, Part 2. Ch. 1. Broughton in Psycholog. particularly in Part 1. §. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8. In Vindic. Mentis per Anonym. Ch. 3, and 4.

that God himself is * *material* and *corporeal*, much more might be oppos'd against *Atheists* and *Hobbits* both in the offensive and defensive way: but this having been done by many other late Hands, I now, for brevity's sake, refer my Reader to them, and so pass on to the next *Atheistick* Argumentations, *viz.* the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth.

Now these pretend to no more than only this, to disprove a *corporeal Deity*; or from the Supposition, that there is no other *Substance* in the World besides *Body*, to infer the Impossibility of a God, that is, of an *eternal, unmade Mind*, the *Maker* and *Governor* of the whole World; which being, as we have seen, a very wrong Supposition, therefore we lay in the first place, that all this will signify nothing at all to the Assertors of a *Deity incorporeal*, who are the only genuine *Theists*. Nevertheless, tho none but *Stoicks*, and such other *Corporealists* as are notwithstanding *Theists*, be directly concern'd in an Answer to 'em; yet shall we so far consider the Principles of the *Atheistick Corporealism*, contain'd in the fifth and sixth Heads, as from the absolute Impossibility of these *Hypotheses*, to demonstrate a necessity of *incorporeal Substance*; from whence a *Deity* will also follow.

Here then are there two *Atheistick Hypotheses*, founded upon a Supposition that *all is Body*: the first in the way of *Qualitys*, generable and corruptible, which we call the *Hylopathian* and *Anaximandrian*; the second in the way of *unqualify'd Atoms*, which is the *Atomick Corporealism* and *Atheism*. The former of these was the most antient, and the first *Sciography* or rude Deli-

* Templer in *Idea Theolog.* *Leviath.* Dogm. 3. Tenison in *Creed of Mr. Hobbs examin'd*, from p. 10.

neation of Atheism. For *Aristotle* tells us, that the most antient Atheists were those, who suppos'd *Matter* or *Body*, that is, *bulky Extension*, to be the only Substance and unmade thing, out of which all things were made, and into which all things are again resolv'd; whatsoever is else in the world, being nothing but the *Passions*, *Qualitys*, and *Accidents* thereof, generable and corruptible or producible out of *Nothing*, and reducible to *Nothing* again. From whence the necessary Consequence is, that there is no eternal unmade *Life* or *Understanding*; or that *Mind* is no *God* or Principle in the Universe, but essentially a *Creature*. The second Atheistick Hypothesis is that Form of Atheism describ'd under the sixth Head; which likewise supposing *Body* to be the only *Substance*, and the Principles thereof to be devoid of *Life* and *Understanding*, does reject all *real Qualitys*, according to the vulgar Notion of 'em, and generate all things whatsoever besides *Matter*, merely from the Combinations of *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions*, or the Contextures of *unqualify'd Atoms*, *Life* and *Understanding* not excepted: which therefore according to them being no simple, primitive, and primordial thing, but secondary, compounded, and derivative, and the mere *Creature* of *Matter* and *Motion*, could not possibly be a *God* or first Principle in the Universe. This is that Atomick Atheism, which we call *Democritical*; *Democritus* having been the first, who, after *Leucippus*, reduc'd it to a Method, and who made *senseless Atoms*, as *Laertius* declares, * the Principles of all things whatsoever, even of *Life* and *Understanding*, *Soul* and *Mind*.

* Ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους.

Indeed it cannot be deny'd, but that from these two things being granted: that all is *Body*, and that the Principles of *Body* are devoid of all Life and Understanding, it will follow unavoidably, that there can be no *corporeal Deity*. Wherefore the *Stoicks*, who profess'd to acknowledg no other Substance besides *Body*, and yet nevertheless had a strong Persuasion of the Existence of a God, or an *eternal unmade Mind*, the *Maker of the World*; deny'd that other Proposition of the Atheistick *Corporealists*, that the Principles of all *Bodys* were devoid of Life and Understanding, they asserting an *intellectual Fire*, *eternal* and *unmade*, to be the *Maker* of the whole mundane System. Which *Postulatum*, of a *living intellectual Body eternal*, were it granted to these *Stoicks*, yet could not this their corporeal God notwithstanding be absolutely incorruptible, as *Origen* often inculcates: * God, says he to the *Stoicks*, is a *Body*, and therefore mutable, alterable, and changeable; and he would indeed be perfectly corruptible, were there any other *Body* to act upon him. Wherefore he is only happy in this, that he has not a Corrupter or Destroyer. And thus much was therefore rightly urg'd by the Atheistick Reasoner, that no *corporeal Deity* could be absolutely in its own nature *incorruptible*, or otherwise than by Accident only immortal, because of its *Divisibility*. Notwithstanding which, these *Stoicks* were not therefore to be rank'd amongst the Atheists, but far to be prefer'd before 'em, and accounted only a kind of *imperfect Theists*.

But now to make good what I promis'd, as being more directly to my purpose, namely, that in both the *Atheistick Corporealisms*, agreeing in those two things,

* Cont. Cell. l. 1.

that *Body* is the only *Substance*, and that the *Principles* of *Body* are not *vital*, there is an absolute Impossibility: this, I say, is true, not only because, as *Aristotle* objects, they suppos'd no *active Principle*; but also because their bringing *Life* and *Understanding*, which are real *Entity*s, out of *dead* and *senseless Matter*, is also the bringing of *Something* out of *Nothing*. Indeed the *Atomick Atheist* is here of the two rather the more absurd and unreasonable; forasmuch as he discarding all *real Quality*s, and that for this very reason, because *Nothing* can come out of *Nothing*, does himself notwithstanding produce *Life*, *Sense*, and *Understanding*, unquestionable *Reality*s, out of mere *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions*, that is indeed out of *Nothing*. Wherefore there being an absolute Impossibility of both these *Atheistick Hypotheses*, neither of which is able to solve the *Phænomenon* of *Life* and *Understanding* from that confess'd *Principle* of theirs, that *Matter* as such has no *Life* nor *Understanding* belonging to it, it follows unavoidably, that there must be some other *Substance* besides *Body* or *Matter*, which is essentially *vital* and *intellectual*; because * *all things cannot possibly have an adventitious and borrow'd Life*, but something in the *Universe* must needs have *Life* naturally and originally, and that not as an *accidental* but a *substantial* thing; agreeably to what has been urg'd with much *Reason* and *Judgment*, by a modern *Writer* concerning *the Life of Nature*. Neither must there be only such a *substantial Life*, as is naturally *immortal* for the future, but also such as is eternal *a Parte Ante*, and was never made; all other *Lives* and *Minds* whatsoever, none of which could possibly be generated out of *Matter*, being deriv'd from this eter-

* Οὐ γὰρ πάντα χεῖται ἐκ τούτου ζῶν.

nal unmade Fountain of *Life* and *Understanding*. Which thing the *Hylozoick* Atheists being well aware of, namely that there must of necessity be a *substantial* and *eternal unmade Life*, but at once supposing *Matter* to be the only *Substance*, thought themselves necessitated to attribute to all *Matter* as such, *Life* and *Understanding*, tho not *animalish* and *conscious*, but *natural* only; and to maintain, that from the Modification thereof, only by Organization, all other animalish *Life*, not only the *sensitive* in Brutes, but also the *rational* in Men, was deriv'd. But this kind of Atheism, thus bringing all *conscious* and *reflexive Life* or *Animality* out of a suppos'd *senseless*, *stupid*, and *inconscious Life* of Nature in *Matter*, and that merely from an *accidental Modification* thereof, or *Contexture* of *Parts*; does again plainly bring *Something* out of *Nothing*. Moreover, as the Atomick Atheists have long since argu'd against it, if *Matter* as such, had *Life*, *Perception*, and *Understanding* belonging to it, then of necessity must every *Atom* or *smallest Particle* of it be a distinct *Percipient* by it self; from whence it will follow, that there could not possibly be any such *Men* and *Animals*, as now are, compounded out of 'em: but every Man and Animal would be a heap of innumerable *Percipients*, and have innumerable *Perceptions* and *Intellections*. Whereas it is plain, that there is but one *Life* and *Understanding*, one *Soul* or *Mind*, one *Perceiver* or *Thinker* in every one. And to say that these innumerable *Particles* of *Matter* do all confederate together, to make in effect every Man and Animal to be a Multitude or Commonwealth of *Percipients* and *Persons*, as it were clubbing together, is a thing so absurd and ridiculous, that one would wonder the *Hylozoists* should not rather chuse

to recant that their fundamental *Error* of the *Life of Matter*, than endeavour to seek shelter and sanctuary for the same under such a Pretence. For tho voluntary Agents and Persons may many of 'em resign up their *Wills* to one, and by that means have all but as it were one *artificial Will*; yet can they not possibly resign up their *Sense* and *Understanding* too, so as to have all but one artificial *Life, Sense, and Understanding*: much less could this be done by *senseless Atoms*, or Particles of *Matter*, suppos'd to be devoid of all *Consciousness* and *Animality*. From what has been said it appears that *incorporeal Substance* is demonstrable, unless this Proposition be deny'd, *Nothing out of Nothing*, even from the very Principles of the *Atheistick Corporealism*. Which is the second Head I undertook in this Chapter.

I now proceed to the third and last, namely, that there being undeniably *Substance incorporeal*, the two next *Atheistick Arguments*, built upon a contrary Supposition, are therefore altogether insignificant also, and do no execution at all. The first of which, in order the seventh, impugning only such a Soul of the World, as is not in the sense of the Pagan *Theists eternal and unmade*, but native and generated, that is the Result of the Disposition of *Matter* and Contexture of *Atoms*, and the Off-spring of Night and Chaos, requires no Answer, and might be very well neglected in silence without the least detriment to the Cause of Theism, inasmuch as it is not directly oppos'd against it. But however because the Atheists do herein pretend, after their suppos'd Confutation of the true and genuine *Theism*, to take away also the very shadows of it, and so to free Men from all manner of *Fear* of being obnoxious to any *understanding Being*, superior to themselves; I shall

shall briefly examine the suppos'd Grounds thereof, which alone will be a sufficient Confutation. The first of 'em then is this, that there is no other *Substance* in the World but *Body*; the second, that the Principles of *Bodys* are devoid of all *Life* and *Understanding*; and the last, that *Life* and *Understanding* are but Accidents of *Bodys* resulting from such a Composition or Contexture of Atoms, as produces soft Flesh, Blood, and Brains in *Bodys* organiz'd, and of human Form. From all which the Conclusion is, that there can be no *Life* and *Understanding* in the *Whole*, because it is not of human *Form* and organiz'd, and has no *Blood* and *Brains*. But neither, I say, is *Body* the only Substance, nor are *Life* and *Understanding* *Accidents* resulting from any Modification of dead and lifeless *Matter*, nor is *Blood* or *Brains* that which understandeth in us: but an incorporeal *Soul* or *Mind*, vitally united to a terrestrial organiz'd *Body*; which will then understand with far greater advantage, when it comes to be cloth'd with a pure, spiritual, and heavenly one. Also there is in the Universe a higher kind of *intellectual Animals*, which tho consisting of *Soul* and *Body* likewise, yet have neither *Flesh*, nor *Blood*, nor *Brains*, nor *Parts* so organiz'd as ours are. And the most perfect *Mind* and *Intellect* of all is not the *Soul* of any *Body*, but compleat in it self, without such vital Union and Sympathy with *Matter*. Wherefore we conclude, that this Passage of a modern Writer; *We Worms cannot conceive how God can understand without Brains*; is *Vox Pecudis*, the Language and Philosophy rather of Worms indeed or Brute Animals, than of Men.

Touching the next Atheistick Argument, which is in order the eighth, that whereas the Deity by Theists is

is generally suppos'd to be a *living Being perfectly happy* and *immortal* or *incorruptible*, there can be no such *living Being immortal*, and consequently none that is *perfectly happy*. Because all *living Beings* whatsoever are no *simple*, *primitive*, and *substantial* things, but mere Concretions of Atoms and *accidental Modifications* of compounded Bodys only, which as they were at first generated, so are they again liable, upon a Disunion of Parts, to *Death* and *Corruption*, and to vanish again into *Nothing*: touching this Argument, we say, that the Atheists indeed do well to confess, that, according to their Principles, there can be no such thing at all as Happiness, because no Security of future Permanency or the Immortality of it; all *Life* perpetually coming out of *Nothing*, and whirling back into *Nothing* again. But then all this is likewise grounded upon the former Error; that *Body* is the only *Substance*, the first Principles whereof are devoid of all *Life* and *Understanding*: whereas it is certain that *Life* cannot possibly result from any Composition of *dead* and *lifeless* things, and therefore must needs be a *simple* and *primitive Nature*. It is true indeed, that the participated *Life* in the Bodys of *Animals* (which yet is but improperly call'd *Life*, it being nothing else but their being actuated by a *living Soul*) is a mere *accidental* thing, *generable* and *corruptible*; since that *Body*, which is now vitally united to a *living Soul*, may be again disunited from it, and thereby become a *dead* and *lifeless Carcase*: but the primary or original *Life* it self is *substantial*, nor can there be any *dead Carcase* of a *human Soul*. That which has *Life* essentially belonging to the Substance of it, must needs be naturally immortal; because no *Substance* can of it self perish or vanish into *Nothing*. And again, there must be also
K k k k some,

some, not only substantial, but also *eternal unmade Life*, whose Existence is *necessary*, and which is absolutely unannihilable by any thing else; which therefore must needs have perfect Security of its own future Happiness: and this is an *Incorporeal Deity*. And according to *Virgil*, expressing the Sense especially of the *Platonists*,

* *Thence are the Lives of Men, and Beasts, and Birds
Of th' Air, and Monsters swimming in the Sea.*

Who again having said, that God † passes thro all Tracts of Earths, Seas, and Heavens, subjoins:

|| *From hence not only Men, but also Brutes
Of ev'ry sort, when first produc'd, derive
Their Lives or Souls; and also at their deaths
Restore the same again into his hand;
Who keeps 'em undestroy'd, so that for Death,
Properly speaking, there is not a Place
Left in the World.——*

To which, that I may further baffle the Corporealist, I add the Reasoning of a ** late judicious Author, that Body cannot be vital, and consequently there must needs be a substantial Principle as the proper Subject of

* *Inde Hominum Pecudumque Genus, Vitæque Volantûm,
Et quæ marmoreo fert Monstra sub Æquore Pontus. Æn. 6.*

† ——— Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque Tractusque Maris, Cœlumque profundum.

|| *Hinc Pecudes, Armenta, Viros, genus omne Ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere Vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi, deinde & resoluta referri
Omnia, nec Morti esse locum.—— Georgic. 4.*

** *Dr. Grew in Cosmologia Sacra, p. 32, &c.*

Life, distinct from Body. For, says he, if Body can be vital, then is it so either as subtiliz'd or organiz'd, or as mov'd, or as endow'd with Life; a proper and immediate Adjunct hereof, as well as *Motion*. But *Body* can in none of these ways be *vital*, and therefore no way. Not as subtiliz'd: for tho some, as the acute *Des Cartes*, and after him *Dr. Willis* and others have suppos'd, that a very subtil, aerial, ethereal, or igneous Fluid, contain'd in the Blood, Brain, or Nerves, or in them all, is the Life of an Animal; yet if we go to the bottom of this Conceit, how vain is it? For tho the said Fluid be attenuated or subtiliz'd, as far as we can conceive, or beyond conceit infinitely; yet the Atoms whereof it consists, are still no more than Parts of the common stock of Body; that is, *Body* by being subtiliz'd can lose nothing of its Corporeity: nor can it hereby gain any thing but *Exility*; for all degrees of Subtility are essentially the same thing; the greatest degree, as well as any lesser, depending solely upon the Division of the subtiliz'd Body. And does the dividing of a *dead Whole*, give *Life* to the two Halves? Or does Life consist in Number, arising from infinite Division and Subdivision? Again, the Corporeity of all Bodys being the same, and *Subtility* of all Degrees and in all Bodys being essentially the same thing; could any Body by Subtility become *vital*, then any degree of *Subtility* would produce some degree of *Life*. As a greater Degree would produce more *Life*, so any less Degree would produce some. But this, I think, no one will be so absurd as to affirm.

Neither can *Body* be *vital*, as it is organiz'd: for to the organizing of a Body these three things are requir'd, and no more, viz. *Bulk*, *Figure*, and *Mixture*;

or that the Parts of the Organ be fitly siz'd, shap'd, and set together. But that Size can never make a Body to be vital, is already prov'd. Nor can *Figure* do it, for then Bodys *quà figur'd* would have *Life*; and consequently not only all Bodys, having some *Figure*, would have some *Life*, but those Bodys which are of a more *complex Figure* would be the more *vital*.

Nor again, can any possible *Mixture* of *Size* and *Figure* make a Body to be *vital*: for as the *Mixture* of Numbers can beget nothing but Number, so the *Mixture* of *Size* and *Figure*, can beget nothing but *Size* and *Figure*; all manner of *Mixture* being essentially the very same thing. If therefore it were in the power of *Mixture* to produce *Life*, then every thing that is *mix'd, quà mix'd*, would be vital. The variety of the *Mixture* will not suffice to produce *Life*; there being no more *Life* in a Pot of *Mithridate*, than in a Pot of *Hony*. Nor will its being *mechanically artificial* do this; unless the Parts of a Watch, set as they ought to be together, may be said to be more *vital*, than when they lie in a confus'd Heap. Nor its being *natural*; there being no difference between the Organs of *Art* and *Nature*, saving that those of *Nature* are most of all *artificial*. So that an Ear can no more hear by being an *Organ*, than an *artificial Ear* would do, had we Materials and Skill to make one like the *natural*. And tho we add the auditory Nerves to the Ear, the Brain to the Nerves, and the Spirits to the Brain; yet is it still but adding *Body* to *Body*, *Art* to *Subtility* and *Engine*, or *Art* to *Art*: which howsoever curious and many, can never bring *Life* out of themselves, nor make one another to be *vital*.

Nor

Nor can Body become *vital* in being mov'd; for what then could have more *Life* than Light, the most movable of visible Bodys? And any the self-same Body having a quick Motion, would for that very reason have more *Life*; and having a slow Motion, would have less. Nor can the finest Engine made by human *Art* or by *Nature* become *vital* in being mov'd, any more than a *Paper-Kite*: nor in being *regularly* mov'd, or in a manner futable to its Composure, any more than a Pair of Organs in being dexterously play'd upon. For all *Motion*, whether regular or irregular, simple or compounded, quick or slow, is essentially the same thing. Were then a Man or other Animal nothing else but an organiz'd Body, let his several Organs be never so artificially made, and variously and regularly mov'd; yet after all he would be no more than a finer sort of *Bartholomew-Baby*.

Neither can Body be endow'd with *Life* as another proper and immediate Adjunct thereof, super-added unto *Motion*. For *Body* is neither productive nor immediately receptive of such an Adjunct. Not productive; that is, *Body* is not *vital*, as it is substantial, or it is not productive of *Life* in it self, by virtue of its being a substantial thing. For if *Body* cannot produce Motion, as most certainly it cannot, which is the less; how is it to be suppos'd, that it can produce *Life*, which is the greater? Nor is *Body* receptive of *Life*, as its immediate Adjunct: For if *Life* be a thing distinct from and more excellent than *Motion*, as undoubtedly it is, then does it require a more excellent, and so a distinct Subject, to which it belongs; and therefore something which is *substantial*, yet *incorporeal*. Again, the *Modification* of *Body* having nothing to do in the Production of *Life*, as
we

we have before seen, were *Life* an immediate Adjunct of *Body* as *Motion* is ; then as all sorts of *Bodys* are capable of all sorts of *Motion*, so would they be capable of all sorts of *Life*, even of *Intellection* it self ; that is, every *Atom* as such would be capable of being intellectual. To avoid which Absurdity, we must allow the Being of a *substantial* Principle, distinct from *Body*, as the proper and immediate Subject of *Life* : or that, as *Body* is the proper and immediate Subject of any Species of *Motion* ; so ought there to be such a substantial Principle, as may be the proper and immediate Subject, not of one only, but of any Species of *Life* : without which indeed there could be no *Living* at all ; much less any sensible, thinking, or reasonable thing. This is a Truth so evident, that the *Hylozoick* Atheists themselves, in this far wiser than the *Atomick*, were fully convinc'd of it : yet nevertheless being strongly possess'd with that Atheistick Prejudice, that there is no other Substance besides *Body*, they attribute the first Original, unmade *Life* and *Understanding*, to all *Matter* as such (but without animal Consciousness) as an essential Part or inadequate Conception of it. From which fundamental *Life* of Nature in *Matter*, modify'd by Organization, they fancy the Lives of all Animals and Men to have proceeded. So that tho the modified Lives of Animals and Men as such, according to them, be accidental things, generated and corrupted, produc'd out of nothing, and reduc'd to nothing again ; yet this fundamental *Life* of *Matter*, which is the Basis on which they stand, being substantial, is also *eternal* and *incorruptible*.

This

This Hypothesis, as granted by some of our Adversarys, and so making for our purpose, it suffices to have nam'd: as it is maintain'd in the Atheistick sense by downright Corporealists, it is too absurd to need a further Confutation. Thus have we discover'd the Emptiness and Falshood of this Atheistick Pretence; That there is no Immortal or Everliving God, because there is no other Substance but Body, and *Life* is no *substantial* thing, but only a Quality or Accident of *Body*, generable from it, and corruptible again into it.

C H A P. IX.

A Confutation of the Ninth and Tenth Atheistick Arguments, taken from the Phænomena of Motion and Cogitation. These Weapons of the Atheist turn'd against himself ; it being invincibly prov'd, that there is a first unmov'd INCORPOREAL MOVER, and that Matter is not capable even of Sensation, and much less of Cogitation. Further, against the Democritick Atheists directly shewn, that Mind is not the Result of any Concretion or Contexture of Atoms. Here also the Hylozoick Atheists are occasionally censur'd. From the Premises, the Immateriality and Immortality, as of God, so also of Human Souls, to be jointly infer'd against the Atheist. The Souls of Brutes consider'd ; whether spiritual and immortal. Other incidental Cavils answer'd by the way.

WHEREAS Theists do commonly bring an Argument from *Motion*, to prove a God or one unmov'd Mover ; the Atheists contend on the other hand, that from the very Nature of Motion, the Impossibility of any such first Mover is clearly demonstrable. For it being an Axiom of undoubted truth concerning Motion, That *whatsoever is mov'd, is mov'd by some other thing*, or that nothing can move it self ;
it

it thence unavoidably follows, that there is no eternal *unmov'd Mover*: but on the contrary, there was an eternal *Moved*; or that one thing was mov'd by another from Eternity infinitely, without any *first Mover* or Cause. Since as *Nothing could move it self*, so could nothing ever *move* any thing, which was not it self before *mov'd* by something else.

To which we reply, that this Axiom, *Whatsoever is mov'd, is mov'd by another, and not by it self*, was by *Aristotle* and other Philosophers, who made so much use of it, restrain'd to the *local Motion* of *Bodys* only. Now it will not at all follow from hence, that therefore no *Body* was ever *mov'd* but by some other *Body*, which was also before *mov'd* by something else; or that of necessity one *Body* was *mov'd* by another, and that by another, and so backwards *infinitely*, without any *first unmov'd* or *self-moving* and *self-active Mover*; as the *Democritick* Atheist fondly conceits. But here however is the ground of the Atheist's Error, in that he takes it for granted, that there is no other *Substance* besides *Body*, nor any other *Action*, but *local Motion*; from whence it comes, that to him this Proposition, *No Body can move it self*, is one and the same with this, *Nothing can act from it self or be self-active*. And notwithstanding, should we grant him this, yet secondly I say, that it is a thing utterly impossible, that one *Body* should be thus *mov'd* by another *infinitely*, without any *first Cause* or *Mover*, which was *self-active*; and that not from the Authority of *Aristotle* only, pronouncing, * *That in the Causes of Motion, there could not possibly be an infinite Progress*: but from the reason there subjoin'd by him, because if there

* Οὐτε δυνάτον ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως ἴσται εἰς ἀπείρον, &c.

were no first unmov'd Mover, there could be no Cause of Motion at all*. For were all the Motion that is in the world a Passion from something else, and yet no first, unmov'd, active Mover; then must it be a Passion from no Agent or without an Action, and consequently proceed from nothing, and so either cause it self, or be made without a Cause. And again, besides the Absurdity of this Supposition, that one Body should move another infinitely and eternally without a first self-active Mover, is demonstrably false, "from the successive
 " and periodical Nature of all corporeal Motion; for
 " all the Parts of whatever is successive were once
 " present; that is, there was a first, or there could
 " have been none succeeding; and therefore that first
 " is limited on both sides. Whereas Infinity and Eternity do in Terms exclude all Limitation. To which I therefore add, that from the Principle acknowledg'd by the Democritick Atheists themselves, that no Body can move it self, it also follows undeniably, that there is some other Substance besides Body, something incorporeal, which is self-moving and self-active, and was the first unmov'd Mover of the Heavens or World. For if no Body from Eternity was ever able to move it self, and yet there must of necessity be some active Cause of that Motion which is in the World (since it could not cause it self) then is there unquestionably some other Substance besides Body, which having a power of moving Matter, was the first Cause of Motion, it self being unmoved. Which puts me in mind, because it appears that we cannot grant the Atheist this, That all Substance is Body and all Action local Motion, to say in the next place that there is another Species of Action, dif-

* *Εἴπερ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως ἄλκιον ἔσθ' ἐστὶ.

ting from *local Motion*, and such as is not *Heterokinesy* or *Motion* from the thing it *self mov'd*, but *Autokinesy* or *Self-activity*. For since the *local Motion* of *Body* is necessarily caus'd, not by the Substance it *self moving*, but by something else acting upon it, that *Action*, by which *local Motion* is at first caus'd, cannot be it *self local Motion*; but must be *Self-activity*, that which is not a *Passion* from any other Agent, but springs from the immediate Agent it *self*; which Species of *Action* is call'd *Cogitation*. So that all the *local Motion* that is in the World, was first caus'd by some *cogitative* or *thinking Being*, which not acted upon by any thing without it, nor at all *locally mov'd*, but only *mentally*, is the immovable Mover of the *Heaven* or *Vortices*: and thus *Cogitation* is in order of Nature before *local Motion*, and *incorporeal* before *corporeal* Substance, the former having a natural *Imperium* and Rule upon the latter.

But here the Atheist thinks he is prepar'd for us, and attempts to assault us with our own Weapons, adding yet further, that *Nothing self-moving* and *self-active*, and no *thinking Being* could be a *first Cause*; because *no thing takes its beginning from it self*. From whence he would infer, that *Cogitation* it *self* is the *Passion* of the Thinker, and the *Action* of something without it; no *Cogitation* ever rising up of it *self* without a Cause: and that *Cogitation* is indeed nothing but *local Motion* or *Mechanism*, and all *living understanding Beings* only *Machines* mov'd from without. To which he adds, that no *understanding Being* as such can be perfectly *happy* neither, as the Deity is suppos'd to be, because dependent upon something without it. As to which I first grant, that no *Substance*, which once was not, and likewise no *Action*, and consequently no *Cogitation*

tation taketh beginning from it self, or causeth it self to be; but is immediately produc'd by some *substantial Agent*: and from this can he not infer any thing to our disadvantage. Wherefore I tell him, that if he would direct his Force against *Theism*, he ought to understand this Proposition thus: That no *Action* whatsoever *taketh* beginning from the *immediate Agent*, which is the Subject of it, but from the Action of some other thing without it; or that nothing can move or act otherwise, than as it is mov'd and acted upon by something else. But this after all will be only to beg the Question, or to prove the thing in dispute *identically*, that nothing is *self-active*, because nothing can act from it self. Whereas it is in the mean time undeniably certain, that there could not possibly be any *Motion* or *Action* at all in the Universe, were there not something *self-moving* or *self-active*; * forasmuch as otherwise all that *Motion* or *Action* would be a *Passion* from *Nothing*, and be made without a *Cause*. But again the Atheist will tell us, that no Cogitation taketh its beginning from the Thinker, but always from the Action of some other thing without it; because it is not conceivable, why this Cogitation should start up rather than that, were there not some cause for it without the *Thinker*. As to which in the first place we freely grant, that our human *Cogitations* are indeed commonly occasion'd by the Incursions of sensible Objects upon us; as also that the Concatenation of those *Thoughts* and *Phantasms* in us, which are distinguish'd from *Sensations*, whether we be asleep or awake, do many times depend upon material and me-

* See more of this in More's Antidote against Atheism, Book 2. c. 3. Parag. 5, &c.

chanical Causes in the Brain. Notwithstanding which, that all our *Cogitations* are obtruded and impos'd upon us from without, and that there is no Transition in our Thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in Sense (which the *Democritick* Atheist avers) is a thing which we absolutely deny. For had we no mastery at all over our Thoughts, but they were all like Tennis Balls, bandy'd and struck upon us, as it were, by Rackets from without; then could we not steddily and constantly carry on any Designs or Purposes of Life. But on the contrary that of *Aristotle* is most true, that Man and all rational Beings are in some sense a * *Principle of Actions*, subordinate to the Deity; which could not possibly be, were they not also a *Principle of Cogitations*, and had some Command over 'em: but these were all as much determin'd by Causes without, as the Motions of the Weather-cock are. The rational Soul is it self an active and bubbling Fountain of Thoughts; that perpetual and restless Desire, which is as natural and essential to us as our very Life, continually raising up and protruding new and new ones in us, which are as it were offer'd to us. Besides which, we have also a further *self-recollective Power*, and a Capacity of determining and fixing our Mind and Intention upon some certain Objects, and of ranging our Thoughts accordingly. And now if inferior finite Thinkers are endu'd with such a Power, well may this teach us a yet further Lesson, and lead us on to the *supreme Thinker*; who has the like Power most eminently in him; who is an *absolutely perfect Mind*, and such as *does not sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand*; who being ignorant of no-

* Ἀρχὴ πρὸς Θεόν.

thing, does not syllogize or reason about any thing, but comprehends all *Intelligibles*, with their Relations and Veritys at once, within himself; and whose Essence and Energy are the very same. Which Notion, if it be above the dull Capacity of Atheists, who measure all Perfection by their own Scantling, this is a thing we cannot help.

But after all, what could incline the Atheist to swallow down this prodigious Paradox, that all Action, and consequently all *Cogitation* is nothing but *local Motion* or *Mechanism*, or, as a Modern utters himself, *that Mind is nothing else but local Motion in the organick Parts of man's Body*; a thing to the full as absurd, as to assert a Triangle to be a Square, or a Sphere a Cube, Number to be Figure, or any thing else to be any thing; nay in effect it is to affirm, that there is indeed no such thing in us as *Cogitation*, there being no other Action in Nature but *local Motion* and *Mechanism*? But what then, I say, could incline the Atheists to this extravagant Notion? Surely it could be no other Motive than this, that they were sensible and aware, that if there were any other Action admitted besides *local Motion*, there must needs be some other Substance acknowledg'd besides *Body*. *Des Cartes* indeed undertook to maintain brute Animals to be nothing else but *Machines*; but then he suppos'd, that there was nothing at all of *Cogitation* in 'em, and consequently nothing of true *Animality* and *Life*, any more than there is in artificial *Automata*, a wooden Eagle, or the like: nevertheless this was justly thought to be Paradox enough. But that *Cogitation* it self should be *local Motion*, and Men nothing but *Machines*, surely cannot find Entertainment in the Thoughts of any but stupid and besotted Atheists, who are no fitter

to be disputed with, than mere Machines *.

But there are those, who notwithstanding will go on to tell us, that all *Sensation* and *Cogitation* are either wholly or in part the *Passions* of him that perceives and thinks, occasion'd by the *Action* or *Motion* of the Bodys that are without him; which Hypothesis, because it is maintain'd in more than one way, that is, with some little variation, I shall in the first place declare the respective Modes in which Men have held it, and after that proceed to examine 'em. First then, the *Democriticks*, as *Lucretius* informs us, conclude, that Sense is caus'd by certain groffer corporeal *Effluvia*, streaming continually from the Surfaces of Bodys, and entering thro the Nerves; and that all other *Cogitations* of the Mind, and mens either sleeping or waking *Imaginations* do proceed from another sort of *Simulachra*, *Idols* and *Images* of a more fine and subtil *Contexture* coming into the Brain, not thro those open Tubes and Channels of the Nerves, but immediately thro all the smaller Pores of the Body: so that as we never have sense of any thing, but by means of those groffer corporeal Images obtruding themselves upon the *Nerves*, so neither have we the least *Cogitation* or *Volition* at any time in our Mind, which was not caus'd by those finer corporeal Images and *exuvius Membranes* or *Effluvia* rushing upon the Brain or *Contexture* of the Soul. But secondly, there were some of the antient Atomists, who could not conceive *Sensations* themselves to be thus caus'd by corporeal *Effluvia* or *exuvius Membranes*, streaming continually from Bodys, and that for divers reasons alledg'd by them; but only by a Pressure from them upon the *Optick Nerve*,

* See Bentley's Second Lecture, p. 22, 23, &c.

by reason of a Tension of the intermedious Air or Æther (being that which is call'd Light) whereby the distant Object is touch'd and felt, * *as it were by a Staff*. Which Hypothesis concerning the corporeal part of Sense is indeed much more ingenious and agreeable to *Reason* than the former. Thirdly, we have, as I lately hinted, a Reviver or New-modeller of this Atheistick Doctrine, who tells us, that there being nothing else but *Body*, all *Sense* and *Cogitation* are only a Motion or Re-action of one Corpuscle against another, or at least a due Continuation of this Re-action.

Now touching the former of these Accounts of Sense and Thought, &c. I shall debate the matter with *Lucretius*, who gives us the sense of the *Democriticks*, something new-fashion'd by *Epicurus*. Accordingly first, as in describing the manner of *Sensation*, he singles out the Instance of Vision to account for, I shall first direct my Answer to that, and so the whole Argument will fall. Here then we find a proper Antidote prepar'd for that Poison by † an ingenious Hand, the Discovery of which would otherwise have so much the less oblig'd the *English* Nation. We need look no further than the very Principles of these *Materialists*, and consider, that they having made *Weight* a Property of Matter, and an Endeavour *downward* a necessary Adjunct, therefore all Motion *upward* is violent, and proceeds from external Pressure or Impulse. Now any man knows that the *Species* are propagated any way with equal ease, and we see as well when the Object is plac'd below our Eye, as when above it:

* *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι βαρύνειας.*

† Creech in his Notes upon the fourth Book of *Lucretius*, p. 37, 38, &c. but

but there is no Force to make these Objects rise, and therefore 'tis impossible they should. Their own Nature opposes; the Air, as all must grant, which lies behind the Object, is unfit to give this Impulse to the solid Parts of the upper Surface, and that on the side, to drive it upward. And I believe none will think these *Images* are rais'd by the Air, which is perpendicular to the *Superficies*; and this Argument more strongly concludes, if we consider the account given of *Distance* by these Atheistick *Atomists*. For there they require that these Images should drive on all the Air between the Object and the Eye, tho it often resists and beats furiously against 'em; which cannot be done, but by a considerable Force, and a greater Strength than can be allow'd these subtil *Forms*, tho rising from any Body in the most convenient *Position*, and when their *Weight* can assist their *Motion*. Again, I say, that if such Images arose, it must be granted that the Object must seem chang'd every minute, and it would be impossible to look upon a Cherry for the space of an Hour, and still perceive it blush with the same Colour; because every Image that moves our Eye, cannot be above one hundred times thinner than the Skin of that Fruit; for I believe any Man will freely grant, that this Skin so divided, will be too transparent to be perceived: or if it may still be seen, let the Division proceed, and at last the Absurdity will press and follow too fast and too closely to be avoided. I shall not mention, that contrary Winds must needs disturb those Images, break their loose Order, and hinder their Passage; but only take notice, that it is impossible such Images should enter at the Eye, and represent an Object as great as we perceive it: for these Images rising from the Surface, must proceed by parallel Lines, and

M m m m their

their Parts maintain as great a distance as the Parts of the Body whence they sprang, because they come from every part of the Object, and are commensurate to it; and therefore cannot be press'd closer without Penetration or Confusion. Now if Vision and other *Sensations* cannot be thus explain'd, much less can Imagination and Thought: for to this purpose let us consider the Powers of Fancy or Imagination, which are most observable in Dreams. Now these *Lucretius* would also explain by entering Images, which pass thro the Body and strike the Soul: but how deficient this account of 'em is, any one may be satisfy'd from his own Observation; for that will tell him, that he dreams of things at a vast distance, and not thought on for some months; and what then? Can the Image pass thro those large Tracts of Air whole and undisturb'd? Are they not as thin a Substance as the *Epicurean* Soul, and as easily dissolv'd? Can they enter the Pores of the Body, and still preserve their Order? And shall the *Mind* be accounted *mortal*, because of the same way of Passage, and this be us'd as an Argument against its *Infusion*? Strange Power of Prejudice! that can blind the sharpest Eyes, make them dull and unfit to be mov'd by these thick and almost palpable Errors: but perchance there is no *Image* of an Absurdity, and therefore must we excuse the *Epicurean*. Besides, some things are presented to our *Imaginations*, of which there can be no *Image*: a Harp seems to sound when it lies silent in the case, when there is no brisk Vibration of the Strings to impel the ambient Air, and create a Sound; for Sound does not consist of Parts which fly from the Body, as *Lucretius* supposes; 'tis only an Agitation of the rigid parts of the Air, as a thousand Experiments can evince, but two may suffice:

one

one is taken from common Observation; for touch the sounding Wire of *Virginals* at one end, and the Noise ceases, tho the Touch cannot hinder the Flux of Atoms from any part, but that which it immediately presseth; the other is known to all who have heard, that a Bell will not sound in the *exhausted Receiver*, tho the Parts might there fly off with greater Ease, they being not troubl'd with any ambient resisting *Air*. But supposing that we perceive and imagin, nay and even think of outward things by the means of corporeal Images flowing from them; yet again, if these Images are continually streaming in upon us, how then comes it to pass, that the Mind does not think of 'em necessarily, but only when and of what it pleases? Why 'tis granted, say they, that *Images* are constantly at hand, but being very thin and subtil, they cannot be perceiv'd unless the Mind endeavours; which Answer is press'd with all the Difficultys propos'd concerning Images, and may receive a further Examination. For first, the Mind must think on the Object before this Endeavour; else why should she strive, why apply her self particularly to that? And that this Argument is strong against the *Epicureans*, is evident from that Question which *Lucretius* proposes in his fifth Book, about the beginning of Ideas in his Deitys. Again, this Endeavour of the Mind is a *Motion*, nothing being to be admitted in the *Epicurean Hypothesis* but what may be explain'd by *Matter*, variously figur'd and agitated. Now *Epicurus* hath settl'd but three kinds of Motion; namely, those of * *Weight, Declination, and Strokes*; the two latter of which do necessarily suppose the former, and therefore if that of *Weight* cannot belong

* κατὰ σαρμὴν, κατὰ παρέγκλισιν, & κατὰ πληγὴν.

to the Soul, 'tis absurd to conclude this *Endeavour* to be either of the latter. And here it must be consider'd, that the *Epicurean* Soul being material, by consequence *Weight* is a Property of all its Parts, which will necessitate this Soul to subside in all the Vessels of the Body, as low as possible; and therefore it cannot actually enjoy this Motion, nor consequently any *Endeavour*.

But now to pass on to the second Explication of Sense, &c. made by some antient Atomists: touching this, I say, in common with the former, that, as they suppose in *Sensation*, there is always a Passion antecedent made upon the Body of the *Sentient* from without, yet is not *Sensation* it self this very *Passion*, but a *Perception* of that *Passion*; much less can *mental Conceptions* be said to be the Action of *Bodys* without, and the mere Passion of the *Thinker*; and least of all can *Volitions* be such, there being plainly here something ἐφ' ἡμῖν, *in our power*, that is something of *Self-activity*, by means whereof we become a *Principle of Actions*, accordingly deserving *Commendation* or *Blame*. They tell us indeed, that in either of these cases the Object is *touch'd and felt as it were with a Staff*: but by what is it touch'd and felt? If by any thing material, as they would have it, it must be the Matter of the animal Spirit; but if so, I say, that in a *Sensation* or *Thought*, either every single animal Spirit receives a whole Representation, which, as was before observ'd, would multiply the Object; or else they must divide the Image among them, and every one have its share, which I confess is the more equal way. “ But then when they
 “ have taken the Object to pieces, how they will set
 “ it together again is hard to imagine. For they can-
 “ not strike all upon one Point; and if they could, they
 “ would jumble the Proportions, and run the Object
 “ all

“ all on heaps, where the latter Impression would go
“ near to deface the former. But if they impinge
“ upon different Parts, and make every Part sensible
“ with the Stroke, 'tis true then they have it among
“ 'em; but which way the *Whole* should emerge, is
“ still incomprehensible. For, as an * ingenious Wri-
“ ter observes, supposing the Image was painted in
“ Order, without any Dislocation, vacant Intervals,
“ or Interloping, yet the Fibres being distinct and
“ impregnated by distinct Spirits, they can account
“ no farther than their own share of Motion reaches:
“ and therefore how they should club their particular
“ Informations into a common Idea, is inconceivable.
“ Besides, if any of the returning Spirits should happen
“ to fall foul upon others, which are outward bound,
“ which is not unlikely, these Countermotions would
“ overset them, or occasion a later Arrival; either of
“ which Accidents would maim the Image, and make
“ it imperfect. These Rubs will lie in the way even
of Sensation, and much more of Imagination and
Thought: “ For here are no external Impressions to be-
“ gin the Motion. 'Tis true outward Objects will make
“ us *perceive* 'em, whether we will or no. But the
“ Exercises of *Imagination* are oftentimes purely vo-
“ luntary. When the Passions are not violent, we
“ may check or quicken, change or extinguish the
“ Operation as we please. Now I would gladly know
the main Spring of the Motion: what Power it is,
which opens the Scene, and gives direction to the whole
Management; which chalks out the Course of the
Spirits, and limits their Commission both as to Time
and Place, and other Circumstances of Action?

* Collier in Ess. Part 2. p. 75, 76. See to this purpose Dr. More's Enchir. Metaph. p. 327, 328, &c.

Against the two former Hypotheses of the Corporealists I need add no more, than what will fall in to that purpose with my Examination of the third, that Sensation and Thought are only the *Re-action* of some inward Matter of the Body upon the Matter of outward Objects first pressing upon that; for this Pressure, say the *Hobbiſts*, being continu'd inwards to the Brain and Heart, causeth there a Resistance or Counter-pressure or Endeavour of the Heart to deliver it self: which Endeavour, because outward, seems to be some Matter without, and the *Seeming* or *Fancy* is that which men call Sense. But in answering to this, I would first know to what this *Seeming* or *Apparition* is? Is it to the Matter of the Heart or Brain? If so, then is the Sensation not the *Seeming* or *Apparition* it self, but the Perception of the *Apparition*; because in this case the *Seeming* or *Appearance* is the immediate Object, and that to which this *Seeming* or *Appearance* is made, must be suppos'd to exert about it a distinct Act of Sensation or Perception. But how the *Matter* of the *Heart* or *Brain* should be able to do this, cannot be conceiv'd: for all that can be done by the Conflicts, the Action and Re-action of Atoms, is only a Communication or Reception of Motion, or a new Direction and Determination of it. The Object impresses nothing but Motion upon the Matter, which is conversant about it; and *Motion* can produce nothing else but *Motion*. Whereas it is most plain, that besides the direct Motion proceeding from the Object it self, and the Reflex proceeding from the *Heart*, there is moreover in man a Perception also, as distinct from the Motion it self, as any other Act whatever is from the Object, about which it is conversant. "The Part counterpress'd being
" still only mov'd, it doth not perceive either that or
" how

“ how it self is mov’d ; unless Motion be the per-
“ ceiving of it self, and apprehending of all the Va-
“ rietys of Motion. What availeth rebounding to the
“ very Act of *Sense* ? For to have Re-action is no
“ more than for *passive Matter* to be thrust first forward
“ and then backward. And why then may not the
“ Part which is crouded forward *perceive* as well in
“ proceeding from one Term in a right Line, as in
“ receding from the other Term : the difference not
“ consisting in any physical Causality, but in the relation
“ or respect to divers Terms ?

But supposing that the Pressure and Counterpressure of Matter might be the Cause of *Sensation* and *Fancy* ; yet how by this means could two things be united in a Proposition, and pronounc’d agreeable ? How, after this Conjunction, could they be consider’d again, and collected and form’d into a *Syllogism* ? For there is no Cause assignable in Matter (tho mov’d as is suppos’d) of those two Acts, and therefore can they not be deriv’d from that. For suppose two things offer’d to Consideration, and let their simple Pressure on the Organs and the Counterpressure of these arising from the Heart raise a *Phantasm* ; this is the only Motion, that can be caus’d originally by the Objects. But now let these be remov’d, and so as there can be then no Pressure, so neither will be a Counterpressure ; yet any man will find himself able to consider the nature of these Objects, compare their Propertys, and view their Agreement, which, if a Motion, must needs be distinct from the former ; and this too can be done several hours, months, or years, after the first Pressure of the Objects, and the Re-action of the Organs upon them, and after the Organs have been disturb’d with other Motions, and consequently the first quite lost. “ And
“ after

“ after all, he can join these two Objects, thus compar’d, with a third, and compare ’em again, and after that bring the two Extremes into a Conclusion; and all this by the Strength of his own Judgment, without the Help, the Pressure, or Direction of any external Impulse*.

Thus have we obviated the Cavil of the Atheist, that there being nothing else but Body, *Cogitation* is no other than local Motion, or the Impression, Reception, or Repulsion of bodily Action; and that in a great measure from the Consideration of our selves, as appearing to be endu’d with an internal Principle of Thought and Self-activity. From whence it may be most strongly argu’d, that the same in the highest Perfection is essential to the Deity; that this is far from owing its original Actings to any precedent Impulse, and is consequently an eternal, incorporeal, unmov’d Mover.

But perhaps some of the *Democritick* Atheists will tell us yet further, that *Mind* or the Principle of *Thought*, as was before said of *Life*, is no simple and primitive Nature, but a secondary and compounded thing, resulting from certain Concretions and Contextures of Matter, and either the Commixture and Contemperation of Qualitys, or else the Combination of those simple Elements, *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site*, and *Motion*; and so is made up of that, which has nothing at all of *Mind* in it. From whence they infer, that there could be no eternal unmade *Mind*, immortal and incorruptible; since upon the dissolution of that Compages or Contexture from which they result, they must needs vanish into nothing. Accor-

* To this purpose see the Creed of Mr. Hobbs examin’d by T. Tenison, now Ld ABp of Canterbury, p. 100, 101, &c.

dingly, say they, as it is probable that sometime heretofore there has been no *Mind* or Understanding at all in the Universe, so may there possibly be none again. Whence the Conclusion is, that *Mind* or *Understanding* is no God or Principle in the Universe, it being essentially factitious, native, and corruptible, or, as they express it in *Plato*, * *Mortal from mortal things*: as also that the Souls of Men cannot subsist separately after death, and walk up and down in airy Bodys; any more than the *Form* of a House or Tree, after the Dissolution thereof, can subsist by it self separately, or appear in some other Body. But the Absurdity of this Cavil has been already often hinted at, inasmuch as this would be to bring *Something out of Nothing*: and *Mind* or *Understanding* being plainly no *Quality* or *Complexion* of *Qualities*, but a substantial Principle, had there once been no *Mind* at all, then could this never have been produc'd out of *Matter*, that was altogether *Mindless*, &c. However, yet further to silence the Atheist, I shall clearly demonstrate that *Matter*, however modify'd and dispos'd, being *Matter* still, is essentially distinct from what we term *Mind* or *thinking Substance*, and consequently this latter can in no wise result from any Contexture of *Matter* whatsoever.

Now first in general to shew that *Matter* or *Body* is essentially distinct from *Mind*, I say, that our completest or perfectest Ideas of one and t'other (the † only ways we have whereby to distinguish the Essences of things) are absolutely distinct; inasmuch as we conceive such an essential Attribute or Property in the one, as we cannot conceive in the other: whence we may

* Ουντὸς ἐκ Ουντῶν.

† See Norris's Theory of the Ideal World, Part 2. Ch. 1.

conclude, that the Subject of this Attribute or Property is really distinct from that other Subject, in which it can't be found. Now the Attribute, I mean, is a power of *Thinking*, which we discover in what we term *Mind*: and this, I say, is no way discoverable or conceivable in *Body* or *Matter*, and therefore is *Mind* a Subject really distinct from *Body* or *Matter*. For all we discover in *Body* is Magnitude, Figure, Situation, and if you will, Solidity or Impenetrability, and a capacity of being mov'd: I say, in the last place, a capacity of being mov'd; for notwithstanding what * a late Writer has seem'd in words to advance to the contrary, telling us that *Motion* or *Action*, by which, as appears from the Sequel of his Letters, he means *Autokinesy*, *internal Energy*, or *Self-Activity* (albeit more than once he † finds fault with others for confounding these Terms) notwithstanding this, I say, I find no just ground to recal what I have utter'd, because, as I shall now beg leave just to mention, and will undertake to shew more fully at a fitter time and place, he has not done what he often boasts of, that is, demonstrated his *Thesis*, that *Motion* or *Activity* is *essential to Matter*; nor indeed evinc'd any more, as essentially belonging to *Matter*, than what I have intimated, namely, an *Agibility* or *Mobility* of *Matter*. This is all that can be drawn from the principal Mediums he urges to this purpose, namely,

* Toland in *Confutation of Spinoza's System of Philosophy*; and his *Answer to Remarks upon the same* by a Noble Friend.

† Action or moving Force is often call'd by the name of Motion, and thus the Effect is confounded with the Cause, which has occasion'd a world of Perplexitys and Absurditys, p. 140. And to the same purpose he writes at p. 155.

the * *Divisibility* and the † *perpetual Motion* of all *Matter*: For touching the former of these, what else is *Divisibility*, but *Mobility*; and a capacity not of *dividing* and *moving it self*, as this Author supposes, but of *being divided*, and consequently *mov'd*? And this I grant is involv'd in the Idea and Conception of *Matter*. Also touching the latter of those Topics, tho we should allow, that all *Matter* is always *mov'd*, and that, || as he argues, all seeming *Rest* is a *real Action* of *Resistance between equal Motions*; yet does it not thence follow, that *Motion* or a *moving Force* is internal and essential to it, and must consequently enter the Conception and Definition of it: but rather that this came to it originally from without, and by the same hand, which first imparted it, has been ever since kept up and display'd in reciprocal Agitations. Hence is the *Activity* or *moving Force*; and *Matter*, supposing all its Parts to be continually *mov'd*, yet has no other power of moving, but only actual *Motion*, derivative from this Spring, by which the several Parts of it do mutually impinge and strike upon each other. But by the way, how does this Writer go about to prove that all *Matter* is always *mov'd*? Of all that he advances, what, in my Opinion, comes nearest to this purpose, is the Argument he builds upon our *Sensation* or

* The commonly acknowledg'd Divisibility of Matter is also an undeniable Argument, that it cannot be conceiv'd without Motion, since it is Motion that diversifies and divides it; which is therefore presuppos'd, as well as Extension, in the Idea of Divisibility, and consequently the one is as essential to Matter as the other, p. 169.

† Seeing that every part of Matter is prov'd to be always in motion, you should conclude that Motion is essential to the Whole, p. 204. To which purpose he also expresses himself at p. 159, 188, 194. and afterwards at 205, &c.

|| Pag. 198, 199.

Perception of Matter, * which Act, he implies, cannot be perform'd without *Motion*; this perhaps some would controvert with him. But however, I say, allowing this, and that by consequence every Portion or System of *Matter*, as being *sensible* and *perceivable*, must therefore needs be in motion; yet still I cannot but observe *ad hominem*, that he having no other way to prove this *constant Motion* of all *Matter*, but from the † particular, determinate, actual *Motions* of the several Parts of it, and because there is in it no absolute Rest: granting him all which this Argument drives at, namely, that all *Matter* is actually mov'd; yet how does this prove an inward Power of moving it self in this or that thing mov'd, and not rather a Capacity or Tendency to be mov'd? which is all that the Mathematicians (whom, because, as || he says, they are generally the best and strictest Reasoners, he would fain draw in to his side) mean by their *Conatus ad Motum* in *Matter*: just as the *Aristotelians*, who, notwithstanding that they hold *Matter* to be *purely passive*, yet go so far as to say of it, that it does *appetere Formam*; not that they suppose it really to exert an elicitive Act of Appetition, but that it is endu'd with an *innate Appetite*, that is a Power or Capacity of receiving *Forms*, and so seems to tend thereunto, as its Perfection and Accomplishment. This, methinks, seems most reasonable to be infer'd from the Premises; and

* The Idea of *Matter* without Action must be of something depriv'd of all Figure or Colour, neither heavy nor light, rough nor smooth, sweet nor sour, hot nor cold, void, in a word, of all sensible Qualities, without Parts, Proportion, or any Relation whatsoever; since all these depend immediately on Motion, &c. p. 168, &c.

† As may be seen at p. 167, 168, 178, 187, 192, 194, 196, 198, & 202.

|| Pag. 141, 237.

the same may be argu'd even from this Writer himself elsewhere : inasmuch as he holds, * that all the Determination of Motion is *from without*, nay and at once † that the Determination is the very particular Motion it self; to which I add, that there is no other Motion of Matter, than particular, local, and determinate (however he may think me || to be rank'd among the Vulgar for saying this) and if so, I say, there is no just reason to suppose, that the moving Force is essentially inherent in this or that Portion, or, as he will have it, in all the Parts of Matter, but rather that all the Systems, and every the least Atom and Particle of it, do mutually receive their Motion from each other. In short, this Writer, as I have said, by Action or Motion means Activity; but now if, as he grants, Matter upon no occasion be put actually into motion, but by some other Matter, what reason have we to think that there is any such *Activity* at all in Matter; and not rather that it is receptive of Impressions, which it again imparts, and so both moves and is mov'd, tho not originally from it self: but Matter

* The particular Motions being determin'd by other more prevalent Motions to be direct or circular, &c. according to the occurrent, subsequent, or circumambient Motions of other Bodys, p. 194. The *Vis impressa*, the impress'd Force of particular Bodys, is some Determination of the general Action: for in this sense it's indisputable, that nothing can move, that is, determine it self, till it be determin'd by some other thing, &c. p. 231.

† This is imply'd in the foregoing Citation: Nothing can move, that is, as he himself explains it, determine it self. Also at p. 159. he says, That all local Motions are only the several changeable Determinations of the Action which is always in the Whole, &c. And p. 176. All the particular or local Motions of Matter are but the several Determinations of its general Action, &c.

|| Those who would take it ill to be rank'd in other things with the Vulgar, yet agree with them in this, thinking that there is no Action or Motion, where they can see or perceive no local or determinate Motion, p. 171.

having been first created by God, and that in motion too (which I suppose this Author will not openly deny) the several Parts of it, under the care of a * presiding Intelligence, which he expressly grants, have turn'd about each other in perpetual Revolutions; and Motion agreeably to the Laws establish'd by God in the Universe, has been constantly transfer'd from one Body to another by a mutual Impulse? As to the difficulty he mentions, that † Motion, if an Accident or Mode, and not an essential Attribute of Matter, would in this sense be said to leave one Subject and go into another; which Absurdity, he tells us, || the *Cartesians* being aware of, to avoid it fell into this other, that God takes the Motion from one Bowl that is running forward, for example, and communicates it to the other, against which it rubs, &c. To this I answer, that I do not conceive Motion to be in a strict sense communicated or imparted, as if the same numerical Quantity of it left one Body and occupy'd another: but that this or that Portion of Matter being actually mov'd, has thereby a sufficient Energy to impel and move other Matter, and that in so doing a proportionable Quantity of its own Motion is spent or abated, to that which it produces or imparts, and therefore seems to be the very *same* transfer'd. And in this sense a Communication of Motion is, methinks, own'd by our Author himself, as when he tells us, “ ** That

* When his Friend objects to him, That after admitting the Activity of Matter, there seems to be no need of a presiding Intelligence, he answers, That this is the most thoughtless and unweigh'd Expression he ever knew drop from his Mouth or Pen; and so goes on to assert the contrary. p. 234, &c.

† Moving Force not a Mode or Accident, since (among other Objections) no Accident can pass from one Subject to another, &c. p. 156.

|| Pag. 236.

** Pag. 200.

“ every Motion is as well a Passion, in respect of the
 “ Body which gave it the last Determination, as it is
 “ an Action compar’d to the Body that it determines
 “ next. And again, when he says elsewhere, that as
 all the *Determination* or *Direction* of local Motion this
 way or that, so likewise the Degrees of it, * *Swiftness*
 or *Slowness*, as ’tis plain to our senses, are from without.
 Now every degree of Motion is Motion, and by con-
 sequence if Bodys can increase or diminish, they can
 also in some sense communicate Motion; and thus for
 the same reason, why may we not suppose, that all the
 energetick or motive Power in Matter is no other
 than the actual Motion of its several Parts, reciprocally
 giving it self, and given throughout the Sphere of
 Body; for this is all that his Arguments prove? Ac-
 cording to which, what manner of ground have we to
 make a distinction between the *Vis motrix* and the *Vis*
impressa, seeing they no otherwise tend to prove that
 there is a *Vis motrix* in Matter it self, but from the
actual Motion of all Matter, and the † *actual Motion* of
 all Matter, according to this Writer himself, is from
 without; and therefore what need or what argument
 is there for another *Vis motrix* within? Or if he will
 distinguish a *Vis motrix* from the *Vis impressa*, or sup-
 pose a power of moving in the Matter it self, distinct
 from the actual Motion it receives; then does he grant
 that *Matter* is or may be *conceiv’d* without *actual Mo-*
tion. And so does he himself overturn all his Reason-
 ings, to prove a *Vis motrix* essential to Matter, from

* The particular Motions being determin’d by other more prevalent Mo-
 tions to be direct or circular, fast or slow, &c. p. 194.

† In this sense it’s indisputable, that nothing can move, that is, deter-
 mine it self, till it be determin’d by some other thing, &c. p. 231.

this, that all Matter is actually mov'd, and cannot be conceiv'd without actual Motion; and that again, because the Idea of it must enter in by *Sense*, and it is no otherwise sensible or perceivable, than by Motion impress'd on the outward Sensory, and convey'd to the Brain by intermedious Nerves and Fibres. Tho by the way, granting that *Sensation* cannot be perform'd without *Motion* of the Object, and consequently that *Matter*, as being *sensible*, is also movable; yet have we no ground to infer from this, that it is always in actual Motion, and much less that *Motion* is *essential* to it: But, it may be, when the Organ of *Sense* is apply'd to it, or it to the Organ, there is such a Habitude of the one to the other, as that the Organ by its Energy and Action upon the Object, excites in it such or such a Motion towards it self, and so is affected by it after such a manner, as if it were really vested with this or that Quality, Mode, or Accident: without which, it being own'd, that according to our imperfect way of Conception (we having no adequate or full Idea of any thing) we cannot conceive of this or that single Portion of Matter, nor by consequence any otherwise, than as in *actual Motion*; yet what else can we hence infer but only this, that *Motion*, and thereby *Sensation*, are indeed the *Occasion*, that we conceive something of *Matter*, but not that *Motion* is therefore an *essential* Attribute of it? The *Essentials* of Matter are still in a great measure hid from our Mind, even after its Reflections and Reasonings upon the first Perception of it; and much less do any of 'em immediately enter in by *Sense*: tho indeed I own, that the Mind, thro the notices it has at first given it, by Impressions on the *Sensory*, is introduc'd to the knowledg of *Matter*; but however still by an After-conception it looks upon its *Essence*

as

as a *Thing* that is absolute, and in it self devested from all *Modes*, that is, Relations to our *Senses*, and by consequence without *essential* and *necessary Motion*. But if it be ask'd what the *Essence* or the Sum of the *Essentials* of *Matter* is? The *Mind* of man can't pretend to know that; but must be content to apprehend and describe it, so as to distinguish it from other things, by those outward *Phænomena* and sensible *Propertys*, which we observe in it, agreeably to my aforesaid Account of it; according to which, *Matter* indeed is own'd to be endu'd with a Capacity of being mov'd by something else: but as for *Autokinesy*, or an *essential Power* of moving it self, this I think very few or none, either before or after this Adventurer (he having, I believe, made hardly any *Converts*) did ever dream of; and therefore I cannot but in this, as well as other things, admire his singular Invention, and, unless * Dr. C—— will come in for a share, shall give him the Honour (if it be any to say and not prove) which he seems to claim, of being the Author of this Paradox. But again, methinks a Parallel brought by this Writer to *prove*, does in effect *disprove ad hominem* the *essential Motion* or *Activity* of *Matter*: He supposes that a Ship, when at a stand, by reason of an equal Force of Wind on one side blowing towards the Mouth of the River, and of Tide on t'other flowing towards the Spring of it, has notwithstanding in it still a † *Self-activity* or inward Power of *moving*. For if he means no other *Activity* in *Matter* than this, I shall not then

* He also ascribing to *Matter* a Power to move it self, but expressly owning that this was given to it at first by God. Grand Essay, p. 153, &c.

† All this while the Ship was depriv'd only of one sort of Motion, and not of all Effort or Action, &c. p. 198, 199.

dissent from him: seeing 'tis most plain, that tho the Ship be every way *fitted* for *Motion*, as I also grant that Matter is; yet as this just Concession, that it is stop'd or hinder'd from a progressive Motion by equal counterpressing Forces, plainly shews it is not put in motion, tho *capable of being mov'd*, by its own Energy, but by an outward impelling Force of Wind or Water.

As to what this Writer often mentions of the general Action of *Matter*, * as the *Subject* of the particular Changes and Modifications in it; this, as he can no otherwise conceive, nor indeed attempts to prove, than from an Induction of particular Motions, I apprehend to be no other than barely a *second Notion*, not really existing in any other Matter but that of his own Brain; that is to say, a *Species* or *Universal* abstracted from *Particulars*, and no less absurdly asserted as a Reality, than the *Materia prima* or general Matter of *Aristotle*, when said to be *neque quid, neque quale, neque quantum, nec quicquam eorum quibus Ens determinatur* († which he makes a jest of) For let him strip me Action or Motion of Determination, or shew me any other than particular Action; and I'll as easily strip him *Matter* of all *Form*, and shew him that which is not circumscrib'd by any individuating Circumstance. Nay this general Action, when nam'd as a *Subject*, is methinks of the two the more absurd; inasmuch as this is abstracted from Modes or Accidents, which never exist but in a Subject, and can never be a Subject

* The external local Motion or Changes of Place, are but the various Modifications of the essential Action, p. 194. The general Motion of Matter is the immediate Subject of all the particular motive Determinations, p. 213.

† Pag. 170.

themselves : whereas the suppos'd *Materia prima* is abstracted from *Substances*, the Subjects of Accidents, and is therefore term'd by the *Peripateticks* a *Substantia secunda*. And why rather after all may not Matter, as endu'd with a Capacity of being mov'd, be thought the Subject of all Motions? Moreover, there can be no other general Motion or Action of Matter, but what is made up of Particulars, granting that the whole bulk of *Matter*, that is, all the *Parts* which make up that *Whole*, are actually mov'd : and neither does our Author, as I have before observ'd, trace the Spring and Original of Motion any other way, than from the *particular* and *constant* Motions of the Parts of Matter. But how does this prove that inward Energy or Activity is essential to it? As well might he argue, that the Force or Power of *determining* Motion is also *essential* to Matter, because all the Motions of Matter are determin'd ; as that the power of moving is *essential* to *Matter*, because all the Parts of *Matter* are *mov'd*. Wherefore in short, I conceive no other moving Force in *Matter* than actual Motion, which is reciprocated forward and backward, this way or that, between the several Parts of it ; and this is all that this Author can pretend to have prov'd : for what he would infer beyond this, that therefore Motion is essential to Matter, is a precarious Guess and Fancy of his own. However thus indeed I grant that *Matter* has in it a moving Force, tho this be not *essential* to it as such ; it having been arbitrarily and freely impress'd on it at first, and afterwards continu'd by the great unmov'd Mover and Creator of it. Here it is high time, and I think not unbecoming Philosophers, to direct our view to the Throne of God, and there to end our Enquiry. But here I make no doubt that I shall fall under our Au-

thor's Censure, * as others have done upon the like occasion ; he being rather willing to ascribe all the Changes in Matter to his fancy'd *essential Motion* of it, than to the creative, or at least the conservative Power and immediate Concourse of God. Accordingly, I find his Hypothesis admits of a Latitude, and is suted to the gust of two very opposite Partys, † of those who believe that Matter was created, and those who believe it to be eternal ; and which of the two our Author is of, I cannot well divine, or rather he seems indifferent to either. Indeed his great Quarrel with *Spinoza* is, that tho he owns all the Variations in the Universe to proceed from Motion, yet he assigns no Cause either of the Original or the Continuation of this Motion || ; and allows that he would have done better to ascribe it to the *Impulse of a presiding Deity* ; and accordingly thinks that ** *Des Cartes* was more in the right of it, “ in that he was not so careless and inaccurate, as to think of deducing the variety and “ difference of particular Bodys from mere Extension, “ and therefore suppos'd God at the beginning to have “ given a shake to the lazy Lump, from which his “ Matters of the first, second, and third Elements successively existed, and from these, after his manner, “ the Disposition of the whole Universe. But however, neither does this way of philosophizing altogether please him ; and therefore he rejects the Opinion of those, who in solving this Point, “ †† are forc'd at last “ to have recourse to God, and to maintain that as he

* In all times, as *Cicero* observes, when the Philosophers are ignorant of the Cause of any thing, they presently betake themselves for Refuge and Sanctuary to God, *Gr.* p. 157.

† Pag. 161.

|| Pag. 143.

** Pag. 152.

†† Pag. 157.

“ com-

“ communicated Motion to Matter at the beginning,
 “ so he still begets and continues it, whenever and so
 “ long as there is occasion for it, and that he actually
 “ concurs to every Motion in the Universe. Whereas
 our Author, as on one hand, by supposing that
Motion is essential to Matter, he does not with *Spinoza* ab-
 surdly attempt the Solution of all material Phænomena,
 from the Motion of Matter, granted to be in it self un-
 active, yet without assigning any outward Cause of its
Motion: so on the other, does he compendiously and
 prettily solve all, without admitting of any *foreign*
Mover or God, acting either mediately by a *Plastick Life*
of Nature, as * *Dr. Cudworth* and others have main-
 tain’d; or † immediately concurring with every Motion,
 as the generality of Theists hold: and this forsooth he
 does, as *Epicurus* of old deny’d a Providence, out of a
 seemingly pious Regard to God, saying, that || this Sys-
 tem, that is, of those who hold that God, as he at first
 impress’d, so he still conserves and immediately concurs
 with all the *Motions* of *Matter*, “ is subject to more
 “ fatal Consequences than those they would avoid by it:
 “ for besides that they hereby destroy what many have
 “ said about God’s impressing Motion on Matter at
 “ the beginning, as something that was of it self suf-
 “ ficient for the future; they further make God the
 “ Author of all the Wickedness in nature, tho Motion
 “ were still but a Mode. ’Tis he, for example, that
 “ actually moves the Tongue of a lying Witness, the
 “ Hand and Dagger of a Murderer, with such other
 “ palpable difficultys, which all their moral and phyfi-

* No less Romantick is the Plastick Life of other Philosophers, &c. p. 211

† Pag. 212. Where he thwarts all those, who provided external or foreign
 Movers of Matter. || Pag. 157.

“cal distinctions are not able to solve. Whereas according to this Writer’s System, all these great Absurdities, namely God’s *Impression* of Motion upon *Matter*, his *Conservation* of it, and immediate *Concourse* with it, are easily avoided! Also * many other Phænomena are hereby solv’d, and a new Light spread as it were upon the World by this † humble Interpreter of Nature! So tender is this Writer of the Glory of God, that if allowing him at first to have so far demean’d himself as to have created *Matter* and *Motion*, yet will he not own that he is still busy’d in conserving, or at least in concurring with the particular Motions of it; lest thus he should be reckon’d the Author of Sin! A notable Consequence indeed from this Principle, that *Motion* is essential to *Matter*! According to which God need not be suppos’d to come upon the stage at every turn, because active *Matter* can work it self into various modes and shapes without him; the Truth whereof, good man! he the rather espouses, lest God should be attainted with doing what is sinful: in the former of which lies the Poison of the Pill he would prescribe; in the latter the Gilding, wherewith he would cover and set it off. Now, this being easily discernible, or at least it plainly making for the Cause of Atheism (whatever this Writer intended by it) I shall not think it impertinent or much out of my way, besides what is directly oppos’d against his Principle, to examine the foregoing Corollary from it; and next to consider whether with *our Distinctions* we cannot come off nor evade the difficulty, with which he thinks the contrary Sentiment is loaded.

* See his Boasts at p. 141, 159, 229, &c.

† So he styles himself at p. 161.

First then, I say, that as neither Matter nor its Motion is self-existent or unoriginated, but, as was before seen, they both must have deriv'd their beginning from a first *Cause* and *Mover*; so neither could nor can they give to themselves any future moments of Existence (since the Continuation of any thing in being is plainly equivalent to the first Production of it) but all these must needs have and do still come from the same benign Hand, which gave to 'em the first and all the succeeding moments of Existence; agreeably to which the Scripture tells us, that * *of him, that is, God, and thro him, and to him are all things*; that † *he upholdeth all things by the Word of his Power*; and that || *in him we live, move, and have our Being*. Nor do I know of any Theists, unless they were the *Pelagians* of old, censur'd for this by ** *St. Jerom*, and †† *St. Austin*; as also *Durandus*, *Taurellus*, and some of the *Cartesians*, who appear to hold what this Writer suggests: That supposing Motion to have been at first impress'd on Matter by God, *this was look'd on to be of it self sufficient for the future*; and the contrary, methinks, is plainly demonstrable, namely, That not only the Conservation, as was before observ'd, but also the Co-operation and Concourse of God with all the Motions of Matter is absolutely needful, and follows upon the same ground with the former; it being essential to the Creature to depend upon the Creator, not only as to its Being, but its Operation: And indeed it is no more reasonable, that a thing should depend upon and need the Influx of God as to its Existence, than as to its Production; or as it is an *Agent*, than as it is a *Be-*

* Rom. 11. 36. † Heb. 1. 3. || Acts 17. 28.

** Lib. 1. cont. Pelag. †† Lib. 5. de Genes. ad Lit. & Lib. de Grat. Christ. c. 4.

ing. Nay further, I say, that every Action or Operation is a real Entity ; now it is certain from what went before, that every real Entity does so depend upon God, as that without his conservative Influx it would relapse and vanish into nothing ; by consequence it must be own'd, that God gives *Being* to the Action in that very instant when it is ; and accordingly that he concurs and co-operates, so that the Action proceeds no less, nay rather more from him than from the second Cause. In short, by the Concourse of God with every Action, I mean no other than his Conservation of it ; which latter being granted in reference to every finite created thing, cannot therefore be deny'd to every Action : in which sense the Scripture again instructs us, That * *God has wrought all our Works in us.*

But notwithstanding the positive grounds we have to believe the immediate Concourse of God with his Creatures, our Author starts a difficulty in the way, which he looks on to be invincible, saying, as was before observ'd, That *this would make God the Author of all the Wickedness in nature.* 'Tis he, for example, that *actually moves the Tongue of a lying Witness, the Hand and Dagger of a Murderer, &c.* Touching which I say, that I think we may well enough come off *with our Distinctions*, so as not to charge the Almighty with Sin, and yet deny *Motion to be essential to Matter.* God, I grant, does move the *Tongue* of him that *lies*, the *Hand* and *Dagger* of him that murders : but what then ? It does not hence follow, that God is any more guilty of the Evil of the Act, than the material *Tongue* or *Hand*, or even the inanimate *Dagger* it self is so : but the Evil of the Act, as it is only derivable

* Isa. 26. 12.

from, so is it only imputable to him, whose free Will determines the *Tongue, Hand, or Dagger* a wrong way, or to an undue Object, and contrary to the Order of the first Agent; and so, as it makes the Action to be of this or that Species, denominates the *man* a *Liar* or a *Murderer*. Wherefore I say, that in these and the like Instances God does indeed *concur with the Motion*, as it is the *Physical Act* of a Man: but the Defect or Evil which attends it, is purely owing to the second Cause or *Man*, which determines the Act; and is in no wise imputable to God, who, tho he concurs indeed with the natural Agent in the positive Action, yet no way contributes to the defect of this Action, nor can therefore be any more attainted with an Imputation of *moral Evil*, than the Sun, when concurring as an *universal Cause*, with any kind of Animal, in the Production of a Birth, that falls out to be monstrous, can therefore be charg'd with a *natural Evil or Defect*; the Monstrosity or Imperfection of the thing caus'd, not proceeding from the Sun, which operated *well*, as it us'd to do, but from some failure in the *Animal or particular Agent*, which determin'd and specify'd the Action: in like manner as * *Aquinas* tells us, "That the defect of
 " Halting or going lame is imputed, for instance, to a
 " crooked Shank or Leg, as to its Cause, and not to the
 " motive Power; by which notwithstanding is caus'd all
 " the Motion that there is in going lame: and thus,
 " says he, God is the Cause of the Act of Sin, yet is
 " not the Cause of the Sin itself; because he is not the
 " Cause of this, that the Act is accompany'd with a
 " Defect. Thus, I think, we may solve this difficulty touching God's *Concourse*; or, if we may not, yet

* In Sum. Theol. 12da Q. 79. A. 2.

will not this be enough to outweigh the contrary Evidences, nor lead us to the brink of denying his Providence and Government of the World; at least not according to our Author's Hypothesis, that *Motion is essential to Matter*; I say his Hypothesis, notwithstanding what he insinuates, that it is * plain Demonstration; for I do not find, as was before seen, that his Performance has answer'd his Boasting. And therefore I cannot but tell him, in a Point of this importance, that I would not have him espouse a Principle, as he appears to do, merely for the sake of such Conclusions as he wishes were true, and would fain deduce from it. And tho I will not here charge him with any further ill meaning than he has express'd, yet can I not but own, that even this plainly favours of Impiety, and is wholly unwarrantable, that God should be suppos'd not to concur and co-operate with his Creatures; and therefore unless he were certain of the Premise, he should not dare to triumph in such Inferences, nor think to wharp or model unchangeable and momentous Truths according to his vain Desire; I say, unless he were certain of his Premise, against which in sum I oppose this Reasoning: Whatsoever has in it a *Vis Motrix essential to it*, can move it self; but Matter cannot move it self; *ergo*, &c. The Major being plain, the Minor is prov'd thus: Whatsoever can move it self, can determine its Motion: but Matter cannot determine its Motion; *ergo*, &c. The Minor is evident at least *ad hominem*, from p. 231. where he says, *It's indisputable, that nothing can move, that is, determine it self, till it be determin'd by some other thing*. Also the Major is plain from this same Passage, he making *moving* and deter-

* Pag. 141, &c.

mining synonymous Terms: and indeed it is certain that all Motion whatsoever is particular Motion, and must needs be directed this or that way; for otherwise in *Bodys* it would be no Motion at all.

Wherefore after all, not finding my self to be justly arrested, as might have been expected from this Writer's Ostentation, I think it needless either to stop or go out of my way to talk with him any longer; and shall therefore securely go on to my intended mark, resuming what was before laid down, to shew the distinction of *Mind* from *Matter*, namely that we find nothing else in *Matter*, but only *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Situation*, *Solidity* or *Impenetrability*, and a *Capacity of being mov'd*. Now that *Mind*, or the Principle of *Thought*, can be the Result of any *one* of these Attributes, is not conceivable; nor will the Atheists themselves pretend to derive it from any single one, unless it be that some of 'em do it from this or that Motion, under this or that Circumstance or Determination: but the various Atheistical ways of accounting for *Sense* and *Thought* from any kind of Motion having been already baffl'd, I need add no more upon that Subject here; but shall only prove in general, that *Thought* cannot be the Result of these Attributes in common, or a Quality rising from them, according to what *Anaximander* of old and another * Atheistick Person has lately fancy'd; namely, that we know only the general Affections, but not the *intima Natura* of Matter; from which, as it is so or so dispos'd, there may emerge this or that particular Quality, of which we don't conceive it to be capable: and thus he would suggest, that *Thought may arise from a certain mixture*

* *The Publisher of the Oracles of Reason, in a Letter touching the Materiality of Human Soul.*

of the Parts of Matter, just as in Pepper, besides the general Propertys which it has in common with all other Matter, there is also a particular Quality of heating the Tongue. As to which I say, that not to name the weakness of this Trifler's *may be*, and how vainly he would argue from what we do not know of Matter against what we plainly do; also not to mention, that there is no proportion between the pretended Quality of *heating in Pepper*, and the noble Power of *Thought*: moreover it is certain, that there are no real Qualitys at all in Matter, as even the Atheistick Atomists, who in this must be own'd to philosophize rightly, will, if true to their own Principles, evince against him; it being a main Fundamental of their Doctrine, as *Laertius* informs us, * *quite to cashier and banish all Qualitys out of their Philosophy*; and so to maintain, that all which can be effected in Matter by the various mixtures and conjugations of Atoms, is only new inward Texture and Alteration of Surface: by consequence that all the seeming Qualitys of Bodys do not absolutely inhere in them, but are only the Effects of their respective Bulk, Site, Figure, &c. apply'd by Motion to our Nerves, and so no more than sympathetical and vital Passions or Fancys produc'd within our selves. In-
 somuch that “† no sensible Qualitys, as Light and Co-
 “ lour, and Heat and Sound, can be subsistent in the
 “ Bodys themselves absolutely consider'd without a
 “ relation to our Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of
 “ Sense. Thus far then the *Democriticks* give us a helping hand to disprove that *Thought* is a *Quality* of Matter. But further now, as they are mere Materialists also, I would fain know how they themselves will get off consistently with their own Principles,

* Εκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας.

† See Mr. Boyle's Mechanical Production of Qualitys.

Shewing that *Thought* is some way or other the Result of *Matter*. That they who hold *real* and *absolute* *Qualities* in *Matter*, generable from it, and corruptible again into it, should hence take occasion, as I am apt to think very many have done, to imagine that *Mind* and *Cogitation* (notwithstanding the great disproportion there is between these and the vulgarly reputed *Qualities* of *Bodys*) are *Qualities* of *Matter*, like *Heat* and *Cold*, generable and corruptible, is somewhat less to be wonder'd at, than that they who explode all real *Qualities*, should still derive *Thought* from the same Original; this being plainly the Effect of a most unreasonable Prejudice, and no way reconcilable with their main Hypothesis. For if all the seeming *Qualities* of *Matter*, howsoever mov'd or modify'd, be not absolute and real, but only *Ideas*, *Fancys* or *Passions* in us; what is it then which forms these *Ideas*? We observe, for instance, that our *Bodys*, as well as other senseless *Matter*, have a seeming *Colour*, *Warmth*, *Softness*, and the like; I say *seeming*, because 'tis acknowledg'd that these *Qualities* are not really subsistent in our *Bodys*, but are *Operations* of *Fancy* begotten in something else. " So that it is not *Blood* or *Bones* that can be conscious " of their own *Hardness* and *Redness*; and we are " still to seek for something else in our *Frame* and " Make, that must receive these *Impressions*. Will " they say, that these *Ideas* or *Fancys* are perform'd by " the *Brain*? But the difficulty returns upon 'em a- " gain: for we perceive that the like *Qualities* of *Soft-* " *ness*, *Whiteness* and *Warmth* do belong to the *Brain* " it self; and seeing the *Brain* is but *Body*, those *Qual-* " *ities*, as we have shewn, cannot be inherent in it, " but are the *Passions* of some other Substance without " it. Therefore the *Brain* is not that Nature which " imagins those *Qualities* of it self. But perhaps it will

“ will be said, that it is not the gross Substance of the
 “ Brain that causes Perception, but the animal Spirit
 “ and insensible Particles that have their rendezvous
 “ there, and are devoid of those Qualities, because,
 “ by reason of their minuteness, they never fall under
 “ our Senses. As to which I answer, that every one
 of these also has a determinate Figure: They are,
 “ * says a late Writer, Spheres, or Cubes, or Pyra-
 “ mids, or Cones, or of some shape or other that is
 “ irregular and nameless; and all these are but Modes
 “ and Affections of Magnitude; and the Ideas of such
 “ Modes can no more subsist in the Atoms so modify’d,
 “ than the Idea of Redness is found to be inherent in
 “ the Blood, or that of Whiteness in the Brain. And
 “ what Affinity is there between a minute Body and
 “ Cogitation, any more than the greatest? Divide Mat-
 ter into as many parts as you please, in order to spiri-
 tualize it, imagine it in all the Shapes and Figures that
 Mathematicians have or can invent names for; yet will
 they operate upon other Bodys and each other, but just
 as other Bodys do of grosser Bulks, that is, but only
 knock, impel and resist one another as greater Bodys do;
 but will be as far from producing *Thought* or *Knowledg* as
 they. Or after all, supposing that *Body* could form in it self
 the Ideas of sensible Qualities, yet how could it again form
 yet further Thoughts and Judgments of them, as compar’d
 and connected or disjoin’d, and then draw Conclusions
 from and make Reflections on them *in infinitum*? Where-
 fore it must be acknowledg’d, that *Thought* is no way inclu-
 ded in the Idea of Matter, but in that of a distinct Subject,
 that is, an immaterial Principle or Mind. From which
 Concession there will follow upon the whole this other
 Inference, that there is an *eternal unmade Mind*: for

* Bently in *Second Lecture*, p. 20, 21.

tho there be no necessity, that there should be any *eternal, unmade Green or Red*, they and all other corporeal Qualities so call'd being but several Contextures of Matter, or Combinations of Magnitudes, Figures, Sites and Motions, causing those several *Fancys* in us; and tho there be no necessity that there should be eternal Motion, because if there were once no Motion at all in Matter, but all Bodys rested, yet might Motion have been produc'd by a self-moving or self-active Principle. And lastly, tho there be no necessity that there should be *eternal unmade Matter or Body* neither, because had there been once no Body at all, yet might it be made or produc'd by a *perfect, omnipotent, incorporeal Being*: nevertheless is there an absolute necessity that there should be an eternal unmade *Mind*, because were there once no *Mind* at all, this could never have been produc'd out of *Matter* that is altogether *mindless*. For tho we should suppose both Matter and Motion from Eternity, yet could they never produce Thought or Knowledg; all they could do, would be only to beget variety of Motion in the several parts, but they could produce nothing to perceive that Variety. Or if eternal Matter were *thinking* or could produce *Thought*, then was it all *Matter* that was so, or else one Atom or a System of Atoms. But first it could not be all Matter, for then every Particle would have been cogitative and sensible, which is contrary to all Experience; and besides, there would then be as many eternal thinking Beings, as there are actually divided Parts of it, which, * as a very solid Reasoner observes, being independent upon each other, of limited Power and distinct Thoughts, could never produce that Order, Harmony and Beauty, which is observ'd in the several Parts of the Universe. Se-

* Mr. Lock in *Ess. Lib.* 4. c. 10.

condly, it could not be one Atom or individual Particle; for if that alone was eternal, then by the power of Thought it must have produc'd all the rest, which it is absurd to suppose; and then even the Atheists must quit their Axiom, *ex Nihilo Nihil fit*, and allow the possibility of Creation by the power of Thinking, both which they deny. Or again, if all other Particles of *Matter* were eternal, then would they have been equally capable of the power of *Thinking*; for *Matter* as such is equally capable of any Figure or Motion or any other imaginable Quality, to fit it for the Exercise of that Power: whence therefore one or more Atoms should have that Pre-eminence above all the rest without a wise Author distinct from them, is altogether unaccountable. Nor thirdly, could that eternal knowing Being be any certain System of the Particles of Matter, whether at rest or in motion; not at rest, because then it could have no power to act upon others; nor in motion, because then its Thoughts would wholly depend on Motion, and would be unavoidably accidental and limited: since all the Particles which make up each System being each of 'em without Thought, they could not regulate their own Motions; because the Thought would not precede the Motion, but the Motion would precede the Thought; and much less could they regulate the Whole.

This Topic I have the rather chosen to insist upon, as it extends in common not only to baffle the Atheistick Corporealist as such, and directly to evince an infinite Mind or Spiritual God, but also as it proves the Immateriality of human Souls; and thereby again makes for the Cause of Theism; the Existence of a God and the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul of Man being streightly connected: upon which account, as well the an-
tient

tient * as modern † Atheists have expressely argu'd against this latter, and offer'd the denial of it, as a means to overturn the former. But, as we have seen, they are very far in this from gaining their point, or making it appear, that the Souls of men are corporeal, educ'd out of Matter and mortal: since it is most evident that there is a Scale or Ladder of Entitys and Perfections in the Universe one above another, and the Production of things cannot possibly be in way of Ascent from *lower* to *higher*, but must of necessity be in way of Descent from *higher* to *lower*; and therefore cannot Mind, as being superior to Magnitude and Body, be the Result and Product of it; or if it were once granted that finite Minds could, then would this raise a fair presumption, that the infinite Mind or God might be so too, which is the height of Atheism. Wherefore, as we had just reason, we have stood upon our guard, and defended this Post against the Atheists, that no Life or Cogitation can either materially or efficiently result from dead and senseless Body; or that Souls being all substantial and immaterial things, can neither be generated out of Matter, nor corrupted into the same, but only created or annihilated by the Deity. Accordingly I cannot but condemn the Doctrine of some profess'd Theists and Christians of latter times, who

* Ἐν περὶ Διὸς λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν ἀνοήτην δόξαν ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὅποιοι ἦν πρὸ φύσεως ἐρήϊον ζήνημάτων; i. e. And thus by Jupiter, says Plato, have we discover'd the very Fountain of that Atheistick Madness of the antient Physiologers, namely, as was just before said, Ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τέτων ὕστερον, That the Soul is junior to and made out of inanimate Bodys.

† And Mersennus sets down this among the Atheists Objections: Sola Animæ Immortalitas Deum esse convincere videtur, atqui mortalis est, igitur nullum superest Divinitatis Fundamentum. *Quest. Celeb. in Genes. Col. 234, &c.*

generate all Souls, not only the *sensitive* in Brutes, but also the *rational* in Men, out of Matter. Forasmuch as hereby not only that Argument for the Existence of a God from Souls, is quite taken away; and nothing could hinder but that senseless Matter might be the Original of all things, if *Life* and *Understanding*, Soul and Mind sprung out of it; but also the Atheist will have an advantage, to prove the Impossibility of a God from hence. Because if *Life* and *Understanding* be in their own nature factitious and generable out of Matter, then are they no substantial things, but accidental; from whence 'twill plainly follow, that no Mind could possibly be a God or first Cause of all things, it being not so much as able to subsist by it self. Moreover, if Mind as such be generable and educible out of nothing; then must it needs be in its nature corruptible also, and reducible to nothing again; whereas the Deity is both an unmade, and also an incorruptible Being. So that there could not possibly be, according to this Hypothesis, any other God, than such a *Jupiter* or Soul of the World, as the Atheistick Theogonist acknowledg'd, that sprung out of *Night*, *Chaos*, and *Non-entity*, and may be again swallow'd up into that dark Abyss; and therefore senseless Matter being the only unmade and incorruptible thing, and the Fountain of all things, even of *Life* and *Understanding*, must needs be acknowledg'd to be the only real *Numen*.

But the grand Objection against this Substantiality and Immateriality of Souls *sensitive* as well as *rational*, is from that Consequence, which will be thence infer'd, their Perpetuity or Immortality, and permanent Subsistence after Death; This seeming very absurd, that the Souls of Brutes also should be Immortal, or subsist after
the

the Deaths of the respective Animals: but especially to two sorts of men: First, To such as do scarcely in good earnest believe the Immortality of their own Souls; And, Secondly, To such Religionists as conclude, that if the *Souls* of Brutes subsist after Death, then must they needs go presently either into *Heaven* or *Hell*. The offensiveness of which Opinion *Des Cartes* was so sensible of, that being fully convinced of the necessity of this Disjunction, that either Brutes have nothing of *Sense* or Cogitation, or else they must have some other *Substance* in them besides *Matter*; he chose rather to espouse the former Branch of it, to make them mere senseless *Machines*, than to allow them *substantial Souls*. Wherein to avoid a lesser Paradox or Absurdity, he plung'd himself into a greater, there being hardly any Opinion more generally received than this, That Brutes are endu'd with a Capacity of *Sense*. Tho in truth all those, who deny the Substantiality of sensitive Souls, and will have Brutes to have nothing else but *Matter* in them, ought consequently, according to Reason, to do as *Des Cartes* did; that is, deprive 'em of all *Sense*. But on the contrary, if it be evident from the *Phænomena*, that Brutes are not mere senseless *Automata*, and only like Clocks and Watches; then ought not popular Opinion and vulgar Prejudice so far to prevail with us, as to hinder our Assent to that which sound Reason and Philosophy clearly dictates, that therefore they must have something more than *Matter* in them. Neither ought we, when we conceive any thing to be true, as this, that Life and Cogitation cannot possibly rise out of dead and senseless *Matter*, to abandon or deny our Assent to it, because we find it attended with some difficulty, not easily extricable by us, or we cannot free all the Consequences of it from some Inconvenience or Absurdity,

Q q q q 2

dity, such as seems to be in the permanent Subsistence of *Brutish Souls*. It is not to be suppos'd (I speak this chiefly in the ears of Theists) that we are made capable of knowing all things, or indeed any thing entirely and thorowly. It is enough that we are in a way to know our selves and other things, so far as they relate to and concern us, and may be of advantage or disadvantage to us. Thus we experience and are conscious to our selves of our own capacity of *Sense* and *Thought*, and do believe the like of those who are of the same kind with us, and give manifest Tokens of it in their outward Conduct; which latter Indication is also, methinks, very plainly observable in Brutes, and therefore we have reason to conclude in some measure the same thing of them. But how or by what means they give us these Appearances of *Sense* and *Thought*, as perhaps we are not concern'd to know, so neither are we able to decide, whether or no they are endu'd with substantial and immaterial Souls? And if they are, whether these perish with their bodily Frame, or subsist after death and dissolution? However some, it may be, will put in and say, that granting we observe many seeming Footsteps of Perception and Reason in Brutes, as in their Contrivances for propagating their Kind, for preserving themselves and their Young, and in many other Instances; yet all this proceeds from a faculty of *Reason*, which tho it act in 'em, yet is not their own, nor are they conscious of it, that is, from *Instinct* or the Providence of God, moving and guiding 'em to their appointed ends; because their noblest Operations, and which are reckon'd to betoken the most Subtilty and Skill, are exerted *necessarily* and without *deliberation*, without *Labour* and *Time* to learn the Arts and to acquire the Habits of it; and this *unerringly* and

and *without mistake*. Which shews 'em to act not barely by themselves, but under the infallible Guidance of a superintending Wisdom, and so to tend *surely* tho *blindly* to their ends, according to the necessary Laws of *Mechanism*. This Opinion, methinks, seems not altogether improbable, because otherwise Beasts would be happier than Men; in that these are not born with those necessary Arts and Contrivances which are discernible in Animals and Birds, as well the first year of their Age, as the second or third: but all their dexterity in managing themselves is owing to Industry and Use, and it is not by inbred Power but Habit, that they display the greatest Tokens of Wisdom and Knowledg. But then again here lies another difficulty, that granting many *natural* and *necessary* Motions in Brutes to betoken indeed a faculty of *Reason*, which tho it act in 'em, yet is not their own. Moreover, we remark in 'em some other *spontaneous* Motions which do betoken such a Principle of *Reason*, as is at once in 'em and also their own; and shews 'em to be not much inferior to some Individuals even of our own kind. Here perhaps some will endeavour to come off, by telling us that Brutes do indeed *seem* to perceive, to think and reason; but that they barely *seem* to do so; * it being not impossible for God Almighty so to dispose the Parts of Matter, as that by the

* God has an infinite Wisdom to direct his Power, and as infinite a Power to execute the Dictates of his Wisdom; and when two such Qualifications concur, we cannot reasonably doubt of the possibility of effecting as much as this comes to, that a pure material Being may without thinking, by the mere Mechanism of its Composure, exert the same sort of outward Motions, which in us take their rise from a Principle of Thought. Norris in *Theory of the Ideal World*, Part 2. p. 82, 83. and to the same purpose at p. 92, 93.

occasion of such or such Impressions it may exert such Acts without any *Reason*, at least of their own, as Men do exert with a *Reason* of their own. But here, not to mention that it does not become a Philosopher, in solving this point, to strain it up to a possibility of what God can do, and that it is no good arguing from what God can do, to what he has done: Moreover, I don't see why this Argument might not also extend to *Men*, besides our selves; I say besides our selves, we having no other but outward Appearances, as we have in Brutes, of their *Perception* and *Thought*, and are only more certain that we our selves *perceive* and *think*, because we are inwardly conscious of it. I have ever thought that whatever many honest *Cartesians* might intend, this Doctrine of theirs instead of supporting, does occasionally ruin the Cause of Theism; I say occasionally, because, tho it magnifies the Power and Wisdom of God, and would do nothing in *Brutes* without him, yet whereas at the same time it asserts the immediate Springs of all that's done in 'em to be purely mechanical and material, the Atheist, we find, is ready to take up one part of the Hypothesis; and not considering the principal Agent, and having at most but a confus'd Notion of a blind unconscious Nature, exclusively of a most wise God, he is ready, I say, to argue from the *Mechanism* of *Beasts* to that of *Men*; and that if seemingly the most sagacious and subtil amongst *them* are but mere Engines, then is there a fair presumption, that we our selves are no more, agreeably to the Mind of the Sensualist, who would fain have his Soul expire with his Body; and to the Doctrine of the *Leviathan*, That Men differ no otherwise from Brute Animals, than only in their Organization and the Use of Speech or Words. Wherefore to prevent this fatal Consequence,

quence, and especially as I'm otherwise convinc'd from the Phænomena, I rather hold that * Brutes do properly *perceive* and *think*; and if so, then, as *Des Cartes* himself will agree with me, I stick fast to this Principle, That they are not mere *Automata*, but endu'd with a substantial immaterial Principle of *Sense* and *Thought*. But here returns this puzzling Query, What then becomes of this Principle or Soul after death? Touching which, upon this Hypothesis, let us next consider what has been and may be reply'd. Now † *Plato* and the *Pythagoreans* were of opinion, that when Brute Animals die, that is, when their Souls are divested of their gross terrestrial Bodys, they live and have a sense of themselves in thin aerial ones. Others exploding those aerial Vehicles of Brutes, and allowing 'em none but terrestrial Bodys, affirm the Substances of 'em surviving death to continue in a state of Inactivity and Insensibility, Sleep, Silence or Stupor. But now to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity that these Souls of Brutes because *substantial*, or even because *immaterial*, should therefore have a permanent Subsistence after death to all Eternity; because tho it be true, that no Substance once created by God will of it self ever vanish into nothing, yet is it true likewise, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing may possibly by him be annihilated and reduc'd to nothing again; and thus as the Souls of Brute Creatures may be, so have we some grounds to think that they are annihilated. God in his Wisdom was pleas'd that such Beings as Animals should exist and bear some part in

* See the Hypothesis, that Brutes are but Machines, smartly baff'd in Suite du Voyage de Monde de Des Cartes, from p. 1. to 89.

† See more of this in Cud. Int. Syst. from p. 863, to 868.

the Scene of the Universe ; and whereas it was impossible that * Omnipotence it self should make 'em what they are, that is, *sensitive* and *cogitative* Beings out of mere *Matter*, he therefore inform'd and animated their *Bodys* with *immaterial Souls* ; which, when they have answer'd the end of their Existence, and so long display'd the animal Life in conjunction with Matter, as the Portions of Matter, to which they were ty'd, were fit to contain and be subservient to them ; what wonder, I say, is it, if after this period God withdraws from 'em his conservative Influx, and then, as all other things would also do without that, they relapse into Non-existence or Nothing ; and this, 'tis probable, by the Will of the Creator is a standing Law of the Universe ? Not that 'twill hence follow, † as one imagines, that the Soul was made purely for the Body, the better part for the worse, which would be absurd and preposterous ; but that it was made for the animal Life, and the several purposes of it. Methinks 'twould be a Reflection upon the Divine Wisdom to uphold that Creature in being which serves to no end or use ; and to what end, do we think, can the Souls of Brutes serve without their Bodys ? Wherefore albeit we have reason to suppose, that they would not of themselves vanish into *Nothing*, or be corrupted like Bodys by a separation of Parts, yet having been created by God in the Generations of the respective Animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may then, as I have said, be of course annihilated in their Deaths : and if this be absolutely the best, as we cannot but conceive it to be, then may we conclude, that it undoubtedly is so.

* See Broughton's *Psychologia*, from p. 57, to 74. and elsewhere.

† Norris in *Theory of Ideal World*, p. 69.

But then you'll ask, Why is it not so likewise with the Souls of *Men*, which are commonly asserted to be immaterial, and therefore immortal? To which I answer, that Immateriality does not infer necessity of Existence, or put the thing fram'd out of the power and disposal of him that fram'd it, and therefore Immortality, upon other wise grounds, is a Gift of the Creator; in which sense * the Apostle tells us, That he *only hath*, that is, originally and essentially, *Immortality*. Again I say, that we must allow different degrees of Perfection in finite immaterial Beings, and that as in the visible, so there are several Scales and Ranks of things in the invisible Creation; and accordingly after all, that is or can be said of the *Sense* and *Knowledg* of Brutes, by which they appear to be in part immaterial, their Souls however must be own'd to be vastly inferior in the measure of these Talents to those of Men: and therefore, as we plainly observe 'em to be made for no other end but the animal Life, and in order to that to exert indeed some lower Acts of Thought and Perception, but not to rise to those far nobler heights of Reason and Religion, of which we see Mankind to be capable; it is an establish'd Law of the Creation, that when the animal Life and the *Matter* of the Brute is dissolv'd, the Soul after that, as it has no more to do, nay perhaps cannot act (as some, we have seen, think that neither can the Souls of Men) nor accordingly serve to any purpose, so do they not subsist any longer, but die with those Bodys, which they once govern'd and directed. Whereas the Souls of Men, as being vastly more perfect, and in a much higher sense *immaterial*, may be destin'd yet further for a future Existence: and that

* 1 Tim. 6. 16.

they are so, may be presum'd, not only because they cannot die as Bodys do by a dissolution of Parts, and so, as they are in themselves more capable, accordingly God has appointed 'em for Immortality ; but also because besides their being *substantial* and *immaterial*, their case in this respect is far different from that of brutish Souls, upon other accounts. Beyond what may be presum'd from the nature of our Souls, and touching God's dealing with 'em accordingly, we moreover are assur'd by Faith in the Divine Goodness, that the Almighty will conserve in being or not annihilate all such Substances created by him, whose permanent Subsistence is neither inconsistent with his own Attributes nor the good of the Universe, as this of *human Souls* unquestionably is not ; they having both *Morality* and *Liberty* of Will (which are not discernible in Brutes) and thereby being capable of Rewards and Punishments, and consequently fit Objects for the Divine Justice to display itself upon, and so to manifest its Glory : and thus the Souls of Men are still as fit to be preserv'd as they were to be created, in order to glorify their Maker ; and that not only passively, as they are proper Objects, about which he may exert his several Attributes, but also actively, as the Souls at least of the Vertuous and Good are still able to pursue the great end of their Creation, by Acts of Adoration and Praise. And accordingly that the Souls of all men will continue in a future Existence, may be concluded from many other reasons which have a peculiar reference to them ; as namely, * the Desires and Instincts they have of Immortality and Eternity, the Sentiment of Conscience, which acts in 'em here as God's Vicegerent, and plainly forebodes his Judgment of us after

* See Moral Essays on the Soul of Man, p. 87, &c.

death,

death, and his Assignment of good or bad Men to Happiness or Misery; the certainty of which is also deducible from the nature of Vertue and Vice, from the Rewardableness of 'em in general, and especially the unequal Returns they meet with in this Life, which argues that they will be more equitably dealt with in another. To which I add what a *very ingenious and eminent Writer has lately observ'd, That Human Souls have a Happiness of their own, distinct from and independent on the Body: now it is impossible the Soul should have a Happiness independent on the Body, without having a Principle of Life independent on the Body also; for the Happiness of all Creatures results from the Principle of Life, and bears proportion to it: and therefore those Pleasures, which do not result from the Body nor depend on it, must result from a Principle of Life independent on the Body; and if the Soul lives and is happy independently on the Body, it can live and be happy without it: which I think sufficiently proves, that there is no reason to suspect that the human Soul dies with the Body; especially if it be consider'd again, that this rational, intellectual, spiritual Happiness, which is the proper and genuine Happiness of human Soul, can never, as we plainly find, attain its just Perfection while we live in these Bodys: but however as we make a gradual Progress that way, this again betokens our Soul's Immortality. An inquisitive and vertuous Soul improves daily in Knowledg and Vertue. Tho the Body decays, and all bodily Pleasures with it, yet Wisdom and Counsel, Piety and Devotion, a steady and inflexible Vertue are the Glory of the Age.

* Dr. Sherlock in a Discourse concerning the Happiness of Good men, from p. 95, to 112.

Sometimes indeed the Infirmitys of Age affect the Mind, destroy the Memory, wipe out all the sensible Marks and Characters of things: but this no more argues any decay of the Soul, than the distractions of a Fever, or the sealing up all our Senses with Sleep; this cannot be avoided while the Soul is vitally united to a Body, *supposing* it only to be never so spiritual. But setting aside such Accidents as these, the Soul is continually improving it self. And can we think, that when it has attain'd the greatest Improvements and Perfections that it can in this Body, it shall fall into Nothing? Does not this rather look like a state of Trial and Probation for a more perfect Life?

Thus have we good reason to assert the *Immortality* of our own Souls, notwithstanding we hold the *Mortality* of the Souls of Brutes; albeit these also are confessedly immaterial, as they appear to be endu'd with *Sense* and *Thought*. But should any Man be yet unsatisfy'd with these Solutions, I would tell him once for all, that tho I could have given no Answer to this difficulty, yet would I not reject what is manifest and plain touching my own Soul, for the sake of what is obscure and dark touching the Souls of Brutes. Sure I am from inward Experience, that my own Soul perceives and thinks; and if so, that it is not mere *Matter*, but a distinct Principle from it, and that not only as such, but on other accounts it is also immortal. Nay and granting that Brutes, which appears very probable, do *perceive* and *think*; as on that account I assert their Souls to be immaterial, so will I rather own 'em to be also *immortal*, than infer from the contrary Supposition, that my own Soul is *mortal*. But having thus far won the Field from *Anaximander*, *Democritus*, and others, who would make *Thought* to be either an absolute
Quality

Quality of this or that Concretion of Matter, or a modal Result of it as thus or thus mov'd; *Strato*, it may be, and some other Hylozoicks will rally up their Forces, and make this Declaration against us, that (as they asserted in reference to *Life*) every Atom of senseless Matter has been from Eternity infallibly omniscient, has known all things without error, and has had a *Science* before *Sense* and underiv'd from *Sensibles* (quite contrary to the Doctrine of the Atomick Atheists, who make all *Knowledg* *Sense* or the Product of it) tho without any animal Consciousness and Self-perception. But besides what went before, shewing that Matter is no way capable even of *Sense* or *Thought*, as nothing can be more prodigiously absurd than thus to attribute infallible Omniscience to every Atom of Matter; so is it also directly contradictory, to suppose perfect Knowledg, Wisdom or Understanding without any Consciousness or Self-perception; Consciousness being essential to Cogitation. Moreover, this Hypothesis can never possibly solve the Phænomenon of Men and Animals neither, not only because, as I have said, no Organization or Modification of Matter whatsoever could ever produce *Consciousness* and *Self-perception* in what was before *inconscious*; but also because every smallest Atom of it being suppos'd to be a *Percipient* by it self, and to have a perfect *Life* and *Understanding* of its own, there must be in every Man and Animal not one, but a Heap or Commonwealth of innumerable Percipients. In short, whereas these Hylozoick Atheists make every Atom of Matter *omniscient*, but nothing at all *omnipotent*, or assert perfect *Knowledg* without any perfect *Power*, a *Knowledg* without *Sense* and underiv'd from *Sensibles*; we demand of them, where the Intelligibles or Objects

of this *Knowledg* are? And whence the Ideas of them are deriv'd? For since, as they would have it, they proceed not in a way of Passion from *Sensibles* existing without, nor could result from those Atoms neither, as comprehending themselves; they must needs come from *Nothing*, and be, many of 'em at least, the Conceptions of *Nothing*. The Wit of Man cannot possibly devise any other Original of *Knowledg* and *Understanding*, than from an absolutely perfect and omnipotent Being, comprehending it self and the extent of its own infinite Power, or all possibilitys of things, that is, all *Intelligibles*. But now there can be but one such omnipotent Being, and therefore no more than one original and eternal unmade *Mind*, from which all other *Minds* are deriv'd; but of this more hereafter.

Having thus far fought my way thro the Ranks of the *Materialists*, I have the more heart to attempt the last difficulty remaining in this Quarter, which is only this; God, according to the Theist, is at once a most understanding and most perfect Being: but, says the Atheist, there is no most understanding and most knowing Being; therefore there is no God. The Major being granted, the Minor, he thinks, is evident, because the two Notions, one of a most knowing and understanding, the other of a most happy Being, are contradictory; seeing * all *Knowledg* essentially implies Dependance upon something else as its Cause, and is therefore inconsistent with perfect Happiness. But this, I say, is in effect to argue with the † *Cyrenaicks*,

* *Scientia & Intellectus signum est Potentiæ ab alio dependentis, id quod non est beatissimum.*

† *Ἐυδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτος.*

that there is no such thing as Happiness at all ; because it is certain, that without *Consciousness* or *Understanding* nothing can be happy, since it could not have any Fruition of it self. And as to the main Force of this Objection, besides what has been * already, and will hereafter be reply'd to it in the following Chapter, I need say no more to it at present but this : That the infinite *Knowledg* or *Understanding* of such a Being as a God, does not imply or suppose a Dependence upon any other thing but himself, that is, it herein appears to be wholly independent, as he, who is a most perfect Being comprehending himself and the utmost extent of his own Fecundity and Power, must needs fore-know antecedently to the Existence of things, all the possibilitys of them, their Ideas and several Relations to one another, and all necessary and immutable Truths. So that we find there is an *Understanding* proleptical to *Knowables*, and therefore independent on them ; which comprehends in it self a kind of intellectual World, and a Paradigm or Platform, according to which all other things were made.

* Pag. 508, and so on.

C H A P. X.

A Confutation of what was propos'd as the Eleventh Atheistical Argument, taken from the Phenomenon of Knowledg. That the World and Things are not antecedent to Mind and Knowledg, but Mind and Knowledg to the World and Things. That besides and before Sensibles and Singulars, there are distinct Knowables and Universals. That Knowledg is not mere Passion nor Sense.

A GAIN the *Democritick* and *Epicurean* Atheists will harp upon this string, and make a yet further Assault from the nature of *Knowledg* and *Understanding*: If the World, say they, as you suppose, were made by a *God* or an antecedent *Mind* and *Understanding*, having in it an *Exemplar* and *Platform* thereof before it was made, then must there be actual *Knowledg* both in order of *Nature* and *Time* before things; whereas *Things*, which are the *Objects* of *Knowledg* and *Understanding*, are unquestionably in order of *Nature* before *Knowledg*, this being but the signature of them and *Passion* from them. Now the only *Things*, say they, are singular *Sensibles* or *Bodys*: from whence they again infer, that all *Knowledg* is but mere *Sense*, and that *Mind* is the youngest and most creaturely thing in the World; or that the World was before *Knowledg*

Knowledg and the Conception of any Mind, and no *Knowledg* or *Mind* before the World as its Cause.

In answer to which I need not repeat what has been clearly prov'd toward the end of the sixth Chapter, that *singular* Bodys are not the only *Things* and Objects of the Mind; but that it contains its immediate *Intelligibles* within it self, which *Intelligibles* are also *eternal*, and that Mind is no fantastick Image of Sensibles, nor the stamp and signature of them, but archetypal to them; as the first Mind is that of a *perfect Being*, comprehending it self and the Extent of its own Omnipotence, or the possibilitys of all things; so that *Knowledg* is older than all *sensible Things*, *Mind* senior to the World and the Architect of it. Among the rest I have said *, that besides *Singulars* there are also *Universals*, some of whose *Singulars* do not at all fall under *Sense*; others of 'em, tho they do belong to Bodys, yet *Sense* can never reach to 'em, nor were they ever in Bodys. When, for example, from the universal Idea of a Triangle, which is neither here nor there nor any where without our *Mind*, but yet has an *intelligible Entity*, we see a plain necessity that its *three Angles must be equal to two right ones*; then do we know the truth of this universal Theorem, and not before: also then we understand, that every singular Triangle, so far as it is exact and true, has this Property in it. Wherefore the knowledg of this and the like Truths is not deriv'd from *Singulars*, nor do we arrive to them in way of ascent from *Singulars* to *Universals*; but on the contrary, having first found them in the *Universals*, we afterwards descending, apply them to *Singulars*: so that even *our Knowledg* here is not after *singular Bodys*,

* Pag. 510, &c.

and secondarily or derivatively from them, but in order of Nature before them. Now whether these universal Ideas in us be the same, as * some will have it, with the Divine or not ; certain it is there are at least *such* in a far more perfect manner in the infinite Mind of God.

But here the Atheist will start up and tell us, that *Universals* are nothing else but *Names* or *Words*, by which *singular* Bodys are call'd, and consequently that in all *Axioms* and *Propositions*, sententious *Affirmations* and *Negations* (in which the *Predicate* at least is universal) we do but add or substra^{ct}, affirm or deny *Names* of *singular* Bodys : and that *Reasoning* or *Syllogism* is nothing but the reckoning or computing the *Consequences* of these *Names* or *Words*. Neither do they want the *Impudence* to affirm, that besides those *Passions* or *Fancys*, which we have from things by *Sense*, we know nothing at all of any thing, but only the *Names* by which it is call'd : Than which, I say, there cannot be a greater *Sottishness* or *Madness*. For in short, if *Geometry*, for instance, were nothing else but the knowledg of *Names* by which *singular* Bodys are call'd, as it self could not deserve that name of a *Science*, so neither could its *Truths* be the same in *Latin*, in *Greek*, and other differing *Languages* ; and *Geometricians* in all the several distant *Ages* and *Places* of the *World*, must be suppos'd to have had the same *singular* Bodys before them, of which they affirm'd and deny'd those *universal* *Names*. But here again both the *Epicurean* and *Anaximandrian* *Atheists*, agreeably to the tenor of their *Hypothesis*, do endeavour to depreciate *Knowledg* or *Understanding*, as a thing which has not any higher

* See Norris in Theory of the Ideal World, from p. 413, to 422.

degree of Perfection or Entity in it, than is in dead and senseless *Matter*; it being, according to *them*, but only a *Passion* from *singular* Bodys existing without, and therefore both junior and inferior to *them*, a Tumult rais'd in the Brain by Motions made upon it from the Objects of Sense; which accordingly includes in it dependence on something else, and is at best but a thin and evanid Image of *Sensibles*, or rather an Image of those Images of Sense, a mere whiffling and fantastick thing: upon which account they conclude it not fit to be attributed to that, which is the first Root and Source of all things; this therefore they will have to be no other than grave, solid, senseless *Matter*, the only substantial, self-existent, independent thing, and consequently the most perfect and divine. In answer to which, besides what has been hitherto said, I add in the first place, that *Knowledg* or *Understanding* is not a mere *Passion* from the thing known, existing without the Knower; because to know and understand, as *Anaxagoras* of old determin'd, is *κατατείνω*, to *master* and *conquer* the thing known, and therefore not merely to *suffer* from it or *passively* to lie under it, this being *κατατείνωμαι*, to be *master'd* and *conquer'd* by it. The knowledg of *universal Theorems* in Sciences is not from the Force of the thing known, existing without the Knower, but from the active Power and exerted Vigor or Strength of that which knows. See you not, says * *Boetius*, how all things in knowing use their own Power and Faculty, rather than that of the thing known? For since Judgment is the Action of that

* Vide sine ut in cognoscendo, cuncta suâ potius Facultate, quàm eorum quæ cognoscuntur, utantur? Neque id injuriâ, nam cum omne Judicium judicantis actus existat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam, non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ Potestate perficiat. *Conf. l. 5. Prof. 4.*

which judgeth, every thing must of necessity perform its own Action by its own Power, Strength and Faculty, and not by that of another. Nay Sense it self is not a mere Passion or Perception of Motion from Bodys without the *Sentient*; for if it were so, then would a Looking-glass and other dead things see: but it is the *Perception* of a *Passion*, made upon the Body of the *Sentient*, and therefore has something of the Soul's own Self-activity in it. Much less is *Understanding* and the *Knowledg* of abstract Sciences either primary Sense, or as some Atheists will have it, the fading and decaying Remainers of the Motions thereof; but a *Perception* of another kind and more inward than that of *Sense*, not *sympathetical* but *unpassionate*, the *Noemata* of the Mind being things distinct from the *Phantasmata* of *Sense* and *Imagination*, which are but a kind of confus'd *Cogitations*. And tho the Objects of *Sense* be only *singular Bodys*, existing without the *Sentient*, yet are not these *Sensibles* therefore the only Things and *Cogitables*, but there are other Objects of Science or *Intelligibles*, which the Mind contains within it self. That dark Philosophy of some, tending so directly to Atheism, that there is nothing in the *Mind* or *Understanding*, which was not first in corporeal *Sense*, and deriv'd in way of *Passion* from Matter, is both elegantly and solidly confuted by * *Boetius's* Philosophick Muse after this manner:

* Quondam Porticus attulit
Obscuros nimium senes,
Qui Sensus & Imagines
E Corporibus extimis
Credant Mentibus imprimi, &c.

Sev. Boet. in Consol. Philos. L. 5. Met. 4. See more to this purpose, That all Knowledg does not take its beginning from Sense, in Lee's Antiscepticism, p. 41, 42, 43.

The Porch did heretofore produce
A kind of dark Philosophers,
Who ignorantly did believe,
That all the Images of things,
Obvious to Sense, imprinted were
By outward Objects on the Mind:
As heretofore with a swift Stile,
Men us'd on waxen Tables smooth,
And free from any Characters,
Letters and Figures to engrave.
But by its proper Motions, if the Mind
Can nothing do, nor yet explain,
But only passively doth lie,
From outward Objects taking all
Ideas, and its Figures, and presents,
Like some dull Mirror, to the Eye
The fainter Images of things;
Whence doth the Knowledg then proceed,
By which the Mind doth all things comprehend?
Whence is the Force which doth behold
Each Being then? Or whence is that
Which doth divide those things, when known?
Or that again, which recollects
Divided things, changing its way
Alternately, for sometimes it
Raiseth its head to higher things,
Then to the lowest doth descend?
And when t' it self it doth return,
Confuteth false things by the true?
This Cause now efficacious is,
More powerful too, than that which doth
Admit the Characters impress'd
Like servile Matter; yet the Sense,

Which

*Which in the living Body doth remain,
 Doth go before, and doth excite
 And move the Forces of the Mind;
 As when the Light doth strike the Eye,
 Or as the Voice doth strike the Ear:
 Then is the Force of Thoughts awak'd,
 Calls out the Species, which it hath within
 It self, to move about and act,
 Applies them to the outward Notes,
 Mingling and joining all those Images
 Fix'd in it self in foreign Forms.*

Whence we may conclude with another * Poetick Philosopher :

*Then is the Soul a Nature, which contains
 The Pow'r of Sense within a greater Pow'r;
 Which doth employ and use the Sense's pains,
 But sits and rules within her private Bow'r.*

He having made good upon many other grounds what he thus prettily sung a little before :

*Doubtless in Man there is a Nature found
 Beside the Senses, and above them far:
 Tho most men being in sensual Pleasures drown'd,
 It seems their Souls but in their Senses are.*

To this I add, that from this Doctrine of the Atheistick Atomists, that all Conception and Cogitation of the Mind whatsoever is nothing else but *Sense* and *Passion*

* Sir John Davies in Poem of the Original, Nature, and Immortality of the Soul, p. 24, 25.

from the Bodys without, this Absurdity follows unavoidably : That there cannot possibly be any Error or false Judgment ; because it is certain, that all *Passion* is true *Passion*, and all *Sense* or *Seeming* and *Appearance* true *Seeming* and *Appearance*. Wherefore tho some *Sense* and *Passion* may be more *obscure* than other, yet can there be none *false* ; it self being the very Essence of *Truth*. And thus *Protagoras*, one of these *Atheistick Atomists*, having first asserted that *Knowledg* is nothing else but *Sense*, did thereupon admit this, as a necessary Consequence, that * *every Opinion is true*, because it is nothing but *Seeming* and *Appearance*, and every *Seeming* and *Appearance* is truly such : and because it is not possible for any one to opine that which is not, or to think otherwise than he suffers. Wherefore *Epicurus* being sensible of this Inconvenience, endeavour'd to solve this Phenomenon of *Error* and *false Opinion* or *Judgment*, consistently with his own Principles, after this manner : That tho all *Knowledg* be *Sense* and all *Sense* be true, yet may *Error* proceed notwithstanding *ex Animi opinatu*, from the *Opination* of the *Mind*, adding something of its own over and above to the *Passion* and *Fancy* of *Sense*. But herein he shamefully contradicts himself : for if the *Mind*, in *judging* and *opining*, can superadd any thing of its own over and above to what it suffers ; then is it not a mere *passive thing*, but must needs have a self-active Power of its own, and therefore will prove to be also incorporeal ; because no *Body* can act otherwise than it suffers, or is made to act by something else without it. Wherefore we conclude, that since there is such a thing as *Error* or *false Judgment*, all *Cogitations* of the *Mind* cannot be mere *Passions* : but there

* Πᾶσα δόξα ἀληθής.

must be something of *Self-activity* in the Soul it self, by means whereof it can give its Assent to things not clearly perceiv'd, and so *err*.

Again, from this Atheistick Opinion, that all *Knowledg* is nothing else but *Sense*, either primary or secondary, it follows likewise, that there is no *absolute Truth* or *Falshood*, and that *Knowledg* is only *relative*, *fantastical* or *seeming*, that is, nothing else but *Opinion*; because *Sense* is plainly *Seeming*, *Fancy*, and *Appearance*, and only relative to the *Sentient*. And here also did *Protagoras*, according to his wonted Freedom, admit this Consequence, that *Knowledg* being *Sense*, there was no *Absoluteness* at all in it; and that nothing was true any otherwise, than * *to this and that Man so thinking*; that every man † did but *opine only his own things*; that || *every Man was the measure of Things and Truth to himself*; and lastly, that *whatsoever seem'd to every one, was true to him to whom it seem'd*. Neither could *Democritus* himself, tho a man of more discretion than *Protagoras*, dissemble this Consequence, from the same Principle asserted by him, that *Understanding* is fantastical, and *Knowledg* but *Opinion*, he owning it sometimes before he was aware, as in these words of his: ** *We ought to know man according to this Rule, that he is such a thing as hath nothing to do with absolute Truth*; and again, †† *we know nothing absolutely concerning any thing, and all our Knowledg is Opinion*. Agreeably to which he determin'd that mens *Knowledg* was diversifi-

* Τάπω καὶ τιμῇ. † Ταῖς αὐτοῦ μόνον δοξάζειν.

|| Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον Ἄνθρωπος.

** Γινώσκειν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον πᾶσι τοῖς νόμοις, ὅτι αἰτίας ἀπὸλλασθαι.

†† Αἰτία οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔτι ἵσμεν καὶ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ὁπρὸς τὴν ἐκάστοτε ἡ δόξιν.

fy'd by the Temper of their Bodys, and the things without 'em. And *Aristotle* judiciously observing both these Doctrines, that there is no *Error* or *false Judgment*, but every *Opinion true*, and again that nothing is absolutely true, but relatively only; to be really and fundamentally one and the same, imputes 'em both together to *Democritus*, in these words of his: * *Democritus held, that there was nothing absolutely true; but because he thought Knowledge or Understanding to be Sense, therefore did he conclude, that whatsoever seem'd according to Sense, must of necessity be true* (not absolutely but relatively) *to whom it so seem'd*. Into these gross Absurdities did the Atheistick Atomists plunge themselves, whilst they endeavour'd to solve the Phenomenon of *Knowledge* or *Understanding* agreeably to their own Hypothesis. And it is certain that all of 'em, *Democritus* himself not excepted, were but Blunderers in that Atomick Physiology, to which they so mightily pretended, but never rightly understood it. Since that with equal Clearness teaches at once these two things, that *Sense* is indeed fantastical and relative to the *Sentient*; but that there is a higher Faculty of *Understanding* and *Reason* in us, which discovers the Phantastry of *Sense*, reaches to the *Absoluteness* of Truth, and is the *Criterion* of it; which discovers to us, that there is nothing in the Objects themselves, like to the *sensible Ideas* of them; and resolves all sensible things into *intelligible Principles*, the Ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive Impressions upon the Soul from without, but native and domestick to it, or actively

* Οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθές· ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν φένησιν μὲν τὴν αἰσθησιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ὅξ' ἀνάγκης ἀληθές εἶναι.

exerted from the Soul it self; no Passion being able to make a Judgment either of it self or other things. This is a thing so evident, that further to shew the Self-inconsistency of *Democritus*, *Sextus Empiricus* records this of him, “ * That in his Canons he affirms, “ that there are two kinds of Knowledg, one by the “ Senses, and another by the Mind: of which that by “ the Mind only is accounted Knowledg, he bearing “ witness to the Faithfulness and Firmness of it, for “ the judgment of Truth. The other by the Senses “ he calleth dark, denying it to be a Rule and Measure “ of Truth. His own words are these, There are two “ Species of Knowledg, the one genuine, the other ob- “ scure and dark: the obscure and dark Knowledg is “ Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, Touching; “ but the genuine Knowledg is another more recondite “ and hidden.

Wherefore in short, let the besotted Atheists say what they will, we find they can't get off with Credit, but, if they will be ingenuous, cannot but expose themselves, even upon their own Hypothesis: for, after all that can be said, nothing is more certain, than that all Knowledg and Understanding in our selves is not a mere *Passion* from *singular Sensibles* or Bodys existing without us, as the foremention'd Atheists would have it; there being nothing which comes to us from external Objects of *Sense*, but only *local Motion* and *Pressure*; and † there being other Objects of the Mind besides *singular Sensibles*, not only all *Universals*, but also such *Intelligi-*

* Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνῶσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθημάτων, τὴν διὰ τῆς διανοίας, &c.

† Of this see Judg Hale discoursing at large in Orig. of Mankind, about p. as I take it, 49, &c.

bles, as never were nor can be in Sense. Now lastly, if our *human Knowledg* and *Understanding* be not a *Passion* from things existing without us, then can it have no other Original, than in way of Participation from a *perfect Mind*, the *Mind* of an infinitely fecund and powerful Being, comprehending it self, and in it self all things, all the Possibilitys of things before they were made, with the Respects and Truths belonging to them. So that a perfect omnipotent Being, together with the Possibilitys of things contain'd in it, is the first *Intelligible* or Object of *Mind* and *Understanding*, by which all other *Singulars* are understood. And were there no such perfect, infinitely fruitful and powerful Being, there could have been no *Mind* or *Understanding* at all. As also were there no *perfect Mind*, namely, that of an omnipotent Being, comprehending it self and all Possibilitys of things virtually contain'd in it; all the *Knowledg* and *intelligible Ideas* of our imperfect Minds must needs have sprung from *Nothing*. And thus, upon the whole, the Existence of a God, instead of being disprov'd, is plainly prov'd from the Phænomenon of *Knowledg* or *Understanding*.

C H A P. XI.

A Confutation of a twofold Objection against the Existence and Providence of God, taken from the Topic of Evils; some Atheists arguing from natural Evils, that is, from the Faultiness of the Mundane System, and from some particular Phenomena and Occurrences in it, seeming either deform'd, superfluous, or hurtful; others arguing from moral Evils or Sins, which, they imagin, would not be permitted, were there a God, that is, a Being infinitely perfect, and be concern'd in the Affairs here below.

HAVING now, as I think, quite routed and vanquish'd the Atheists Main Body, that is, baffl'd and exploded their seemingly most puzzling philosophical Reasonings; I shall proceed to blow away the Remainder of their weaker and scatter'd Forces with a breath or two.

Now the Atheist here taking it for granted, that by a God we Theists mean a first Cause and Maker of the World, endeavours to disprove his Existence *ad hominem*, from the *Faultiness* of the mundane System, *intellectually* consider'd and in order to *Ends*, saying that * it is so very ill made, that it could not be the

* ——— Tantâ stat prædita Culpa.

Work of such a God, as we suppose. Touching which, before we come to examine Particulars, let us first of all observe, that we poor Mortals are not competent Judges of all that is in the Universe, of the whole *Make*, and all the *Uses* to which the several Parts of it may serve. But however, as we find in the sixth Chapter, God has not left himself without *Witness*; some such manifest Tokens there are of Wisdom and Contrivance in the World, as do plainly discover a wise Contriver of it, and vastly out-balance those few things which seem to have in 'em Disorder and Deformity, in so much that these latter can in no wise be instanc'd as a fair and prevailing Opposition to the former; especially considering that whatever after all seems faulty in the Universe, does so, in all likelihood, thro our want of understanding it. Of this we have a rebuking Example in that insolent King of *Aragon*, who supposing that, according to the old Hypothesis, all things in the Heavens were to be resolv'd into Eccentricks, Epicycles, Librations, contrary Motions, &c. presum'd blasphemously to say, that if he had been of God's Council, he would have directed him to have made them better. For which, according to some Writers, as he was convinc'd of his Impiety by an *extraordinary* fatal stroke, so touching the same might the better Skill of modern Astronomers have easily uncas'd and confounded his Ignorance, shewing that he went upon a wrong ground, and that the Absurditys he fancy'd in the Heavens were not really in them, nor therefore to be imputed to the Author of them, but first to others for inventing, and next to himself for accepting such a clumsy Hypothesis. From the like occasion, that is, from want of Knowledg, it is, that the Atheists imagine Defects and Flaws in this or any other Parts of the World, in which

which what wonder is it, if there are many things, which we cannot either at all, or but very slowly reach? Touching these Matters, says *Theodoret*, * *who ever arriv'd at so great a pitch of Wisdom, as to explore and see thro the Creator's Wisdom?* Very hardly many times do we dive into the Skill of human Artists, and how much less can we comprehend the Workings of the Divine Opificer? Alas! the things of Nature were contriv'd by a Knowledg far superior and transcendent to ours; and at the most we know no more of 'em, than what may convince us of the Wisdom of their Author; and in arriving at this Knowledg too, our Reason and Experience, as I have before hinted, do discover but slowly the Intrigues and Contrivances of Providence. Witness the *Circulation of the Blood*, the *Milky* and *Lymphatick* Vessels, and other things (without which the mechanick Structure of the Bodys of Animals cannot be understood) all of 'em but so very lately brought to Light. Wherefore I say, we must not conclude, that whatsoever we cannot find out the reason of, is therefore *ineptly made*: let us be cautious of this from the single Instance of the *Intestinum cæcum*, which in the Bodys of Men and other Animals seems at first sight to be but a mere Botch or Bungle of Nature, and an odd impertinent Appendix; nor do we know that any antient Anatomist or Physiologer has given a rational account of it, or discover'd the Use to which it serves: yet the Moderns, we find, have observ'd a Valve at the Entrance of it, by the means of which it is, we perceive, a most artificial Contrivance of Nature, and of great advantage in Animals, for hindering the Regur-

* Τὴς εἰς πᾶσαν σοφίας ἀφικέτο, ὥς τὸ πλάσει σοφίαν ἀκεχῶς θεωρεῖται.
Theod. in Orat. 3. de Provid.

gitation of the *Faces* upward towards the *Ventricle*. Wherefore in short, let this admonish us to charge upon our Ignorance, and not upon the World, what we imagine to be *Imperfections* in it; and at once to *praise* the undoubted Maker of it in what we do know, and to *admire* him in what we don't know of his Artifice about it.

But besides that our Minds are not able to master so vast, so copious a Subject as the World, and therefore our Ignorance should seal up our Lips, and not suffer 'em to censure this or that as imperfect; again we may observe, Men are apt to do this, because they take this goodly Frame in pieces, and then not considering the mutual Relations of one thing to another, and the many Dependences and Subordinations of the several Parts of it, which conspire to make up the Order of the Whole, they single out some which look meaner than the rest, and then find fault with them, as being ill made or for no wise end. Whereas I tell 'em, that in making a judgment of the Works of God, we ought not to consider the Parts of the World alone by themselves, and then because we could find or fancy some much finer things, thereupon to blame the Maker of the *Whole*. As if one should attend only to this *Earth*, which is but the lowest and most dreggy part of all the Universe; or blame *Plants* because they have not Sense, *Brutes* because they have not Reason or Religion, *Men* because they are not Dæmons or Angels, and *Angels* because they are not Gods, or endu'd with Divine Perfection. Upon which account God should either have made nothing at all, since there can be nothing besides himself absolutely perfect; or at most nothing else but the higher Rank of Angelical Beings free from Mortality, and all those other Evils which attend Mankind; and such

such fine things, as *Epicurus's* Gods were feign'd to be, living in certain delicious Regions, where there were neither blustering Winds, nor lowring Clouds, nor nipping Frosts, nor scorching Heat, nor Night, nor Shadow; but the calm unclouded Æther always smiling with gentle Serenity. Whereas if there were but one kind of things, that is, the very *Best*, thus made, then could there not have been any Harmony or Musick at all in the World, for want of a sweet Variety. But instead of this, we ought rather in the first place to consider the *Whole*, whether it be not the best that could be made, having all that belongs to it; and after that, the *Parts*, in reference to the *Whole*, whether they be not in their several Ranks and Stations congruous and fitted thereunto. To this purpose let us hear what *Plotinus* has very well said: “ * *God*, he tells us, made the
 “ Whole most beautiful, entire, compleat, and sufficient, and all agreeing friendly with it self and its
 “ Parts; both the nobler and meaner of 'em being
 “ alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever therefore
 “ from the Parts thereof will blame the Whole, is an
 “ absurd and unjust Censurer. For we ought to consider the Parts not alone by themselves, but in reference to the Whole, whether or no they be harmonious and agreeable to the same. Otherwise we
 “ shall not blame the Universe, but only some of its
 “ Parts taken by themselves; as if one should blame
 “ the Hair or Toes of a Man, taking no notice at all
 “ of his Divine Countenance; or omitting all other
 “ Animals, one should attend only to the most con-

* “Ολον γὰρ τὸ ἐποίησε πάγκαλον καὶ αὐταρκές καὶ φίλον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πῶς αὐτῷ, τοῖς τε κρυωτέροις καὶ τοῖς ἐλαττοῖσιν ὡσαύτως προσφύει, &c.
 En. p. 256.

“ temptible

“temptible of them ; or in short overlooking all
“other men, one should only consider the most de-
“form’d *Thersites*. Whereas that which God made
“was the Whole as one thing, which he that attends
“to it, may hear speaking to him after this manner :
“God Almighty made me, and from thence came I per-
“fect and compleat, and standing in need of nothing,
“because in me are contain’d all things ; Plants and
“Animals, and good Souls, and Men happy with
“Vertue, and innumerable Dæmons, and many Gods.
“Nor is the Earth alone in me adorn’d with all man-
“ner of Plants and variety of Animals, or does the
“power of Soul extend at most no further than to the
“Seas ; as if the whole Air and Æther and Heaven in
“the mean time were quite devoid of Soul, and alto-
“gether unadorn’d with living Inhabitants. More-
“over, all things in me desire Good, and every thing
“reaches to it, according to its Power and Nature.
“For the whole World depends upon that first and
“highest Good, the Gods themselves who reign in my
“several Parts, and all Animals and Plants, and what-
“soever seems to be inanimate in me. For some things
“in me partake only of Being, some of Life also,
“some of Sense, some of Reason, and some of Intel-
“lect above Reason. But no man ought to require
“equal things from unequal, nor that the Finger
“should see, but the Eye ; it being enough for the
“Finger to be a Finger, and to perform its own Office.
Again says he, “as an Artificer would not make all
“things in an Animal to be Eyes ; so neither has the
“Divine Wisdom or spermatick Reason of the World
“made all things Gods ; but some Gods, and some Dæ-
“mons, and some Men, and some lower Animals : and
“that not out of Envy, but to display its own Vari-

V v v v

“ ety

" ety and Fecundity. But we are like unskilful Spec-
 " tators of a Picture, who condemn the Limner, be-
 " cause he has not put bright Colours all about :
 " whereas he had suted his Colours to every part re-
 " spectively, giving to each such as belong'd to it.
 " Or we are like to those, who would blame a Comedy
 " or Tragedy, because they were not all Kings or He-
 " roes that acted in it, but some Servants and Rusticks
 " introduc'd also talking in their rude manner : where-
 " as the Dramatick Poem would neither be complear,
 " nor elegant and delightful, were all these worser
 " Parts taken out of it. To which I add the Obser-
 " vation of St. *Austin* : Speaking to the *Manichæans*
 (who here fall in with the Atheists) " * Men, says he,
 " are so stupid, that tho they durst not for shame dis-
 " parage those things or *Tools* they do not understand
 " before a Mechanick, who is only a Man, but be-
 " lieve 'em to be necessary and appointed for Uses ; yet
 " in this World, whose Maker and Ruler is God, they
 " dare find fault with many things, the Causes where-
 " of they do not discern, and would seem to know that
 " in the Works and Instruments of the Almighty Ar-
 " tist, which they are altogether ignorant of. For
 " my part I own that I do not know, why Mice, Frogs,
 " Flys, and little Worms were made ; yet I see all
 " things beautiful in their kind, tho, for our Sins, ma-
 " ny of 'em seem to be at enmity with us. In the
 " Body and Members of each Animal I look upon, I
 " find that Measures, Numbers, and Order do belong

* Sed cum ita dicunt, non intelligunt, quemadmodum omnia pulchra
 sunt Artifici & Conditori suo, qui omnibus utitur ad gubernationem Uni-
 versitatis, cui summâ lege dominatur, &c. *Augustin. in Lib. 1. de Genes. ad*
Lit. contra Manichæos, cap. 16.

“ to the Unity of Concord, and make up the Harmony
“ of the Whole: all which from whence they come I
“ do not know, unless it be from the supreme Mea-
“ sure, Number and Order, which are in the unvaria-
“ ble and eternal Sublimity of God himself. Which if
“ these talkative and foolish men did but well consider,
“ they would not trouble us with their Impertinences;
“ but considering the Beautys of all things, as well the
“ lowest as the highest, would praise God in all as the
“ Creator of ’em; and because Reason is not offended,
“ where it may be carnal Sense is so, they would im-
“ pute this not to the Fault of the things themselves,
“ but to the Desert of our mortal Condition.

The aforesaid general Observations may, I think, give some Rebuff to the Atheists, and a little moderate and qualify their Heat. But however yet further let us now proceed to examine Particulars, and see what the Atheist can instance in, to prove the World a Work unworthy of a God, in respect of the Deformity or Uselessness of things. First then, the Atheist supposes, that according to the general Persuasion of Theists, the World and all things therein were created only for the sake of Man; whereupon he singles out some Particulars as not serving to this end, and which he would have to be useless or hurtful. But before we let him go on in this carier, let us stop him a little, and see whether or no he builds on a wrong *Postulatum*; if he does, then may we save our selves the labour to pursue him any further. Now this Opinion of the *Stoicks* and some other Theists, that the World was made purely for the sake of Man, I do not take to be at all warrantable, nor ought it to be universally suppos’d on the part of the Theists. For the Whole was not properly made for any Part, but the Parts for the Whole, and

the Whole for the Maker of it. And therefore it is too hasty and vain a Conclusion to think, for instance, that the glorious Bodys of the celestial Host were made merely for the Service of Man; and it is also Folly and Presumption to suppose that even the things of this inferior World, tho principally destin'd for the Use of Man, yet were merely and only intended for that end. Almighty God has the Glory of his own Greatness, and the Communication of his own Goodness, as the chief end of all his Works. Nay and 'tis the Opinion of * two great men, that even in the very lowest Animals, and whatsoever has *conscious Life*, God, besides their being serviceable to Man, had other Designs, which we know not of, and that possibly in the Effect of them he intended a Communication of so much of his Beneficence to them, as might give 'em a kind of Complacency and Fruition suitable to their own Capacity, tho subordinate to other ends.

Now the Case being so, the Atheist going upon a wrong Supposition, we might now very fairly take our leave of him, seeing he does not directly oppose us, and so does only beat the Air, we not conceiving the World to have been made purely for the sake and service of Man; and moreover denying that the things which do not wholly serve to this end, when also we know not what other ends they serve to, must therefore be look'd on as superfluous or ill-made. But however allowing the Atheist the ground he would go upon, let us a little enquire into Particulars, and see whether he could gain his point this way. Pursuant then to what he would have the Theists grant, he tells us,

* *Judg Hale in Origination of Mankind, §. 4. c. 4. Dr. Cudworth in True Intel. Syst. fol. 876.*

* that the mundane Sphere is so fram'd in respect of the Disposition of the *Æquator* and *Ecliptick*, intersecting each other in an Angle of three and twenty Degrees and upwards, as to render the greatest part of the Earth uninhabitable and useless to Men and other Animals ; partly by reason of that Excess of Heat in the *Torrid Zone*, containing all between the *Tropicks* ; and partly from the Extremity of Cold in both the *Frigid Zones* towards either *Pole*. To which he adds, that besides, a great part of the habitable Earth is taken away from us by the Barrenness of Mountains and Rocks, Heaths and Sands, by the overspreading of the Seas ; and that the Remainder of the Earth which is inhabited, would yield no Fruit, were it not for man's Industry and Labour, but would be over-run with Thorns and Brambles ; nay when by this means it is made fruitful, and all things in it look green and flourishing, yet very often all this hope is quash'd by either excess of Heat and Drought, or Violence of Rain and Storms, or Keeness of Frost and Cold.

Now touching the first of these Cavils, which proceeds upon this ground, that the *Torrid* and *Frigid Zones* are not habitable : I flatly deny the Truth of this. As to the *Torrid Zone*, I say, that tho the Course of the Sun be indeed curb'd between the *Tropicks*, yet are not the Parts directly subject to his perpendicular Beams, either uninhabitable or extremely hot, as the Antients fancy'd : but the Parts under and near the Line are as

* Quod si jam rerum ignorem Primordia quæ sint,
Hoc tamen ex ipsis Cœli rationibus ausim
Confirmare, aliisque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis Divinitus esse paratam
Naturam rerum, tantâ stat prædita Culpâ.

fruitful and pleasant, and fit to make a Paradise of as any in the World; witness those delightfom Seats possess'd by *Portuguese, Spaniards, French, English, and Dutch*, upon the Sea-coasts of *Africa, the East Indies, Brasile*, and some of the *Charibbee* Islands; those fruitful Soils, which, says a learned Man, even * *Terra Di Lavoro* and *Sicily*, those most delicious Countrys, might justly envy; for here, he tells us, † the Inhabitants enjoy a perpetual Spring and Verdure, and, with this Fertility of the Earth, an uninterrupted Health, and, unless the Thred of Life be violently broken, they commonly arrive to a very great Age. The same is true of the *Aethiopians*, emphatically call'd by the Antients μακρόβιοι or long-liv'd; and especially of the *Brasilians*, who, as that learned Physician *Piso* has observ'd, do commonly live a hundred years: and so very wholesom is the Isle of *St. Helen* to the languishing *East India* Sailors, that, if they are not quite spent and gone, when landed there, they soon recover; and many other adjacent Countries have hardly any other Disease but old Age. E'en as if the Author of Nature, to baffle the Suspicion of foolish Man, had thought fit to signalize his Omnipotence by this apparent Indication, shewing it not to be out of his power to adapt the most unlikely Element to human Use; he having so order'd the Course of the Sun, that it does not lie long upon the places in the Torrid Zone, the Day there being but twelve hours to heat, and the Night as long to refresh and cool 'em; and withal they have frequent Showers and constant Breezes or fresh Gales of Wind from the

* Quibus Campania vel Sicilia invidetur.

† Vere enim & Viore perpetuo fruuntur, &c. Et nisi filum Vitæ externa vi abrumptur, eorum fere Longævitas. *Dr. Munday in Βιοχημικολογία.*

East. And Art moreover being the Handmaid of Nature, what the Mistress here fails immediately to provide for Man's convenience, is tolerably supply'd by his own Industry, under the Guidance of an all-seeing Eye; as by the use of Umbrellos, Air-spouts, sleeping by day under ground, and doing their business by night, &c.

Secondly, as to the *Frigid Zones*, whereas our Objector thinks these uninhabitable by reason of the Cold: yet that by a wise Contrivance, had there been any such, this might have been prevented, as supposing that the Tropics stood at a greater distance, and the Sun mov'd further Northward and Southward; for so the North and South Parts would be reliev'd, and not expos'd to so extreme Cold. To this I answer with the * Learned Mr. Ray, that this would be more inconvenient to the Inhabitants of the Earth in general, and yet would afford the North and South Parts but little more Comfort. For then as much as the Distances between the Tropics should be enlarg'd, so much would also the Arctick and Antarctick Circles be enlarg'd too; and thus we here in *England*, and so on Northerly, should not have that grateful Tranquillity and useful Succession of Day and Night; but proportionably to the Sun's coming towards us, so would our Days be of more than twenty four hours length; and according to his Recess in Winter, our Nights proportionable: which how great an inconvenience it would be, is easily seen. Whereas now the whole Latitude of Earth, which hath at any time above twenty four hours day, is little and inconsiderable, in comparison of the whole

* Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of Creation, &c. p. 147, 148.

Bulk, as lying near the Poles. And neither is that altogether uninhabitable or useless. For some of these Parts, we are told, are very populous, notwithstanding their terrible Winters; the Reason and Industry of Man here also subserving to the Providence of God. For either they dig convenient Caves, and filling 'em with Stores necessary for Life, do abide in 'em securely during the Winter; or they build Houses, which are so contriv'd, that they are easily warm'd by good Fires, and in 'em there are Stoves and inner Rooms so exactly compacted, that they let not in the least breath of Air. Also they fortify their Bodys against the piercing Cold, by lining their Clothes with very thick Furs, which, as * one observes, Nature has kindly provided for 'em in great abundance, because there was so much need of 'em. Again, besides good Liquors and Oils to comfort 'em as well within as without, moreover what is an Attendant and Effect of the Cold, they use as a Remedy against it; for they rub their frozen Joints with Snow, which, we are told, is an excellent means to expel the frigorifick Particles; and at length after their six months Cold and Darknes, they enjoy so many singular Advantages, as do very well compensate, if not outweigh those former Inconveniencys of Winter. Soon after Spring they have a perpetual and discontinu'd Light. Their Land, which for six whole months had lain cover'd with Snow, is thereby so enrich'd, that *Ceres* is now as it were transported with Joy, that she has found her dear *Proserpina*, and the People are bless'd with a fruitful Season; and withal this Fertility of Soil is attended with such a Salubrity of Air, that, as one asserts, some of the Natives live to

* *Quarum Copiam, quia tantus earum usus, benignè indulgit Natura.*

140 years, and * many more, he tells us, would also do so, unless by their Intemperance they violently broke the Thread of Life. And neither, I add, are those frozen Regions which are not actually inhabited by Men, altogether useless and unserviceable to 'em; for in the Waters live Whales and other Fish, which are not so obvious elsewhere, and yet are of great advantage to us; and on the Land are Bears, Foxes, and Deer, even in the most Northerly Country that was ever yet touch'd, and "† doubtless if we shall discover further " to the very North Pole, we shall find all that Tract " not to be vain, useless, or unoccupy'd. Wherefore on t'other hand I say, that what the Atheist here objects against, is a plain Demonstration of a provident Creator; the aforesaid Constitution of the Heavens being the most convenient that could be devis'd, as will appear from considering the great Inconveniences of other Dispositions, and especially these three: First, if the Axes of the *Æquator* and *Ecliptick* were parallel, and their Plains co-incident; Secondly, if these Circles should intersect each other in right Angles; and Thirdly (which is a middle betwixt both) if they should cut one another in an Angle of forty five Degrees. For it is evident, that each of these Dispositions would be attended with far greater Inconveniences to the Terrestrial Inhabitants, in respect of the length of Days and Nights, Heat and Cold. And therefore in short, that these two Circles should be as they are, and withal continue thus to keep the same angular Intersection, when Physical and Mechanick Causes

* Quod plures facerent, nisi suâ Intemperantiâ filum Vitæ medium abrumperent. Dr. Munday in *Broxens*.

† Mr. Ray in Lib. prius citat. p. 148.

would bring 'em still nearer together, is also, as we have before observ'd, a further Eviction of a Providence.

Again, whereas the Atheist would have it, that Mountains and Rocks are useless to us, and only Deformitys and Bungles in the Earth: As well, says a * learned Man, might the Ant ask him of what use is the Eminence of his Nose and Eye-brows, which stand up higher proportionably in his Face, than Mountains do in reference to the Plains of the Earth? And why should what is look'd on as Beauty and Proportion in the former, be condemn'd for Deformity and Disorder in the latter? If you see a shady Rock hanging over a Plain, and at the head of a clear Stream, a mossy Grot out of which it flows, you think a Landskip of this very pretty. Not, it may be, that you are any more taken with the Plain than the Mountain, with the River than the Rock, but because without these you'd not be pleas'd with it at all. Now if you behold the World as it is the Work of God, and the Mountains and other Parts, which you find fault with, not as they are in themselves, but as they are little Parts of this Work, undoubtedly you'll say the same of this: but if at one view you can't see all the World, so as to judg of the Proportion of the whole Body and its Parts, this methinks should teach you this Lesson, rather to praise the Skill of the Artist in what you think you do understand, than to doubt of it in what you do not understand. But let us see what further ground you have to complain. Would you secure your self from Rain, from Heat and Cold? the Mountains sup-

* Philippes de Mornay in his *De la Verité de la Relig. Chrest.* p. 168, &c. where there is much more to this purpose.

ply you with Forests, to cover, to shade, and to warm you. Would you pursue the Advantage of Trade? the Mountains and Rocks furnish you with Rivers from East to West, from North to South, and join for you the middle of the Earth to the Sea, and the ends of the Earth together. Are you suspicious of your Neighbours Ambition, or have they reason to be jealous of yours? The high Mountains and Rocks do bound and separate Nations, and hinder 'em from making Inundations on each other. As the Kingly Prophet tells us, that the former * *are a Refuge for the wild Goats*, and the latter *for the Conys*; so had he learnt the Safety of these for Men by his own experience, when being pursu'd by *Saul* in the Wilderness he himself was fain to take refuge in a Mountain. " The same is witness'd by " our unconquer'd *Wales* and *Scotland*, whose greatest " Protection, as † one well observes, hath been the " natural Strength of their Country, so fortify'd with " Mountains, that these have always been unto them " sure Retreats from the Violence and Oppression of " others. Wherefore a good Author, says he, doth " rightly call them Nature's Bulwarks, cast up at God " Almighty's own charges, the Scorns and Curbs of " victorious Armys; which made the *Barbarians* in " *Curtius* so confident of their own Safety, when they " were once retir'd to an inaccessible Mountain, that " when *Alexander's* Legate had brought 'em to a Parley, " and persuading them to yield, told 'em of his Master's " Victories, what Seas and Wildernesses he had pass'd; " they reply'd, that all that might be, but could *Alex-* " *ander* fly too? Over the Seas he might have Ships,

* Psal. 104. 18.

† Bp Wilkins in Discovery of a new World, p. 77, 78.

“ and over the Land Horses, but he must have Wings
 “ before he could get up thither. In short, it is well
 observ’d by *Pliny*, that Mountains and Rocks are pur-
 posely fram’d by Nature for many excellent Uses: as
 partly to tame the Violence of greater Rivers, to
 strengthen certain Joints within the Veins and Bowels
 of the Earth, to break the Force of the Sea’s Inunda-
 tion, &c. not to mention what Treasuries they are of
 Minerals and Metals and useful Stones, what wholesom
 Pasturage, pleasant Wines and Fruit they yield, what
 pure Waters they distil, * nay that without ’em there
 could be no Springs or Rivers at all, and what delicious
 Habitations they cover. All which if the Atheist can
 shew us only in the Plain, I will then leave him to find
 fault with Mountains and Rocks: but if not, then let
 this rather convince him of the Being of an all-wise
 Maker and Ruler of these things, than be the least Ar-
 gument against it.

As to the next Cavil about barren Heaths and Sands,
 &c. To this I say in short, that the Earth appears to
 have been made convenient for Habitation, but not all
 of it, for that very reason, was to be inhabited. But
 in order to its being so, does the *Epicure* think that it
 must have been so contriv’d, that all the Surface
 of it should be rich Meadow and fruitful Soil, and so
 very thick inhabited? If so, ’tis observ’d by an † inge-
 nious Writer, that the Air would become so unwhole-
 som, that Plagues and Death would ever and a-
 non sweep away all. Wherefore long Tracts of dry
 and barren Places are the Security of so much Health
 as we enjoy: which is of more consequence, than to

* See Keil in Exam. of Burnet’s Theory, from p. 54, &c.

† The Author of Divine Dialogues. Dial. 2. p. 201.

have the Earth so pester'd with Inhabitants, and ever and anon to have all stink with Noisomness, Pestilence, and Death.

But *Lucretius* again is displeas'd with the *Sea*, for overspreading so much of the Earth. But how much room is there besides, which is habitable? And methinks he might be pleas'd with the Sea, because of those many Creatures which it breeds, and those many Citys which it enriches for him; because of the Navigation over it, which shortens his Way and accommodates his Traffick, and of the Vapours which entertain the Air and fatten the Earth. Supposing the Sea were once dry Land, how many Citys would be desolate, and how many People ruin'd? But besides the Accommodation it gives him, methinks instead of making him to question, it should cause him to acknowledg the provident Power and powerful Providence of Him who made it; when he sees it hanging above the Earth, and threatning it continually with an Inundation, yet he finds that it has such Bounds set to it, as it cannot pass. Not that I imagine with some, that this is done by a constant supernatural Force, and so is a standing Miracle: but rather, as a * learned Man observes, it would be a Miracle, if the Water should overflow the Land, as it did in the general Deluge. The reason is, says he, because the Water of it self must necessarily descend to the lowest place, which it cannot do, unless it be collected in a spherical Form: so that for the Sea to keep always in its Channel, is but agreeable to its nature, as being a heavy Body. But herein are display'd the Wisdom and Power of God, that it is collected in that Form, and so endu'd with a Principle

* Bp Wilkins in Discourse concerning a New Planet, p. 62, 63.

of Gravity ; that it has Channels appointed for it, and is beset with strong Banks to withstand the Fury of its Waves. To which purpose it is further observ'd by * *Strabo* as an Argument of Providence, that the Waters, if you respect only their Quality, and suppose 'em left to themselves, must needs take place between the Earth and the Air, whenas now we behold them confin'd to one proper Channel and interfus'd in the Earth, so far as to make it more fruitful and useful †.

Again, as to that Complaint, that Thorns and Thistles would over-run the Earth, were it not for the Labour of Man in the Cultivation of it ; to this I say, that besides that we know what Curse ensu'd upon the *Fall*, it is fit that we in this Life should have something to grapple with, to keep us from Idleness, the Mother of Mischief. And lastly as to the Husbandman's pains being after all often lost by unseasonable Weather ; “ by
“ this, I say, he is taught not to sacrifice to his own Net,
“ and that the Earth has a necessary Dependance on
“ Heaven and the Labours of Men on the Blessing of
“ God, that therefore he should depend on him, and
“ give him the Praise when he is successful ; as also to be
“ frugal and provident, and to lay up for a hard Year.

But this minds me to consider what the Atheist urges further, in that from things seemingly *deform'd* and *defective*, and *useless* particularly to Men, he passes on to such as he pretends are downright Evils, and directly hurtful to us ; which afterwards he taking for granted to be such, argues thus upon the point, endeavouring to reduce us *ad absurdum* : The suppos'd Deity and

* Mention'd by Sir C. Wolfely in Reasonableness of Scripture Belief, p. 47.

† See more on this Subject in Demonstration of the Existence and Providence of God, from p. 176, to 182. By John Edwards, B. D.

Maker of the World, says he, was either willing to abolish all Evils, but not able; or he was able, but not willing; or he was neither able nor willing. If he was willing, but not able to abolish 'em, then he was impotent; if he was able but not willing, then he was envious; if he was neither able nor willing, then was he at once both impotent and envious. Upon this I shall first make some general Observations, as I also did upon the former Head; and then proceed to examine Particulars. First then I observe with * St. *Austin*, that this Censure also proceeds from our Ignorance of things: " This, he tells us, is just as if an
 " unskilful Person going into the Shop of an Artificer,
 " and seeing in it a great variety of Instruments and
 " Tools, the Reasons and Uses of which he does not know,
 " should thereupon think 'em, if he but very weak, to
 " be superfluous and useless? Nay, and if he chance
 " to step into a Furnace, or to wound himself with an
 " edg'd Tool, which he did not rightly handle, he should
 " presently imagine, that many things there were per-
 " nicious and hurtful. Notwithstanding the Artift
 " himself, well knowing the good use of 'em, laughs
 " at his Folly, and not minding such Impertinencys,
 " goes on with his Work. Again I say, concerning the
Evils of Affliction, that a great part of those Evils
 which Men are afflicted with, is not from the Reality
 of things, but only, as the † *Moralist* tells us, from
 their own *Fancy* and *Opinions* about 'em. And there-
 fore it being much in our own power to be freed from
 'em, God and Providence are not to be blam'd upon
 the account of 'em. Again let me hint, tho I shall
 not repeat what was || before observ'd; that the true

* In Loc. prius citat.

† Ταράσσει τὸς ἀνθρώπους ἢ τὰ πρᾶγματα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῶν πραγμάτων
 δόγματα. || See back at pag. 136, 137, &c.

Occasion of Evils in the World, is from the *Incompossibility* of things and the *Necessity* of imperfect Beings; that *Evils* are proper to set off and give the greater relish to Good; also that there seems to be a necessary Use in the World of those *involuntary Evils* of *Pain* and *Suffering*, both for the Exercise of Vertue, and for repressing, chastizing and punishing those *voluntary Evils* of *Vice* and *Action*. To this purpose we are told by an * excellent Divine, that the Evil of Misery is no way inconsistent with the Goodness of Providence, since the generality of those Evils which we suffer in this World, are either the natural Effects, or the just Punishments, or the necessary Antidotes and Preventives of our Sin. And therefore, says he, when you come into a great School of wild and unruly Boys, you may as well argue that there is no Master of it, because there are Rods and Ferula's in it, as that there is no God or Providence over this sinful World, because there are Miserys and Afflictions in it. To which I add, that the Divine Art and Skill do most of all appear in bonifying these *Evils*, and making 'em, like Discords in Musick, to contribute to the Harmony of the Whole, and in the end to the good of particular Persons; inso-much that whatever design'd or permitted Evil there is in the World, is for a far greater Good, and therefore is not properly in the summary Compute of the whole Affairs of the Universe to be reputed Evil. It is therefore our Ignorance, says † one, of the true Law of Goodness, that makes us such incompetent Judges of what is or is not carry'd on according to the Law of that Love or Goodness, which is truly Divine. The

* Dr. Scot in *Christian Life*, Part 2. Vol. 1. p. 247, 248.

† Author of *Divine Dialog*. p. 181.

Wisdom whereof appears also in this, that the Passion of Sadness in us has a proper Object answering to it, and which, as it is the Mother of Tears, very often excites Compassion in the Spectators, and so moves 'em to be serviceable to our Comfort or Relief. Wherefore, as I said, that in making a Judgment of the *Goodness* of the World, we should not single out the *Parts* of it as standing by themselves, but look on 'em as under the relation which they bear to each other in the *Whole*: so likewise I now say, that in judging of the *Wisdom* or *Providence* of God, we should not single out *particular* Dispensations whether *past* or *present*, and then consider 'em abstractly by themselves; but we should look on 'em as under the relation which they have to the general Oeconomy of the *Whole*, and some remoter End at which they drive, connecting together the *future* Time with *past* and *present*. And then should we undoubtedly find just ground to applaud the *whole Drama*, tho some single *Scenes* and *Acts* of it might not be so diverting by themselves: And in short we should find enough to make us acknowledge a *good* and *wise* God in the Contrivance of it. And as to what we do not discover the reason of, as being laid out by an *infinite Mind* beyond the Sphere of our *finite ones*, this ought we to admire upon the account of what we do, and suppose it to be order'd with an excellent *Design*; * *it being very probable*, as *Origen* tells us, *that there are Causes of these things in the Reasons of Providence, tho they do not easily fall under human Notice*. And indeed that they do not, is perhaps a further Indication of a God and

* Ταὶς ὅτι καὶ τῶν αἰτίων πάντως μὲν εἶδος ἔχει, ἐν τοῖς τῆς προνοίας λόγοις. πίπτειν δὲ αὐτὰς εἰς ἀνθρώπου ἐκ ἐυχαιῶν.

a *Providence*; whose several Actings, were they so palpable and plain, as that we could not but see and know them, would not then be so well suited to the Powers and Design of our *Nature*; forasmuch as this would be to *compel*, not to *persuade* the *free* Creature to acknowledg its Creator. “ And thus again would “ our Intellectuals lose their most proper and pleasant Game, the seeking out of God by his Foot- “ steps in the Creation. For this were to thrust “ himself upon us, even whether we would or no, “ and not to leave us the Exercise and Pleasure of “ searching for him in the Tracts of Nature: in “ which there is this further Delight, that if we meet “ with any thing which seems less agreeable at the “ first sight, let us use the utmost Wit we can to alter “ and amend it; and upon a trial shall we find, that “ we only made it worse by tampering with it.

But after all, What are those particular *Evils*, which the Atheist insists on? Why he tells us, there’s a multitude of these, and that Man is subject to ’em from his Birth; witness the several Miserys of *Infancy*, his being liable to *War*, *Plague*, *Famine* and *Earthquakes*, to Diseases and Pains, to be disturb’d or taken off by *poisonous Herbs*, *noxious Animals* and *devouring Beasts*; or, after all, if he chance to escape a *violent*, yet must he at last yield to a *natural Death*.

First he insists on the pretended Miserys of * *Infancy*,

* Tum porro puer, ut sævis projectus ab Undis
Navita, nudus humi jacet, Infans, indigus omni
Vitæ Auxilio, cum primum in Luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo Matris Natura profudit:
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum ’st,
Quoi tantum in Vitâ restet transire malorum.
At variæ crescunt Pecudes, Armenta, Feræque,
Nec Crepitacula eis opu’ sunt, &c.

in that we are born *helpless, naked, wanting Rattles* and other the like Amusements, and only able to *cry* and *bawl*; which latter, he thinks, may also be look'd on as a Prefage of future Disasters hanging over us. But these, I say, are so far from being grounds to disprove, that on the contrary they prove an all-wise Providence, which, if it be at all, as it must be suppos'd to govern all things according to their respective Natures, so has it thought it not only allowable, but also needful, that Infants should be *helpless: allowable*, I mean, without any way reflecting on the superintending Care of God; and that because they descend from such Parents, as besides what the *Greeks* term *στοργή*, a *natural Affection toward their Off-spring*, are also endu'd with *Reason* and *Religion*, which, upon a more lasting ground than the former is seen to do also in brute Creatures, makes 'em indulgent and kind to their Young, so long at least as the Infirmary of their Nature and Condition requires it; and accordingly is it never known, I mean in the ordinary Course of things, that Infants fail of Nourishment or Nurses, notwithstanding the Supply of the one and the Office of the other be a matter of Labour and Trouble: so that methinks by how much the less the Infant is able to provide for it self, so much the more is the Divine Power seen in making some other Provision for it. And therefore as it is plainly allowable, that Infants should be born *helpless*, because they are thus providentially *help'd*; so again do we find it to be a thing absolutely needful in it self that they should be so, inasmuch as the Nature and Condition of Man do plainly require it. For as the *rational Soul* in *Man* is vitally united to a *Body*, it has a mutual Intercourse with it, and in a great measure depends on the assistance

of such bodily Organs, as requiring a *competent Strength* and *Firmness*, must accordingly have some time for Growth, before they can be fix'd and made useful to that End. But again when that is done, then is the delay of Maturity amply compensated, either by the Vigour and Acuteness even of those Facultys which are common to Men with Brutes, or by the Diuturnity of Life; it being remark'd by * Naturalists, that those Animals which live long, have not only a long Gestation in the Womb, but also a long Infancy, and attain but slowly to their Maturity and Standard of Growth.

What again if the Child be also born *naked*? Has it not kind indulgent Parents, endu'd with the Use of *Reason* and *Hands*, who are able to contrive and make Clothes for it? To which I add, that perhaps it is not disagreeable to the *natural* State of our Bodys to be without Clothing; since they, as some think, will endure any thing, which from the beginning they are accustom'd to. However, as one tells us, that Body which was to be an Habitable for so sensible a Spirit as the human Soul is, ought to be more tender and delicate than that of brute Beasts, according to that Physiognomonical Aphorism of *Aristotle*: † *The Generous have tender Flesh*.

And what again if the Infant stand in need of Rattles, &c. which brute Creatures are not observ'd to do? To this I answer, that Brutes are not so properly said not to need these Toys, as not to be capable of them, they having not so excellent a Spirit in them, as to be taken up with the Admiration of any thing: whereas

* Dr. Charlton in *Darkness of Atheism dispell'd by the Light of Nature*, C. 3. Sect. 2.

† *Οἱ μαλακώτατοι ἐν ψυχαῖς.*

the Child's Amusement, the Rattle, is the Effect of that noble Passion, which is the Mother of Reason and all Philosophy; and accordingly is it observable in Men, that those amongst 'em who are noted to have the greatest share of this latter, were seen, when Children, to give most attention to such Objects.

But further, can the Infant do nothing else but *cry* and *bawl*? This, I say, is not so much a Presage of *Evils* to come, as the begging of Aid against the present from those that are about it; Providence having very seasonably furnish'd it with this natural, this moving Rhetorick of Tears, to excite Compassion and call in Assistance. But what in the next place are those *future Evils*, which the Atheist says are afterwards incident to Men in the Course of their Lives, and inconsistent with the *Providence* of a good and wise God? Why the first Sample he gives us of 'em are *War, Famine, Plague* and *Earthquakes*. Touching which I first answer in general, that these are partly the Effects of our own inordinate Passions, partly of such natural and necessary Causes, as upon the *supposition* of a good and wise Providence, without a miracle cannot be prevented; partly they are the just Consequences of Sin, or else Preservatives of us against it, and that sometimes in a manner extraordinary, when God for these Ends makes it sensibly appear that he ruleth in the Earth and is the Lord of Nature. Did not such Disasters ever happen in the World, we should be apt to think that it is liable to none, not even from the Hand of a superior Power; but that it stood as a *necessary* Aggregate of things, and wholly upon its own Legs: Whereas we now seeing it obnoxious to so great ones, and yet such as are perpetually triumph'd over by the Wisdom and Counsel

sel* of God, we are thereby plainly convinc'd of Providence, that is, even from such things as seem at first sight most of all to disprove it. Accordingly I say in particular of *War* and its Effects, that these are not to be cast upon God (supposing that there is one) but upon our selves, whose untam'd *Lusts* having shaken off the Yoke of *Reason*, make us greedy of Dominion and Rule over others, our Pride and Haughtiness not letting us put by any the least Affront or Injury. And as for *Famine*, this again is ordinarily rather the Effect of *War* than the Defect of the Soil or Unkindness of the Season: and were it otherwise, then might the Frugality and Providence of Men prevent any further ill Consequence thereof, and present Necessities set their Wits a work. To which I add, that there is such a Communication betwixt Nations and People, that mutual Supplis are usually made in such like Exigencys. And touching *Plague*, this, I confess, would seem more justly reflecting on God, did we not pull it down upon our selves as a deserved Scourge for our Disobedience. And again we may consider, that tho whole Citys are sometimes swept away by this Devourer, as were *Athens* and *Constantinople*, yet such an acute Disease as this makes quick dispatch; which also renders *Earthquakes* in like manner more tolerable. For in this case 'tis methinks an advantage to the Good and Pious, that they have a present Death and more speedy Burial; and as for the Wicked and Profane, they are justly made an Argument of what they deny, by the revenging Hand of God, their Souls being condemn'd and hurry'd away, without hope of a Reprieve,

* For Human Kind notwithstanding is preserv'd. Of this see Judg Hale in Origin. of Mankind, §. 2 c. 10.

to an eternal State of Torment. So that in this case the *Epicure* must be silent on his own part, and all that he can say against *Providence* must be in reference to the Destruction of *good Men*; who, if they are sometimes swept away with the Bad, as, without an extraordinary prevention, it cannot but sometimes happen, while the one are mingled with the other and the *Tares* with the *Wheat* in this Life; yet is the *Goodness* of God still justify'd, while the former have as it were a *Surprise* into Happiness, as the latter have into Misery. Indeed we humbly and modestly pray with the Church of *England* against a *sudden Death*, as supposing that without a sensible Prospect of our End in a lingering Illness, even the best of us are not *actually* prepar'd for it; yet in Cases of this Nature it is to be hop'd, that the God of all Mercy will make some Allowances, that upon a *general Repentance* (which must needs be the constant Effect of an inward good Principle) he will, thro Christ, have mercy on those, who albeit they are not *actually perfect*, yet in the Course of their Lives do endeavour to be so, and with the Apostle follow after *Perfection*. To which I add, " that it is
" the Skill of the great *Dramatist* to enrich the History
" of the World with such Tragical Transactions as
" those before-nam'd, without which the Spectators
" of this terrestrial Stage-play would even nod, for
" want of something more than ordinarily notorious
" to engage and hold on their Attention. And in short,
" the Records of those forepast Miserys of other Ages
" and Places do engender a pious Fear in the Well-
" dispos'd, and make all that hear of 'em more sensi-
" bly relish their present Tranquillity and Happiness.
" And, which is ever to be consider'd, the inexhausti-
" ble Stock of the Universe will very easily bear the
" Expence

“ Expend of these so amusing Poms and Solemnitys ;
 “ which therefore give the more ample witness to
 “ the *Wisdom* and *Power* and also the *Goodness* of the
 “ Deity : which latter Attribute is concern’d in displaying and setting the former a work, in order to perfect our Natures, and bring us over to the Admiration, to the Fear and Love of himself, and so to make us happy.

The next *Evils* incident to Men, and which the Atheist objects against the Goodness of God, are *Diseases* and *Pains*. As well might he find fault, as was before intimated, that God, if he be infinitely good, did not make every thing *best*, and that not only in its Kind but Degree ; and among the rest, that he did not at least make *us* without *Bodys* and equal to the Angels of Light. But let him consider, that the World is made according to *Number*, *Weight* and *Measure*, and that all things are plac’d in regular *Scales* and *Orders* ; that accordingly we, as Parts of the Universe, have our proper Station in it ; that we are rank’d, and are as it were a knot of Union between *Angels* and *Brutes*, carrying about us *material Bodys*, and being upon trial of our *spiritual Souls*. Now these Bodys are either of course subject to *Diseases* and *Pains*, or else are sometimes made so for an Experiment or Increase of our *Vertue*, or the Reformation of our past Lives. That they should be so, according to the ordinary Course of things, is a necessary Consequence of the Justlings, Conjugations, Separations, &c. of the Parts of *Matter* ; which in this or that particular System must needs occasion Discomposures and Disorders. However ’tis enough, as touching the present Instance, to justify Providence herein, that first our little World, as a compleat *Automaton*, is fitted to move upon its own
Springs

Springs and Wheels ; and, which the more discovers the Divine Skill incorporate in the *Matter* of it, it does not frequently need the Interposal of *absolute Power*, but is in a way, so far as the Frailty of its Nature will allow, to be kept up and secur'd from harm by God's general Influx, together with the innate Caution of the Soul that resides in it, and the commodious Organization of its *bodily Principle* : so that the *Evils* aforesaid are, properly speaking, *Mischances* or *Accidents* ; and unless it be either thro our own Mismanagement or the special Hand of Providence, do not often happen in the Course of our Lives. To which I add, that the Blessing of *Health* and *Pleasure* is best set off and recommended to us by the Misery of *Sickness* and *Pain* ; and therefore as 'tis fit we should set a due value on the former, so are we visited sometimes by the latter ; and accordingly do we find that these Extremes are often coupled, agreeably to that *Socratick Fable* : That *when God could not reconcile their Natures as he would, he ty'd 'em head and tail together*. So that as after the falling of the Clouds there is Serenity and Sunshine, so the *Pleasure* of Recovery taking its turn after the *Pain* of Illness, does ordinarily more than compensate the overpast Misery. And moreover in reference to others, the *Sick* being a Spectacle to those that are *well*, do make them more sensible of their own *Health*, and are a means to stir up in them a thankful Devotion towards God their Preserver, and to engage 'em to employ their Health to good purposes.

But again, the Atheist tells us of another Set of *Evils*, namely, in that we *Men**, for whom he takes it for granted that Theists do suppose this World to have

* ——— Horum omnia Causa
Constituiffe Deum fingunt ———

been made, are liable either to be taken off or much disturb'd by *poisonous Herbs or Plants, noxious Animals* and *devouring wild Beasts*. Touching all which I first say in general, that this Objection does not reach all Countrys, witness our own and some others; or if it did, yet first in reference to the former Instance I say, that as for *poisonous Herbs and Plants*, it is in our power to refuse and avoid 'em, and 'tis thro our own fault or mere accident, if at any time we suffer from 'em: to which I add, that either immediately or mediately they are very useful to us; for in Composition, as in Treacle and the like, they serve to medicinal Ends, and to other purposes of Life, and often they are food to other Creatures which do so. Accordingly again may this also be a Salvo to the next Instance of *hurtful Animals*, which moreover are not properly *evil* in themselves or to us; " They are capable of the Delights of " the *Animal Life*, and were fitly brought into being " in this Region of *Sin*, as ready Instruments of the " Divine Wrath, notorious Ornaments of the Theatre " of the World, and great Enrichments of the History " of Nature, which would be defective, did it not " run from one Extreme to another. And as to these and also *wild Beasts*, *Theodoret* gives this reason why God created 'em: namely, * that by the Terror of them he might confront our Boldness, form us to Virtue, and make us need and accordingly beg the Divine Assistance; † And thus, says he, speaking to Man, *does thy Fear lead thee to God*. " But, he goes on, to the " end that thou mightest not lie under a constant dread, " and lead thy whole Life in Sadness, he has plac'd

* Ὅπως οὖν τὸ νεανικὸν καὶ θρασὺ παιδαγωγῆσιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς φόβον καὶ θείων εἰς χρεῖαν σε καλᾶσθαι τῆς θείας ἐπικρείας, &c. In Orat. 5. de Prov.

† Εἰνέλαι σοὶ ὅτος ὁ φόβος προηγὸς πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Ib.

“ these odious Creatures at a distance from thee:
 “ the venomous ones he has hid and commanded to live
 “ in Caverns under Ground; and as for wild Beasts,
 “ he has order’d for their Dwelling, Woods, Rocks,
&c. remote from all Society of Men, and appointed
 ’em a certain Season to feed in, namely the *Night*;
 and again, he has endu’d ’em with such an awe of hu-
 man Kind, as makes ’em commonly fly the sight of
 Men, and rarely invade or fall upon ’em, unless pro-
 vok’d or pinch’d with vehement Hunger. And those
 among these Creatures which are very deadly, as for
 instance the Rattle-snake, the Viper, *&c.* are provi-
 dentially forc’d to give warning of their Approach, or
 to bring with ’em a Cure of the Mischief which they
 do; and as to those other *savage Beasts* which are
 stronger than *Men*, and naturally arm’d, *Men* by the
 Use of Reason can so provide against ’em, as either to
 avoid, to ensnare or destroy them by a thousand arti-
 ficial ways; and then to make use of their Flesh, or
 wear their Skins as Trophys and Marks of a Conquest
 over ’em. To which I add, that these noxious Crea-
 tures are but few in number, and multiply but little.
 And in short, it is a token of a good Providence over us,
 that as all those Creatures, which may do us hurt, are
 afraid of and shun us, so all those, which are of use to us,
 do as it were meet us, and may be led even by a Child.

But what if some Animals, tho not deadly, yet are
 wont to be troublesome to us? At least they try
 our Patience then; and if they be not otherwise of
 immediate use to us, yet are they Food for other Crea-
 tures which are so; and what more just in the Course
 of things than this *Pythagorean* Aphorism: * *the worse*

* Χέρσιν ἐνεργεῖν τὸ βελτίον.

is made for the better. Every the least Creature is perfect in its Kind, and serving to something superior, contributes according to its Sphere to the general Good of the World. The *Flys* are Food for the *Swallows*; and besides other purposes, what more proper than even these latter to purify and cleanse the Air? Both these and other *Insects* do gather up the Corruption of the Earth, as also the *Vermin* do that of the Blood. But what if with * *St. Austin* we should own that we don't know why *Mice* and *Frogs*, why *Flys* and little *Worms* were made? We find 'em however to be compleat Pieces in their kind, and from the Organization and Structure of their Parts do descry a wise Contriver of 'em, and ought therefore to conclude that they serve for some Ends, albeit we do not discern 'em. And besides, there are so many Footsteps of Wisdom visible in the other Parts of the World, as are enough to convince us that it is not wanting in these also. And what wonder is it if we do not, nay cannot know the Ends of some things; unless we had been of God's Council in designing 'em, and shar'd *Omniscience* with him? Especially considering that some things were not *confessedly* made for our sakes only or immediately; and accordingly as it may not *concern* us to know the other respective Ends to which they serve, it is not strange that we do not.

What again if there be some *Monstrositys* and *Heteroclites* in Nature? Are these an Argument against the Divine *Wisdom* and *Power*? And that things are carry'd on not by any steady superior Cause, but at random and by chance? These φύσεως ἀμαρτήματα, these

* Ego verò fateor me nescire Mures & Ranae quare creata sint, aut Muscæ aut Vermiculi. *In Loc. nuper cit.*

little *Deviations* or *Miscarriages* of Nature are but few, and seldom come to pass; and it is indeed the Rarity of 'em that makes us so admire and remark 'em. These do bear no proportion to the ἀποτελέσματα, the perfect Pieces of undoubted Artifice and Skill, which we behold in the things of Nature. And again, even the former are far from proving the Absence or the Inadvertency of a superior *Wisdom*; seeing they may not be look'd on as mere *accidental* and *random Strokes*, but as done or allow'd with *Deliberation* and *Design*. God, to let us see that *Nature* does not act as a Mistress, but as a Servant and Instrument under him, may think fit sometimes to wrench, pervert and turn it at his pleasure. And tho *Monstrositys* may seem to deface the *Beauty* and *Order* of this or that particular thing; yet as they are fit to illustrate and set off what is *well made* in 'em (for still there are some Footsteps of Wisdom even in the greatest Monsters) so accordingly might they be intended as so many Spots in the Face of *Venus*, or as the *Negro* at *Cleopatra's* Elbow, to enhance the Beauty of other Parts or Things, and so to contribute to the *general Advantage*. But of this only by the way; return we now to the pretended *downright Evils* incident to Men in this World.

Supposing, says the Atheist, that we make a hard Shift to endure or escape, with our Life, the *Evils* aforesaid; yet is there an *irresistible Necessity*, that after having run thro all these Troubles or Dangers at least, and got clear of a *violent*, we must at last yield to a *natural Death*; which at the best is justly call'd the *King*, because it is the greatest of *Terrors*, and an insupportable *Evil*. To which I answer, that the Atheist methinks of all Men should spare the urging of this; because, granting the Truth of what he said before, that this Life is attended with

with a multitude of *Evils*, yet then would Death, according to his Principle, prove no small *Good*, in that it would be a Release from all *Evils*. But no, says the Atheist, it can't be so neither, because tho it does indeed free us from all other *Evils*, yet still is that it self an intolerable *Evil*, in that it annihilates and puts an end to our very *Being*; to the very Thoughts of which Mankind can never be reconcil'd: for while they love themselves, as all Men certainly do, and accordingly desire the Continuation of their *Being*, they can't but have the greatest Abhorrence of *Death*, which destroys their Existence. But this, we say, has a tang of his own Atheistick Principle, and goes upon a false Supposition, that there is no future *Existence*, but that *Death* puts a final period to our *Being*. Whereas we assert and are able to prove, that *Death* only opens the way to a more durable State, either of *Happiness* or *Misery*; and so proves either *good* or *evil* according to the Quality of the Person it lights upon, and as Men themselves make it so either by a well or ill-spent Life. And thus indeed if we consider Death not barely as it terminates the present, but also commences a future *Life*, it is indeed *evil* to the Atheist himself, tho not to *Men* as such; and that first, because at the present he can't be assur'd of the Principle he'd go upon, and therefore lying under suspense in a case of this moment, must needs *all his Life long be subject to Bondage thro the Fear of Death*; and when at length he comes to die, he is seiz'd with Horror, and at the best has only a fluctuating hope of *Annihilation*; of the Folly even of which hope he is at last sadly convinc'd by that *Misery*, which he must endure to everlasting Ages. But let him not measure the State of all Men by his own; for on the other hand, as *Death* must needs be a very great

great *Evil* to them that *live ill*, so does it prove a very great *Good* to them that *live well*; inasmuch as it is not a bare Enfranchisement from the Vanitys and Troubles of this World, but a means of procuring us a Tenure indefaible in a *far more exceeding and eternal Weight of Glory*. And therefore, how unreasonable is it to complain of Death, and to make it an Argument against *God and Providence*, whenas I add, upon the supposition of a God that is absolutely *good*, his Destination of Men to this Fate is most decorous and just? For not to mention to the Atheist our *laps'd Condition*, which made us incur the Penalty of Death, there is a becoming *Sweetness* in this *Severity*, inasmuch as by this our Souls are timely releas'd from the present Bondage of *Vanity and Sin*, and in a way to be most happy, if it be not our own fault. Again, "I hold it to be
" an Oeconomy more befitting the Goodness of God to
" communicate Life to a succeeding Series of terres-
" trial Persons, than that one constant number of 'em
" should monopolize all the Good of the World, and sti-
" fle and prevent succeeding Generations. Especially
considering, that also in this case there would be a Sa-
tiety of the Enjoyments of this Life; and therefore is
it fit, that, *as well saturated Guests, we should at length*
willingly recede from the Table. And methinks there
can't but arise to Men more Joy and Pleasure in this
way of Succession, than if there were the same Men
always; " for it were a dull thing constantly to have
" the same Actors on the Stage: besides that the Va-
" riety of mens Ages would be lost, as also the Pretti-
" nesses of their *Passions* and the Difference of *Sexes*,
" which afford to each other their peculiar Delights.
And in short, it appears to be of the very nature of
terrestrial Animals to be mortal; insomuch that with-
out

out the Force of a Miracle 'tis impossible they should be everlasting. What therefore could Providence do better in this case, than to make their *Species* at least immortal, by a continu'd Propagation and Succession?

After these Engagements I find the Atheistick Forces divided, some of 'em resolving to rally and stand it out upon a new piece of Ground, proceeding from the Topic of *natural* to *moral Evils* or *Sins*, the Permission of which, they tell us, can never consist with the *Providence* of a God that is *infinitely good*; others of 'em, and those the main Body, do now think fit to file off and quit the Field, as namely the *Democriticks* and *Epicureans*, who speciously argue in * *Dr. Cudworth*, upon the foregoing Topics, of what they pretend are *natural Evils*; and are not, I think, so speciously answer'd, the † Doctor himself confessing on that head, that *he had not room to expatiate in*. But as for *moral Evil* or *Sin*, these Atheists have nothing to say to that; because they denying a *Liberty of Will* in Man, do thereby deny the distinction of *moral Good* and *Evil*; and accordingly the aforesaid learned Author, as chiefly concerning himself with *them*, has mention'd no other than *seeming natural Evils*, in his Catalogue of *Atheistical Reasonings*. But however, because other Atheists, and among the rest the impious *Vanini*, have taken up the Cudgels, and pretend to argue with us, that upon the supposition of a most good God, surely there would be no *moral Evil* or *Sin*, saying that either our pretended God *cannot hinder Sin, and so is impotent*, or *else he will not, and so is evil*; nay, and that he seems plainly to be the Author of Sin, as having given to us

* True Int. Syst. p. 77, 78, &c.

† P. 880.

those *Wills* by which we *sin* *; because of this, I say, and withal it being my design in this Work to leave nothing material unanswered, which any way tends to make for the Cause of Atheism, I think it expedient, after having mention'd *natural Evils*, to solve this Doubt about *moral Evils*; which methinks comes near to the Argument of that Pagan Philosopher, who said, *If there be a God, whence then proceeds Evil?* but who as suddenly recollects himself, *If there be no God, whence then proceeds Good?* As likewise under the former Head, instead of arguing against a God and a Providence from any seeming Disorder or Deformity in the World, it might have been more rationally urg'd, *If there be no God, whence then is so much Order and Beauty?* But to give a full Satisfaction in this point, I desire in the first place it may be consider'd, that Man is only a Part of the World and not absolutely perfect, but has according to his Rank and Station in the Universe a *Metaphysical Goodness*, that is, he is perfect in his kind, and in conjunction with his Fellow-Creatures, may fitly contribute to the general End of the Creation. 2^{ly}, that God indeed must be suppos'd to be infinitely perfect in all senses, as well in point of Wisdom, &c. as in point of Goodness, and to be the Maker and Ruler of all other things as well as Men. But again, it is to be consider'd, that as he did not pour out the utmost Extent of his Goodness upon any one thing or Species of *Being*, so neither did he impart an equal measure of it to all things: but his infinite *Wisdom*, which first

* Van. in Amphitheat. Prov. agreeably to the state of this Objection in Mer-
 fennus, cum melius sit in mundo nulla esse Peccata, & tamen illa regnent,
 non est Deus, alioquin illa tollere deberet. And again, Si Deus esset, sicut
 nec facere, ita neque permittere valeret, ut Peccata fierent, permittit tamen,
 igitur non est. In Quæst. Cel. in Gen. Col. 234.

directed his Council in making them, as it dealt out a certain Portion of *Goodness*, agreeably to the nature of the thing design'd, and the respective Part it was to act in order to the great End of all; so does it still display a futable measure of the same in caring for and directing it at once to the publick and also the private Intendment of its Being. Accordingly we find, that Man among the rest, to avoid a Chasm and Gap in the Universe, having been allotted a proper Station between *Angels* and *Brutes*, and so being, * *as it were, a vital Joint clasping the upper and lower World together*, consists not only of a *corporeal necessary* Lump which is proper to the latter, but also of the *spiritual* and *free* Substance of the former; and as such, God is pleas'd to govern him, agreeably to what in his infinite Wisdom he first made him, that is, not as a mere necessary Cause, but as an Agent endu'd with *Reason* and *Liberty of Choice*, and withal as in a State of Probation and Trial for a more lasting and better Inheritance. Wherefore as in *Matter*, which I hinted before, he does not so overpower its natural Capacity, as to set it above *Changes*, *Diseases*, *Corruption* and *Death*; so neither in free *Creatures* does he irresistibly prevent the use of their own Nature, nor forcibly supersede the Tendency of their Wills: but affording 'em his conservative Influx and Concourse, he leaves 'em further to do their own part; that is, as he *made* 'em to act *freely*, so he *allows* 'em to act *freely*; and if in doing this they make a wrong Choice, this is not chargeable on God, but themselves. This, I conceive, may in Reason be granted upon the bare supposition that there is such a God as we Theists assert, and accordingly that

* Συνδεσμος ζωικός ὅς τε ἄνω καὶ ὅς κατω. Simplic.

there may be *Sin* in the World; for indeed it would be as absurd to expect that God should suspend the Force of Fire, whenever it is set to a House or falls where it may do hurt, as that he ought to interpose continually, and hold Men back, when he sees 'em inclin'd and ready to do ill. For in short, this would be to offer violence to the Nature of Man, to alter his State and Condition at every turn, and to make him somewhat else than he is, that is, than a rational and free Agent. But still so far as it is proper and consistent with the Privilege of a Being of this Character, what has God omitted to do on his part to hinder Men from *Sin*? He enlightens their Minds, gives 'em a Discernment of *Good* and *Evil*, sollicitates and moves 'em to chuse the one and refuse the other, by the Instincts of Conscience, by the Workings of his Spirit, which co-operates with theirs, by Commands and Prohibitions, by Promises and Threats, by Rewards and Punishments, and those as well present as future, all the ways of Vertue being Pleasantness and her Paths Peace; whereas those of Vice are crooked, painful and uneasy: insomuch that *the wicked Man travelleth with Pain all his days*, and neither his Flesh nor Spirit are at ease; whereas a *good Man* is constantly delighted, *and ever satisfy'd from himself*. And when especially God has done all this, not only made us by Nature *free*, but has added much weight to the Ballance one way, and powerfully influenc'd and engag'd our rational Powers to the side of Vertue; if Men, I say, after all this is done will fall in with Vice, upon whom does the Wickedness reflect but themselves? But, says the Atheist, God, according to your Supposition, gave Men those Wills by which they sin, and therein seems to be at once the Author and Approver of Sin. As well

might God be blam'd because Men often die by the abuse of those very things, without the use of which they cannot live, as because Men are evil even by that, without which they cannot be good. And this, as * one compares it, is just as if a Person who has given me good Wine, which yet thro my Neglect to keep it as it should be, does in time grow sour, should be reputed the Cause of its Sourness. But again says he, if your God, as you suppose, foresaw that by your Power of Freedom and Choice you would turn to the side of Evil, why then did he make you free? Would it not have been a shorter Cut and consequently wiser and better for God to have wholly prevented it? This, I confess, is somewhat saucily put in, as if our *finite* Understandings were competent Judges of what is laid out by an infinite *Mind*, and we poor silly Mortals were able to scan, and allow'd to censure the Designs and Actions of an all-wise God; and which is more, to prescribe to him Rules of Decorum and Order. As well might it be ask'd why God made us at all, or any other Creatures in conjunction with us, as why he made us *free*, and consequently *peccable*? However I tell my Opponent, that God did this first for his own *Glory*, which is undoubtedly better carry'd on by the Act of a *free Creature*, wherein he sees a Reflection of his own Beauty and Amiability, than by a *necessary* Adherence to him, wherein he rather views his infinite irresistible Power: and secondly, at once that we might also partake of his Goodness, and this that we might do the more abundantly too, he has endu'd us with a *Liberty of Choice*, and consequently of erring: whereby in the first place the Objects a-

* Charron in Les trois Verités, p. 82.

bout which we are or ought to be conversant, are more endear'd and sweeten'd to us, than they would have been by a *necessary* Indeficiency; and secondly, besides the present Satisfaction, our Actions become yet further rewardable. Accordingly God has not plac'd us here on Earth, as in our fix'd abiding place; but we are only upon trial here, and as we find that our spiritual Nature is capable, so is it destin'd for a future State, of Happiness, if we observe the Terms of his Covenant with us, but of Misery, if we transgress 'em. And why should God deny the Bulk of Mankind the Privilege of *Liberty*, and by consequence of being vertuous, rewardable and happy, because some, he knew, would abuse this Talent, and so become obnoxious to Punishment and Misery? But still, says the Atheist, your suppos'd God might have made you *free* like himself, and so withal *impeccable*. He might, I own, have made nothing else but a kind of Gods, or the best Beings that could be next to himself: but where then were the *Number, Weight and Measure* of those infinite Tokens of Wisdom, which appear and are display'd by a Variety of things? Man is plac'd in his proper Rank, as a Part of the general System; is perfect in his kind, and at once furnish'd with such Advantages, as may carry him on to that Happiness, of which he finds himself capable. Which does sufficiently speak the Goodness of a free unlimited Wisdom. As well then might a *Worm* complain that it is not a *Man*, as *Man* that he is not an Angel, or Creature of the very highest Order. Surely God, who was unconstrain'd and under no Obligation to create any thing at all, was not unjust or unholy for not making every thing absolutely perfect, either in its Nature or Motions; but giving to each Rank of *Being* what
Degrees.

Degrees of Perfection he pleas'd : and therefore *who art thou, O Man, that repliest against God ? Shall the thing form'd say to him that form'd it, Why hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the Potter power over the Clay, of the same Lump to make one Vessel unto Honor and another to Dishonor ?* To which I add, that Freedom is essential to a rational Being as such, and in a *Creature* it necessarily supposes *Fallibility* and Obnoxiousness to *Sin* ; since the *Mind* of no *Creature* can be suppos'd to be omniscient, but it is of a limited Capacity and Knowledge, and may possibly err : by consequence the *Will*, which it is to prescribe to and determine in its Choice, must also be liable to go astray and turn to the side of *Evil*. So that to be free to *Good* and *Evil*, and consequently *fallible*, is as natural to all reasonable *Creatures* as to be finite in Knowledge and Understanding ; and therefore does our Saviour tell us, * that absolute and essential Goodness is an incommunicable Attribute of God ; who as he is vested with it, is not so properly said to want the liberty of chusing what is evil, as to be above it, inasmuch as he is infinitely perfect : whereas for a *Creature*, which is in all respects finite, it is, I say, essential to it as such to be fallible ; which yet again is so far from lessening, that indeed it magnifies the Dignity of it ; it being far nobler for it to be in a Capacity of tasting the Sweet of its own Discretion and Well-doing, and so again, if I may so speak, to merit somewhat from the Creator, than to be ty'd up to a fatal Necessity of Action and Beatitude. And this Condition seems to me more suitable to the *Divinity* of God and the relative Condition of Men ; I say, the relative Condition of Men, for let it be consider'd,

* Luke 18. 19.

that Man is not such an absolute irrelative Being, as that he stands purely by himself, nor accordingly does God look upon and govern him as such, but as in a Subordination to himself, in conjunction with other Men, and, as I have said, in a state of trial. Under one or other of which References, tho when this or that Person makes a wrong Choice and turns to the side of Evil, to *him* indeed it is culpable, and Sin lieth at his door, yet eventually and in the long run it may come under the Notion of *Good*; and thus as *the Judgments of God are unsearchable, and his Ways past finding out*, what is evil to *us* and in the *present Juncture*, may on other accounts, in other circumstances, or in the issue prove good; and so upon the whole matter may have a quite different aspect to *him*, who sees from one end to another, connects together and orders all the Parts and Motions of the universal System, makes amends in one way for what is amiss in another, and causes all things to work at last for some general Good of the Whole. Is it then at all reasonable to suppose, that God is oblig'd in Justice or Goodness forcibly to hinder or prevent the Miscarriage of this or that Man, when especially he knows in his Wisdom, that to Men in general the very Capacity of sinning or not sinning is of singular Advantage in order to Vertue and Happiness, if they make a right use of it; and if they do not, upon whom lies the blame but themselves? Is God to be censur'd for not denying to all Mankind the properest means of being happy, because some have been so indiscreet, as by the same to make themselves miserable? Especially considering, that even in the Toleration of this, his Omnipotence and Wisdom do signally appear, in that it is his Prerogative to bring *Good* out of *Evil*, and to turn particular present ill Events to universal future excellent Purposes: so

to that, says one, it is not repugnant to his Goodness that there is Evil in the World, which is the Deed of another; but rather 'tis agreeable to his Almighty Goodness to convert *Evil* into *Good*, nay and a Good that is far greater than the Evil he permits. Here then his stupendous Wisdom should rather be admir'd, than his Benignity question'd, in that after all he can make an advantage of the *voluntary Failures* of us his Creatures, which Failures his infinite Justice, in pursuance to the Measures laid out by his infinite Wisdom, cannot but allow, at least in *free Agents*; and that he should do this, is again the less to be wonder'd at, because, I say, he does not govern this or that Man, as standing purely by himself, but as a part of the whole Compages, as under a relation to God, to their Kinsmen in the Flesh, and agreeably to the general Capacity and Tendency of human Nature; and thus does he still bring about the great End of all, the Manifestation of his Glory even in the Permission of Sin. In relation to God, as we are free Agents, we necessarily face the Divine Attributes in several respects, and even in the abuse of our Freedom do occasion many of 'em to appear, which would have been otherwise hid from our Eyes. Were it not for this, how should we have seen his wonderful *Patience*, *Meekness*, *Long-suffering*, and *Forbearance*; his strict and severe *Justice*, in distinguishing the Merits of Persons and Things? "What adorable Instances of " *Love*, *Mercy*, and *Goodness* would have been wanting, if Sin had not given occasion for them? Not to mention the admirable Work of our Redemption, in which the Perfections of the Godhead have illustriously appear'd: "those stupendous Undertak-
 " ings of the Saviour of Mankind, and the admira-
 " ble

“ ble Windings of Providence in her Dramatick Plot,
 “ which has been acting on this Stage of the Earth
 “ from the beginning of the World, had been all of
 “ ’em prevented and stop’d, if the Souls of Men had
 “ not been laps’d into Sin ; and the sweetest and most
 “ enravishing Musical Touches, upon the melanco-
 “ liz’d Passions (so far as I know) of both Angels
 “ and Men, had never sounded in the Consort of
 “ the Universe, if the Orders of free Agents had
 “ never play’d out of Tune. So that in short, as
 the dark Shadows of a Picture do render the other
 Colours more bright and the Proportions more dis-
 cernible, so *Sin* shews the Divine Attributes and
 Perfections most illustrious ; and I do not see how
 we could have had an Idea of some of them, had
 it not been by this Occasion. Again I say, that
 God also looks on and rules us, as we are in con-
 junction with other Men : and thus his Wisdom so
 orders the matter, that what prejudice is done by
 some Men to themselves, thro the abuse of their
 Liberty, becomes advantageous to others ; so that
 the lessening of Happiness in one is the Advance-
 ment of it in another ; just as it is in the Motion
 of Bodys, what Agitation one loses, is transfer’d up-
 on another : while it is plain, that the Vices of the
 Wicked do intend and exercise the Vertues of the
 Just, and make ’em more perfect and rewardable.
 “ Where would be that noble Indignation of Mind,
 “ which holy Men conceive against wicked and blas-
 “ phemous People, if there were neither Wickedness
 “ nor Blasphemy in the World ? What would be-
 “ come of those ravishing Vertues of Humility,
 “ Meekness, Patience and Forbearance, if there were
 “ no Injuryes and Wrongs amongst Men ? Whereupon
 B b b b b “ would

“ would the Godly employ their Wit and Abilitys;
 “ had they no Enemy's to grapple with? How would
 “ their Faith be try'd, if all things here below had
 “ been carry'd on in Peace and Righteousness, and
 “ in the Fear of God? How would their Charity and
 “ Sedulity be discover'd in endeavouring to gain Men
 “ to the true Knowledg of God, if they were al-
 “ ways found so to their hands? In short, as one
 “ tells us, terrestrial Goodness would even grow slug-
 “ gish and lethargical, if it were not sharpen'd and
 “ quicken'd by the Antiperistasis of the general Ma-
 “ lignity of the World. Accordingly I add, that the
 being liable to *Sin* is of no small advantage to our
 selves, in order to present Delight and future Glory;
 forasmuch as this shews us the Necessity of serious
 Reflection and Consideration, obliges us to walk with
 Circumspection and Humility, convinces us how need-
 ful it is to apply our selves to God for Guidance and
 Assistance: “ In short, it gives us Opportunitys of
 “ exercising Patience, Meekness, Humility and Cha-
 “ rity towards Men, and of endearing our selves to
 “ God, by great and remarkable Instances of true and
 “ perfect Love, in that for his sake we can both de-
 “ spise the Pleasures of Sin, and cheerfully encounter
 “ with Trouble and Persecution. Wherefore the Sum
 of all is this: God indeed leaves us at liberty, and
 that among many Temptations to *Sin*; but this is no
 more than the very State and Composition of our Na-
 ture requires: and what moreover he designs by it, is
 to exercise our Vertues, and so to improve and train us
 up to a State of higher Perfection, and to furnish us
 with glorious Opportunitys of fighting for and winning
 Crowns and Reward. “ Which is so far from any
 “ way reflecting on the Goodness of his Providence,
 “ that

“ that it is an illustrious Instance of it ; and yet ’tis
 “ only thus far, that he is concern’d in the being of
 “ Sin in the World ; all the rest is owing only to our
 “ own mad and desperate Abuse of our natural Liber-
 “ ty, to our wilful Opposition to his gracious Inten-
 “ tions, and obstinate Resistance to his powerful Arts
 “ and Methods of preventing our Sin and Ruin.
 Wherefore now, I think, I may take my leave of the
 Atheist for this time, I having sufficiently answer’d the
 Cavil, which he built upon the Topic of *Evils*, whe-
 ther *Natural* or *Moral*.

C H A P. XII.

A Confutation of what was propos'd as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Objection of the Libertine against a Divine Providence: in that he tells us, First, that Human Affairs are in a great Confusion, all things either happening alike to all, or indeed sometimes the Wicked being in Prosperity, while the Good are in Adversity. Secondly, that it is impossible for any one single Being at once to animadvert and order all things in all the most distant Places of the World; or if this could be, yet would it be unworthy of the Majesty of a God to stoop so low, and inconsistent with the State and Character of a most happy and most powerful Being, to take care of all things, and be employ'd in such an infinite Negotiosity.

TH E Atheist, we find, will not yet hold his Peace, but taking it for granted, that we who assert a God, do at once assert a Providence as a thing inseparable from him, thinks yet further to abet his Cause, by doing what he can to explode this latter: and that in the first place, because, says he, were human Affairs dispos'd and govern'd by a most wise and perfect Being, surely things would not happen at random as they do, and either alike and indifferently to all,

all, or at least the Wicked would not flourish, while the Vertuous are miserable: but rather the Profane and Irreligious would be presently thunderstruck from Heaven, or otherwise made remarkable Objects of Divine Vengeance; whereas the Good and Pious would be protected and rescu'd from Evils and Harms. This Objection, I confess, has very much puzzled and stagger'd weak Minds in all Ages of the World: Nay the Psalmist himself was much perplex'd with this Phænomenon, *The Prosperity of the Ungodly, who set their Mouths against Heaven, and whose Tongue walk'd thro the Earth*; so that he was almost tempted to think, that *then he had cleans'd his Heart in vain, and wash'd his Hands in Innocency*. And thus do we find, that some in *Plato* from hence concluded, that * *tho there were Gods, yet they took no care of human Affairs*; agreeably to this in *Aristophanes*,

† *I dare to say, no Gods direct this Whole,
For Villains prosperous distract my Soul.*

And we have numerous Examples of what the wise Preacher hath observ'd: that *because Sentence against an evil Work is not executed speedily, therefore the Heart of the Sons of Men is fully set in them to do Evil* ||. Nay this is said to have made *Diagoras* ** a downright Atheist,

* Εἶναι μὲν θεοὺς, τῶν δ' ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμελεῖν πραγμάτων. De Leg. 10.

† Τολμῶ καταπεινὴν μήτι' ἐκ εἰσιν θεοὶ
Κακοὶ γὰρ εὐτυχῶντες ἐπιπλήτῃσι με.

|| Eccles. 8. 10.

** Because a Person who had stolen a Poem from him, swore that he had not, before the Athenian Senate, and was not for his Perjury immediately struck dead.

and among many others, it very much tempted the
* Poet *Claudian* to reject all Religion.

But however having leisurely turn'd this Cavil every way, I find it in the main not near so formidable, as some may imagine it at the first Glance, and therefore shall not fear to attempt a Reply to it. First then, I say by way of Concession, as to the former part of it, that in the ordinary Course of Nature all things do indeed happen alike to all: that is, the inward Springs and Workings of Mens own Constitutions, and the Relations of them to one another, as well as to other outward Beings, do indifferently affect both the Good and the Bad, with Pain or Pleasure, Inconvenience or Convenience; so that there is commonly one Event of Health and Sicknes, Riches and Poverty, Peace and War, Victory and Defeat to the Righteous and to the Wicked. The Sun indifferently spreads his Beams, and at once either cherishes or scorches up the Fruits as well of the Just as the Unjust; and the Rain either moderately waters and improves, or violently dashes and overwhelms the Lands of one and t'other. And, while upon other just accounts the *Tares* are suffer'd to grow amongst the *Wheat*, and bad Men to live promiscuously with Good until the Day of Judgment, how can it be expected to be otherwise? Can we think it proper, that God should at every turn repeal those Laws which he had before settled, and that for the sake of particular Persons he should by an immediate Touch of his Finger offer Violence to Nature, should either hasten or retard, stop or change the Springs

* Sed cum res hominum tantâ caligine volvi
Aspicerem, lætosq; diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios; rursus labefacta cadebat
Religio, &c. L. I. cont. Ruff.

and Wheels, the Combinations, Tendencys and Motions of his Creatures; and reverse or alter the general and establish'd Course of the mundane System, which he had before made *good*, advantageous and fit for the Purpose and Intendment of the *Whole*; and which therefore it would not consist with the Honour of his *Wisdom* to be ever and anon interrupting, undoing or changing; for this would look as if he were dissatisfy'd with his own Contrivance, and upon *every Revisal of this great Volume of the World*, did still discover new Errata in it to be corrected and amended? Wherefore as 'tis reasonable to suppose, that Things are left to act agreeably to their respective Natures and first Establishment in the World, what wonder is it, if in their Workings and Effects they make not a Discrimination of Persons, especially those of them, which having no *Knowledg*, do accordingly act by a blind *Necessity*, and are ty'd up by the Laws of *Mechanism*? And as for those which have *Reason* and *Knowledg*, they being also endu'd with a *Freedom* of Choice, and on that account left to act *freely*, no wonder if when this *Reason* is dark, and this *Knowledg* imperfect, as they are in Men, the *Will* be determin'd to undue Objects; and its Love or Aversion be not fix'd and proportion'd according to the real Value or Vileness of the Thing, but its erroneous or unequal Conception of it. And thus Mankind particularly in their Commerce with each other, as they are uncertain in their Discernments, so do they uncertainly and indifferently direct their Favours or Frowns to good and bad Men: whence it comes to pass, that as a great part of the Evils Men suffer, and of the Goods they enjoy, is undoubtedly owing to their Neighbours; it is not at all strange that they fall so uncertainly, as we see they do, because they depend

depend on so uncertain a Thing as the Will of Man is. To which it may be added, that * a great share of these is necessarily convey'd by good or ill Parents to their Offspring, and without a Miracle cannot be prevented. And thus, I say, must it needs be in the ordinary Course of Nature, even while we suppose a Providence to govern it, *that all Things happen alike to all*. Not but I own, that tho not frequently, yet sometimes this general Rule does meet with such Exceptions, as might, one would think, preclude from the Epicure this impious Surmise, that all things go on at Random and by Chance: for God, to advance his glorious Purposes, to assert his Prerogative, and to convince an Atheistick World that he is the Creator and Governour of it, does, when he pleases, so interpose and overpower the general Laws of it, as to make Things, in a manner extraordinary, contribute to the Happiness and Delivery of good Men, and to the Misery and Punishment of the Bad; however for a time the former indeed may flourish and prosper, while the latter are afflicted and distress'd: And of this we have numerous Examples in Histories, both Sacred and Civil. And when such things come to pass, as the Atheist has reason to lay his Hand upon his Mouth, and give up the Cause now in hand; so also the well-meaning, but wavering Persons, are fully set at Ease and freed from Scruples, especially when the Event comes home to 'em, as sometimes it does, and they see their own particular Evils and Grievances redress'd by the Punishment and Misery of the Wicked: for tho before this they might indeed be troubl'd, because God seem'd to hide his Face, tho they might almost distrust a Provi-

* See Dr. Cradock in Sermon upon Eccles. 9. 2. p. 10, &c.

dence, and their Treadings might well-nigh slip, when they beheld the Ungodly in great Prosperity, but they themselves were plagu'd all the Day long, and chasten'd every Morning; yet now the Divinity breaks out illustriously, as the Sun out of a Cloud, so that they cannot but rest well satisfy'd, and readily declare, that *verily there is a Reward for the Righteous, doubtless there is a God that judgeth the Earth* * : agreeably to what the Royal Prophet saw, when he enter'd into the Sanctuary of God; for then understood he the End of ungodly and wicked Men, how God set 'em in slippery Places and suddenly destroy'd 'em; and then did he rally up his Confidence, and firmly trust in a Divine Providence, saying, *Whom have I in Heaven but thee? &c. my Flesh and my Heart faileth, but God is the Strength of my Heart, and my Portion for ever.* Thus what a mighty Turn was given to the Affairs of the Jews, and what just reason did they find to own an over-ruling Hand, and thereupon to have † Joy and Gladness, a Feast and a good Day, when Haman their Adversary was hang'd on the Gallows he had prepar'd for Mordecai, and so he and they were rescu'd from Destruction? And what a fresh Supply of Faith and Confidence in God was added to his almost desponding Servants, || when the Fate of Christianity lying at stake

* Sustulit hunc tandem Ruffini Poena Tumultum,
Absolvitq; Deos———

———jam non ad Culmina Rerum
Injustos crevisse queror; tolluntur in altum,
Ut lapsu graviore ruant.———*Claud. l. 1. in Ruff.*

† Esth. 8. 17.

|| This Account is cited out of Dubravius's Bohemian History, and credited by the learned Dr. Jackson, who also look'd upon the Opening of the Earth at that very Instant, when this wicked Woman was passing over it, to be the Lord's Doing, and no less wonderful to Christian Eyes, than if it had been, as he says perhaps it was, a mere Miracle. Dr. Jackson in Works, Vol. 2. Book 6. c. 36.

in Bohemia, and the Lot being cast as it were, whether That or Paganism should be entertain'd, all on a sudden that very spot of Ground open'd its Mouth, and swallow'd up *quick* that Enemy of Christ, Queen *Drahomira*, on which she had caus'd many Prelates and Priests to be cruelly massacred, and their Bodies to lie unbury'd, that so others might be deter'd from taking Orders, and endeavouring to propagate the Christian Religion. And of God's Judgment in this way, *Theophrastus* gives us a notable Instance in the *Acrothoita*, whom he affirms to have been a Nation of Atheists; in that they also were swallow'd up by the gaping Earth; *undergoing*, says * one, a Judgment worthy that God, whom their Imaginations banish'd out of the World. To which I only add, how were Calvin and his Company confirm'd in their Belief of a God and a Providence, when, † as he tells us, a certain profane Despiser of God, deriding their pious Discourse touching the Hope of the Heavenly Life, and ever now and then belching out this Scoff, *Cælum Cæli Domino, Terram autem dedit Filiis Hominum*, was seiz'd on a sudden with most exquisite Torments, and then immediately recanted his Philosophy, sadly crying out upon that God, whom before he ridicul'd, to come in and help him. But here on the other hand it may be you'l make this Repartee from the Poet:

|| Selins affirms there is no God, and why?
 Because while he that Being does deny,
 He finds himself in great Prosperity.

* Tenison in Creed of Mr. Hobbs examin'd, p. 144. from Simplic. Com. in Epict. Ench. p. 200. Ed. Cant.

† Calvin in Exposit. of 115th Psalm.

|| Nullos esse Deos, inane Coelum

Affirmat Selius, probatque quod se

Factum, dum negat hoc, videt beatum. Mart. in Epig. l. 4.

And in short, you'l say, tho the Wicked sometimes may chance to fall under very grievous Calamity's, yet considering how often they escape 'em, still this latter seems, in the Phrase of *Diogenes* the Cynick, *Testimonium dicere contra Deos*, and is a greater Argument against a Providence, than the former is for it. To which I answer, that altho God, as indeed it is not fit, does not all ways appear as it were miraculously upon the Stage, manifesting himself by immediate Vengeance upon notorious Malefactors; yet considering especially what other ample Proofs there are of a Providence, it's enough he does this sometimes, and even when he goes on in a still and silent Path; as if, what the Libertine imagines, he either did not see or could not punish, he at length sufficiently displays his Art and Skill, in making Things of themselves fairly unwind and clear up at last into a satisfactory Close. Alas! the Passion and Self-Interest of Men are blind and short-sighted; but that which steers the whole World, is no ignorant, impatient, fond or partial Thing, but an all-knowing, steady, disinterested and uncaptivated Nature. How unreasonable then is it for us to prescribe to, or pretend to correct the Measures of infinite Wisdom; to demand or expect that God should continually be at our Beck, to execute our Sentence, to second our Malice, and to award our Passion and Revenge? How much fitter is it, that the All-wise Creator of us should be left to his own Discretion in ruling us; and shall not he, the Judg of all the Earth, do Right? This most certainly he does in the Issue, tho it must be own'd, that the Periods and Evolutions of his Providence in this World are sometimes long and slow; tho not from any Slackness or Remisness in the Deity, but either from his Patience and Long-suffering, he willing

that Men should repent; or else to teach us Patience by his Example, or that all things may be carry'd on with the more Pomp and Solemnity: Or lastly for other particular Reasons, as *Plutarch* ventures to assign one, why it might not be expedient for *Dionysius* the Tyrant, tho so profane and irreligious a Person, to have been cut off suddenly. Such wicked Men are often spar'd to be Scourges to others; and this requires, that besides their being free from Punishment, they should also enjoy Wealth and Power, and all the Opportunities and Instruments of Mischief. But however when their Wickedness has had its Course, and eventually serv'd the Ends of Providence, it is very great Odds but it meets with its Wages, even in this World, and is branded with Marks of God's Displeasure, agreeably to this of the Poet:

* *Seldom Revenge, tho slow of Pace,
Leaves ill foregoing Men to trace.*

and those proverbial Speeches of the Pagans,

† *Mills of the Gods do slowly wind,
But they at length to Powder grind;*

*And Divine Justice steals on softly with woollen Feet,
but strikes at last with Iron Hands.*

But to obviate this Answer, it will perhaps be again reply'd, that wicked Men do often live and also die in Ease and Prosperity, and, generally speaking, they ob-

* *Rarò antecedentem scelestum*

Deseruit Pede Poena claudo. Hor. Od. 2. L. 3.

† *Ὁψέ θεῶν ἀλεῦσι μύλοι εἰλεῦσι δὲ λεπτά.*

tain a greater share of good things than the Righteous. As to which I say in the first place, that we are incompetent and partial Judges of good and bad Men, and often miscale the one for the other; and then upon this first Error we are apt to arraign the Providence of God for an inequitable Management of things, even contrary to the ground which is here pretended, namely that the Vertuous are afflicted, while the Vicious prosper. "For alas on one hand there are many close
 "Hypocrites, who under a great shew of Piety do
 "secretly indulge themselves in ruinous Vices, which
 "many times reduce 'em to Poverty and Misery; and
 "those we commonly rank with the Good it fares ill
 "with; yet whose own Consciences tell them, that they deserve those Afflictions which the most miserable have endur'd, besides that they are also in a great measure accessory to 'em themselves: "And on the
 "other hand, there are many truly good Men, who
 "in the Course of a reserv'd, modest and unaffected
 "Piety, which makes but very little shew in the eye
 "of the World, are bless'd and prosper'd; and these
 "we commonly rank among the Bad that fare well. And again, besides what proceeds from our *Ignorance* of Men, *Envy* and *Pity* do also very often bias our Judgments to make a wrong Estimate of them: the one gives us a prejudice at the very best of Men, if in Prosperity; the other inclines us to think well even of the very worst, if in Adversity: and thus it comes to pass, that not mens inward Vertues but their outward Condition do stamp 'em with the Characters of *Good* or *Evil*. And now is it reasonable to quarrel with Providence, because God does not reward or punish Men according to the Sentence which our blind *Envy* or *Pity* passes on them?

But

But further, I would fain know what the Libertine means by being prosperous and at ease? Does he mean what we term the being easy in outward Circumstances, and possess'd of a competent Estate? This I can't deny, but that the Wicked may be, nay and that he often has a far greater Affluence of temporal Advantages than the Good and Vertuous; and that because he must be suppos'd by his Character to direct his whole Aim at them, and to be no way restrain'd from obtaining them, if he can but be secur'd from outward Penalty, whether by Right or Wrong: so that his very Wickedness, his Perjury, Oppression, Usurpation and Injustice may, as it often happens, of course enrich and make him great, and thus his Prosperity may rise from the Ruin or Affliction of the Innocent; who on the other hand being strictly forbidden to love the World and the things that are in the World, is ready to give way in the Road of temporal Advantage, and forego his own Right to it, if strongly contended for; because he regards it as only design'd for present Convenience, and as that which he must soon leave; and therefore not setting much Value upon it, he directs the main bent of his Affections and Endeavours at things above: or if at any time he chance to put in and scramble for the things on Earth, then to admonish him that he ought not to do so, it is great odds but he comes by the worst of it; and that because it is quite out of his way to meddle with or rest on these. and how should he, whose Hands are ty'd up by Virtue and Conscience, make his party good with those Worldlings, who will not be under any mental Restraint, and whose Injustice can have no bounds set to it, but only by outward Force? But can such a Man, tho ever so great and wealthy, be properly said to be
at

at ease? Whatever the Necessitous and those who are pinch'd with Want may think, as supposing his Condition far better than theirs; yet he himself finds, that * what he possesses, above what he can enjoy, and which might better serve to relieve the Needs of others, proves to him only a *Temptation* and a *Snare*, which draw him yet further and entangle him in *many sinful Lusts, that war against his Soul, and drown him in Perdition and Destruction*. Nay, and besides the other *ordinary* Consequences of such a man's course of Life, as namely the decaying of his Body and the shortning of his Days, &c. and what, as I have said, is inflicted sometimes *extraordinarily*; moreover in his very Wickedness there is a present, and that, as † *Seneca* thought, a most exquisite Punishment, which neither Riches nor Honour can hardly ever divert or alleviate, and much less entirely remove. For a terrible Remorse continually attends him upon the Abuse of his *Reason*, which besides its not being entertain'd with any proper Object, moreover being forc'd to do homage to *Sense*, disdains its Vassalage and upbraids his Mismanagement; and thus as he can have no *rational*, so neither has he any *sensual* Enjoyment, but even this also is embitter'd or defeated. In short, however gay and glorious his Outside may be, yet his Inside is black and dismal; while his Mind is tortur'd with Pride and Envy, with boundless Hopes, insatiable Desires and horrible Reflections; and he has within himself a woful Experience, that neither his Life nor his Happiness consists in the abundance of the things which he possesses: Inso-

* Periculosissima Felicitatis Intemperantia est. *Sen. in Lib. De Provid.*
 five quare bonis Viris Mala accidunt † In Scelere Sceleris supplicium est. Maxima Peccati poena est peccasse. *Sen.*

much that what *Tacitus* applies to Tyrants in particular, may truly be said of all wicked Men, tho never so great: "That could we but see their Souls laid open, we should find 'em torn and mangled by their own Guilt, like the Bodys of Criminals cut with the Lashes of the Whip. Wherefore I say, that they who make the unequal Distribution of worldly things an Objection against the Providence of God, as if he did not regard or use us according to our Merit or Demerit, are, as I have intimated, not only incompetent Judges of good and bad Men, but also of the Happiness or Unhappiness of them; for inward Goodness and outward Greatness, worldly Prosperity and real Happiness are quite different things; and nothing, I assure 'em, can make a Man happy or unhappy, but what can denominate him *good* or *evil*, *vertuous* or *vicious*: so that they who respectively bear these Characters have their Felicity or Misery, not from without, but within their own Breasts. Touching outward things, tho with *Aristotle* I own they are indeed Complements of temporal Beatitude, yet are they not the primary Objects or Causes of it; and it is just according as they are us'd, that they prove advantageous or hurtful to us. As * *Nothing of all these is truly evil to the Good*, so also is *Nothing good to the Evil*: and as by a moderate use of 'em they are wholesom to the Vertuous, so by an immoderate are they noxious to the Vicious. Accordingly I say, that if only a *Mediocrity* of outward things contributes to the real Welfare of Men, as most certainly 'it does, either Extreme being liable to great Disadvantages, and seeing what is more than that, they cannot properly enjoy; I deny in the main what the Libertine supposes,

* 'Ουδέν κακόν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ἔδ' αὖ τῷ φαύλῳ ἀγαθόν.

that the Wicked, however he may indeed possess, yet enjoys more of 'em than the Righteous, or can therefore be said to be happier than he. For tho the latter, as not coveting, but rather rejecting Superfluities of them, in that he looks on 'em as useless, nay hurtful, and as Impediments and Clogs in his way to Heaven, is many times not burden'd with 'em, yet does he commonly obtain, and may accordingly enjoy a Sufficiency of them. Starving Poverty is usually the Consequence of Idleness or Luxury, or Faction or Knavery: whereas a good man's Vertues, his Prudence, Frugality and Temperance at home, his Justice, Sincerity and Kindness abroad cannot ordinarily fail to secure him a Competence. And this, I say, has in it all the advantage that can be expected from the things of this Life; for beyond this, what is there valuable in Riches which is not impal'd with Cares and Fears? Or what is there solid in Dignity and Power, which does not lie open to a thousand Inconveniences and Troubles? Or what is there so charming in Sensuality, which does not lead away the Mind from Divine Contemplations and the Pursuit of Vertue? But here lies the ground of mens Error in this point, that they * are generally apt to measure the Value of things purely in reference to the *Body* and this *Life*, and according as they serve to the Uses of one or t'other: whereas they should rather estimate this from the relation they bear to what is far more excellent in us, and capable of a future Immortality; and then might they make this After-reflection: That God does not intend our Happiness here, but is training us up for a more lasting Inheritance. Accordingly, as his Wisdom proposes this End, so ought they to conclude that

* *Vulgus omnia metitur Corpore, sapientes Animo. Lud. Viv. de Ver. Fid.*

it appoints such Means as are proper to attain it; that it being held out as a Prize and Reward of man's right use of his *Free-will*, he may thereby appear in some sense to *deserve* it: and how shall he better do this, than by manfully combating and conquering Hardships, by giving full proof of his Faith and Fortitude, his Sincerity and Constancy, and earnestly pressing toward the Mark that is before him? And tho a Change from Prosperity to Adversity may sit uneasily on *Flesh* and *Blood*, yet ought his *Soul* to go parallel with the Divine Providence, and aim further at the Scope which God points out, namely, an infinite Recompence of Reward: this should it eagerly drive at; and whatever it meets with disgustful in its way, it ought to look on either as a *Chastisement* of its past Sin, or as a *Bridle* to restrain it for the future, or as a Motive us'd by the Almighty to wean it from this World and draw it home to himself, the only proper Center of its Rest, and fit it for a glorious Immortality. And thus if Men, in imitation of God, would look upon things with the same impartial Eye that God himself does, surely they would not suspect him of a Male-administration; but rather, if even the very best among 'em do struggle with some Difficultys, they would be satisfy'd with *Seneca*, * *that God takes the same Course with good Men which Masters do with their Scholars; who require so much more pains from those, in whom they have the greater hope.* What then need they care how the trifling, nay the deceitful things of this World go, since Vertue instead of *temporal Prosperity*, which to us seem'd its

* Hanc itaque rationem Dii sequuntur in bonis viris, quam in Discipulis suis Praeceptores, qui plus Laboris ab eis exigunt, in quibus certior Spes est. *Sen. in Lib. De Prov. five quare Bonis Mala, &c. c. 4.*

due, will have an *eternal Reward*? as on the other hand, Vice instead of *temporal Adversity* will have an eternal Punishment, God having appointed a Day, *wherein to render unto every Man according to his Works*; and then 'twill finally appear, that *he judges the World in Righteousness and the People with Equity*. Thus ought we to acquit the Almighty from the Charge of Injustice, not only as being an absolute Proprietor of all things, and free to do what he pleases with his own, but also as dispensing Prosperity and Adversity not as the final Results of his Favour or Displeasure, but endeavouring either to lead or drive Men by one or t'other, according to the various Springs of their Temper, to the same great End of their Being: And in this view a little that the Righteous hath is better than great Riches of the Ungodly: for whatever the outward Condition be, *great Peace have they who love God's Law, and nothing can offend them; but the Wicked are like the troubled Sea when it cannot rest, whose Waters cast up Mire and Dirt*. Wherefore the generously Vertuous, tho in a low Estate, are so far from being fretted at the Wicked, or envious against the Evil-doers, that rather it pities 'em to see them in the Dust, and not only their *Bellies* but their very *Souls cleaving to the Ground*; to see them, I mean, immers'd in Sense, and entirely devoted to earthly things: in reference to which, tho at present these may seem more happy than themselves, yet being well assur'd that shortly there will be a new Scene of things, and a more just Discernment made *betwixt the Righteous and the Wicked, betwixt him that serv'd God and him that serv'd him not*, they march along with an erect and cheerful Countenance thro all the difficult Mazes of this World, and

D d d d d 2

having

having within 'em an Antepast of Heaven in the Fruit of a good Conscience, they think no pains or trouble too much in quest of an infinite Recompence of Reward; and so far are they from questioning the Providence of God, because of his seemingly inequitable Usage of Men here below, that hereupon they magnify his Wisdom and his Goodness, in that by a paternal Correction he calls those whom he loves to a state of Salvation, makes all things in the issue work together for their Good, and entitles 'em to an infinite and eternal Weight of Glory, in token of their having undergone, as they ought, some present light Afflictions, which were but for a moment. And as this, they know, will make abundant amends for what is here grievous and uneasy, so do the present uneven ways of Providence, besides what other Proofs they have, convince them yet further of the Certainty that it will be so, and that therefore this Life is only a state of Trial: For were good Men always blest'd, and bad Men always punish'd according to their Merit and Demerit here below, then this Life, instead of a State of Probation to either, might justly be look'd on as the Heaven of the one, and the Hell of the other; but while things go in quite another method, and seem to be dispens'd by a careless Hand, yet so far are they from being hereby stagger'd in their Belief of a God and Providence, that by this very thing they are confirm'd in an Assurance that God inspects our Actions here, and will reward or punish 'em hereafter; that therefore most certainly a Day will come when God and human Nature will be justify'd, and Vertue and Conscience appear to be reasonable, when all things shall be set streight and right, and Rewards and Punishments impartially dispens'd.

Wherefore

Wherefore now to conclude this Answer, they who blame the Management of things as faulty, and Providence as defective, because Judgment is not presently executed upon the Ungodly, are like such Spectators of a Dramatick Poem, as when wicked and injurious Persons are brought upon the Stage for a while swagging and triumphing, impatiently cry out against the Dramatist, and presently condemn the Plot: whereas if they would but expect the winding up of things, and stay till the last Close, they would then see them come off with Shame and sufficient Punishment. The Evolution of the World, as *Plotinus* calls it, is a * *truer Poem*, and we Men, histrionical Actors upon the Stage, who notwithstanding insert something of our own into the Poem too: but God Almighty is that skilful *Dramatist* who always connecteth that of ours, which went before, with that of his, which follows after, in good coherent Sense; and will at last make it appear, that a Thred of exact Justice did run thro all, and that Rewards and Punishments are measur'd out in Geometrical Proportion.

But does the *Epicure* again object, that it is impossible for any one single Being to animadvert and order all things in all the most distant places of the World. To this I answer, that this is to measure the Deity according to our own Scantling: whereas tho we ourselves and all created Beings have but a finite Animadversion and narrow Sphere of Activity, yet does it not therefore follow, that the Case must be the same with the Deity suppos'd to be a Being infinitely perfect, that has no Limit or Defect either of Essence, Knowledg or Power. But says the Libertine, granting it possible

* Ἀντίθετον Ποίημα.

for the God you suppose to animadvert and order all things, yet again to do this would be unworthy of him, and far beneath so great a *Majesty*. To which I answer first, that doubtless it is greater and more majestick for any Being to exercise and employ its Powers, than to let them lie idle and make no use of 'em; and with the noblest of Beings doubtless the noblest Exercise will best comport: Now what nobler Exercise can there be, than that of Government? And what Government more majestick than that of all the World? Where else can the infinite *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Goodness* of God find a more ample Sphere for Action, Contrivance and Beneficence? Infomuch that so far is this from obscuring or lessening, that it illustrates and magnifies the Divine Perfections. But does the Libertine bring in some Theists, even *Aristotle* or the Writer *de Mundo*, *Cicero*, *Lucan*, &c. so far appearing on his side, as to make it a question, whether or no it would not be an Indignity for God to extend his Care to all the *least* and *meanest* things. To this I answer, that I mind not these Authoritys, while Reason is against 'em: tho touching *finite* Beings, which have a limited Sphere of Activity, and are destin'd to be conversant about such certain Objects as bear a Proportion and Congruity to their Nature, it would indeed be an Indignity for them to descend below their Station, just as it would be so for an Emperor to turn a Fidler or a Fly-catcher: but as for Him who is infinite, were the World so too, as it would but bear a proportion to him as *Finite* does to *Finite*; so would it be his proper Sphere of Action to be conversant about it: And what could be more glorious, than for him to display himself, and to shew that his *Greatness* and *Goodness* are infinite? seeing by the former of these

he

he is *able*, and by the latter he is *willing* to inspect all, even the minutest Parts of the Creation. Nay, and besides what God may be suppos'd to do *freely* in this case, moreover there's a kind of Necessity grounded in the Relation betwixt him and his Creatures, that he should be sensible of and accordingly bear some regard even to the most contemptible of them. For, * as a Learned Person makes the Comparison, were the Sun an Animal, and had Life co-extended with its Rays and Light, it would see and perceive every *Atom* of Matter, that its outstretch'd Beams reach'd to and touch'd: Now all created Beings, says he, are themselves in some sense but the Rays of the Deity; which therefore cannot but feel and sensibly perceive all these its own Effluxes and Emanations. And indeed it is as natural and proper for God to preserve and rule, as it was for him to make the meanest thing; for if it has some *End*, as most certainly it has, for the sake of which he thought it worthy to be an Object of his Creation, why should he not as well think the constant Direction of it to that End to be an Object worthy of his Providence? And how is he any more dishonour'd by thus imparting his Influence, than the Sun-beams are polluted by shining on a Dunghil, or a King is disgrac'd by taking care even of the meanest of his Subjects? To which I add, that indeed the *great* things of the World cannot well be order'd neither, without some regard to the *little*, † as Architects affirm, that great Stones can't be well plac'd together in a Building without small. Neither could Generals of Armys, nor Governors of Familys, nor Masters of Ships, nor me-

* Dr. Cudworth in Int. Syst. p. 884.

† Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνεῖν μικρῶν τὰς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εἶναι καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν.

chanick Artificers discharge their several Functions, and do their Works respectively as they ought, did they not mind the small things also as well as the great. Wherefore, says *Plato*, let us not make God Almighty inferior to mortal Opificers, who by one and the same Art can order small things as well as great; and so suppose him to be supine and negligent*.

But, says the *Epicure*, tho it were possible, and also not dishonourable for God to take care of all things, yet still it would not consist with the State of a most happy Being to be involv'd in so much Business; this must needs occasion Disturbance and Distraction to him, and it is more reasonable to think that he enjoys himself, being idle and at ease. To which I answer, "That this again is to conclude concerning the Nature of God, which is infinitely perfect, from the Defects and Imperfections of a Man; because we can't attend long nor to many things at once, but are tir'd with thinking and perplex'd with Doubts, wavering and uncertain to resolve, erring in the Choice of our End, and when that is chosen easily bewilder'd and lost in our Way: therefore infinite Knowledg and Almighty Power must be liable to the same Inconveniencies with our Ignorance and Weakness. Alas God is not, as *Epicurus* dreamt, a finite bodily Substance, obnoxious to Weariness and Defluxion of Parts; but he is on all accounts an infinitely perfect Mind or Spirit: and among the rest, as he is omniscient and omnipotent, he can meet with no Labour or Difficulty; it being altogether as easy for him to know all things that are knowable, and do all things that are possible, and consequently to inspect and govern all

* Μη τίνυν τὸν θεὸν ἀξιώσωμεν ποτὲ θνητῶν συμπιεγῶν φυχλότερον, &c.
the

the World, as it is to know or do any one thing whatsoever. Nay, and as he *can* do this without *Trouble*, so must he needs be *willing* to do it with *Delight*; because the infinite *Power* of a most *perfect Being* must be suppos'd to have a tendency to *Action*, its infinite *Wisdom* to *Contrivance*, and its infinite *Goodness* to *Bene-
 " fidence*. " And again, it being as easy for the God we
 " suppose to exercise those Perfections about many
 " things, as about few, it must rather be a *Pleasure*
 " than a *Disturbance* to him, to exercise them about
 " a World of things, because the more he exercises
 " them, the more he complies with their natural Ten-
 " dencys and Inclinations. We can't deny but that an
 'Απεργία or *having nothing to do* is troublesom even to
 our selves, and how much more must it be so to the
 Deity or a perfect Being, whose *Activity* is alto-
 gether as easy to it as its *Essence*? and accordingly
 for it to act nothing, to contrive nothing, and to
 do no good, would be to run counter to its Nature,
 and to cross the Inclination of his own Perfections.
 Indeed were God a *Body*, and so could not move
 Bodys but by Thrusting and Pressure, then might
 he find the World a heavy and cumberfom thing
 to move: but as he is an universal *Soul*, and so does
 all by *Thought* and *Will*, the Case is far otherwise.
 " For if it be no labour to our *Soul* to *think* and
 " *will*, and therewithal to move our *Body*, why should
 " we conceive it any labour to God, who penetrates all
 " thro, and co-exists with every part of the material
 " World, to move and actuate the Whole, and mode-
 " rate all the Motions of it, according to his own *Will*
 " and *Pleasure*?

To which after all may be added this Salvo, ap-
 ply'd by Dr. Cudworth to the foregoing Difficultys,
 E e e e That

That weak Mortals may here be somewhat eas'd and help'd by considering what has been before suggested: That there is no necessity God Almighty should do all things himself * immediately and drudgingly; but he may have his inferior Ministers and Executioners under him, to discharge him of that suppos'd Encumberment. As first of all an *artificial Plastick Nature*, which without *Knowledge* and *Animal Consciousness* disposes the Matter of the Universe, according to the Platform or Idea of a *perfect Mind*, and forms the Bodys of all Animals. Secondly, those *Instincts* also impress'd upon Animals, and which they are passive to, directing them to act for Ends either not understood or not attended to by them, in order to the good of themselves and the Universe, are another Part of that *Divine Fate*, which being inserted into things themselves, is the *Servant and Executioner of Providence*. And thirdly, there are yet other knowing and understanding Ministers of the Deity, as its Eyes and Hands, *Demoniack* or *Angelick Beings*, appointed to preside over Mankind, all mundane Affairs, and the things of Nature, they having their several distinct Offices and Provinces assign'd 'em. All which inferior Causes are constantly overlook'd by the watchful Eye of God Almighty, who, as we have seen, may also sometimes extraordinarily interpose.

But lastly the Atheist tells us, that tho it be not *impossible* for God, and it be at once consistent with his *Majesty* and his *Happiness* to care for and do good to all his *Creatures*, yet still this would not comport with the Character of a most *powerful Being* (such as we

* *Int. Syst.* p. 884.

suppose God to be) which as it not only fears no Evil, but also needs no Good to be done for it by any other thing, so neither does it do any, nor consequently is its Providence over its Works. But this, again I answer, is for him to measure the Deity not only by Men, but also by the very worst of Men, such as he himself is; who imagines that *Indigence* or *Imbecillity* is the only ground of *Benevolence*, even because he himself does good upon no other Principle, as 'tis too often observable; which only argues his vitiated Nature, his low-sunk Mind and gross Immorality: Whereas other Men experience a more generous Benignity, and a higher Spring of Life than this contracted Self-love; and how much more is the same to be suppos'd in the Deity, which is infinitely *Good* as well as *Great*?

C H A P. XIII.

Replys to several bold Querys : as among others, Why God, whom we suppose to be sufficiently happy in the Enjoyment of himself, should go about to make a World? Or, if he must needs make a World, why he did not make it sooner? And, when he made it, what Instruments or Tools he used? What Machines or Engines had he? Or how could he move the Matter of the whole World, especially if incorporeal, &c? And again touching Providence, How is it imaginable, upon the supposition of this, that ever so great a Part of Mankind, as the Infidel World includes, should be left so utterly destitute, as they are, of the Knowledge of God, and of the Means of attaining their Everlasting Happiness?

THE Atheist being almost non-plus'd for the present, and having nothing directly to answer or object to us, thinks to puzzle us, as he amuses himself, with certain little Scruples, which he proposes by way of Query, touching that God, whom we assert to be the Creator and Ruler of the World. And first, upon the supposition that there is a God or perfect Being, sufficiently happy in the Enjoyment of himself, why would he go about to make a World? To which
in

in short I answer, that the reason of this was from his own overflowing and communicative *Goodness*, that there might be other *Beings* also *happy* besides him, and enjoy themselves. But in reference to *Men* he returns, * what hurt had it been for us never to have been made? To which the Answer is easy, that then not only we should never have enjoy'd any *Good*, or been capable of *Happiness*; but had there been no such *rational Creatures* made, it must have been either from impotent *Sterility* in the Deity, or else from an invidious, narrow and contracted *Selfishness*, or want of *Benignity* and communicative *Goodness*; both which are inconsistent with a *perfect Being*.

But says trifling *Lucretius*, till God, for instance, set up Stars, as so many Lamps and Torches in the World, was † he from Eternity in a vast Abyss of infinite Darkness? I tell him, that God does not see, as we see, with Eyes of Flesh, and by a darting of outward Rays upon them; and that in him, who is all Light and Life, there never was any Darkness: and as for those Lights in the Heavens and Firmament, besides what other Benefits they afford, they might, one would think, enlighten his Eyes, tho not the Almighty's, and guide him to the Knowledg of their Maker. But here perhaps he'll take me up short: What then you'll say, || that these Globes of Light, as well as other integral Parts of the World, were made for the sake of Men? *Ans.* As was before noted,

* Quidve mali fuerat nobis non esse creatis? &c.

† An credo in tenebris Vitâ & Mærore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis Origo?

|| ——— At quid immortalibus atque beatis
Gratia nostra queat largiri Emolumentum,
Ut nostrâ quicquam causâ gerere aggrediantur?

I do not hold with some Theists, that the World was made *purely* for the sake of Men, however in part it undoubtedly was so, as may appear from the *Usefulness* of most things to them. But says he again, if it was in any sense made for Men, then must it be either for wise Men or Fools: if for wise Men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for Fools, what reason could there be why the Deity should seek to deserve so well at their hands? A weighty Objection indeed! To which I answer, that the World in part was made for Men in general, and by consequence at once for the *Wise* and the *Unwise*, tho not expressly preconceived as such, but simply as they were Men, that is, Creatures endued with a power of Reason and Freedom, and so in a way to come under the one or the other of these Denominations. But again to adjust this matter, let us see in what sense the Atheist understands the Terms: In making this distinction he looks upon Men either as they are by Nature, made by God and under his Providence; or as they are by Habit, and they make and manage themselves. If he regard 'em in the former sense, then is he quite out in his Supposition, there being but few Fools, and those Monstrosities of Nature thro the accidental Defect of *second Causes*, and a number disproportionately great of wise Men; of such I mean, as according to the genuine Import of the Word, are in a way to know and propose the last and great End of their Being, and to discern and chuse fit means for attaining it. But if he regard Men in the latter sense, that is, according as they make themselves, and wilfully swerve from this Advantage of Nature and Providence, then indeed I own that there is a great number of Fools, and that the Atheist himself

self eminently bears this Character, while *saying in his Heart that there is no God*: yet however I do not deny, but that the World was in some sense partly made for these, as well as for the Wise; in that if they would not glorify God in pursuing their own Happiness, agreeably to his infinite *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, they might at least give him an occasion by their own Folly to manifest his *Power* and *Justice* in their Misery.

But again in reference to our principal Answer to the first Query, the Atheist demands, upon the Supposition that the World proceeded from the Goodness of God, why was it not made sooner, nay why was it not coequal in duration with this *Goodness*, which is without date and from everlasting? To which I answer, that the reason why the World was not made from *Eternity* was not from any Defect of Goodness in the Divine *Will*; but because there is an absolute *Impossibility* in the thing it self: for we must confess, * says Dr. Cudworth, that for our parts we are prone to believe, that could the World have been from *Eternity*, it should certainly have been so. But that it could not be so, Philoponus gives a twofold account: † *First*, because there can be nothing actually infinite and yet run thro, as all the past Duration of the World has been; and secondly, because that which is made or brought into being by another, as a distinct thing from it, cannot be coeternal with its Maker ||. But still, says the Atheist, if

* Int. Syst. p. 887.

† Ὅτι τὸ ἀπείρου καὶ ἐνέσυχον ὑποστῆναι ἢ διεξίτητον εἶναι, ἀδυνατόν ἐστιν. καὶ ὅτι συναιδέον εἶναι τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ γινόμενον οὐκ ἔχει.

|| To this purpose may be profitably read Johannis Schuleri Exercitatio Philosophica, quæ refutantur Argumenta Aristotelis, Procli, item & Averrois, aliorumque, quibus Æternitatem Mundi probare conati sunt. As also Dero- don's Arraignment and Conviction of Atheism, done out of French by Bonhome, from Chap. 2. ad finem.

it was in it self impossible that the World should be eternal, yet at least why was it no sooner, but so very lately made? To which I answer, that this is an absurd Question; both because *Time* was made together with the World, and there was no *sooner* or *later* before *Time*, and also because whatsoever had a beginning, must of necessity be once but a *day old*. Wherefore the World could not possibly have been so made by God in *Time*, as not to be once, but five or six thousand years old and no more, as now it is.

But says the Atheist, if God made the World, what Tools or Engines did he use in forming and moving the *Matter* of it? This again, I tell him, is to level Omnipotence with human Weakness, which needs Machines and Instruments in framing its Works: whereas he who is Almighty has no such occasion, he doing with ease what he pleases by himself. But says our Opponent, tho God be omnipotent, yet can he not do what implies a Contradiction: now it seems contradictory and in it self impossible, if withal you suppose him, as you do, to be *incorporeal*, that he should any way *move* or consequently model the *Matter* of the Universe; for then he must needs run thro all things, and could not lay hold nor fasten upon any thing. To which I answer, that since no *Body* can possibly move it self, that which first mov'd *Matter* must of necessity be *incorporeal*; not that this mov'd it by *local Motion*, as one *Body* moves another, or as Engines and Machines move by *Trusion* or *Pulsion*, they being before mov'd; but must do it by another kind of *Action*, such as is not *local Motion* nor *Heterokinesy*, but *Autokinesy*, that is, by *Cogitation*. Now that a *cogitative Being* as such hath a *natural Imperium* over *Matter* and power of moving it, and that without any Engines or Tools, is,
as

as we have said, unquestionably certain even from our own Souls, which *move* our Bodys and command 'em every way merely by *Will* and *Thought*. And surely a *perfect Mind*, presiding over the *Matter* of the whole World, could much more irresistibly and with infinitely more ease, move the whole *corporeal Universe*, merely by *Will* and *Cogitation*, than we can our Bodys. Thus far I have answer'd the Querys of the Atheistick Philosopher, touching God's Formation of the World, as they are set down in *Dr. Cudworth*: to which I think it not unreasonable to add one more, touching his Providence over it, which is offer'd by the staggering or *Epicurizing Christian*. If, says he, there were a good Providence, that over-rul'd the Affairs of this World, how is it imaginable that ever so great a part of Mankind, as the Infidel World includes, should be left so destitute, as they are, of the Knowledg of God, and of the means of attaining their everlasting Happiness? To which I cannot better answer than in the Words of a * late Divine: First, that the Infidel World is not perhaps left so utterly destitute, as we are apt to imagine; for they have the Law of Nature to direct them, by which alone they must be try'd, and stand or fall at the day of Judgment; which as to the main strokes of their Duty is so plain and intelligible, that no sincere Inquirer can be ignorant of it: and if when they may understand it they will not, or if when they do understand it they wilfully transgress and violate it, this is purely their own fault, and no way reflects on the *Goodness of Providence*. To which I add, that as they have not those vast Advantages, which we have, of becoming good, and growing up into a State of Per-

* *Dr. Scot in Christian Life, Part 2. Vol. 1. p. 265, &c.*

fection and Happiness, so proportionably less degrees of *Good* will be accepted of those that do *well*, and less degrees of *Punishment* inflicted on those that do *ill*. And in a word, tho their Condition were a great deal worse than it is, yet would it be very unreasonable for us to object it against the *Goodness* of the Divine *Providence*, unless we better understood, than we do, how God will dispose of 'em, and compensate their present Disadvantages in the other World: and therefore since yet we know not what he will do, as having no Revelation in the Case, it becomes us to suspend our Judgment, till the Event hath determin'd this.

In short, I then say with a * late ingenious Writer, in reference to this and the like Cavils about *Providence*, “ That upon the account of the Infinity of the
 “ Subject, the design'd Secrecy, and the Intricacy of the
 “ Chain of things, because of their wonderful Inter-
 “ mixture, and the strange Connection betwixt things
 “ at remote Distances both of Time and Place, upon
 “ one or other of these accounts, we cannot hope to
 “ understand perfectly and clearly all the Acts of Di-
 “ vine Providence: but many things relating both to
 “ private Persons and publick States, to the Heathen
 “ and Christian World, must be entertain'd with a
 “ silent Admiration.

* Dr. Cockburn in *Essays*, Part 2. p. 206. who therein has very well solv'd most other Objections against Providence.

C H A P. XIV.

A Confutation of the Atheist's last Head of Argument, by which he would persuade us first, that it is the general Interest of all Mankind; and secondly, that it is the particular Interest of Civil Sovereigns and States, that the Belief of a God, a sense of Religion, &c. should not be entertain'd.

ONCE more the Atheist being re-inforc'd, makes directly upon us a fresh Attack, and tells us in the first place, that it is the *Interest* of Mankind in general, and by consequence of every particular Person, that the Belief of a God, a sense of Religion, &c. should not be entertain'd. To which I first answer, that if there be a God, a Providence, and Souls be immortal, &c. then is it not any Man's thinking or believing otherwise that will alter the case, nor afford the Atheists any Relief against these two imagin'd *Evils* of theirs. For things are fullen, and will be as they are, whatever we think of 'em or wish 'em to be; and Men will at last discover their Error, when perhaps it may be too late. *Wishing* is no *Proving*, and therefore this Atheistic Argument from Interest does not do any the least execution against the Being of a God, it being nothing else but an ignorant *Wish* and vain *Desire*. But having no true ground, how comes the Atheist to wish or desire that there were no God? Why it is partly from a mistaken Notion of God, whom he looks on as a Being infinitely powerful, and

that has no Law, but its own *Will*; and therefore may punish whom it pleases after death: and partly from the sense of their own Guilt, for which they know, if there be a God, that they shall be accountable to him. First, I say, from a mistaken Notion of God, that he is nothing but *arbitrary Will omnipotent*, which indeed is not the most desirable thing: whereas his *Will* is the *Will* of *Goodness*, *Justice*, and *Wisdom* it self *omnipotent*. His *Will* is not mere *Will*, such as hath no other *Reason* besides it self: but it is *Law*, *Equity* and *Chancery*; it is the τὸ δέον or *Ought* it self, decreeing, willing and acting. Neither does God punish any one out of a delight in Punishment, or in the Evil and Sufferings of the Persons punish'd; but to those, who are not altogether incurable, his *Punishment* is *Physick* in order to their Recovery and Amendment: so that the Source and Fountain thereof is *Goodness* to the Persons themselves punish'd. But to such as are incurable, the Punishment inflicted on them is intended for the good of the *Whole*. So that the Attribute of *Justice* in God does not at all clash with the Attribute of *Goodness*, it being but a Branch or particular Modification of it. *Goodness* and *Justice* in God are always complicated together; neither his *Goodness* being *Fondness*, nor his *Justice* *Cruelty*: but he being both good in punishing and just in rewarding and dispensing Benefits. Wherefore it can be the *Interest* of none that there should be no God, no Immortality, &c. unless perhaps of such desperately and incurably wicked Persons, as abandoning their true *Interest* of being good, have thereupon no other *Interest* left 'em, but *not to be*, or *to become nothing*. And even this they can never be assur'd of, but are still under a dread of Misery; or if they are not, yet as they have no Hope in a future, so neither can they

they have any Satisfaction in the *present Life*, nor can possibly be *easy*, and much less *happy*, without *Immortality*, and a Security of the *Continuance* of what they now possess. How then can it be the *Interest* of *Men*, that this Hypothesis should be true, which thus plainly cuts off all *Hope* from 'em, and leaves 'em in an utter *Impossibility* of being ever *happy*? Whereas to believe a *God*, according to the true Notion of him, is to believe such a Being, as if he could be suppos'd not to be, there is nothing which any, who are not desperately engag'd in *Wickedness*, could possibly more wish or desire. Since * infinite *Hopes* lie before us from the Existence of a Being infinitely *good* and *powerful*, and the *Immortality* of our own *Souls*; and nothing can obstruct or hinder these *Hopes*, but our own *Wickedness* of Life. While on the other hand, to *believe a God* and *do well*, are two the most hopeful, cheerful and comfortable things that possibly can be. And so far is this from doing what † *Lucretius* and *Macchiavel* suggest, that is, from depressing and debasing mens Spirits, that it inspires 'em with the greatest Bravery; Experience telling us, as well among Heathens as Christians, that the Fear of God has even chas'd away all other Fears, and the Belief of a Providence and the Soul's Immortality has made Men easy and magnanimous in all Conditions. And tho indeed true *Religion* forbids all private Revenge, and teaches us *Meekness* and *Humility* towards all Men, yet does this no way tend to impair, but highly to improve true Valour, by laying its Foundation withal upon the best *Reason*, and

* Ἐλπεῖσθαι χρὴ παντ', ἐπεὶ ἐκ ἐς' ἄδ' ἐν ἀελπίῳ.

Ῥάδια πάντα Θεῷ τελέσσει, καὶ ἀνήνυστον ἔδ' ἐν. Linus.

† Efficiunt Animos humiles formidine Divum,
Depressosque premunt ad Terram, &c.

directing

directing its Course by the steddier Prudence : so that in this case one Vertue is not purchas'd at the expence of another, nor Magnanimity forfeited to maintain true *Meekness*, it being well known, that the most stout are always the most humble, meek and merciful, and that only pusillanimous, because irreligious and unballasted Spirits, are haughty, turbulent and cruel. But having lately said, that the *Fear* of God does even chase away all other *Fears*, here, it may be, the Atheist will think to lay fast hold of me, and make no question but to rout me now by the additional Aid of temporal *Princes*, whom he thinks to sooth and draw in to his side : for knowing how ambitious they generally are to enlarge their Bounds, he cunningly touches on this String, telling 'em how much it would aggrandize their Power on Earth that God were entirely excluded from it. For in the second place he argues, that it is their *particular Interest*, that the Belief of a God, &c. should not be entertain'd; this being, as he pretends, inconsistent with their Government : for the proof whereof he assigns three Reasons.

The first of which is, that the *Civil Sovereign* reigns only in *Fear* ; and therefore if there be any Power or Fear greater than that of the *Leviathan*, as Theism requires that of God to be, *Civil Authority* can signify little. But here, I say, let *Civil Sovereigns* beware how they follow this rash Counsel ; lest thinking by this method to enhance, they ruin their Power, and by undermining that *Fear* of God, which chiefly makes *themselves* to be fear'd, they unhinge the Peoples Fidelity to 'em : and therefore in this sense let 'em rather chuse with brave *Theopompus* willingly to make their *Power* less, that it may be the more secure and lasting. However agreeable the End propos'd may seem to as-
piring

piring Princes, yet besides the great danger of pursuing it even in despite of the Almighty, it is not so easy to be compass'd as nam'd, nay after all it can never be attain'd; and accordingly the Argument here offer'd for it is both *false* and *inconclusive*. First, I say that it is false, in that it is built upon a Specimen of *Princes* and of *Men*, which the Atheist takes from the *worst* of *Princes* and the *worst* of *Men*; and agreeably to this supposes, that because some *Princes* are *Tyrants*, derive their *Sovereignty* from *Power*, and exert no other Attribute but that, therefore *Civil Sovereigns* as such and in general are so: And again, because some *Men* are not guided by *Reason*, but a belluine Appetite of sensible things, and owning no essential Distinction of moral *Good* and *Evil*, or of *Mine* and *Thine*, have no other *Standard* to act by, and no other *End* in view, but only their *temporal Self-interest*; therefore all Mankind as such and by Nature are so, that is, Thieves, Cut-throats, Knaves and the like: Only whereas by Consent, for mutual Convenience, one is rais'd to a State of Sovereignty above the rest, him other Men are inclin'd to obey, because they *fear* his *irresistible Power*, lest it should deprive 'em of the *Supports* or *Conveniencies* of *Life*, or of *Life it self*. And accordingly the Obedience or Disobedience of the *Civil Sovereign*, consequent to the Preservation of themselves, is made a secondary Ground of *Good* or *Evil*: every thing being *good*, because for our Safety, which he commands; but every thing *evil*, because for our Destruction, which he forbids; he having *absolute Power* over others, and in this sense *not bearing the Sword in vain*. But this at first sight appears to be a very wrong way of arguing, that is from *some*, and those Anomalys and Monsters of the kind (as most Men own) to *all in general*; and
plainly

plainly discovers the Falshood of the Maxim it is brought to establish. However yet further, as the Atheist stands in it, that his Judgment is right and takes in all Mankind, just as * *Mr. Hobbes confessedly* went about to measure human Nature by the Observation of his own; I shall think it worth my while to single out and examine the Particulars he has croud-ed or suppos'd in this Argument: at the head of which Enquiry I shall first set in view his main Assertion, with what I have to say of it; and next consider the Train of Presumptions or Suppositions, on which he builds it.

First then, as touching his main Assertion, that the *Civil Sovereign* reigns only in *Fear*, I flatly deny the Truth of it. This is an ill-natur'd Maxim of those Statesmen, who derive all *Sovereignty* from *Power*: "Whereas Dominion of Government, † says one, is "not only from Power, nor by Power alone; for Un-
"derstanding, Will and Power must all concur to Go-
"vernment. And accordingly the most flourishing of earthly Princes have successfully us'd many other Ingredients in the Art of Empire; and among the rest, have found it not a little turn to their account to draw the People by the *Cords of Love*: and if so, methinks it is strange, that in case of Subjection the Passion of *Fear* should be always uppermost; and that, even upon the *Hobbist's* Supposition, that *Self-preservation* is the first Principle of Nature, Men should not be as much, if not more affected with the present Enjoyment of *Life*, and the *Hope* of a Continuation of it, as with the *Fear* of losing it, and that by the hand of those,

* Lev. p. 2. † Lawson in Examination of the Political Part of Mr. Hobbes's Leviathan, p. 151.

whose Interest leads 'em as well to succour and support, as to lord it over and trample on their Subjects; who as they are endu'd with *Reason* and *Freedom*, and movable by Springs as well of *Hope* as *Fear*, are best govern'd by the *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, in conjunction with the *Power* of their *Sovereigns*; it being very much for the *Safety* and *Security* of these to *reward* as well as *punish*, and therefore tho they are *Terrors* to *Evildoers*, yet are they *Encouragers* to them that do well. Accordingly says the Writer last mention'd, " * the People may indeed be kept in awe and order, and this cannot be without *Power*. But what is here understood by *Power*? It's not *Potestas*, but *Potentia*, *Strength* and *Force*, which may be great in a *Leviathan*; yet without *Wisdom* and *Justice*, and (he might have added *Benevolence* and *Kindness*) can never long keep the People in Subjection. And thus much follows from the Atheist's own Doctrine, while tho he allows the Sovereign to be *absolute*, yet is it no longer than he can keep himself so, and his *Power cannot be resisted*: but when it can, it lawfully may be; and so unless some other Principle than that of *Fear* restrain, the *Prince* then lies at the mercy of the *People*. And of this our Nation has had a signal Experiment; as a *Salvo* to which it is not improbably guess'd by a * very great Man, that this Atheistical Doctrine was calculated; the Broacher of it himself in the Interregnum implying an Acknowledgment of it too, when being ask'd, *Why he would publish such Doctrine?* he answer'd, *The truth is, I have a mind to go home*; and ac-

* Pag. 122. † Lord Clarendon in Survey of Mr. Hobbes's *Leviathan*, p. 8. who also elsewhere justly censures this Doctrine, as tending to countenance *Usurpation* and *Rebellion*, viz. at p. 5, 92, 193, &c.

cordingly when having escap'd the *Justice* at *Paris* he got into *England*, there he found Favour and Protection; and then to have answer'd his Book, *had been*, says this Author, *to have disputed with a Man that commanded thirty Legions.*

Here the Atheist's Treachery being smelt out by all *rightful Potentates*, he is forc'd to quit his Dependence on their Interest, and wheeling about as it were for breath, goes by the following Steps or Suppositions to abet this Assertion, that the *Civil Sovereign* reigns only in *Fear*: according to which, as before he did no small discourtesy to *Princes*, making 'em to be either *absolute Tyrants*, or otherwise mere Noses of Wax; so now he vilifies *human Nature* in general, and would have all Mankind to be of no better disposition towards each other, than Lions, Bears and Tigers. In that first he tells us, that there is not among Men what is commonly understood by the *Law of Nature*, or a standing and essential Distinction betwixt *moral Good* and *Evil*, &c. “ * but that these words of *Good* and *Evil*, &c. “ are ever us'd with reference to the Person that useth “ them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, “ nor any common Rule of *Good* and *Evil* to be taken “ from the nature of the Objects themselves, but from “ the Person of the Man (where there is no Common- “ wealth) or (in a Commonwealth) from the Person “ that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judg, “ whom Men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and “ make his Sentence the Rule thereof. And in short, “ *Good* and *Evil* † are Names that signify our Appetites “ and Aversions; which in different Tempers, Cus- “ toms and Doctrines of Men, are different, &c. But

* Hobbes in *Lev.* p. 24.

† *Lev.* p. 79.

on the contrary I say, that *right Reason* dictateth to all Men some certain things to be done or omitted; whose Dictates accordingly being *universal*, and withal, I add, being found for the *Benefit* of the *reasonable Nature*, must therefore be look'd on as Rules or Laws given by him, who made it and those at once in a true and proper sense to be term'd *natural*: as likewise the things they command or forbid come under the name of *moral Goods* or *Evils*, such as are not changeable at pleasure, according to *Circumstances*, *Times* or *Places*, or, as the Objection supposes, according to *private Humour*, *publick Authority*, *Institution*, *Custom*, or the like; but such as are perpetually and universally regarded as such in all Tempers and Conditions, when and where Men use their *Reason*, and when or where thro mere Brutishness they do not, as, besides Individuals here and there, is perhaps truly reported of some whole Nations; or thro prejudice will not use it rightly, as the Atheist himself, who in denying this runs counter to the general sense of Mankind, may be suppos'd to do. These Instances are to be look'd on as Irregularitys and Exorbitances from the stated Course of human Nature, and afford us no Argument against the *common Observation* *; no more, as † *Andronicus Rhodius* compares it, *than he can be said to be in the wrong, who calls Honey sweet, tho it does not tast so to Persons that are sick*. And therefore does *Aristotle* very well advise, that || *if we know what is natural in any Species of things, we must*

* Of the Universality of the Law of Nature, see Sharrock de Finibus & Officiis secundum Naturæ Jus, p. 104, &c. and p. 118, 130, &c.

† Ουδὲ γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ εἶναι ψεύδεται, διὰ τοῖς νοσέουσιν ἢ πικρὸν δοκεῖ.

|| Δεῖ ὃ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὰ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. Pol. 1. 5.

seek it in those Individuals which are well and in a good state according to Nature, and not in such as are deprav'd and out of Order. Accordingly, says * Grotius, that may be concluded to be the Law of Nature, which obtains among all Nations in general, or at least among those which are most civiliz'd. For an universal Effect requires an universal Cause, which in this case cannot possibly be any other than that inward sense, which is common to, and upon the use of *Reason* exerts it self in all Men; I say, upon the *Use of Reason*, for this Faculty, tho it be indeed an essential and a distinguishing Character of Men, yet in those who either do not or will not use it as they should, it is much the same thing as if they had it not; and so no wonder if they do not distinctly perceive those Rules of Life, which tho properly natural, as flowing from the open and true Current of Nature, yet are first as it were to be awaken'd and stir'd up by the Force of *Reasoning*, and are therefore, as † one thinks, term'd by || St. Paul not in the common Expression κοινὰ ἔννοιαι, general Notions and Instincts of Good and Evil, but by the word λογισμοί, that is evident Conclusions resulting from the *Exercise of Reason*; which those, who not using their natural Powers, do not accordingly perceive, but hold the Truth in Ungodliness, are by ** Cicero divested of the Character of Men, and rang'd among Brutes, that have no Understanding. However, I would not

* Juris naturalis esse colligitur id, quod apud omnes Gentes, aut moratiores omnes tale esse creditur, &c. Grot. de Jure Bel. & Pac. p. 6. where see more to this purpose.

† Parker in Demonstration of the Law of Nature, p. 7. || Rom. 2. 14, 15.

** This he tells us is Hominem ipsum ex Homine tollere. De Offic. l. 3. non procul ab Init. And again in reference to the same thing he says, Quid interest utrum ex Homine quis se convertat in Belluam, an in Hominis Naturâ Immanitatem gerat Belluæ? Ib. prope ad Fin.

be meant to speak here of what the *Platonists* term the *smaller Morals*, which are only Deductions from other Principles, and in drawing forth which into Use and Practice Mankind are determin'd by uncertain and casual Motives, by Custom, Superstition, Interest, Circumstances, &c. and so may very much differ about 'em: and of these only is it true, which * Mr. *Hobbes* asserts, " That divers Men differ not only in their Judgment " on the Senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to " the Taste, Smell, Hearing, Touch and Sight; but " also of what is conformable or disagreeable to Reason " in the Actions of common Life. Nay, the same " Man in divers times differs from himself, and one " time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another " time he dispraiseth and calleth Evil, &c. and which † Mr. *Selden* supposes, namely, that those we term the Laws of Nature sprung from Custom or publick Consent. But here I would be understood to speak, with a very || Learned Man, of the greater Morals, which are the Foundation of the former, and of which ** Mr. *Hobbes* (I know not how inconsistently with himself) had just before said, that they are *immutable* and *eternal*; and elsewhere supposes, as is observ'd by the †† Learned *Pufendorf*, that *they are declar'd by the tacit Dictates of right Reason*. Now these, that is to say the moral Goods and Evils, which were before pointed at, together with the Rules that concern 'em, are compriz'd in what we term the cardinal Vertues and Vices, such as Prudence,

* Lev. p. 79. † De Jure Nat. L. 1. c. 6, 7; &c.

|| Loquuntur enim illi (meaning *Hobbes* and *Selden*) de Legibus in Specie, nos de maximis singularium Legum Fundamentis, &c. neque circa prima hæc Justitiæ Placita variatæ sunt morationum Leges, &c. Dr. *Sharrock* de Fin. & Offic. p. 132.

** De Civ. c. 15. §. 3.

†† Of the Law of Nature and Nations, *English Ed.* p. 114. col. 2.

Justice, Benevolence, Temperance, Fortitude, &c. and the Branches immediately springing from them; as also the End which they of course drive at, that is, the Happiness or Misery of the *rational Nature*: which also being set in view to Nature's Light, and certainly consequent to the *Means* aforesaid, do point out to us a natural Obligation to pursue the one, and to avoid the other. Which *Obligation*, as *Aristotle* words it, is of the same force in all places, as Fire burns every where alike, and is of the same use in *Greece* and in *Persia*. And this, as one observes, is enough to stamp these Dictates of right Reason with the Character of *natural Laws*, they being not only evident to us, but also establish'd and enforc'd by the Sanction of Reward and Punishment: "For neither indeed, says * he, in my
 " opinion do any positive Laws whatever oblige or bind
 " after any other manner, but only by shewing, that
 " Happiness and Misery are most firmly connected with
 " the Obedience or Transgression of them. Not that I think it needful to suppose, that these Laws or Principles of Duty are *innate* or *imprinted on the Mind in the manner of distinct and actual Propositions*: but I reckon it sufficient to denominate 'em *Laws*, " that they are
 " gather'd and understood any way, whether by In-
 " stinct or the Order of Nature, and the notorious
 " Usefulness of 'em to Men; † by internal Suggestion
 " of the Mind, or from the Contemplation of our
 " State and Condition, and of the nature of those
 " Affairs and Transactions, which are to engage our
 " Life. Thus, says *Tully* in his Book *de Republicâ*, as he is cited by *Lactantius*, " There is a constant and

* *Sharrock de Fin. & Offic.* p. 134.

† *Pufendorf in Treatise of the Law of Nature and Nations*, p. 114. col. 2.
 " perpetual

“ perpetual Law of Reason, made known to all Men,
 “ which calls us to Duty by Commands, and detersus
 “ from Sin by Threats ; and whose Commands or
 “ Threats are neither of ’em in vain * : because, as † an-
 “ other expressees it, a constant Obedience is follow’d
 “ by Serenity and Security of Conscience, join’d with
 “ a good and certain Assurance ; by a good Frame and
 “ settled Tranquillity of Mind ; by the Preservation
 “ of the Body from many Evils not *fatal* : besides an
 “ infinite number of Advantages, which may be ob-
 “ tain’d by the mutual Benevolence and good Offices
 “ of other Men. On the other hand, from Disobedi-
 “ ence do arise by a natural connexion Disquiet of Con-
 “ science, Disturbance and Degeneracy of Mind, De-
 “ struction of the Body, and numberless Evils which
 “ may be occasion’d by the withdrawing of other
 “ mens Assistance, or by the violence of their pro-
 “ vok’d Revenge. Which Consequences of keeping
 or breaking what we reckon to be *Duty* or *natural Law*,
 are call’d by Dr. Cumberland, *natural Rewards and Pu-
 nishments*. To this I add, that there is universally in
 human Nature, as well a previous *liking* or *disliking* of
 some things as *good* or *evil*, which prompts us to chuse
 the one and refuse the other ; as hereupon there’s a real
 Advantage or Disadvantage, an inward Complacency
 or Trouble of Mind : nay and we perceive, that this
Inclination or *Aversion* is in us antecedently to all *Rea-
 soning* and *Discourse*, and without Deliberation carries
 us on || by a *certain natural Impetus* or *Enthusiasm* to *ver-
 tuous Actions*, and forcibly restrains us from the con-

* Est quidem vera Lex recta Ratio, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiter-
 na, quæ vocet ad Officium jubendo, vetando, &c. *Last. lib. 6. Inst.*

† Pufend. of Law of Nat. and Nations, p. 116. col. 2.

|| Παρόρμησις ἢ ἐνθουσιασμός τὰς κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετῶν.

trary ;

trary; which is plainly a Consequence of what may be particularly observ'd, * that we are constituted and fram'd with such *Passions* and *Affections*, as for instance with Love and Hatred, Complacency and Horror, Glory and Shame, Repentance and Self-satisfaction, with Veneration and Disdain, Commiseration and Envy, &c. as do some of 'em signify to us in general, " that there is such a thing as moral Good and Evil in " human Actions, and others of 'em point out what " those Actions are, wherein this moral Good or Evil " is subjected. Infomuch that it would be to reverse the very Foundation of *Nature*, as well as to oppose *right Reason*, for Men to confound *Vertue* with *Vice*; and nothing would be harder than to stamp what we reckon *moral Good* with the Character of *Evil*, and make the one indifferently to pass for the other. It is in vain to tell us, that even in so polite a Country as *Greece*, and particularly among the *Lacedemonians*, † τὸ ληστέειν, or to *rob* and *steal*, was reckon'd *honorable*; for this is a Mistake purely from a misconstruction of that Word, which generally signifys not to rob or steal, but to act the part of a valiant Soldier, and carry away Spoils in War, it being not otherwise suppos'd, but that the ground of the War is just: And however this is but a single Instance, and of no weight against the general Observation. Were there not a natural ground of Duty, and an essential Distinction of Good and Evil, Men might be brought in this particular to assent to and like whatever Imposture pleas'd: But was it ever known, or can it be, that, for example, Perfidiousness and Blasphemy

* See this particularly shewn in Dr. Scot's *Christian Life*, Vol. 1. Part 2. p. 26, &c. And in Bp Parker's *Demonstration of the Law of Nature*, p. 50, &c.

† See Dr. Templer in *Idea Theolog. Leviath.* p. 29.

should

should be esteem'd Vertues, that it should be deem'd the same thing, whether I honour or murder my Parents, and whether I am just and kind, or else endeavour all possible hurt to those that are just and kind to me? Surely these Sentiments can't so much as enter our Minds without horror! This Horror, you'll say, proceeds from the Prejudices of Education. But how then comes it to be so universal and among all People, tho their Education be never so different? And surely it must be rather from ill *Education* or *Custom*, that the Atheist herein thinks counter to all Mankind.

Will you say again, that Politick Law-givers have infus'd into the People the quaint Distinctions of *Good* and *Evil*. But how could they all so exactly agree, without consulting together, to impose the same things upon *so many different People*? How could they engrave the sense of Duty in the bottom of mens Hearts, nay and inspire them with that degree of Niceness, as that they make it a scruple of Conscience to act against it, and that even tho it be sometimes, on other accounts, uneasy to observe it? Law-givers undoubtedly did not make, but find these Principles in the People; which they perceiving to be absolutely needful in Society, have accordingly presuppos'd, as the ground of their own Laws. "For thus, we see, that the
" great Design of all human Constitutions has been to
" secure and enforce the prime Rules of Morality;
" which is a plain Argument, that Men have always
" found by Experience, that they are *naturally good*
" and productive of their Happiness and Welfare.
And accordingly things cannot be said to be therefore good or evil, because commanded or forbidden by human Laws: but generally speaking to be therefore commanded or forbidden, because antecedently good or evil

H h h h h

evil in themselves. But you'll say, from hence 'twould follow that all *human Laws* are good. *Answ.* It does hence follow, that either they are *really good*, or at least have a *Semblance of Goodness*, this being the Motive that makes 'em go down with the People, and that is enough for my purpose : But as for Laws, which might plainly be seen to be downright and altogether bad, * such as these no Legislators could ever impose ; no, not tho they have attempted it by Violence and Force : and therefore if they have intended any such, they have always given 'em a plausible Disguise, either intermixing 'em with *good ones*, and endeavouring to support 'em with just Principles already in vogue among the People, or some other specious way. Which minds me further, that Laws which are *evidently good*, and do plainly confirm the *first Principles* of Duty (to shew the intrinsick and natural Bottom on which they go) are either readily obey'd, as carrying with 'em their own Reward ; or even when they are disobey'd, the Disobedient can't but own the real Goodness of 'em, saying with her in the Poet :

† *We see and like what's better, but pursue
What's worse.*——

“ Now, says || *Aristotle*, that which even ill Men are
“ forc'd to praise, is certainly praise-worthy ; for if such
“ approve it, this is as much as if all Men confess it : for
“ nothing surely could make them do it, but the manifest
“ Evidence of Truth. From which inward sense of

* See Dr. Scot's Christian Life, Part 2. p. 18, &c.

† ——— Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.———

|| Rhet. l. 1. c. 6.

Goodness also 'tis, as * *Quintilian* observes, That no Man is so bad, as that he desires to seem bad; and almost every Body speaks more honestly than he either thinks or acts.

Thus far it appears that the Atheist at first has made a wrong step, and therefore no wonder if his next be so too: in that he tells us, that there being nothing simply good, honest or praise-worthy, all is reduc'd to what is profitable to one's self; and thus Self Interest is the primary Measure and Standard of our Actions. As to which I answer, that were Self-Interest rightly understood and taken in its due Latitude, as it is the *Self-Interest* of Men, according to what they are by Nature, that is, not only as standing in private Capacities, but also as political and sociable Creatures; and withal as it extends both to their Souls and Bodys, both to another World and this: then perhaps he and I should not very much differ; because in this sense what is term'd *Self-Interest* would fall in with the last End and greatest Happiness of our Nature, as well hereafter as here; which certainly we cannot love or desire too much, and which ought therefore to be look'd on as the main Scope of our Aims and Endeavours, and so should we measure the Goodness and Value of all other things, according as they serve to the Attainment of this †. But whereas in all senses he limits *Self-Interest* to private Persons as such, and to them also would have it refer no further than touching their Body and this Life ||: here, as I can with good Assurance deny, and

* Inst. l. 3. c. 8.

† Of this see Abbadie in L'Art de se Connoitre Soy-même, c. 7, 8, 9, 11. part 2.

|| Thus according to Hobbes the Right and the Law of Nature do refer no further than to each Man's using his own Power in preserving his Life, and avoiding what is destructive of it. Lev. p. 64.

engage to make my words good, that the Atheist understands his true Interest, so likewise do I say, that he is as much mistaken in pursuing what he fancies to be such. For should I grant his *End* to be right, namely *temporal Self-Interest* and the *Preservation of the Life present*; yet what are the means by which he would attain it? Why * *Force* and *Fraud* are, he thinks, the aptest for this purpose, and therefore to be term'd the *two cardinal Vertues*, as mainly carrying on the great Concern of Man, to wit the preserving of his Life, and getting possession of whatever he can, by whatever means he can. But touching this, I tell him, he is grossly mistaken: For nothing certainly can better conduce to our *temporal Self-Interest*, than the opposite way of proceeding by *Benevolence* and *Kindness*, *Sincerity* and *Fair-dealing*. Because we plainly see the Nature and Condition of Men to be such, as that they cannot subsist by themselves, upon their own private Stock; and their Time as well as Power would fail them, to procure the most useful and the most necessary things. Wherefore as they need, so accordingly do they seek for Supplies from without, and in this Enquiry do they find that Men of all Creatures are most fit and most able to promote their mutual Advantage; " and that " next to the Support and the Defence of Heaven, " they draw their chief Help and Comfort from one " another. And this they perceive to be an ordinary Consequence of the natural Disposition of Men, in that they are inclin'd to be grateful to others, and expect others to be grateful to them; and if they are not so, to refrain from doing 'em any further Benefactions. Now when we find the case to be such, how

* Hobbes in Lev. p. 63.

open and plain do we see the way lie to our private Advantage, to the Interest of our Bodys, Lives and Fortunes? By first shewing kindness to others our selves, may we call in their *Help* and *Good will* to us, and even *provoke 'em to Love and good Works*; and in the same Circle, by returning their Favours, may we still secure a Continuation of them. Whereas on the contrary
“ ’tis a great mistake * to fancy it will be *profitable* to
“ you to take away either by *Fraud* or *Force* what another Man has acquir’d by his Labour; since others
“ have not only the power of resisting you, but of
“ taking the same freedom with your Goods and Possessions: and therefore whoever took such a course, would
“ indeed set a fatal Pattern, and chalk out the way to
“ his own Destruction. Nay, should a Man thus attempt to draw every thing to himself and to his own Interest, without looking toward his Neighbour, “ he
“ would both labour in vain (it being impossible that
“ all Persons and all Things should be dispos’d according
“ to the contradictory Desires and Wills of particular
“ Men) and at once not only teach, but invite and
“ move others to plunder and to ruin him: Especially considering, that as Men are inclin’d to do good Offices for good, so are they very often to do bad ones for bad, and withal are as powerful in effecting Mischief, as they are ready in designing it. This is so very plain, that none, methinks, but such a *Fool* as an Atheist could ever think otherwise, or propose indeed the *End* before mention’d, yet exclusively from the properest *Means* of attaining it; but rather the more rationally a Man loves *himself*, the more earnest he will be in en-

† See Pufendorf of the Law of Nature and Nations, p. 102.

deavouring by good turns to procure the Love of other Men.

Well then, says the Atheist, granting you this, that * when it is manifestly for your own good to do good to others, it will be a point of Wisdom in you to be kind and friendly ; yet when it is not so, to consult the good of others would betoken the greatest Indiscretion : especially considering that in the state of Nature there is no Law, no real Obligation to it ; “ † the Notions
“ of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, having
“ there no place, and consequently there being no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct ;
“ but that being every Man’s which he can get, and
“ for so long as he can keep it. To which Huddle of Matter I shall answer under three particular Heads. First then I say, that every wise Man would state the Notion of *Profit*, and accordingly take his measures of acting, not from what is advantageous at this or that Time, or to this or that Person under such or such a Circumstance ; but from what is perpetually and universally so. Now Benevolence, Humanity and Kindness to others are by Experience found to be so, and it is only by accident, if they prove otherwise, or that a contrary method of proceeding is in the issue advantageous. Secondly I say, that the Vertues aforesaid being so universally conducive to the good of private Persons, any sober unprejudic’d Man would from hence infer, that this is a part of that excellent *Decorum* and *Order*, which may be observ’d throughout the Universe ; that the same infinite *Wisdom* and

* Thus Carneades in Lactantius, *Inst.* l. 3. c. 8. And to the same purpose Mr. Hobbes, Quare quærendam esse Pacem, quatenus habendæ ejus Spes aliqua affulserit, ubi haberi non potest, quærenda esse Belli Auxilia, &c. *De Civ.* p. 17.
† Hobbes in *Lev.* p. 63.

Power, which contriv'd and made the Nature of Man, design'd it for Happiness, and appointed means in order thereunto ; by consequence whatever is found in the course of things to contribute to that End, nay without which it cannot be attain'd, is to be fix'd on as a proper means, and the doing so observ'd as *natural Law*. Accordingly as Men are seen to stand in an absolute need of each others Help, in order to their Well-being, " every Man ought as far as in him lies to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others, agreeable to the main End and Disposition of human Race in general ; and that not so much out of *Fear of Hurt*, as *Hope of Good*. Thus the Notion of what is truly *profitable*, instead of making void, might, one would think, introduce that of *honesty*, and make it be receiv'd amongst Men, seeing the one so necessarily depends on, nay so plainly falls in with the other : upon which account, as * *Tully* informs us, *Socrates* was us'd to curse the Authors who first divided these Names in Notion and Opinion, which Nature so inseparably united. But neither do I draw the ground of social Vertues merely from their being useful to *private Interest* ; since the Obligation of 'em, as was before observ'd, is discernible by *Reason* abstractly from *Profit*, and we find what is our *Interest*, not therefore only to be our Duty, but to come under that Character also upon some higher ground. To which purpose a † late Writer tells us, " that tho it be " certainly true, that the Practice and external Exercise " of Justice and many other moral Dutys, doth suppose " a Society, or at least a State of Friendship, that so

* De Offic. l. 3.

† Lowde in Discourse concerning the Nature of Man, p. 161.

“ Men may have proper Objects of those respective
 “ Vertues ; yet the reasons of their Obligation are
 “ founded in the Nature of each single Man, and so
 “ may belong to a Man in Solitude : for the reasons of
 “ Justice and other moral Vertues, are not ultimately
 “ to be resolv’d into that natural Support and Advan-
 “ tage they bring to a Society and Commonwealth,
 “ and that they cannot without great disadvantage be
 “ banish’d out of it ; but into that Conformity they
 “ bear to the Divine Nature, and to the Participation
 “ thereof in our selves. Hence it is that some Max-
 ims and Vertues are universally look’d on as obligatory
 in themselves, and needful to be practis’d, tho with the
 loss of Life and Fortune : Agreeably to which, Tully
 says particularly of *Friendship* * *That it first arose ra-*
ther from Nature than from Weakness ; rather from the
Bent and Inclination of mens Minds, than from the Con-
sideration of the Profit it would bring. And thus Jam-
 blichus says of *Justice*, after having spoken of *Advan-*
tages, † *That it is desirable of it self without these ; for*
to it we are by Nature born : and therefore tho we are so
far from getting, that we very much lose by it, yet is it
still our Duty to be just. Thus the Philosophers in ge-
 neral have asserted, that Vertue is desirable either for its
 own sake, or at least not for any outward Profit, but
 only the rational Delight or Hope it brought with it ;
 and we might instance in many moral Rules, which
 Men universally look on as *reasonable*, and the Oppo-
 sites to ’em as *unreasonable*, without the Consideration
 of *Profit* or *Disprofit* : as namely, not to hurt one that
 does no hurt, to help the Helpless, to be obedient to

* In Quest. Cel. † Χωρίς ὅ τέρψαι αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτὸ ἀρετὴν ἐστὶ τὸ
 δίκαιον, &c. Jamb. in Protrep. c. 18.

Parents, tender of ones Offspring, grateful to Benefactors, and observant of Contracts; and in short, a general Benevolence or Inclination to do good to others shews it self, says *Plutarch*, even in our greenest Age, and almost prevents the Thought of what is profitable to our selves. Wherefore, methinks, if we consider Mankind as they are in themselves, and even out of all Society, the *Notions* at least of *Right* and *Wrong*, *Justice* and *Injustice*, as being necessary Adjuncts of their Nature, would have place in 'em; and, contrary to the Atheist's Supposition, why may not these Qualities be in a Man, that were alone in the World, as well as some of his *Passions*, which do also necessarily relate to their proper Objects, tho these are not always ready at hand? But moreover as we find, that Men are by their Nature and Condition *sociable*, the *Reasonableness* of social Dutys is further confirm'd to us by a Motive of *Interest*; insomuch that if they are not allow'd and practis'd, Men would in no wise be able to subsist. The Truth of this, besides what has been said for it, will further appear, in that I add Thirdly, that in the *State of Nature* there is *Propriety* or *Dominion*, *Mine* and *Thine*: for whether we consider Men as actually *sociated*, or only *sociable*, or as neither, but barely *existent*; yet must they of course be suppos'd to occupy something or other for their Subsistence and Convenience, even as soon as they enter into *Being*. Now in the beginning of things, what each Man *first* occupy'd, became his own; so that afterwards to take it from him or his, became *unjust*: I say, what each Man first occupy'd, I do not mean in a way of Scrambling, or according to insatiable Lust and Appetite (for that is unnatural) but only for convenient Subsistence and Support, that

is, the due *Exigence* of *Nature*. And thus far, tho I grant that antecedently to *Possession* or *Pecis Positio*, which has been since look'd on as a * *Token* of *lawful Occupancy*, each Man had a *Right*, and all Men an *equal Right* to *some* things; nay, and that before the first Seizure there was so far a *Communion* of Goods, as that Men might be suppos'd to be equally indifferent in their *Claim* to this or that *Portion*: yet could they not be said to have an *equal*, because they had indeed *no Right* to *all*; but their *Propriety* or private Share was originally and by *Nature* stated. I say by *Nature*, inasmuch as every natural Power and Capacity of Man is found to be *limited*; which unavoidably and by it self introduces a limited Use and Enjoyment of things: "For no Man can claim a greater Right from Na-
 "ture than he is capable of enjoying: and therefore
 "seeing that is fully provided for by a Parcel that is
 "proportion'd to it self and its *Necessitys*, he can-
 "not challenge, by virtue of his *natural Right*, any
 "Power over the Remainder; but will be content to
 "leave whatsoever he cannot enjoy himself to other
 "mens Use and Advantage: and certainly that is
 "very reasonable to allow our Neighbours to chal-
 "lenge their share of Happiness, when our turn is fully
 "serv'd and satisfy'd †. Because, I say, to exceed this Bound is plainly contrary to *Nature* and to *Order*; which, as *Scaliger* tells us, is *quasi* ὅρον δ' αὖ, or that which of course sets Limits.

Thus far I have trac'd the Atheist's Steps, and so prevented his Aim in some of his most subtle and intricate Windings toward his purpose; the Plan where-

* Ruth. 4. 8.

† See this Point more fully clear'd in Parker's Demonstration of the Law of Nat. from p. 35, to 42.

of is this: There being nothing *simply Good or Evil, Right or Wrong, no Mine or Thine, but all having an equal Right to all*; and at once, he adds, they being well-nigh *equal in Power and Strength*, as they may all aim at, so have they an equal ground to *hope for all*; and so if more of 'em do affect or like the *same thing*, then, because it can't be enjoy'd by all at once, there arise Competition and Diffidence, till by this means they come to Blows: and thus Mankind either thro *Interest or Glory* are of course in a state of *Enmity and War**. These are vile Scandals upon human Nature, the main ground whereof I have before prevented; and as for the rest, it deserves no other Answer, but such a ridiculing Turn, as a † late ingenious Pen has given it. Granting that Men by Nature are well-nigh equal in Power and Strength, yet are they not so savage, as, because on this account they might have an *equal Hope* of Conquest, and so to obtain this or that thing, immediately to quarrel and combat for it. The Atheist cannot argue this from the true Nature of *Man*; but either from his own ill Temper (as methinks || he propos'd to do) or from the inordinate Passions and Practices of some other Men; (as also ** he plainly does) against the injurious Violence whereof, because we use to secure our selves, therefore he would have it, that we likewise have the same distrust of all Mankind, and make the like Estimate of their *natural Temper*; that is, because *we ride arm'd in a Journey, lock our Doors and Chests*, to prevent Mischief and Robbery, therefore we have an inward Opinion that the World is fill'd with Murderers and Robbers, and

* Lev. p. 61. † Dr. Erchard in Mr. Hobbes's State of Nature consider'd.

|| In Lev. p. 2.

** Lev. p. 62.

that all Men by *Nature* are such *. This, as † one observes, is the proper Character not of Men but Beasts, that are made up and govern'd only by the inordinate Appetites of the *Body*, without any Vertue, Honesty or Honour of the *Mind*. And here indeed lies the fundamental Error of all Mr. *Hobbes's* Theory of *Man*, that he confounds what we tend to as mere *Animals* for the Conservation of Life and the avoiding of Death, with what we desire and is perfectly agreeable to our *rational Nature*. How much better is Man defin'd by || *Aristotle*, to be an *Animal that is naturally peaceable and mild*? To which purpose ** *Plutarch* also affirms, That no Man is or ever was by Nature a fierce or unso-
ciable Creature. For without question Men as such, and before they are deprav'd by barbarous Customs, have in 'em the Seeds of *Philanthropy* and *Love*; and may therefore be suppos'd to have been at first inclin'd not to scramble and fight for whatever they could get, but amicably to settle each others Bounds: and henceforth commenc'd the *Exercise* of *Justice*. This we may much better conclude from History and Observation, which afford us Examples of Mercy and Compassion to others, of a generous Condescension and Self-denial, of an universal Love and Good-will to Men, sufficient to wipe off the aforesaid Aspersions cast upon human Nature. “ Tho, says †† one, it must “ also be granted, that there have been too many

* See Lord Clarendon in Survey of the Leviath. p. 27, 28.

† Non humanum quid Cogitatione depingit, &c. hominem denique ut Belluam, ad quam Animi Virtus aut Honestas & Decus nihil pertinent, nobis exhibet. *Philosoph. Burgund. in Tom. prior. p. 392. Ed. Lond.*

|| Ἄνθρωπος ζῶον ἡμμερον φύσει. *Top. 5. 2.*

** Φύσει μὲν ἄνθρωπος εἴτε γέρονεν, ἔτ' ἐστὶν ἀνήμερον ζῶον. *In Vit. Pomp.*

†† Lowde of the Nature of Man, p. 166.

“ barbarous

“ barbarous and inhuman Actions committed, both by
 “ Heathens and Christians too; but then those Actions
 “ were not approv’d by the more wise and sober Per-
 “ sons of those very Nations that committed ’em.
 “ 2. They were universally condemn’d by the more
 “ civiliz’d part of the World. 3. They were so far
 “ from tending to their Advantage, that they have
 “ many times prov’d the cause or occasion of many
 “ and grievous Calamitys brought upon themselves
 “ and Nation by the just Providence of God. And
 however the Atheist thinks we are * let loose to all
 manner of Villany, nay and has the confidence to add,
 that this Licence is a noble and happy Privilege of
Nature, in that we are born without Fetters or Shac-
 kles upon us, free from all Duty and Obligation, all
 Justice, Benignity and Morality, which according to
 him are Restraints of true Liberty: yet those who
 have better weigh’d these Matters, are of opinion,
 “ That he deprives Man of the greatest Happiness and
 “ Glory that can be attributed to him, who devests
 “ him of that Gentleness and Benevolence towards
 “ other Men, by which he delights in the good For-
 “ tune and Tranquillity that they enjoy, and makes
 “ him so far prefer himself before all others, as to make
 “ the rest a Prey to advance any Commodity or Con-
 “ veniency of his own; which is a Barbarity superior
 “ to what the most savage Beasts are guilty of †.

* For this is a Consequence of the Atheist’s Principle; Perspicuum est enim
 nisi *Æquitas*, *Fides*, *Justitia* proficiscantur a *Naturâ*, & si hæc omnia ad *Utili-*
tatem referantur, *Virum bonum* non posse reperiri. *Cic. de Fin. 2.*

† Thus my *Ld Clarendon* in Survey of the *Leviathan*, p. 28.

—————Quando Leoni
 Fortior eripuit Vitam Leo? Quo Nemore unquam
 Expiravit Aper majoris dentibus. *Apri?*

And methinks, upon second thoughts, the Atheists seem to be convinc'd of this, or at least that their pretended State of Nature is very * inconvenient: For, say they, tho the aforesaid State of Nature be in it self absolutely the *best*, yet nevertheless by reason of mens *Imbecillity*, and the *Equality* of their *Strengths*, and *Inconsistency* of their *Appetites*, it proves by accident the worst; this *War* with every one, making mens *Right* or *Liberty* to every thing, indeed a *Right* or *Liberty* to nothing; they having no Security of their Lives, much less of the comfortable Enjoyment of them. And therefore if we ask in the next place, Supposing Mankind to have been so dissever'd and dissociated, so lawless and hostile by Nature, as is pretended, how came they to settle in orderly Communitys and States, and whence arose that Face of *Justice* which is now seen in the World? Here the † old Atheists in *Plato*, and also *Epicurus* will forestal Mr. *Hobbes* (tho it seems || he knew not of it, as neither did another ||| late Writer) and tell us, that Necessity put Mankind upon this: For when they had been a good while kicking and cuffing, hewing and flashing, and jostling against each other, they became at length all weary of it, and conceiv'd it necessary by *Art* to help the Defect of their own Power

* Lev. p. 62. † See Cudw. True Int. Syst. p. 892, 893. To which I add, besides what is there cited out of Plato, these plain words in his 10th de Leg. p. 197. Ed. Cant. Τα ὅτι δίκαια ἐστὶ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἐμφισβητῶντας διαλέγειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μετὰ λιδεμένους αἰεὶ ταῦτα. αὐτὸ δ' ἀνμετάδωκεν καὶ ὅταν, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι, γιγνόμενα τέχνη καὶ τῆς νόμοις, ἀλλ' ἔτι δὲ τινὶ φύσει.

|| He affirming this Hypothesis to be a new Invention, as the Circulation of the Blood, and no older than the Book de Cive.

||| Mr. Lowde, who in the Book before-cited, p. 163. tells us, That to make Good and Evil, Just and Unjust to depend merely upon the Pleasure of the Civil Magistrate, seems to be a peculiar Flight proper only to Mr. *Hobbes*, &c.

here,

here, and to chuse a *lesser Evil* for the avoiding of a *greater*, that is, to make a voluntary Abatement of this their *infinite Right*, and to submit to Terms of Equality with one another, in order to a sociable and peaceable Cohabitation; and not only so, but also for the Security of all, that others should observe such Rules as well as themselves, to put their Necks under the Yoke of a *common coercive Power*, whose Will being the *Will* of them all, should be the very *Rule*, and *Law*, and *Measure* of *Justice* to them. For, say they, tho Men have an *infinite Right* by Nature, yet may they alienate this *Right* or Part thereof from themselves, and either simply renounce it or transfer the same to some other Person; by means whereof it will become unlawful for themselves afterwards to make use thereof. But the Conceit of this *artificial Justice* is quite baff'd by what we have before said of the grounds of *natural Justice*. To which in this place I add, that the afore-said Hypothesis for consociating Men by *Art* into a Body Politick, who were naturally dissociated, seems to be no other than the Effect of the Atheist's own cowardly Disposition; for certainly in this case, they who had *Courage* and *Generosity* in them, would never submit to such sneaking Terms of *Equality* and *Subjection*, but venture for *Dominion*, and resolve either to win the *Saddle* or lose the *Horse*. Again, tho Men be suppos'd to renounce or transfer their *Liberty* and *Right*, yet if there be nothing in its own nature *unlawful*, then cannot this be *unlawful* for a Man afterwards to make use of such *Liberty*, as he had before in words renounc'd or abandon'd. Nor can any Man, by his mere *Will*, make any thing *unlawful* to him, which was not so in it self; but can only suspend the Exercise of so much of his *Liberty*, as he thought good.

good. But however could a Man by his *Will* oblige himself or make any thing *unlawful* to him, which was not so before, there would be nothing got by this: because then might he by his *Will* disoblige himself again, and make the same *lawful* as before; for what is made merely by *Will*, may be destroy'd by *Will*. Wherefore these *Politicians* will yet urge the business further, and tell us, that *no Man can be oblig'd but by his own Act*, and that the Essence of *Injustice* is nothing else but *Dati Repetitio*, the taking away of that which one had before given. To which we again reply, that were a Man *naturally unoblig'd* to any thing, then could he no way be *oblig'd* to stand to his own *Act*, so as that it should be really *unjust* and *unlawful* for him at any time upon second Thoughts *voluntarily to undo* what he had before *voluntarily done*. Nor let these Political Jugglers think to cast a mist before our eyes, when telling us, and that indeed with somewhat more Speciousness, that *Injustice is a Breach of Covenants*: for tho it be true, that if there be *natural Justice, Covenants* will oblige; yet upon the contrary Supposition, that there is nothing *naturally unjust*, neither can this be *unjust to break Covenants*. But, say they, it is a *Law of Nature* to stand to *Pacts* or *Covenants*. This, I answer, is plainly contradictory to their main *fundamental Principle*, that by Nature nothing is *unjust* or *unlawful*: for if nothing be so, then can there be no *Laws of Nature*; as also if there be *Laws of Nature*, then must there be something *naturally unjust* and *unlawful*. So that these Atheistick Politicians do plainly dance round in a Circle, they first deriving the Obligation of *Civil Laws* from that of *Covenants*, and then that of *Covenants* from the *Laws of Nature*; and lastly, the Obligation both of these

these *Laws of Nature* and of *Covenants* themselves again from the *Law, Command* and *Sanction* of the *Civil Sovereign*: without which neither of 'em would at all oblige, this being the only *Rule* and *Fountain* of *Justice*. So vain are the Attempts of these *Politicians*, to consociate those by *Art*, whom they affirm that *Nature* has dissociated; as well might they produce Something out of Nothing, or tie knots in the *Wind* or *Water*, or build up a stately *Palace* out of *Sand*: and indeed the *Ligaments*, by which they would tie the *Members* of their huge *Leviathan* or *artificial Man* together, are really nothing else but *Will* and *Words*: and surely if *Authority* and *Sovereignty* be made only by *Will* and *Words*, 'tis plain, that by *Will* and *Words* they may be unmade again at pleasure. And indeed the *Atheist* is so weak, as to own how little he is ty'd by this means either to be dutiful to his *Sovereign* or just to his *Fellow-Subjects*, and so to maintain the *Bond of Peace*; saying, that the *Violation* of that *Justice*, which he understands, is no real *Evil* in the *Man*, but only an *Incongruity* or *Absurdity* in the *Citizen*; just as when in * *Disputation* a *Man* denies a *Proposition* which he had before granted, and contradicts what he maintain'd in the beginning. How weak a *Barrier* is this *Notion* of *Justice* and *Injustice* against the *Force* of *Appetite* and private *Utility*, and for securing the *Obedience* of *Sovereigns* and the *Propertys* of *Subjects*, whenever it is contrary to the same. Wherefore again the *Atheistick Statesmen* being sensible of this, that *Covenants* of themselves being but *Words* and *Breath*, are of no strength to hold the *Members* of their *Leviathan* or *Body Politick* together, are forc'd at last

* Lev. p. 65.

to betake themselves from *Art* to *Force* and *Power*, and make their *Civil Sovereign* really to *reign only in Fear*: and thus at length do they think to come about to their ungodly Purpose, and to clinch the Nail. This must needs be their meaning, when they so constantly declare all *Obligation*, *Just* and *Unjust*, to be deriv'd only from *Law*, they by *Law* there understanding a *Command directed to such, as by reason of their Imbecillity are not able to resist*; so that the *Will* and *Command* of the more *powerful* obliges by *Punishment* threaten'd, as this is a *Ground of Fear*. The Absurdity whereof has hitherto been shewn either directly or indirectly; and touching the same I add in this place, that if the only real *Obligation* and *Ground* to obey *Civil Laws* be from the *Fear* of *Punishment*, then could no Man be oblig'd to hazard his *Life* for the *Safety* of his Prince and Country; and they, who could reasonably promise to themselves *Impunity*, would be altogether disoblig'd, and by consequence might justly break any *Laws* for their own advantage: an Assertion so extravagant, that these confounded *Politicians* themselves are ashamed plainly to own it, and do therefore disguise it, what they can, by *Equivocation*, themselves also sometimes confessing so much of Truth, * *That Punishment does not oblige, but only hold those to their Duty, who were before oblig'd*. Furthermore, what is made by *Power* and *Force* only, may be unmade by *Power* and *Force* again. If *Civil Sovereigns* reign only in the *Fear* of their own *Sword*, then is that *Right* of theirs, so much talk'd of, indeed nothing else but *Might*, and their *Authority Force*; and consequently successful and prosperous *Rebellion*,

* *Pœna non obligat, sed obli gatum tenet.*

and whatsoever can be done by *Power*, will be *ipso facto* thereby justify'd. And thus, as an * accurate Writer observes, the Atheist by endeavouring to invalidate the Force of natural Laws, does in effect plead for or excuse High Treason, and so entice men to commit that horrid Crime. Lastly, were *Civil Sovereigns* and *Bodys Politick* mere violent and contra-natural things, then would they quickly all vanish into nothing; because *Nature* will prevail against *Force* and *Violence*: whereas we see, that Men do constantly every where fall into *Political Order*, and the Corruption of one Form of Government is but the Generation of another.

From what has been said it is plain, that *Sovereigns* do not reign only in the *Fear of their own Swords*; and that *Civil Supremacy* and *Bodys Politick* are not mere *artificial* and *violent* things: and consequently I add, they must of necessity have some natural *Basis* and *Bond*, something of a common and publick, of a cementing and conglutinating Nature, in all rational Beings, to found and unite 'em together; and such as may at once both really *oblige Subjects* to obey the lawful *Commands* of *Sovereigns*, and *Sovereigns* in commanding to seek the Good and Welfare of their *Subjects*. Which Basis or Bond of Society can be no other than *natural Justice*, which has its original from the Deity: Nay, the Right and Authority of God himself is founded in *Justice*; and of this the *Civil Sovereignty* is also a certain *Participation*. It is not a mere Creature of mens *Wills*, and therefore annihilable again by their

* Velit nolit Hobbius in hoc Crimen homines sollicitat, quoties affirmat Dictamina hæc rationis improprie dici Leges, &c. Bp Cumberland de Leg. Nat. p. 418, &c.

Wills at pleasure, but hath a stamp of *Divinity* upon it; as may partly appear from hence, because that *Jus Vita & Necis*, that *Power of Life and Death* which *Civil Sovereigns* have, was never lodg'd in *Singulars* before *Civil Society*, and therefore could not be confer'd by them. Had not *God* and *Nature* made a *City*; were there not a *natural* Conciliation of all rational Creatures, and Subjection of them to the *Deity* as their Head, (which is *Cicero's una Civitas Deorum atque Hominum*, one *City of Gods and Men*) had not *God* made * *ruling and being rul'd*, *Superiority* and *Subjection*, with their respective *Duty* and *Obligation*; Men could neither by *Art*, nor yet by *Force* have made any firm *Citys* or *Politys*. The *Civil Sovereign* is no *Leviathan*, no *Beast*, but in some sense a *God* (*I have said ye are Gods*) and he reigns not in mere brutish *Force* and *Fear*, but in *natural Justice* and *Conscience*, and in the *Right*, the *Power* and *Fear* of *God Almighty*. Not that I deny but that there is need of *Force* and *Fear* too to constrain those to *Obedience*, to whom the *Conscience of Duty* proves ineffectual: but then I say, that the *Fear* of the *Civil Sovereign's* own *Sword* alone is not sufficient for this neither; it must be assisted by *Religion*, and the *Fear* of an invisible Being *Omnipotent*, who seeth all things, and can punish secret as well as open *Transgressors* both in this *Life* and after *Death*. Wherefore we grant that the *Civil Sovereign* does indeed reign in the *Fear* of his own *Sword*, yet not in this *Fear* only, but at once in that of *God*; which tho it be justly greater than that of *Civil Sovereigns*, yet is no way opposite, but subordinate to, and therefore very well consistent with it. So that hereby

* ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρχαία.

at last the Atheist is hinder'd from clinching the Nail, and the main Inference he drives at is prevented; unless we suppose what in his Heart he would very fain be at, that there is no *Being* superior to *Men*, and by consequence no *God*. For tho I own, that indeed amongst *Men*, as the *Civil Sovereign* reigns partly in *Fear* of his own *Power*, it is therefore his *Interest*, that there be no greater *Fear* than that of himself, inasmuch as this would not be consistent with his *Safety* on the *Throne*; because this would suppose another *human Power* greater than his own: and where there is *Power*, *Ambition* seldom fails to put it in execution, and so to dismount and conquer that *Power*, which is less. But in reference to *God* the case is far otherwise; for altho the *Fear* of him be, I say, justly greater than that of *Civil Sovereigns*, yet is it in no wise repugnant to it, but carries on the same *Interest* and *Purpose*: nay, it is a yet higher ground of *Civil Subjection* than their own separate *Power* can be, and gives it a yet stronger *Enforcement*, and makes way for a hearty and sincere *Observance* of those *Political Vertues*, *Justice*, *Kindness*, &c. without which neither *Princes* could rule nor *Subjects* obey as they ought. To which purpose *Tully* well observes, "I know not, says he, "but that upon taking away *Religion* and *Piety* towards the *Gods*, all *Faith* and *Society* of human Kind, and even the most excellent *Vertue* of *Justice* must be banish'd the *World*. This is a thing so confessedly true, that *Atheists* have therefore pretended *Religion* to be at first a mere *Political Figment*, a subtle *Contrivance* of *Men* for the better *Support* of *Communitys* and *States*; and could *Civil Sovereigns* demolish and destroy *Conscience* and *Religion* in the *Minds* of *Men* (which is an absolute *Impossibility*) yet thinking hereby

hereby to make room for themselves, they would certainly bury themselves in the ruins. Wherefore, let the Atheist pretend what he will, as *Princes* cannot usurp such a Power as is independent on that of God, let 'em not be so weakly ambitious, as to be flatter'd and sooth'd into a fancy that they may; lest rashly attempting to aggrandize, they *lay all their Honour in the dust*: but as they regard their own Security, let 'em be content to be *second* to the Almighty, to reign in Justice and in the Fear of God, laying this up as a most certain Truth, that it is by him *Kings* reign in safety, and that because God is in the first place fear'd, the King is the rather honour'd. In this sense I understand Religion or the Fear of God to be the *Basis* and *Bond* of human Society: I do not say, this or that particular Scheme of religious Principles; but in general the *Apprehension* of God, &c. and of mens *Obligation* to him.

And therefore I can't but take notice of an *Equivocation* to this purpose in a * late Writer; who having laid down this general Position, "That Religion is not the Basis upon which *Civil Government* is founded, nor indeed the *Bond* or *Cement* that unites and conjoins men in *Society*; endeavours to prove this *Universal* by a particular Instance, saying, "That there are now Governments, where there is no *reveal'd* Religion acknowledg'd by publick Authority. Who denies this? Yet never, I add, was there any regular Government without some *Religion*, at least *natural*, tho not *reveal'd*; nor any Government so regular, as where there is most of it; particularly in the more civiliz'd Heathen Countrys,

* The Author of Civil Polity, p. 104, 105.

and especially where Christianity flourishes. Again he tells us, " That Men in their Politicks do not seem to regard it. Which Saying is also ambiguous: and by it if he means, that Politicians themselves have not much Religion, or have not a particular eye to it in every step of their Conduct, this I don't deny, nor does it any way make against my purpose: but if he means, that in the general Scope of their Administration they do not presuppose it in the People, and build upon it, this is what I do deny; and were it not for this stable Foundation, their Politicks would soon dwindle into nothing, and Governments fall into ruin and confusion. Lastly he tells us, " That Religion proposes only future Rewards, and therefore can't be a Foundation of Civil Polity, whose principal End is the Security and Preservation of mens Lives and Properties. The first of which Premises, and also the Consequence from it are false: The Premise is so, because Religion proposes to its Votarys as well the good things of this Life as of that which is to come, and in a natural way does best of all provide for the Security and Preservation of our Lives and Propertys, by those Vertues which it teaches, namely Prudence, Justice, Love, &c. which carry along with 'em their certain Rewards: also the Consequence is false, because granting that Religion proposes only future Rewards, and withal that the principal End of Civil Polity is the Security and Preservation of mens Lives and Propertys; yet does it not hence follow that Religion is not still a ground of Civil Polity: for tho the more vicious part of the World have not an eye to *Futurity*, and therefore to prevent their Exorbitance human Laws do make some provision by *temporal* Threats and Punishments, yet is there in the generality of Men a natural

natural sense of Immortality, so that they can't but look further, and steer their course in the Path of Justice, and refrain from invading their Neighbour's *Right*, because of the Fear of God, and in view of *eternal* Rewards and Punishments; and were it not for this Apprehension of an invisible Judg and this Anticipation of Eternity, the secular Arm would soon find it self too short, and never could we be secure of our *Lives* and *Propertys*, when Temptation offer'd to take them from us, especially if back'd with Secrecy and Safety from temporal Infliction, as it might too often happen.

Thus I have fully answer'd the Atheist's first Pretence, that it is the *Interest* of *Civil Sovereigns* that the Belief of a God, &c. should not be entertain'd. I now proceed to the second, in that he says, that *Sovereignty is essentially infinite*, and therefore altogether inconsistent with *Religion*, which would limit and confine it. To which I answer, that the Right and Authority of *Civil Sovereigns* is not, as the Atheistick Politicians ignorantly fancy, a mere *belluine Liberty*; but it is a Right, as we have before declar'd, essentially founded in the being of *natural Justice*. For Authority of commanding is such a *Right*, as supposes Obligation in others to obey, without which it could be nothing but mere *Will* and *Force*. Now none can be oblig'd in duty to *obey* but by *natural Justice*, *Commands* as such not creating Obligation, but presupposing it; so that if Persons were not before oblig'd to obey, no *Commands* would signify any thing to them: and therefore the first original Obligation is not from *Will*, but *Nature*. Now again I say, that there can be no more *infinite Justice*, nor by consequence *infinite Authority*, than there can be *infinite Rule* or an *infinite Measure*:

Measure : *Justice* is essentially a determinate thing, and therefore can there not be any *infinite Jus*, Right or Authority. For in short, if there be any thing in its own nature *just* and *obliging*, or such as *ought to be done*, then must there of necessity be something *unjust* or *unlawful*, which therefore cannot be obligingly commanded*; and thus does all Authority appear to be limited. And now I have done with the Atheist's second Pretence for the Inconsistency of *Religion* with *Civil Sovereignty*.

And so I go on to the third and last, That *private Judgment of Good and Evil is contradictory to Civil Sovereignty and a Body Politick, this being one artificial Man, that must be all govern'd by one Reason and Will*: But now Conscience, which is introduc'd by the Belief of a God and the Sense of *Religion*, is private Judgment of *Good and Evil, Lawful and Unlawful, &c.* To which I answer, that it is not *Religion*, but on the contrary the Principles of the Atheistick Politicians, that unavoidably introduce private Judgment of Good and Evil, such as is absolutely inconsistent with *Civil Sovereignty*; there being, according to them, nothing in nature of a *publick or common Good*, nothing of *Duty or Obligation*, but all private Appetite and Utility; of which also every man is Judge for himself. For if this were so, then whenever any man judg'd it to be most for his private Advantage or for the Preservation of his Life to disobey Laws, rebel against Sovereigns, nay to poison or stab'em, he would be unquestionably bound by Nature and the reason of his own Good, as the highest Law, to do the same. Nor indeed can this *private Judgment* of men, according to their *Appetite and Utility*, be otherwise taken away, than by *natural*

* More to this purpose may be seen in Cudw. Int. Syst. p. 896, 897, &c.

Justice, which is a thing not of a *private*, but of a *publick* and *common nature*; and by *Conscience*, which obligeth to obey all the lawful Commands of *Civil Sovereigns*, tho contrary to mens *Appetite* and *private Interest*. So that *Conscience* also is in it self not of a *private* and *partial*, but of a *publick* and *common nature*, it respecting Divine Laws, impartial *Justice* and *Equity*, and the Good of the Whole, when clashing with our own *selfish Good*; and thus confociating Mankind together, and laying a Foundation for *Bodys Politick*. It is true indeed, that particular Persons must make a *Judgment* in *Conscience* for themselves (a *publick Conscience* being nonsense and ridiculous) and that they may also err therein; yet neither is the *Rule*, by which *Conscience* judgeth, *private*, nor it self *unaccountable*, unless in some mistaken Fanaticks, as professedly following *private Impulses*: but either the *natural* and *eternal* Laws of God, or else his *reveal'd Will*, things more *publick* than the *civil Laws* of any Country, and of which others also may judg. And when evil Persons, as sometimes we own they do, make a pretence of *Conscience* and *Religion* in order to *Sedition* and *Rebellion*, as indeed the best things may be abus'd; this is not the fault of *Religion*, but only of the *Men*; *Conscience* obliging, tho first to obey God, yet in subordination to him, the Laws of *civil Sovereigns* also. To conclude, *Religion* and *Conscience* oblige Subjects *actively* to obey all the lawful Commands of *civil Sovereigns* or *legislative Powers*, tho contrary to their private *Appetite* and *Interest*: and even when these same *Sovereign Legislative Powers* command *unlawful* things, *Conscience*, tho it here obliges to obey God rather than Men, yet does still oblige * *not to resist*.

† See Rom. 13. & Mat. 26.

And thus does Religion give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.


And now, as I think, having fully confuted the Atheist's Objections against a God and a Providence, and by the way consider'd many Topicks, which do *directly* prove the one and the other, we conclude with full Assurance, that there is one only *necessary Being*, the Cause of all other things; and this an absolutely perfect, infinitely good, most wise and powerful GOD; who has made all that was fit to be made, and that according to the best Wisdom, and displays an exact Providence over all: whose Name ought to be hallow'd, and separated from all other things; and to whom be therefore given all Honor, Glory and Worship, for ever and ever. *Amen.*

T H E E N D.

The principal Errata which I could observe in running over the Sheets, are thus to be corrected.

IN the Introduction. Page 1. at bottom, read *επαμυνέων*. P. 8. l. 11. dele full. P. 33. l. 4. r. of their Essences. P. 76. l. 11. dele in. P. 102, 103. l. 27. r. *Aginnensis*.
 In the Treatise it self. P. 8. l. 7. r. *nor go*. P. 16. l. 2. r. *or*. P. 27. l. 9. instead of a Period a Semicolon; *ib.* l. 13. instead of a Period a Colon. P. 34. l. ult. after *World*, r. *even some of these holding either*. P. 47. l. 7. r. *Arguments*. P. 54. l. 21. r. *strange*. P. 55. l. 1. for *but further*, r. *for again*. *Ib.* l. 9. dele *different*. P. 56. l. 18. r. *Diogenes Apolloniates*. P. 57. l. 19. for *do*, r. *does indeed*. P. 71. l. 6. r. *Stoical and Stratonical*. P. 76. l. 19. for *in the Close of this whole*, r. *in the Sequel of this*. *Ib.* l. 25. for *but*, r. *and*. P. 103. l. 4. for *neither*, r. *either*. *Ib.* l. 5. dele *is*. P. 110. l. 30. for *Atheists*, r. *Theists*. P. 112. l. 3. r. *then*. *Ib.* l. 6. put for a Period a Comma. P. 115. l. 9. r. *Anaxagoreans*. P. 131. l. 8. r. *Psychogonia*. P. 152. l. 23. dele *but*. P. 163. l. 9. dele *made*. P. 164. l. 17. dele *differ*. P. 171. l. 26. r. *Air*. P. 172. l. 24. r. *O Jupiter, O King give us, &c.* P. 180. l. 12. r. *declares*. l. 13. dele *says he*. P. 190. l. 3. for *produc'd*, r. *cited*. P. 197. l. 2. for *him*, r. *it*. P. 199. l. 27. r. *Jamblichus*. P. 201. l. 21. for *his*, r. *its*. P. 205. at bottom r. *ἀνάσσει*. P. 222. l. 3. at bottom r. *πλάσσει*. P. 238. l. 2. r. *requiredst*. *Ib.* l. 9. after *of*, r. *reading*. P. 239. at bottom, l. 2. r. *ποιεῖν*. P. 258. at bottom, l. 2. r. *עולת חמיר*. P. 260. at bot. r. *ἐσεβάζησαν*. P. 276. l. 21, 26, 28. and P. 277. l. 4. r. *Venuses*. P. 301. l. 22. f. *three*, r. *two*. P. 316. after *it*, dele l. 5, 6, 7, 8. to *it*. P. 281. l. 1. r. *which with*. P. 294. l. 25. after *yet*, r. *as*. P. 332. l. 13. after *Hypostases*, r. *in the Godhead*. P. 371. l. 23. f. *supposing*, r. *suppose*. P. 372. at bot. r. *pulchros*. P. 379. l. 17. dele *but*. P. 395. l. 7. at bot. r. *Naturam*. P. 409. l. 4. r. *have only betray'd*. P. 442. l. 1. f. *are*, r. *is*. P. 447. l. 15. before *only*, r. *made*. P. 469. l. 30. after *Tide*, r. *of right Belief*. P. 480. l. 9. after *God*, for a Period, r. a Semicolon. P. 492. l. 5. f. *But*, r. *However*. P. 520. l. ult. r. *in that it would bring*. P. 533. l. 18. dele *it self and also*. P. 539. l. 7. f. *assert*, r. *deny*. *Ib.* l. ult. f. *Sense*, r. *Force*. P. 540. l. 15. f. *no*, r. *any*. P. 562. at bot. r. *ἀσωμάτοισιν*. P. 568. l. 9. f. *so then*, r. *and so*. *Ib.* at bot. r. *ἔπει*. P. 575. l. 3. at bot. r. *συμφυῖς*. P. 589. l. penult. r. *natural*. P. 594. l. 24. dele *that*. *Ib.* l. 28. r. *shewing 'em not, &c.* P. 644. l. 22. r. *it is*. P. 649. l. 13. dele *or none*. P. 678. l. 21. f. *perfect*, r. *happy*. *Ib.* l. 23. f. *knowing*, r. *happy*. P. 684. l. 4. f. *Perception*, r. *Reception*. P. 720. l. 26. dele *past*. P. 728. l. 20. r. *they in effect*. P. 736. l. 4. f. *Goodness*, r. *Wisdom*. *Ib.* l. 16. f. *their*, r. *his*. P. 741. l. 26. f. *its*, r. *our*. P. 746. l. 27. r. *Selius*. Besides these, some other literal Mistakes, and wrong Pointings here and there of the Greek, the Candid Reader is desir'd to excuse.









Cudworth, Ralph,

An Abridgment Of Dr. Cudworth's True Intellectual System of the Universe,
In which all the Arguments for and against Atheism are clearly stated and
examined To which is prefix'd, An Examination of what that learned Person
advanc'd touching the Doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, and the Resurrection
Bd.: 2

London (1732)

4 Ph.sp. 41-2

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10008135-7